↪VagabondSpectre
For me, Noam is a puny ant, he hasn't even come under my radar, that's how (un)important he is — Agustino

To each their own, but he certainly has a mighty high reputation in many circles. I like a lot o what he has to say.

but he certainly has a mighty high reputation in many circles — VagabondSpectre

In modern academic and popular culture circles, and I swim in none of those.

Best to stick to the little pond!

Best to stick to the little pond! — John

? >:O What's this supposed to mean?

I think therefore I am ... Descartes could even have said I shit therefore I am, for pretty much any other activity that he would put in there apart from thinking would entail being... obviously *facepalm* >:O

Locke – Lockean substance is the thing-in-itself, reduction of traditional metaphysical categories to epistemological categories of man, project of dissection of the human mind to discover the conditions of the possibility of knowledge

Descartes – synthetic unity of apperception

Berkeley – ideality of space and time (Kant renounces Berkeley explicitly but ends up adopting his position almost exactly – he does apriorize them, but this is a rhetorical move to salvage metaphysics, not one that's argued for)

Hume – 'destruction of metaphysics,' analytic-synthetic distinction

Daniel 'we are all zombies' Dennett.

His claims are debunked here and here.

ideality of space and time — The Great Whatever

In what sense are space and time ideal if they are not a priori? It seems to me that it is necessary to a priorize them à la Kant to prove them to be ideal...

Ideal, meaning not independent of their perception. What is perceptual doesn't need to be a priori.

Ideal, meaning not independent of their perception. What is perceptual doesn't need to be a priori. — The Great Whatever

But space isn't perceptual - you don't perceive space, you perceive objects in space.

I'm not sure I committed myself to claiming you perceive space, but the contention is purely verbal: to perceive objects in their spatial relations is to perceive space in some trivial sense, which is all that's needed (and probably all that can be made intelligible).

The point was just that something being ideal, in the sense Kant uses the term, is not for it to be a priori. Or is this the distinction you don't understand? Ideality in Kant is opposed to reality, not to a posteriority.

The point was just that something being ideal, even in the sense Kant uses the term, is not for it to be a priori. — The Great Whatever

:-} Yes obviously. Nowhere did I claim that. For something perceived to be ideal doesn't require it to be a priori - and space isn't perceived - things are perceived in space. So it could very well be that the objects and perceptions given in space are ideal, but not space itself. So I'd say that for something non-perceptual to be ideal does require it in some sense to be a priori - hence why space and time are called transcendentally ideal.

The point is, whether you like it or not, that Kant's a priority of space, time, causality, etc. was an original stroke of genius, and I'm not a big fan of Kant either.

The point was just that something being ideal, even in the sense Kant uses the term, is not for it to be a priori. — The Great Whatever

Yes obviously. Nowhere did I claim that. For something perceived to be ideal doesn't require it to be a priori — Agustino

In what sense are space and time ideal if they are not a priori? It seems to me that it is necessary to a priorize them à la Kant to prove them to be ideal... — Agustino

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So I'd say that for something non-perceptual to be ideal does require it in some sense to be a priori - hence why space and time are called transcendentally ideal. — Agustino

It's misleading to call space and time 'non-perceptual' in Kant's sense, because although they aren't objects of perception, they are conditions of perception, and so in this sense are not independent of perception (are not transcendentally real), which is precisely what Kant's point is.

But Kant didn't invent the aprioricity of time, space and causality. These are old rationalist notions.

My point is we tend to be ahistorical in discussing individual thinkers, because as single people we just don't read very much, so we don't understand that individual thinkers are not as original as they seem to be when read in isolation.

In fact, to understand Kant, you must understand that it was the attempt to empiricize especially causality that he was reacting against. Again, situate it in history.

It's misleading to call space and time 'non-perceptual' in Kant's sense, because although they aren't objects of perception, they are conditions of perception, and so in this sense are not independent of perception (are not transcendentally real), which is precisely what Kant's point is. — The Great Whatever

Conditions of perception are not themselves perceived - the eye does not see itself. Therefore, you can say that objects of perception are ideal - which is what Berkeley does - but to make the claim that space, time etc. are ideal requires making them a priori.

But Kant didn't invent the aprioricity of time, space and causality. These are old rationalist notions. — The Great Whatever

Who held them before Kant?

My point is we tend to be ahistorical in discussing individual thinkers, because as single people we just don't read very much, so we don't understand that individual thinkers are not as original as they seem to be when read in isolation. — The Great Whatever

Well of course most of a thinker's ideas aren't original, even if he is a great thinker, like Kant or Schopenhauer - however, some of them are original insights. It would be strange to say that there are no original insights, and everything has already been thought before.

In fact, to understand Kant, you must understand that it was the attempt to empiricize especially causality that he was reacting against. Again, situate it in history. — The Great Whatever

Sure he was reacting against Hume's skepticism of causality, I'm already well aware of that.

Conditions of perception are not themselves perceived - the eye does not see itself. Therefore, you can say that objects of perception are ideal - which is what Berkeley does - but to make the claim that space, time etc. are ideal requires making them a priori. — Agustino

This strikes me as a verbal dispute. By 'not beyond perception' I did not intend to limit myself to 'objects of perception.' Though there seems to be no good reason to me to believe space isn't an object of perception.

And of course, the eye does see itself.

Who held them before Kant? — Agustino

Pretty much every rationalist philosopher prior to Malebranche and Leibniz and so on.

Well of course most of a thinker's ideas aren't original, even if he is a great thinker, like Kant or Schopenhauer - however, some of them are original insights. It would be strange to say that there are no original insights, and everything has already been thought before. — Agustino

It's not that I think everything has been thought before, it's just that in its milieu no purportedly original insights look very impressive. Their impressiveness is a function of ignorance of the surrounding historical context.

Sure he was reacting against Hume's skepticism of causality, I'm already well aware of that. — Agustino

But consider: how could Hume have been making a stride for Kant to react against, if prior to Kant, everyone had already thought causation was empirical (Hume's position)? Kant was trying to salvage an older position that Hume was attacking. If Hume had not been attacking it, no one would have thought Hume was making any point at all. Yet he could not have been attacking it, if there were nothing to attack.

Though there seems to be no good reason to me to believe space isn't an object of perception. — The Great Whatever

Objects of perception are given in space. Space is a precondition of perception, and therefore cannot itself be perceived. You cannot hold space, touch space, etc.

And of course, the eye does see itself. — The Great Whatever

Yeah maybe if you're looking in a mirror.

Pretty much every rationalist philosopher prior to Malebranche and Leibniz and so on. — The Great Whatever

I am unaware that they held them, if you have evidence of this please cite it.

It's not that I think everything has been thought before, it's just that in its milieu no purportedly original insights look very impressive. Their impressiveness is a function of ignorance of the surrounding historical context. — The Great Whatever

Insight has to do with how one solves a problem provided by his context. It can be impressive if the way the problem is solved is spectacular, as in Kant's case with regards to causality.

But consider: how could Hume have been making a stride for Kant to react against, if prior to Kant, everyone had already thought causation was empirical (Hume's position)? — The Great Whatever

No they didn't think everything was empirical, quite obviously. But neither did they think that causality was a precondition of any experience at all... that's Kant's original insight. And in fact, Hume's criticisms would have been irrelevant if philosophers had already thought of causality as a precondition to any and all experience - so Hume was certainly not acting against that position.

Kant was trying to salvage an older position that Hume was attacking. — The Great Whatever

Yes that's true. So what? The way he salvaged it is genius - that is original.

Objects of perception are given in space. Space is a precondition of perception, and therefore cannot itself be perceived. You cannot hold space, touch space, etc. — Agustino

That is a (highly specific) philosophical position, not an ordinary uncontroversial fact.

Yeah maybe if you're looking in a mirror. — Agustino

Yes. Yes, that's what I meant.

I am unaware that they held them, if you have evidence of this please cite it. — Agustino

There are literally too many examples to cite. But you can start with the Stoics – I'm no expert on this, but they believed that the necessity of causation was a necessary precondition for the rational intelligibility of the world (and therefore for its existence, since reality is inherently intelligible). Kant makes the same move: it is necessary for causation to be to literally hold the world together. He is slightly different in saying that this is more or less the same as holding experience together.

Insight has to do with how one solves a problem provided by his context. It can be impressive if the way the problem is solved is spectacular, as in Kant's case with regards to causality. — Agustino

"By means of a faculty?"

No they didn't think everything was empirical, quite obviously. But neither did they think that causality was a precondition of any experience at all... that's Kant's original insight. — Agustino

OK, I see. I think maybe this is debatable, but the rationalist position has always been that causality is a prior necessary to hold the world together, as its precondition. Kant is doing the same thing, he just thinks the (empirical) world is in your head, something Berkeley already thought. So if you like he's resuscitating the rationalist position contra Hume to make it compatible with Berkeley. That is an innovation of a sort, but not quite the one that's attributed to him.

But you can start with the Stoics – I'm no expert on this, but they believed that the necessity of causation was a necessary precondition for the rational intelligibility of the world (and therefore for its existence, since reality is inherently intelligible) — The Great Whatever

Ok so on this view, causality is associated with the intelligibility of the world, not with its possibility - the world could possibly not be intelligible, and indeed that is a different statement from that mentioned before, and requiring separate proof. Under Kant, the world simply cannot but be intelligible, since all experience is so structured.

"By means of a faculty?" — The Great Whatever

Yes >:) just like opium causes sleep because it has sleep inducing properties

I think maybe this is debatable, but the rationalist position has always been that causality is a prior necessary to hold the world together, as its precondition — The Great Whatever

No... the rationalist position has been that causality is required to make the world intelligible - no rationalist held it that causality was required to be able to make the world possible - it was only with regards to the world's intelligibility that this was under discussion. So if they were wrong about the world's intelligibility, then obviously they could be wrong about causality. Causality wasn't certain in other words, which is exactly what Hume attacked. But Kant showed that they can't be wrong about causality, and showed why the world is necessarily intelligible - because it is structured, a priori to experience, by space, time and causality. This is a significant achievement, because it makes the question "is the world intelligible" redundant.

Descartes – synthetic unity of apperception — The Great Whatever

Can you please provide me with a citation for this? Has René shown that there is an unexperienced synthesis of self and world that occurs prior to experience and indeed makes experience itself possible?

the world could possibly not be intelligible — Agustino

I think a classical rationalist would deny this.

But Kant showed that they can't be wrong about causality, and showed why the world is necessarily intelligible - because it is structured, a priori to experience, by space, time and causality. This is a significant achievement, because it makes the question "is the world intelligible" redundant. — Agustino

In fact Kant didn't show that – he postulated it, but there's nothing to show that the way our faculties happen to be are necessary – it's only that given that we have faculties that enforce necessities within them, such necessities obtain – well, within them.

With regard to whether our faculties could be different, or if it's necessary that they function in such a way, his claim was that to know this, or to even raise it as a question that we can answer, is impossible. So there is a deeper contingency to Kant's system, even if you take his positing of such faculties as justified.

I had in mind his response to Hobbes (I think it was) when he claimed that the cogito wasn't a syllogism as such, but a sort of bootstrapping intuition on which allowed one to conclude that any thought that was had must be 'my' thought (which is the unity of apperception).

I think a classical rationalist would deny this. — The Great Whatever

Yes he would obviously deny it, but he would have to provide additional argument for it. That's what it means when something isn't certain. Kant created a framework in which this was certain.

In fact Kant didn't show that – he postulated it, but there's nothing to show that the way our faculties happen to be are necessary – it's only that given that we have faculties that enforce necessities within them, such necessities obtain – well, within them. — The Great Whatever

I think his analysis of experience shows that experience - as we find ourselves experiencing - necessarily will follow those necessities - we cannot even imagine it being otherwise. But of course, it could be possible.

So there is a deeper contingency to Kant's system, even if you take his positing of such faculties as justified. — The Great Whatever

I tend to agree with this. The contingency was well noted afterwards with the advent of modern physics. Our synthetic judgements, while a priori, aren't necessary. This may sound shocking but it basically means that we're in all cases, a priori, having a form of say space, imposed on our experience, but how we conceive of this space (Euclidean, non-Euclidean, etc.) can be different, and indeed can change. What cannot change is that we must have some sort of conception - ie space is an a priori form of experience. It's the necessity of a particular conception which vanishes.

I had in mind his response to Hobbes (I think it was) when he claimed that the cogito wasn't a syllogism as such, but a sort of bootstrapping intuition on which allowed one to conclude that any thought that was had must be 'my' thought (which is the unity of apperception). — The Great Whatever

I don't know who it was addressed to, but I do remember reading about Descartes not taking the cogito as a syllogism but rather as an intuition. Fine. So how does this show that "any thought that was had must be 'my' thought (which is the unity of apperception)"? How is 'any thought that was had being "my" thought' equivalent to:

an unexperienced synthesis of self and world that occurs prior to experience and indeed makes experience itself possible — Agustino

:s

I think his analysis of experience shows that experience - as we find ourselves experiencing - necessarily will follow those necessities - we cannot even imagine it being otherwise. But of course, it could be possible. — Agustino

As we find ourselves experiencing – but this 'finding ourselves' – the faculties we happen to have, for no discernible reason, are still potentially contingent, and Kant admits we can't even sensibly answer questions about what things would be like otherwise. This doesn't mean that he's showed such a necessity, only that he is committed to claiming we can't answer (or possibly even understand) certain questions.

Note that it's always necessary that given something is the way it actually is, it actually is that way.

an unexperienced synthesis of self and world that occurs prior to experience and indeed makes experience itself possible — Agustino

Are you wording this from the text itself? My memory of the unity of apperception has to do with the fact that it's only intelligible to have a thought insofar as one can at least in principle intuit that it is 'mine.' This is roughly the move made in the cogito as Descartes qualifies it.

A polysemous rejoinder I will leave you to ponder...or not..I don't want to take the fun out of it.
;)

Descartes was an idiot — Agustino

Especially compared to all the geniuses on PF.

Kant responded to, and bettered, all of their work. And why? Because unlike them, he deeply analysed the processes of reason, knowedge, and thinking itself.

Before Kant, philosophers wanted to arrive at irrevocable truths of nature, either through intuition and reason (rationalism) or empiricism (perception). Descartes wants to prove that the foundation of knowledge is grounded in certain knowledge of one's own existence and the 'clear and distinct' ideas of mathematics, Locke and Hume that it comes from experience alone.

What Kant did was ask a different question. He didn’t ask “what is reality?”; he asked a much more profound question. What are the conditions by which I know the world, or what is good, or what is beautiful? Kant wanted to know how the human mind and cognitive structure was such that we know anything at all. And many of Kant's basic insights still stand; there are still Kantian philosophers of science, Kantian cognitive science, and so on.

Kant renounces Berkeley explicitly but ends up adopting his position almost exactly. — The Great Whatever

He differentiated his view from Berkeley in a lengthy argument in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the 'Refutation of Idealism'.

A polysemous rejoinder I will leave you to ponder...or not..I don't want to take the fun out of it. — John

Well I certainly prefer the smaller pond of reason, than the larger pond of bondage to lust, greed, etc. if that's what you mean :P

Because unlike them, he deeply analysed the processes of reason, knowedge, and thinking itself. — Wayfarer

It's laughable to claim that philosophers before Kant didn't 'deeply analyze the processes of reason...' etc. 'Unlike them?' I'm sorry, this is just totally ludicrous. This is the kind of ahistorical nonsense I'm talking about.

What are the conditions by which I know the world, or what is good, or what is beautiful? — Wayfarer

Again, epistemology is ancient.

He differentiated his view from Berkeley in a lengthy argument in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the 'Refutation of Idealism'. — Wayfarer

Yeah, I'm aware of the refutation. But it's not a refutation of Berkeley, even if Kant thought he was.