The reason Socrates conceals his true beliefs about the gods is because he wishes to avoid persecution by the city. This is the source of his irony. He wants that his hearers believe he believes as they do, while subtly expressing doubt through his questioning, to elicit those of his audience who might rise above the conventional opinion of the citizenry. — Leghorn

I do think Socrates works laterally in many exchanges to question a convention rather than declare something wrong outright. I am not sure of how cleanly the boundary between the realm of the city from the pursuit of philosophy is drawn. I don't think Socrates is hiding anything or avoiding persecution when he explains why he won't go into exile:

Or is your wisdom such that you do not see that your country is more precious and more to be revered and is holier and in higher esteem [51b] among the gods and among men of understanding than your mother and your father and all your ancestors, and that you ought to show to her more reverence and obedience and humility when she is angry than to your father, and ought either to convince her by persuasion or to do whatever she commands, and to suffer, if she commands you to suffer, in silence, and if she orders you to be scourged or imprisoned or if she leads you to war to be wounded or slain, her will is to be done, and this is right, and you must not give way or draw back or leave your post, but in war and in court and everywhere, [51c] you must do whatever the state, your country, commands, or must show her by persuasion what is really right, but that it is impious to use violence against either your father or your mother, and much more impious to use it against your country?” What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not? — Plato, Crito, 51a, translated by Harold North Fowler

The view of the city during attempts to persuade her of "what is really right" is different from attempts to see the city as itself. The staging of the Republic as taking place outside of Athens seems to point toward a tension between the two places but not that one cancels the other.

I don't think Socrates is hiding anything or avoiding persecution when he explains why he won't go into exile: — Valentinus

He is certainly not avoiding persecution by not going into exile, which would have been a way of avoiding it. But can we say Socrates is not hiding something? Consider to whom he speaks here, Crito, the sort of man devoted to his country and its laws, certainly not a philosopher:

What shall we reply to this, Crito, that the laws speak the truth, or not? — Plato, Crito, 51a, translated by Harold North Fowler

To such a one he cannot say, “Look, I love to question young men about their notions of justice and courage and moderation and the like—I’ve been doing it all my life, and it has been all I lived to do. But I’ve lived here in Athens all my life, and I’m an old man now, on the threshold of Hades: what great addition of my peculiar pleasure to a long life lived so pleasurably could I expect to get in exile?

“On the other hand, by displaying devotion to my country and its laws, I might gain favor in the eyes of posterity, and my life might be immortalized in the writings of one of my disciples, as Achilles’ was in Homer’s, thereby bestowing on me the only true immortality a man can have: the sort he can’t enjoy—and perhaps even helping philosophy survive by making it more palatable to aristocratic youth, the sort most likely to influence the regime’s opinions.”

Socrates knows full well that the laws don’t speak the truth!—but this appeal will work with a man like Crito.

The view of the city during attempts to persuade her of "what is really right" is different from attempts to see the city as itself. — Valentinus

But it was Socrates’ direct experience of Athens being wrong that undoubtedly taught him first-hand about the irrationality of the polis. I refer to the putting to death of the generals after the naval battle at Arginusae. Socrates’ vote was the only one in the council acquitting the generals. He alone, free of the theocratic terror that gripped the other councilmen, realized that more lives would have been lost by attempting to recover the bodies, that it is sometimes impractical to assuage the gods...

...more importantly he learned that, according to the polis, you must always assuage the gods.

He is certainly not avoiding persecution by not going into exile, which would have been a way of avoiding it. But can we say Socrates is not hiding something? — Leghorn

That's the big question. If he is hiding something, what exactly is it that he is hiding?

And, if he is not afraid of prosecution, why hide anything?

On the one hand, with justice understood as minding your own business, the just city protects the self-interests of the philosopher. — Fooloso4

The city doesn’t protect the interests of the philosopher, whether it be just or unjust. Leaving aside the latter, even in Plato’s Republic, the ideal and just city, the philosophers are not allowed freedom as private men, “minding their own business” to pursue “the things under the earth and in the heavens”, but must be dragged back into the darkness of the cave to rule a merely temporal entity. Does that sound to you like a true philosopher’s business?

On the other, although the city may be hostile to philosophy, the philosopher is not hostile to the city. — Fooloso4

The city is hostile to the philosopher precisely because the philosopher is hostile to the city—not in the way of ordinary lawbreakers, but implicitly, by calling the city’s dearest beliefs into question.

It is characteristic of modern thought that there must be a solution to every problem. Socrates and Plato knew much better: there are inherent problems we can ameliorate—but never eradicate...and some of these are imbedded in the nature of mankind. One of these is the tension b/w the philosopher and civil society: you can accommodate, but never entirely reconcile the two.

The response to this tension is what characterizes and explains the history of Western philosophy. The difference b/w ancient and modern philosophy is the difference b/w persuading aristocrats to accept philosophy, and forcing rulers to so do, and what made this difference was the advent of what we now call technology: modern philosophy, armed with the new practical science that not only explains all natural phenomena, but, more importantly, uses that knowledge to benefit mankind at large, could appeal to the hoi polloi above the heads of the nobles and tyrants and force the latter to leave science alone to pursue its objects in peace—

—except now an entirely different relationship b/w philosopher and civil society had come into being: the philosopher was a benefactor of mankind—just as he is in Plato’s Republic: as ruler! In The Republic he is forced to rule; in the modern dispensation, he chooses to. Swift’s Flying Island is conceived of, and nuclear weapons fall into the hands of both Roosevelt and Khrushchev...

...there was a time when an Archimedes, out of disdain for their practicality, destroyed the manuscripts of his that described the engines of war he fashioned in Syracuse to repel the invading Roman army. This was proof of his disinterested philosophical nature. Now, as I suppose, a scientist’s papers would receive short shrift unless they benefitted man through potential application of technology. This fact, I say, compromises the purity of the philosopher’s natural quest, what he was born to do: is he a benefactor of mankind, or a seeker of the truth? Are these two separate goals reconcilable?

He is certainly not avoiding persecution by not going into exile, which would have been a way of avoiding it. But can we say Socrates is not hiding something?
— Leghorn

That's the big question. If he is hiding something, what exactly is it that he is hiding?

And, if he is not afraid of prosecution, why hide anything? — Apollodorus

Viewing him as a martyr makes sense of his trial and death sentence.

Viewing him as a martyr makes sense of his trial and death sentence. — baker

Sure. The question remains, though, what exactly is he hiding? And if he is hiding things, how can we rely on what he is saying?

There are numerous instances in the dialogues where he appears to be praying, or is supposed to attend the worship of some deity or other. Is he pretending or being ironic in all cases?

I went down yesterday to the Peiraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions to the Goddess, and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration (Rep. 327a)

The problem appears to be the same as with some other religious martyrs.
If someone is so sure that things are exactly as they should be and that nothing happens without God's will -- then what exactly is going on??

The problem appears to be the same as with some other religious martyrs.
If someone is so sure that things are exactly as they should be and that nothing happens without God's will -- then what exactly is going on?? — baker

Good point. However, some seem to believe that he was an anti-religious martyr, something like a "militant atheist" under a theocratic system.

Personally, I do not think this is supported by the careful examination of the evidence. The charge against Socrates was (1) politically motivated and (2) it was not that he was an atheist but that he disrespected the Athenian Gods and introduced "new deities".

This is consistent with the mainstream scholarly view that Plato introduces a new theology based on cosmic Gods such as the Sun as a substitute for the traditional Olympic Gods (Zeus, Hera, et al.), as admitted even by anti-Platonists like Strauss.

Socrates knows full well that the laws don’t speak the truth! — Leghorn

As I noted earlier, both Plato's Laws and Cicero's Laws, as opposed to their Republic which takes place in the light of the sun, take place in the shade. As Strauss says succinctly:

... We seek light, we seek knowledge; shade, we seek obscurity.

Why is obscurity necessary for the Laws and not for the Republic? The answer has something to do with the fact that the Republic is a city in speech, it is theoretical, but the Laws has to do with the founding of an actual city. This is related to the theologico-political problem. On the one hand, political action requires concealment. On the other, what might be called "legal theology" or theology enacted in the laws requires that it be shaded from the light of truth. Men are lawmakers but they make it appear as though the authority for what they do lies with the gods. Nomos in the sense of custom must be honored, but as law it attempts to stand above what is customary.

Euthyphro is a distorted image of the lawmaker. Piety is for him the measure of the law. Socrates, in praying to the gods, does what is customary. But Socrates' actions are guided by his views of the just, noble, and good not by piety.

... must be dragged back into the darkness of the cave to rule a merely temporal entity. Does that sound to you like a true philosopher’s business? — Leghorn

They still spend most of their time in philosophy and return to the cave out of necessity. (540b)

The city is hostile to the philosopher precisely because the philosopher is hostile to the city—not in the way of ordinary lawbreakers, but implicitly, by calling the city’s dearest beliefs into question. — Leghorn

If the philosopher does this for the benefit of the city is this still a hostile act or a benevolent one? But here Plato puts his thumb on the scale. In the Republic the philosopher is not one who inquires but one who knows what is best for the city. The philosopher in the Republic has knowledge of the good. But, of course, this is not a true image of the philosopher. Plato makes the philosopher appear to be more beneficial to the city than he might be. Were Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle hostile to the city? Did their activities cause more harm than good? Those who wished to conserve the old ways might think they did, but if the old is not the good then it is not so clear that what they did was not for the good of the city.

He is certainly not avoiding persecution by not going into exile, which would have been a way of avoiding it. But can we say Socrates is not hiding something? — Leghorn

I agree that Socrates is hiding many things, that was what I was referring to when saying the place where he tries to persuade is different from where he looks at that activity from the outside, as it were.

What I read to be sincere in the passage was how his devotion to the city gave him the right to criticize and attempt to change it. He suffers the cruelty and ignorance of the city and his acceptance gives him the right to confront its decisions and standards. In that sense, the city belongs to him to whatever extent the city claims he belongs to it.

This obligation to what brought him into the world sees filial duty and that of the citizen together in the Crito dialogue. In the Republic, the relationship between those elements is brought into question. Can it be said that the obligation itself has been surpassed?

Power is a problem only when it is misused. This is why it is important for all philosophers, beginners and experienced, to place themselves in the proper power context vis-a-vis one another.

This is why, traditionally, the cultivation of virtues is a preparatory stage to philosophy proper. — Apollodorus

Okay.

I do think Socrates works laterally in many exchanges to question a convention rather than declare something wrong outright. — Valentinus

Although the images are vertical - ascent, higher, the importance of lateral exchange should not be ignored. It is often a matter of a shift in focus or attention.

I am not sure of how cleanly the boundary between the realm of the city from the pursuit of philosophy is drawn. — Valentinus

This raises all sorts of questions. A distinction must be made between the philosopher in the Republic and actual philosophers. But this raises the question of who the philosopher is in distinction from those who call themselves or are called by others philosophers. Both actual philosophers and actual cities exist in the realm of opinion. The city regards itself as wise, but does not make the distinction between knowledge and opinion. The philosopher's knowledge of ignorance is not simply a matter of knowing he is ignorant but knowledge of what it means to think, choose, and acting in the face of his ignorance.

If the city is the cave and responsible for our opinions, is the city responsible for the philosopher? Or is philosophy something that arises contrary to the city? Is the education of the philosopher dependent on or independent of the city?

When reading Plato the problem of concealment stands together with the problem of interpretation. Someone lacking the ability to interpret is not even aware that there is anything concealed. They are content with what the see and may even vehemently deny that there is another other than plainly stated claims that they accept as true.

The problem is not that anyone can read what is written, but the author is not there to respond to misunderstandings and misrepresentations. In the Seventh Letter Plato says:

Therefore every man of worth, when dealing with matters of worth, will be far from exposing them to ill feeling and misunderstanding among men by committing them to writing.

It is not that there is some secret teaching hidden in the dialogues meant only for initiates into the mysteries. It is, rather, that there are matters that those too attached to their beliefs would be hostile to, things that are not understand by men who are not of worth and cannot deal with matters of worth.

But Plato did write, and it would be wrong to assume he did not say anything of worth in his writings. He devised ways of keeping things from readers who are not suited to read them while making them available to those capable of interpretation and following the arguments wherever they lead. So we find statements and claims that give the impression that he or Socrates thinks or believes one thing or another only to find that he says something else elsewhere in the same or another dialogue. Even the impression that is Plato or Socrates and the problem of whether it is one or the other or both is the result of an act of concealment.

The charge against Socrates was (1) politically motivated and (2) it was not that he was an atheist but that he disrespected the Athenian Gods and introduced "new deities". — Apollodorus

I reread the Apology not long ago, and if I remember correctly, during his trial, Socrates WAS charged with atheism...some of you who can retrieve the passage more quickly than I can at this late hour might help me out here.

As far as “politically motivated” goes, are you referring to “corrupting the youth”, the formal charge, or to something different? As far as I know, corrupting the youth in this context is really the same thing as teaching gods different from those of the city.

I reread the Apology not long ago, and if I remember correctly, during his trial, Socrates WAS charged with atheism...some of you who can retrieve the passage more quickly than I can at this late hour might help me out here. — Leghorn

Regarding the motivation of his accusers, Socrates says:

From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon, Meletus angered on account of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the public men (23e)

So, it appears that Anytus, Meletus and others had some grudge against him.

Regarding the charges against Socrates, "corrupting the youth" was one of them and "introducing new Gods" would amount to "corrupting the youth".

However, my comment referred to Socrates being taken to court for "making new Gods" and "not believing in the old ones" which seems different from "atheism" in the sense of "believing that there is no God"

In the Euthyphro Socrates says:

For he says I am a maker of gods; and because I make new gods and do not believe in the old ones, he indicted me for the sake of these old ones, as he says (3b)

And in the Apology:

Let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is about as follows: it states that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings (24b-c)

The issue is how do we reconcile Socrates' "making new Gods", "believing in new spiritual beings", and the various instances in the dialogues where he appears to be praying and/or worshiping some deity, with the view that he was an "atheist"?

However, my comment referred to Socrates being taken to court for "making new Gods" and "not believing in the old ones" which seems different from "atheism" in the sense of "believing that there is no God" — Apollodorus

Those were the two formal charges. But Meletus goes further: at 26c-d (Thomas G. West’s translation), Socrates asks him:

“...Or do you assert that I myself do not believe in gods at all and that I teach this to others?”

[MELETUS] This is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all.

[SOCRATES] Wondrous Meletus, why do you say this? Do I not even believe, then, that sun and moon are gods, as other human beings do?

[MELETUS] No, by Zeus, judges, since he declares that the sun is stone and the moon is earth.


Socrates then goes on to make fun of Meletus, “as if he were to say, ‘Socrates does injustice by not believing in gods, but believing in gods’”, for Meletus’ formal indictment was (24b), “Socrates does injustice by corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other daimonia that are novel.”

The issue is how do we reconcile Socrates' "making new Gods", "believing in new spiritual beings", and the various instances in the dialogues where he appears to be praying and/or worshiping some deity, with the view that he was an "atheist"? — Apollodorus

It is a difficult question, requiring intimate familiarity—which I do not possess—with not only Plato’s works, not only Xenophon’s in addition, but also the greatest interpretations of Socrates down through the tradition. It would also require the ability to interpret Socrates’ life through those works:

When reading Plato the problem of concealment stands together with the problem of interpretation. Someone lacking the ability to interpret is not even aware that there is anything concealed. They are content with what they see and may even vehemently deny that there is another [way of seeing these things] other than the plainly stated claims that they accept as true. — Fooloso4

It would be easy for a modern educated liberal student of him to be unable to believe that Socrates actually believed in gods— and it would be difficult for a theist not to be heartened by Socrates’ prayers and worship. To the former I would point out all these signs of Socrates’ piety; to the latter, I would point out that we cannot know what is really going on in the mind of a man who prays silently.

It would be easy for a modern educated liberal student of him to be unable to believe that Socrates actually believed in gods— and it would be difficult for a theist not to be heartened by Socrates’ prayers and worship. To the former I would point out all these signs of Socrates’ piety; to the latter, I would point out that we cannot know what is really going on in the mind of a man who prays silently. — Leghorn

Well said.

That observation returns us to the beginning of the OP and the proposal of a continuity of meaning from Plato down through the last of the Neoplatonists. However one stands upon the issue, the latter are unmistakably theist in their language and read Plato as a unified cosmogony. Augustine took hold of the package and remodeled it for the purpose of explicating Christian doctrine.

In the context of those conditions, being able to read Plato without assuming it was a theological text is a relatively recent development.

[Accidently posted before complete.

all these signs of Socrates’ piety — Leghorn

But we have no signs of Socrates' piety. We have the stories of Plato and Xenophon who wrote in light of the trial and prosecution of Socrates. There was good reason to portray Socrates as pious in both the conventional and an unconventional way.

It is not without significance that Plato brings Anaxagoras into the trial. It is not just Socrates but philosophy that is on trial. It should be noted that Socrates neither affirms nor denies that the sun is a rock and not a god.

All too often it is unreflectively assumed that talk of god or gods is about the same thing. Although Plato wrote a dialogue that asked what piety is, there is no dialogue that asks what a god or a deity or a divinity or daimonion or the divine is.

When the question of whether or not Socrates was an atheist is raised we need to ask just what specifically it is that one thinks is being denied or affirmed. Did he believe in the gods of the city? Did he believe in one or more of the gods recognized as gods today?

What is the relationship between gods and Forms? What is the relationship between theology and religion? Between gods and religion?

The problem was raised regarding how Socrates is seen in light of current views. We must also consider how he was and is seen under the influence of Platonism and Christian Platonism where it is unquestionably assumed that he did believe in gods as they did. But we must also look back prior to Platonism. The pre-Socratic philosophers, sophists, and those educated by them were not bound by such assumptions. In other words, appeal to the views of modern, educated liberal students on the one hand, and Platonists on the other solves nothing. They are not the only options.

What both might overlook but we should not is that questions about gods could not be raised without regard for politics and public opinion without great risk.

But we have no signs of Socrates' piety. We have the stories of Plato and Xenophon who wrote in light of the trial and prosecution of Socrates.. — Fooloso4

What signs of Socrates’ piety would you accept as proof then of his belief or disbelief in god? confession from his own lips? But those lips have been silenced for millennia...well, only literally: we have the “stories” of Plato and Xenophon about him—which may be better than having him in praesentia before us, as I’ve been told—for I doubt that either Socrates confessed his atheism to Plato or Xenophon, his most prized pupils, or that they asked him whether he believed in god or not.

There was good reason to portray Socrates as pious in both the conventional and an unconventional way. — Fooloso4

The only way I’m familiar with from the dialogues of Plato is the latter...unless you mean the descriptions of him praying to the goddess, etc. I wonder: did he ever exclaim, as did his many interlocutors, in any of the dialogues, “by Zeus!”, or, “by Hera!”, or any of the other stock exclamatory theistic formulae? That would be an interesting topic of research.

It is not without significance that Plato brings Anaxagoras into the trial. It is not just Socrates but philosophy that is on trial. — Fooloso4

But, if I recall correctly, Socrates in that passage attempts to distance himself from that natural philosopher, saying that Anaxagoras’ works can be so cheaply bought that the young can purchase them and learn these ideas without having to bother Socrates to learn them, “especially since they are so strange” that he would never espouse them.

But this passage is fraught with irony. Firstly, Socrates never charged anyone a fee for his audience (though a “tip” might have been accepted) and therefore, to learn these ideas might have been even cheaper through him. Secondly, the charge Socrates brings of “strangeness” to Anaxagoras’ ideas is ironic, since so many of his own ideas are strange.

What signs of Socrates’ piety would you accept as proof then of his belief or disbelief in god? — Leghorn

Both Plato and Xenophon defend Socrates in a way that he does not defend himself in their accounts of the trial. What we read of his piety should be seen in light of their rhetoric. In the Euthyphro Socrates places the just above piety to the gods. In Plato's Apology he demonstrates his obedience to the god by doubting what the oracle said and trying to show it was wrong. His daimonion is problematic because it is a personal deity, which is quite different from the gods of the city as well as gods of the cosmos.

Socrates in that passage attempts to distance himself from that natural philosopher — Leghorn

He correctly points to Anaxagoras as the source of that claim, but he does not distance himself from it. He neither confirms nor denies.

But this passage is fraught with irony. — Leghorn

As are many others as well. The whole question of the gods is fraught with irony.

if I recall correctly, Socrates in that passage attempts to distance himself from that natural philosopher, saying that Anaxagoras’ works can be so cheaply bought that the young can purchase them and learn these ideas without having to bother Socrates to learn them, “especially since they are so strange” that he would never espouse them. — Leghorn

Correct. In fact, in the Phaedo (98b) Socrates relates how he started his true philosophical career by renouncing Anaxagoras' materialism.

Had he been an atheist all those years, he would have been taken to court much sooner. But he was taken to court very late in life and only after falling out with Anytus and others (Meno 95a).

I think on the whole the arguments for Socrates being an atheist are very weak and unconvincing.

More generally, what we must not overlook is that religious beliefs were quite common among ancient philosophers, and it seems unwarranted to assume that they all were secret atheists.

in the Phaedo (98b) Socrates relates how he started his true philosophical career by renouncing Anaxagoras' materialism. — Apollodorus

He did not renounce it, he declared it insufficient for his purpose to understand the causes of things.

I think he found Anaxagoras unsatisfactory and disappointing.

In any case, I don't see Socrates taking a huge interest in Anaxagorean materialism, and unlike Anaxagoras, he did not deny the divinity of Sun and Moon.

And I see no evidence that he preached atheism.

Whoa there, fellow reader of the Dialogues.
I did not mean to argue whether Socrates was an atheist or not.
You referred to a bit of text as amounting to something. I took issue with the reading.
If the difference is not a difference in your mind, just ignore it.

Socrates in that passage [Apology, 26d-e] attempts to distance himself from that natural philosopher
— Leghorn

He correctly points to Anaxagoras as the source of that claim, but he does not distance himself from it. He neither confirms nor denies. — Fooloso4

O Morosophos, do you assert that distancing yourself from something is the same thing as denying it? Does not Socrates in that passage ridicule Anaxagoras’ notions as so strange that no reasonable person would assign them to him? Is this not distancing himself from Anaxagoras and his ideas?

Nevertheless I agree with you that he doesn’t come out and boldly proclaim that the sun is not a rock, and the moon not earth, and I believe this fact indicates he may have believed something similar to what Anaxagoras taught.

Both Plato and Xenophon defend Socrates in a way that he does not defend himself in their accounts of the trial. — Fooloso4

This statement leaves me very perplexed, since we only know Socrates’ defense of himself from Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of it.

In any case, I don't see Socrates taking a huge interest in Anaxagorean materialism, and unlike Anaxagoras, he did not deny the divinity of Sun and Moon. — Apollodorus

So I learn from @Fooloso4 that Socrates neither confirms nor denies the divinity of the sun and moon, and I learn from @Apollodorus that he does not deny that same divinity—seems like you guys have at least half of something in common—unless you, O Morosophos, further agree that Socrates never denied the divinity of Sun and Moon. In which case, y’all would be in total agreement!...

...but I suspect that even if y’all agreed that Socrates neither denied nor confirmed those celestial beings to be gods, you would disagree as to how this fact is to be INTERPRETED...and that is the crux of the problem. I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation.

I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation. — Leghorn

Your suspicion possibly points in the right direction.

However, my own suspicion would be that Socrates does not only not deny the divinity of Sun and Moon, but positively acknowledges them as “Gods in heaven” as in the Republic (Rep. 508a) and in the Timaeus where the heavenly bodies are said to be divine, in fact, the whole Cosmos is an ensouled, living being:

We must declare that this Cosmos has verily come into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God (Tim. 30b)

Could it be that Plato became so popular precisely because he was not an atheist and that his views resonated with those of the majority of philosophy students?

I wonder: did he ever exclaim, as did his many interlocutors, in any of the dialogues, “by Zeus!”, or, “by Hera!”, or any of the other stock exclamatory theistic formulae? That would be an interesting topic of research. — Leghorn

As it happens, Socrates does use theistic expressions like "by Zeus" (Cratylus 423c; Rep. 345b) and "if God wills" (Phaedo 69d) quite frequently.

They are not always translated literally, but if you look at the Greek text, you will often find "nai/ma Dia", "yes/no by Zeus/God", etc.

do you assert that distancing yourself from something is the same thing as denying it? — Leghorn

As to whether the sun was a rock, he neither affirms nor denies it. As to whether Anaxagoras' Mind is a cause, he found it problematic. Anaxagoras' explanation did not show how Mind order each thing in a way that is best. (Phaedo 97b-d)

I believe this fact indicates he may have believed something similar to what Anaxagoras taught. — Leghorn

The passage from the Phaedo is a prelude to Socrates "second sailing", which he calls his safe answer, the hypothesis of Forms. He shifts from Mind to his own mind.(99d-100a) He arranges things according to kind. That it is best that they be this way, either as a way of understanding things or as things are, is something he does not show. As to the relationship between a Form and a thing of that Form he says he cannot insist on the nature of that relationship. (100e). Later he recognizes the need to reintroduce physical causes. He calls the safe answer, his hypothesis of the Forms ignorant. (105b-c)

This statement leaves me very perplexed, since we only know Socrates’ defense of himself from Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of it. — Leghorn

Right. That is why I said, in their accounts of the trial. We do not know what he actually said, but we do know that both Plato and Xenophon defended him in their works after their Apologies.

I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation. — Leghorn

I think both would agree that whatever Socrates might have believed about the gods is secondary to the truth about the gods. To even raise the question is an impiety. To who or what do we turn to learn the truth about the gods? Do we believe the poets and their stories of the gods acting unjustly? Do we turn to reasoned argument? In that case the authority of reason stands above the gods, for it is reason that determines their truth.

There is, however, no such dialogue.

We must declare that this Cosmos has verily come into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God (Tim. 30b)

But these are Timaeus’, not Socrates’ words.

Could it be that Plato became so popular precisely because he was not an atheist and that his views resonated with those of the majority of philosophy students? — Apollodorus

I suspect the reason is more likely this: “But why, then, do some enjoy spending so much time with me? You have heard, men of Athens; I told you the whole truth. It is because they enjoy hearing men examined who suppose they are wise, but are not. For it is not unpleasant.”—Apology 33b-c, West translation.

As it happens, Socrates does use theistic expressions like "by Zeus" (Cratylus 423c; Rep. 345b) and "if God wills" (Phaedo 69d) quite frequently. — Apollodorus

Yes he does, just like we, whether atheists or believers, exclaim, “Oh God!”, or, “Jesus!”, or, “God willing...”, or, “Lordy mercy!”, etc.

Both Plato and Xenophon defend Socrates in a way that he does not defend himself in their accounts of the trial. — Fooloso4

This statement leaves me very perplexed, since we only know Socrates’ defense of himself from Plato’s and Xenophon’s accounts of it.
— Leghorn

Right. That is why I said, in their accounts of the trial. We do not know what he actually said, but we do know that both Plato and Xenophon defended him in their works after their Apologies. — Fooloso4

But your statement is unsubstantiated: since we do not know what Socrates actually said, how can you say that Plato and Xenophon didn’t faithfully portray his defense? Does Plato’s portrayal contradict Xenophon’s?