But these are Timaeus’, not Socrates’ words. — Leghorn

It is the Platonic perspective with which Socrates' statements are in agreement. Why would he spend hours in the Phaedo trying to convince people of the immortality of the soul and divine judgement in the after life, if he is an atheist?

Similarly, in Gorgias he says that he is convinced of divine judgement after death and urges all men to join him in this belief in order to save themselves in the other world (Gorgias 526e). He repeats this in the Republic (621c), etc.

But your statement is unsubstantiated: since we do not know what Socrates actually said, how can you say that Plato and Xenophon didn’t faithfully portray his defense? — Leghorn

I am referring to their Socratic apologies compared to their Socratic dialogues, Socrates in a public, legal forum versus Socrates in private conversation.

Does Plato’s portrayal contradict Xenophon’s? — Leghorn

There are differences.

Why would he [Socrates] spend hours in the Phaedo trying to convince people of the immortality of the soul and divine judgement in the after life, if he is an atheist? — Apollodorus

Why would he suggest it is possible that death is like a dreamless sleep in the Apology? I quote from West’s translation at 40c. Socrates speaks:

“Let us also think in the following way how great a hope there is that it [death] is good. Now being dead is either of two things. For either it is like being nothing and the dead man has no perception of anything, or else, in accordance with the things said, it happens to be a sort of change and migration of the soul from the place here to another place.”

There are a couple things that stick out to me in this statement. The first is that Socrates confines the possibilities of what death is to just two things, which correspond to the atheistic and theistic versions: there are no third nor fourth, etc, options available. Why does belief in god(s) require the immortality of soul? Because we wouldn’t believe in them unless we were granted the same immortality they enjoy?

The second thing that impresses my mind is the insertion of the phrase, “...in accordance with the things said...,” for it is just this, the things that are said, that Socrates has been contradicting all his life. At 40d-e he continues...

“And if in fact there is no perception [after death], but it is like a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream at all, death would be a wondrous gain. For I suppose that if someone had to select that night in which he slept so soundly that he did not even dream and had to compare the other nights and days of his own life with that night, and then had to say on consideration how many days and nights in his own life he has lived better and more pleasantly than that night, then I suppose that even the Great King [of Persia] himself, not to mention some private man, would discover that they are easy to count in comparison with the other days and nights. So if death is something like this, I at least say it is a gain. For all time appears in this way indeed to be nothing more than one night.”

What strikes me in this passage is that Socrates favorably compares the one eternal night of perceptionless sleep to—not just the many nights full of dream, and thus perception, we experience while alive, but also to the DAYS, in which we are awake. Even the King of Persia, the popularly considered happiest man, would prefer it! Life is but a nightmare in which you row, row, row your boat—not gently down the stream, but strenuously up against a contrary one. You suffer unhappiness during your waking hours, then have bad dreams while asleep, waking only to repeat the process—who wouldn’t prefer an eternal night of dreamlessness to this?

But Socrates appears to us to have lived a happy life—however much he was harassed by Xanthippe, or prosecuted for impiety, or criticized by Cleitophon, etc. So the above argument, though his own, doesn’t seem to apply to himself. For he is not speaking to himself, but rather to those who voted for his acquittal. He himself, we presume, would want to go on living the blessed life we suppose he lived—yet he chose death. He continues (40e-41c):

“On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place, and if the things that are said are true...,”—cf “in accordance with the things said,” above: he continues to stress that the second alternative, that death is a journey to another place, is something merely spoken of—“that in fact all the dead are there, then what greater good could there be than this, judges? For if one who arrives in Hades, released from those here who claim to be judges, will find those who are judges in truth—the very ones who are said to give judgement there...,”—here again he points out that these things are only reported, not necessarily factual—“Minos and Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus, and Triptolemus, and those of the other demigods who turned out to be just in their own lives—would this journey be a paltry one?”

Suffice it to say that Socrates continues on to list other renowned men he would be more than glad to converse with in Hades. But this one statement, at 41b, sticks out: “And certainly the greatest thing is that I would pass my time examining and searching out among those there—just as I do those here—who among them is wise, and who supposes he is, but is not.” (!) Didn’t he just say he looked forward to finding the true judges there? Now he is saying he will examine them too, just as he did the mortal judges on earth, to see if they are wise, not assuming, as the many do, that they are actually wise!

What daring! What hubris!—to examine the greatest of all time in the afterlife—That is our humble Socrates.

I see what you mean and I certainly don’t disagree. :smile:

However, expressions like "in accordance with the things said" may well be just a manner of speech.

Also, there may be a difference between the way Socrates presents his case to the court and the things he says privately to people who are close to him.

I think his statements in the Phaedo shouldn't be ignored. Would he spend the last hours of his life convincing others of things he himself doesn’t believe in?

I do agree that the impression one gets of Plato is that sometimes he simply wants to get people to think and other times he has some message to convey. But if he does have a message, it does not seem to be atheism. Questioning and examining beliefs, yes, because that is his (or Socrates') particular way. But this does not amount to outright rejection or denial.

At any rate, I know of no serious scholars who are taking the stance that Plato is an atheist. Nor is there any independent credible tradition that claims this to be the case. I could be wrong though.

The first is that Socrates confines the possibilities of what death is to just two things, which correspond to the atheistic and theistic versions: there are no third nor fourth, etc, options available. Why does belief in god(s) require the immortality of soul? Because we wouldn’t believe in them unless we were granted the same immortality they enjoy? — Leghorn

That is an interesting question. It reflects how our use of the division "atheist versus theist" is a species of the "modern educated liberal student " you referred to before. In the Laws, starting from 885b, Plato argues that the legislation of piety requires declaring that the soul was created prior to all other things as the explanation for natural causes. This entangles the distinction between what is natural from what is artificial in terms quite different foreign from our modern discourse. We take the recourse to adequate means to seek natural causes for granted. Plato did not have recourse to such a nifty tool.

The way we treat theism/atheism as an inseparable pair may frame our desire for immortality as the reason we talk of the gods.
It does not help address these questions from Fooloso4:

When the question of whether or not Socrates was an atheist is raised we need to ask just what specifically it is that one thinks is being denied or affirmed. Did he believe in the gods of the city? Did he believe in one or more of the gods recognized as gods today? — Fooloso4

A sophist's notion of 'wisdom' – a syllabus of self-help nostroms. — 180 Proof

How do you think that put-down contributes to the thread?

...in accordance with the things said... — Leghorn

For if one who arrives in Hades, released from those here who claim to be judges, will find those who are judges in truth ... — Leghorn

In other words, only the dead can judge the truth of death, but they are dead and, if death is like a dreamless sleep, then they cannot judge either. So how are we to judge whether the truth is in accordance with things said? Once again, Socrates points to our ignorance. The things said, are just that, things said. We cannot advance from the things said to the truth of what is said. Once again, we are led to aporia.

In the Laws, starting from 885b, Plato argues that the legislation of piety requires declaring that the soul was created prior to all other things as the explanation for natural causes. — Valentinus

A few points should be noted. First, they are making laws. The law itself is not natural. The city itself is not natural. Second, in the Timaeus neither the world soul nor the human soul was created first. As things made they are not eternal. Timaeus' speech was to be made for the purpose of seeing the Republic at war, that is, in action. A task that is left incomplete.

The craftsman, "the poet and father" (28e) is himself the work of Timaeus' poetry. The craftsman says he is "craftsman and father" of the gods who make gods. (41a) The craftsman of the craftsman, Timaeus, is the craftsman of the gods. But Timaeus himself is the work Plato and his poetry.

The law is arbitrary and and does not fit with the Timaeus or the limits of understanding the natural world as expressed by Socrates in a number of dialogues.
The use of the statement as a justification for outlawing impiety is interesting because it defends the existence of gods by demanding a certain view of the natural world rather than citing how angry gods will get if not worshiped properly.

Ask TheMadFool since my remark was in reply to his post. He then replied to me in turn:

Point! However, you're a veteran philosopher and philosophizing is second nature to you, your middle name so to speak. For beginners, on the other hand, how to do philosophy? is a skill that has a steep learning curve, especially for those self-taught. Self-help books on philosophy are just what the doctor ordered! — TheMadFool

So a (small) contribution provoking more clarity of purposes, no?

Also this: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/574601

The law is arbitrary and and does not fit with the Timaeus — Valentinus

This is related to the problem of the uncompleted task of the Timaeus, explaining how cosmogony leads to the city.

... it defends the existence of gods by demanding a certain view of the natural world ... — Valentinus

I take it you mean this:

For the result of the arguments of such people is this,—that when you and I try to prove the existence of the gods by pointing to these very objects—sun, moon, stars, and earth—as instances of deity and divinity, people who have been converted by these scientists will assert that these things are simply earth and stone, incapable of paying any heed to human affairs, and that these beliefs of ours are speciously tricked out with arguments to make them plausible. (886d-e)

The concern here seems to be twofold, first, the implications of the scientific view rather than the truth of it. This is the problem Socrates points to with Anaxagoras. Second, a proper account of the gods, theology, must take into account the human good. This is what Leo Strauss refers to as the theologico-political problem.

Yes, that passage is the start of the argument against the "scientists." But before the explanation of what should be accepted as "natural" is given, the matter is connected to the role of convention:

[890a] is at that time authoritative, though it owes its existence to art and the laws, and not in any way to nature. All these, my friends, are views which young people imbibe from men of science, both prose-writers and poets, who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force; whence it comes that the young people are afflicted with a plague of impiety, as though the gods were not such as the law commands us to conceive them; and, because of this, factions also arise, when these teachers attract them towards the life that is right “according to nature,” which consists in being master over the rest in reality, instead of being a slave to others according to legal convention. — Plato, Laws 890,translated by R.G. Bury

The matter of nature versus convention is being directly connected to a discussion of who is above the law. That certainly did not come up when I studied the behavior of fruit flies. It involves other issues than a person believing or not believing in a divine agent. The next statement from the Athenian brings in a tiny bit of Socratic persuasion while considering proper punishment for the crime:

What, then, do you think the lawgiver ought to do, seeing that these people have been armed in this way for a long time past? Should he merely stand up in the city and threaten all the people that unless they affirm that the gods exist and conceive them in their minds to be such as the law maintains2 and so likewise with regard to the beautiful and the just and all the greatest things, [890c] as many as relate to virtue and vice, that they must regard and perform these in the way prescribed by the lawgiver in his writings; and that whosoever fails to show himself obedient to the laws must either be put to death or else be punished, in one case by stripes and imprisonment, in another by degradation, in others by poverty and exile? But as to persuasion, should the lawgiver, while enacting the people's laws, refuse to blend any persuasion with his statements, and thus tame them so far as possible? [890d] — Ibid

The Dialogues challenge us to ask how much to accept or question convention while seeking the actual Good rather than poor copies of it. The distance between that openness to discover what is not known and this argument for the gods upon the basis of service is large.

I spoke too broadly when saying the account of soul in the Laws did not fit the story of the Timaeus. It is an edited version of some details to serve a rhetorical purpose. Regarding how to view "materialism" versus "form" there is this observation:

Athenian: The sun's body is seen by everyone, its soul by no one. And the same is true of the soul of any other body, whether alive or dead, of living beings. There is, however, a strong suspicion that this class of object, which is wholly imperceptible to sense, [898e] has grown round all the senses of the body,2 and is an object of reason alone. Therefore by reason and rational thought let us grasp this fact about it,—
Clinias: What fact?
Athenian: If soul drives round the sun, we shall be tolerably sure to be right in saying that it does one of three things.
Clinias: What things?
Athenian: That either it exists everywhere inside of this apparent globular body and directs it, such as it is, just as the soul in us moves us about in all ways; or, having procured itself a body of fire or air (as some argue), it in the form of body pushes forcibly on the body from outside; [899a] or, thirdly, being itself void of body, but endowed with other surpassingly marvellous potencies, it conducts the body. — Ibid

It sounds like what we have sorted out as materialist or not in our modern lexicon is not a deal breaker to accepting the divine for Plato.

As related in the Timaeus, in the beginning God created the Cosmos as a living being endowed with a soul and reason. He next created the Cosmic Gods, i.e., the Earth, Sun, Moon, Stars and other heavenly bodies as living creatures, from whom were born Cronos and Rhea, Zeus and Hera, and the other Gods:

Wherefore, as a consequence of this reasoning and design on the part of God, with a view to the generation of Time, the Sun and Moon and five other stars, which bear the appellation of “planets,” came into existence for the determining and preserving of the numbers of Time. And when God had made the bodies of each of them He placed them in the orbits along which the revolution of the Other was moving, seven orbits for the seven bodies. The Moon He placed in the first circle around the Earth, the Sun in the second above the Earth; and the Morning Star and the Star called Sacred to Hermes He placed in those circles which move in an orbit equal to the Sun in velocity, but endowed with a power contrary thereto; whence it is that the Sun and the Star of Hermes and the Morning Star regularly overtake and are overtaken by one another. As to the rest of the stars, were one to describe in detail the positions in which He set them, and all the reasons therefore, the description, though but subsidiary, would prove a heavier task than the main argument which it subserves. Later on, perhaps, at our leisure these points may receive the attention they merit. So when each of the bodies whose co-operation was required for the making of Time had arrived in its proper orbit; and when they had been generated as living creatures, having their bodies bound with living bonds, and had learnt their appointed duties … Thus He spake, and once more into the former bowl, wherein He had blended and mixed the Soul of the Universe, He poured the residue of the previous material, mixing it in somewhat the same manner, yet no longer with a uniform and invariable purity, but second and third in degree of purity. And when He had compounded the whole He divided it into souls equal in number to the stars....(38c-41d)

I have read this text before. Are you offering it as an argument in the context of the discussion underway?

It sounds like what we have sorted out as materialist or not in our modern lexicon is not a deal breaker to accepting the divine for Plato. — Valentinus

By the divine do you mean the intelligible soul?

The Athenian says:

If soul does drive the sun around ...

Whether or not it does is an open question. In Anaxagoras' account Nous orders all things but he holds that the sun and moon are rocks. Why does the Athenian propose that the sun is driven by its own soul? Is there some concern with autonomy? Some problem with a separate Mind that imposes order? Is this related to the political order and the imposition of laws?

So a (small) contribution provoking more clarity of purposes, no? — 180 Proof

No, the only thing disrespectfulness will get is negative.

(1) Did you ask @TheMadFool if he had perceived my reply to him as "disrespectful" and that he told you so? His reply to my reply, which I have quoted above (with a follow-up link to another reply no less), certainly suggests he didn't think I'd given offense. And nothing "negative" has followed between us from that exchange either. In any case, I'll gladly apologize to TheMadFool if he now says my reply to him (quoted above) was "disrespectful" to him. (2) So tell me, "Miss Manners", on what basis do you accuse me of this "disrespectfulness"? (3) And lastly, since mine are evident on the first several pages of this thread, where are your positive contributions to this topic? (Answering these three questions might count as you contributing something.)

By the divine do you mean the intelligible soul? — Fooloso4

I was referring to the way the "scientists" are viewed as being against the existence of the gods because of the power that arrogates to themselves at the expense of duty to the city.The observation was directed toward how we are using the terms of "atheist versus theist" in my reply to Leghorn saying:

There are a couple things that stick out to me in this statement. The first is that Socrates confines the possibilities of what death is to just two things, which correspond to the atheistic and theistic versions: there are no third nor fourth, etc, options available. Why does belief in god(s) require the immortality of soul? Because we wouldn’t believe in them unless we were granted the same immortality they enjoy? — Leghorn

The way we use the terms to affirm or deny what is believed by an individual to be true is going to have trouble in a land where the line between Olympian Gods and a rational Creator has not been clearly drawn. This goes back to me agreeing with you that Plato is not a unitary model but adding the caveat that what counts as a model of the divine will become more difficult to identify.

The Athenian says:
If soul does drive the sun around ...
Whether or not it does is an open question. In Anaxagoras' account Nous orders all things but he holds that the sun and moon are rocks. Why does the Athenian propose that the sun is driven by its own soul? Is there some concern with autonomy? Some problem with a separate Mind that imposes order? Is this related to the political order and the imposition of laws? — Fooloso4

As regards to there being a problem with a separate mind imposing order, the Athenian's argument does resemble Aristotle's' approach of reasoning backwards to the Prime Mover. We don't get to look over his shoulder while he is making stuff the way we can in Timaeus' Craftsman's shop. On the other hand, Aristotle cannot have been a supporter of legislating upon the pursuit of natural causes seeing as how he did exactly that for a long time.

Pardon me if I don't respond to any responses for a while. I am giving my laptop to somebody else for a few weeks. I need to explore other regions of the soul.

"Scientists" is an infelicitous translation, Pangle has "men considered wise by young people". (890) This explains why the poets are included. Things are complicated by this:

What pertains to the ancients should be left alone and bid good-bye ... but what pertains to our new and wise men must be accused in so far as it responsible for bad things. (886d)

Surely the ancients include the poets Hesiod and Homer. Should they be included in those:

who maintain that the height of justice is to succeed by force — Plato, Laws 890,translated by R.G. Bury

or excluded because they are among the ancients? To put it differently, does the fault lie with atheists? They after all were the primary source of stories about the gods.

The observation was directed toward how we are using the terms of "atheist versus theist" in my reply to Leghorn ... — Valentinus

If I understand you correctly, I agree. In the Apology Socrates points to different ways in which the term atheist is used as an accusation. In addition, I don't think belief in gods requires the immortality of the soul. In fact, a common distinction was made between mortal men and immortal gods.

The way we use the terms to affirm or deny what is believed by an individual to be true is going to have trouble in a land where the line between Olympian Gods and a rational Creator has not been clearly drawn. — Valentinus

This is part of what Socrates was ensnared in. A rational Creator is not the gods of the city. It is an innovation. The accusation of atheism would in one sense of the term be accurate.

...the caveat that what counts as a model of the divine will become more difficult to identify. — Valentinus

Two comments: First, it is generally the Biblical God who is identified with will, with the Greeks emphasizing intellect. Second, there are some theologians, both ancient and modern, who either eschew any such description (negative or apophatic theology) or reject and kind of personification or anthropomorphism (Tillich, the ground of being).

Pardon me if I don't respond to any responses for a while. I am giving my laptop to somebody else for a few weeks. I need to explore other regions of the soul. — Valentinus

Be well.

However, expressions like "in accordance with the things said" may well be just a manner of speech. — Apollodorus

By “a manner of speech” are you referring to a formulaic expression, like, “Let me be (very, perfectly) clear,” or “At the end of the day,” or “It was (good, useful, helpful, etc.) until it wasn’t,” or “These are not partisan issues,” or any of the other stock phrases that are so popular now? These sorts of phrases have little variability and wide application. Let’s compare Socrates’ phrases in the Apology from 40c through 41c, to see if they resemble these sorts of “manners of speech”, for I have found as many as four of them there that stress the fact that the popular accounts of the afterlife are merely “things said”. I quote them in the order in which they occur:

1) “in accordance with the things said”, (kata ta legomena); 2) “and if the things that are said are true”, (kai [ei] alethe esti ta legomena); 3) “the very ones who are said to give judgement there”, (oiper kai legontai ekei dikazein); 4) “at least if the things that are said are in fact true”, (eiper ge ta legomena alethe estin).

Of these four phrases, three have one word in common, ta legomena (“the things said”), and two of those share the additional words, alethe esti (“are true”). The third numbered phrase, however, is radically different, having in common with ta legomena only the same verb in a different form, legontai (“are said”).

I think this linguistic analysis is sufficient to prove that these phrases of Socrates’ in this passage are not identical mere “manners of speech” or variations of stock formulae. The only thing they have in common is the passive verb legesthai, “to be said”, and even it is in different forms. Add to this the fact that in this relatively short passage, a description of the afterlife, Socrates as many as four times reminds us that these are things only said, implying that they are not necessarily so.

Consider in contrast the passage where he describes the alternative: where there is no afterlife, only a dreamless sleep (40d-e). In that passage he never says anything like, “if these things that are said are indeed true”, as he does repeatedly in his account of the afterlife. Why not? Obviously because no such things are ever said—though they be certainly considered in the secret soul of every private human being.

The most obvious thing to the soul of man is that death marks the end of his life and consciousness. He sees not only all the animals die and rot, but even his own kind. This idea, that he will one day cease to be, is not tolerable for a human being. One of my fellow churchgoers once told me, “Everyone wants to go to heaven, but nobody wants to die to get there”.

But everyone must agree that there was an infinity of time before he was born in which he didn’t exist! Shouldn’t there then be, in correspondence with the afterlife, a “before-life”, in which the eternal soul lived before it was born into its earthly consciousness? Yet we have no memory of this before-life. If something is eternal, doesn’t it exist for ALL time? Does it make sense that there are things that come into being, but don’t pass away? Isn’t it in the nature of things that come into being that they must also pass away? On the other hand, doesn’t it make sense that the things that don’t pass away were always in existence?

I think that, for most of us, our mortal lives are tolerable only to the extent we can have hope in the promise of immortality offered by our gods and our religious beliefs in an afterlife. For a few, however, the only hope in happiness down here on this earth (for we can’t bring ourselves to believe that things that come into being can last forever), is to strive to grasp the things that are truly immortal, that is, the things that are eternal, that neither come into being (are born), nor perish (pass away), while we are still alive.

“But I think the vulgar notion of the immortality of soul leads us to consideration of a truer representative of human immortality.”

“What would that representative be, Leghorn?”

“Why, the men who have done great deeds or written great books. Aren’t Shakespeare’s or Plato’s or Milton’s, or many other men and their works said to be immortal?”

“Yes, that’s true.”

“Well, are they considered immortal for any reason other than that they influenced men’s souls long after their own death?”

“Yes, exactly for that reason.”

“And do you think they could have exerted this influence had they not tapped into the truly eternal things, the things whose consideration both make a man happy in his mortal life, and ensure that he will be remembered long after his death?”

A sophist's notion of 'wisdom' – a syllabus of self-help nostroms.
— 180 Proof

How do you think that put-down contributes to the thread? — Athena

(1) Did you ask TheMadFool if he had perceived my reply to him as "disrespectful" and that he told you so? His reply to my reply, which I have quoted above (with a follow-up link to another reply no less), certainly suggests he didn't think I'd given offense. And nothing "negative" has followed between us from that exchange either. In any case, I'll gladly apologize to TheMadFool if he now says my reply to him (quoted above) was "disrespectful" to him. (2) So tell me, "Miss Manners", on what basis do you accuse me of this "disrespectfulness"? (3) And lastly, since mine are evident on the first several pages of this thread, where are your positive contributions to this topic? (Answering these three questions might count as you contributing something.) — 180 Proof

180 Proof & Athena. I'm alright. Thank you for your concern. Good day.

Socrates as many as four times reminds us that these are things only said, implying that they are not necessarily so. — Leghorn

Not necessarily. He is discussing things that are being said. He (almost) always starts with the current popular view of a particular topic. How else could he refer to things said than by using the verb legomai?

there is no afterlife, only a dreamless sleep — Leghorn

But he does not say "death", "dissolution", or "disappearance". If there is dreamless sleep, there must still be someone who sleeps. And someone who sleeps can wake up as explained in the Phaedo. One state gives rise to its opposite: being awake gives rise to being asleep and being asleep gives rise to being awake, etc. (71c ff.).

Yet we have no memory of this before-life. — Leghorn

However, absence of memory is not evidence of non-existence.

When we say "I do not remember living before", we are merely referring to "I" as this particular person as we know it in this life which naturally did not exist prior to being born. It does not mean that the pure, disembodied "I", the nous, did not exist.

On the contrary, whenever we say "I do not remember", the existence of the "I" is always presupposed. For, without it, we would be unable to say anything. But, since we are saying something, it must be admitted that there is a subject who says it.

It is that conscious subject who does not remember existing as this current person. And by the very fact that it is in a position to remember not existing in the current form, it demonstrates its previous existence.

Socrates as many as four times reminds us that these are things only said, implying that they are not necessarily so. — Leghorn

Whether or not they are so is not addressed. This stands in stark contrast to Socrates standard practice of questioning what is said. It is left as one of two possibilities. The other is that :

it is like being nothing — Leghorn

The possibility that it is like being nothing is raised prior to what accords with things said. In the Phaedo, where Socrates attempts to charm away their childish fears of death (77e) this possibility is not raised at all. All the arguments are designed to demonstrate the immortality of the soul, but, of course, they fail.

As long as one assumes that Socrates' efforts are simply to discover the truth of things, the truth of his efforts will not be discovered.

Let us also think in the following way how great a hope there is that it [death] is good. — Leghorn

His efforts are, in part, to persuade, to give his listeners hope that death is good, but if it turns out that the things said are true, then it is good only for the souls of those who are good. And yet, what might be good for their soul is not necessarily what is good for them. Socrates the man is not a disembodied soul.

How else could he refer to things said than by using the verb legomai? — Apollodorus

That’s exactly my point! Any resemblance to a common “manner of speech” all of those four phrases have would have to be based on the fact they share the verb legesthai, which, as you say, is a necessary ingredient in a phrase asserting that something “is said”. Therefore, these phrases were not mere manners of speech, as you suggested.

He (almost) always starts with the current popular view of a particular topic. — Apollodorus

...and he (almost) always goes beyond it, often contradicting it. How does the fact that he is relating the vulgar view of the Greek afterlife explain why he so frequently reminds his listeners that the things he says are only things said? Do you suppose his audience, the Greek citizens who voted for his acquittal, need such constant reminding? Most likely they didn’t. They made up the more liberal element of the citizenry, the men more likely themselves to question the theological traditions of the regime, to see them as mere myths and to be more tolerant of a questioning Socrates.

But he does not say "death", "dissolution", or "disappearance". If there is dreamless sleep, there must still be someone who sleeps. And someone who sleeps can wake up as explained in the Phaedo. — Apollodorus

But he does say this, as the ultimate sentence in his description of death as “the dreamless sleep” (40e): “For all time appears in this way indeed to be nothing more than one night.” (kai gar oudev pleiwv o pas chronos phainetai outw de einai e mia vuks). In other words, this dreamless night lasts for all time. There is no waking from it. It seems to be but one night precisely because it lasts forever.

And by the very fact that it is in a position to remember not existing in the current form, it demonstrates its previous existence. — Apollodorus

It is not that it remembers not existing, but rather that it doesn’t remember existing. There is a difference. If I remember not eating, I believe I didn’t eat, because I have a memory of not having eaten. If, however, I don’t remember eating, I am in a state of uncertainty: maybe I ate, maybe I didn’t. I need more evidence than my poor memory.

But that extra evidence is easily supplied by reason: everyone knows he was born on a certain day and in a certain year back to which his memory does not even stretch, and he knows that before he was born, he was a sperm and egg on the verge of uniting. How did an immutable nous find its brief temporal home in the chance coincidence of two merely earthly bodies?

That’s exactly my point! Any resemblance to a common “manner of speech” all of those four phrases have would have to be based on the fact they share the verb legesthai, which, as you say, is a necessary ingredient in a phrase asserting that something “is said”. Therefore, these phrases were not mere manners of speech, as you suggested. — Leghorn

However, it isn't my point. I simply gave “manner of speech” as an example. The central issue is that he uses the verb legomai, “to be said”, to refer to things said. Hence my question (which you did not answer), “How else can he refer to things said without saying ‘it is said’ or something to that effect?”

How does the fact that he is relating the vulgar view of the Greek afterlife explain why he so frequently reminds his listeners that the things he says are only things said? — Leghorn

I don’t think he does though. “It is said” or “according to things said”, etc., is simply a statement of fact. He does not say “Please remember these are just things said”.

But he does say this, as the ultimate sentence in his description of death as “the dreamless sleep” (40e): “For all time appears in this way indeed to be nothing more than one night.” (kai gar oudev pleiwv o pas chronos phainetai outw de einai e mia vuks). In other words, this dreamless night lasts for all time. There is no waking from it. It seems to be but one night precisely because it lasts forever. — Leghorn

1. He says “appears,” phainetai.

2. Where there is sleep there is a sleeper.

3. He gives “dreamless sleep” as just one possibility, the other possibility being “a change and migration of the soul from this to another place” (Apol. 40c).

4. Elsewhere he urges all men to accept his account of divine judgement after death:

And I invite all other men likewise, to the best of my power, and you particularly I invite in return, to this life and this contest, which I say is worth all other contests on this earth; and I make it a reproach to you, that you will not be able to deliver yourself when your trial comes and the judgement of which I told you just now (Gorg. 526e).

5. Similarly, he now ends his speech to members of the jury by reminding them of the “truth” that God does not neglect a good man either in life or after death:

But you also, judges, must regard death hopefully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him (Apol. 41c-d).

It is not that it remembers not existing, but rather that it doesn’t remember existing. — Leghorn

If the soul is immortal and existed before, of course it cannot remember being the current person who did not exist prior to being born. But it may well have prenatal memory of itself as pure nous. It may also have latent memory of Forms, etc. This is what Socrates' Theory of Recollection is about which he expounds after the trial in the Phaedo!

I simply gave “manner of speech” as an example. — Apollodorus

My apologies. I thought you were saying that Socrates’ repetition of phrases meaning that these were “things said” only indicated a certain idiom of speech that could normally be expected in any sort of discourse in the dialogues about a matter that was merely spoken of...but let me ask you, O Apollodorus: as an example of what, exactly, did you give “manner of speech”? That has me confused.

It is said” or “according to things said”, etc., is simply a statement of fact. He does not say “Please remember these are just things said”. — Apollodorus

He essentially says “Please remember that these are just things said,” by repeating so often the different phrases that remind us of it. He is not speaking thusly to everyone who voted for his acquittal; only to those few who notice that, by repetition, he is reminding them of the spuriousness of the traditional tales of the afterlife.

If the soul is immortal and existed before, of course it cannot remember being the current person who did not exist prior to being born. But it may well have prenatal memory of itself as pure nous. It may also have latent memory of Forms, etc. — Apollodorus

Do you have prenatal memory of yourself existing as pure vous? I don’t either, and I’ve never met anyone who did. My earliest memory is of pissing in the kitchen trash can thinking I was in the bathroom.

As for memory of forms (eidwn) before birth, those too must certainly be hidden (latent) from me, for I have none of them. I learned about them, like everyone else I suppose, by growing up trying to understand the world before my eyes, in the first place, and by reading books that I thought might teach me about them, in the second.

but let me ask you, O Apollodorus: as an example of what, exactly, did you give “manner of speech”? That has me confused. — Leghorn

Example of things other than "reminders".

He is not speaking thusly to everyone who voted for his acquittal; only to those few who notice that, by repetition, he is reminding them of the spuriousness of the traditional tales of the afterlife. — Leghorn

But you are not answering my question (which I have asked about three or four times): How does one speak of things said without using phrases like “as they say”, “according to things said”, etc.

Do you have prenatal memory of yourself existing as pure vous? I don’t either, and I’ve never met anyone who did. — Leghorn

If, as Socrates says, the soul pre-exists the current life, prenatal memories may be stimulated through philosophical inquiry and contemplation. Any one recollection can lead to general recall of knowledge we once actively had. Incidentally, there is a similar teaching in Buddhism and Hinduism. In any case, we are talking about Socrates’ Theory of Recollection as given in the Meno and repeated in the Phaedo (after the trial and his speech to the jury), not about you and me.

He is not speaking thusly to everyone who voted for his acquittal; only to those few who notice that, by repetition, he is reminding them of the spuriousness of the traditional tales of the afterlife. — Leghorn

I think he is addressing both those who recognize or will come to understand that these are things said rather than things known, and those who will believe they are things known because they are things said.

The latter is a salutary teaching. Believing it is true promotes justice in the soul and the city. Those who are philosophical by nature, however, desire the truth. But, as Socrates points out in the Republic:

the best natures become exceptionally bad when they get bad instruction (491e).

That these are things said and not the truth is a truth suitable only to those who are of the best natures and have been properly educated through an education that includes such salutary tales.

The possibility that "death is like being nothing" presents both an ethical and existential problem. Plato deals with the first in the Republic where Socrates argues that justice is a matter of the health of the soul rather than a calculus of rewards and punishments. He deals with the second in the Phaedo, where Socrates attempts to charm away childish fears of death. (77e) In doing this he appeals to "things said" as well as his own myths. But none of these myths say what will happen to Socrates or you or me. They take the part as the whole.

but let me ask you, O Apollodorus: as an example of what, exactly, did you give “manner of speech”? That has me confused.
— Leghorn

Example of things other than "reminders". — Apollodorus

Do you mean that Socrates’ frequent—I almost said “reminders”—repetitions of different phrases meaning that what was being said was only spoken of might be characterized by other phrases or words? Instead of “reminders”, might we call them “admonitions”? how about, “accidents”, or “glosses”, or “incidental comments”, or “insignificant utterances”, etc. You can call them a host of things, but if you agree they are there in the text in the frequency in which they are extant, you can’t merely dismiss them without cause.

But you are not answering my question (which I have asked about three or four times): How does one speak of things said without using phrases like “as they say”, “according to things said”, etc. — Apollodorus

Well, you could say something like, “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters,” etc. I suppose you would have to read a long time thence before ever encountering a phrase like, “as they say”, though all these sayings be characterized by that phrase.

we are talking about Socrates’ Theory of Recollection as given in the Meno and repeated in the Phaedo (after the trial and his speech to the jury), not about you and me. — Apollodorus

Well, Mr. Apollodorus, I am certainly interested in what Socrates has to say about all this, but if what he says doesn’t jibe with my experience, I don’t have him around to ask about it. So if you say he tells me that I have a prenatal memory, the only one I have to question is you.

Do you mean that Socrates’ frequent—I almost said “reminders”—repetitions of different phrases meaning that what was being said was only spoken of might be characterized by other phrases or words? Instead of “reminders”, might we call them “admonitions”? how about, “accidents”, or “glosses”, or “incidental comments”, or “insignificant utterances”, etc. You can call them a host of things, but if you agree they are there in the text in the frequency in which they are extant, you can’t merely dismiss them without cause. — Leghorn

Well, if you ask me, when I relate what is being said, I normally use phrases like "They say that ..." etc. and I know of no other way of putting it in everyday language. "They say that", "as they say", etc. simply indicates that something is being affirmed. It by no means signifies that what is being said is a mere "story".

Hence my question to you (which I have asked multiple times):

How does one speak of things said without using phrases like “as they say”, “according to things said”, etc. — Apollodorus

This, for some unknown reason, you have declined to say.

I don’t have him around to ask about it. So if you say he tells me that I have a prenatal memory, the only one I have to question is you. — Leghorn

Sure. However, as I am merely relaying what Socrates states in the dialogues, I can only advise you to read the dialogues. :smile: