the use of the word ‘pain’ is to express rather than to describe the sensation — Richard Floyd

Doesn't it do both? Isn't the word 'pain' itself a description? From it we know that the sensation is not pleasant, that it is something I want alleviated rather than prolonged.

A diagnosis is aided by a description of the sensation, its severity, where it is located, whether it is sharp or dull or throbbing, sudden or continuous, tender to touch, whether better or worse with activities or conditions heat or cold,

In the same way, we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is — Richard Floyd

Refer directly to the sensation of what? The pain? It would be odd if the word pain did not refer to pain!

... sensation words do not have sensations themselves as their meaning, and in fact the exact nature of the sensation has no bearing on the meaning (use) of the word whatsoever. — Richard Floyd

The sensation of pain does have direct bearing on the meaning of the word pain. Suppose there is one of Wittgenstein's tribes, one whose members do not feel pain. The term 'pain' would be meaningless. It is only because we have had the sensation of pain that we understand what the word means.

One of the difficulties of this discussion is that pain is not a simple sensation, but a sensation under judgement. Or more likely a complex of sensations in a context under judgement. Consider, for example the burning sensation produced by chillies. Pain can be explored, and modified; one's 'threshold' can be raised or lowered.

Nevertheless, if you cut Wittgenstein, does he not bleed? As with 'red', we are talking about the sensation - the negativity of the sensation - first-aiders are taught to apply some harmless pain to an unresponsive person to see if they are conscious or not. We know how to do it and what it feels like because we practice on each other. We assume our sensations are alike enough because our bodies and our reactions are alike enough. I think this is called a 'theory of mind'. You might just be howling at the moon, but I noticed you dropped that rock on your foot and now you are hopping on the other and clutching your foot as well as howling. I think you are in pain, and the pain is in your foot just there where the blood is oozing out. I'll fetch the Germoline.

It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain". — Luke

I think this is exactly what he believes. We each have our own type system, each have different meanings for the words we share.

All right, I'm not worried, I've hit myself with a hammer enough times to know what it feels like, and also to know that there is never any tokens for me there. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is there not a different instance of pain each time you hit your hand with the hammer?

Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain. — Luke

That's obviously wrong. Clearly there are many different types of pain. That's exactly what being divisible into many different types means, that there are many different types of the type which is divisible.

You're right, neither of us can. We can't have the class/category. We can only have tokens or instances of that class/category. — Luke

If I don't have the type, and you don't have the type, then where is the type? I think you're wrong here. A type must be somewhere, if it has any existence at all. I think that types are within my mind, and they are within your mind as well. They do not exist in some realm of Platonic Forms.

Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to. — Luke

No that's not true, because you are again using sensation to refer to a type of inner experience. A type is not a token. "Mustang", as a type of car is not a token of the type, "car", it's a subtype. A particular Mustang, or any particular car is a token of the type "car". But, as Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258, "a sensation" cannot be identified as a particular thing, due to the lack of a criterion of identity. So it cannot have an identity as a particular, because there can be no correctness in identifying it.. Therefore "a sensation" cannot correctly be used to refer to a token. If you insist on that type/token dichotomy, then it must always refers to a type.

If you took some time to analyze your own inner experience, and sensations, through introspection, as Wittgenstein did, you'd probably come to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein does at 261 " he has
something—and that is all that can be said". Inner experience is "something", sensation is "something", but we surely cannot say that it consists of tokens.

Is there not a different instance of pain each time you hit your hand with the hammer? — Janus

No, because no pain exists as "an Instance", so it's equally wrong to say that different pains are different instances of pain. We do say things like this though, but Wittgenstein is demonstrating that this is a way of speaking which is like an illness that needs philosophical treatment.

No, because no pain exists as "an Instance", so it's equally wrong to say that different pains are different instances of pain. We do say things like this though, but Wittgenstein is demonstrating that this is a way of speaking which is like an illness that needs philosophical treatment. — Metaphysician Undercover

That seems absurd to me. Say last week I had a headache, and now today I have a headache. They are two different occasions or instances of having a headache. They are not the same headache, as they would be if it had persisted the whole time.

I doubt Wittgenstein would agree with you on this; but even if he would, that is no reason to accept something that seems so absurd.

Isn't the word 'pain' itself a description? From it we know that the sensation is not pleasant, that it is something I want alleviated rather than prolonged. — Fooloso4

Earlier in the article, Floyd offers this "possible interpretation":

Wittgenstein thus claims that the word ‘pain’ does make reference to a sensation, but does not describe it. So the actual sensation that you feel does not affect the meaning (ie public use) of the word, but whether or not there is a sensation being felt does. — Richard Floyd

Following this interpretation, the word "pain" is used as a reference to a sensation, rather than a description of it.

A diagnosis is aided by a description of the sensation, its severity, where it is located, whether it is sharp or dull or throbbing, sudden or continuous, tender to touch, whether better or worse with activities or conditions heat or cold, — Fooloso4

I would consider these as descriptions of (various instances of) pain, rather than showing that the word "pain" is a description.

In the same way, we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is — Richard Floyd

Refer directly to the sensation of what? The pain? It would be odd if the word pain did not refer to pain! — Fooloso4

I think what he means by "directly" here is that the word 'pain' cannot refer to the "exact nature" of the pain (he uses this phrase in your next quote of him), such as the exact nature of the quale or of what the sensation feels like. In other words, a description of (the exact nature of) the sensation.

It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain".
— Luke

I think this is exactly what he believes. We each have our own type system, each have different meanings for the words we share. — Srap Tasmaner

Why do you think that?

This would imply that we all use words differently (assuming meaning is use) and that there are no criteria of correctness in the use of words .Therefore, we could not correct anyone's usage or teach anyone a language. That is the opposite of my reading, and of what is obviously the case.

Why do you think that? — Luke

I was describing MU's views, based on dim memory of similar disputes before. And as it turns out:

If I don't have the type, and you don't have the type, then where is the type? I think you're wrong here. A type must be somewhere, if it has any existence at all. I think that types are within my mind, and they are within your mind as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a surprising strain of psychologism in MU's thinking.

Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain.
— Luke

That's obviously wrong. Clearly there are many different types of pain. That's exactly what being divisible into many different types means, that there are many different types of the type which is divisible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I misspoke here, but I corrected it in my following response. Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain".

If I don't have the type, and you don't have the type, then where is the type? I think you're wrong here. A type must be somewhere, if it has any existence at all. I think that types are within my mind, and they are within your mind as well. They do not exist in some realm of Platonic Forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree the type exists only as in knowing how to use the word "pain" correctly; as the definition of the word "pain"; or as our agreed usage of the word "pain". Tokens are the actual instances to which the word refers. Hence, "Ford Mustang" as a type is an abstract concept. whereas a Ford Mustang is a concrete particular (token) that we classify as belonging to the type "Ford Mustang".

See also my earlier post where I mentioned Platonic Forms.

Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to.
— Luke

No that's not true, because you are again using sensation to refer to a type of inner experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

I wanted to correct this, too. I should not have suggested that all subtypes are themselves tokens. As above, all types are abstract concepts, whereas tokens are (what we might consider to be) actual instantiations of those types.

But, as Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258, "a sensation" cannot be identified as a particular thing, due to the lack of a criterion of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree with this reading. The word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. And he clearly indicates at PI 244 that our reference to sensations is unproblematic:

244. How do words refer to sensations? — There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day, and name them? — LW

If you took some time to analyze your own inner experience, and sensations, through introspection, as Wittgenstein did, you'd probably come to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein does at 261 " he has something—and that is all that can be said". Inner experience is "something", sensation is "something", but we surely cannot say that it consists of tokens. — Metaphysician Undercover

He is referring here to the mistaken idea that "the connection between the name and the thing
named" can be established privately. He is not saying that this is a problem for the words "sensation" or "pain" as these are words of our public language. The problem is with the putative private word/sign "S".

261. What reason have we for calling “S” the sign for a sensation? — LW

That is, what reason have we for calling the private sign "S" the sign of a sensation, given that the word "sensation" has a public meaning?

No, because no pain exists as "an Instance", so it's equally wrong to say that different pains are different instances of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type. That obviously contradicts how we use the word.

Key ideas vis-à-vis Wittgenstein's general thesis:

1. Ostensive definitions. Are they any good? They seem to be.

2. Consistency of word usage. Memory failure. Can we remember the first word-referent association we decided upon? This is a major setback.

3. Beetle-in-the-box problem. The referent, insofar as private experiences are concerned, drops out of consideration (pain). The word/sign for them but must necessarily attach themselves to some shareable, externalizable thing (tears, wincing, screaming :cry: )

Conclusion: Private languages will be incoherent. Inner/private experiences are language-apt if there are consistent public/external correlates (pain & :cry: for example).

Ramifications: How much of philosophy or anything else for that matter rests on not just the possibility of but the actuality of a private language? When I discuss, for example, public sanitation with, say, the Mayor, is it a requirement that I possess and use a private language? Basically, in any discourse, am I sharing, trying to at least, my private experiences?

Why do you think that?
— Luke

I was describing MU's views, — Srap Tasmaner

Ah, I misread you. My apologies. Yes, that is his misconception. :grimace:

I think most people tend to dismiss the ("inner") sensation completely (it "drops out of consideration") and presume Wittgenstein to be identifying a sensation only with its expression.
— Luke

Yes, I agree with this. — Sam26

You agree that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation completely, or you agree only that most people tend to think this?

What's the difference between me trying to express my exclusively private experiences to someone and an alien, from another dimension, shareable but not yet shared, trying to express himself to us? :chin:

Be on another planet (Cambridge Dictionary)

Ah, I misread you. — Luke

I habitually write in the voices of other people without making it obvious I'm doing so. Need to work on that. (Though I can't imagine giving up these little embedded dialogs. Can you imagine the Investigations without all the other voices?)

That seems absurd to me. Say last week I had a headache, and now today I have a headache. They are two different occasions or instances of having a headache. They are not the same headache, as they would be if it had persisted the whole time. — Janus

OK, but by that logic I can say that the headache I had last second was not the same headache as this second. Or we could say that it changes by the nanosecond, or Planck length. Luke and I went through this already.

If coming into, and going out of ,the conscious mind, is what constitutes the beginning and ending of an instance of sensation, then why do I say that I have the same toothache when I wake up in the morning, as when I went to sleep? In reality, we do not judge a sensation as "the same", based on a judgement of "an instance", we judge it as "the same" based on a description of type.

The issue is even more pronounced and significant when we consider other types of inner experiences like memories and ideas. We designate it "the same memory", and "the same number two", no matter how many different times it comes in and out of the conscious mind. So why is there a double standard with respect to what constitutes "the same" inner experience? In the case of "a sensation", one might say that it is "the same" sensation for the length of its continuous duration in the conscious mind, whereas in the case of "a memory", or "an idea", we say that it is "the same" memory, or idea, no matter how many different times it come in and out of the conscious mind.

Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain". — Luke

Well, you'd have to demonstrate that, if you really think it's true, because I think the evidence demonstrates that this is clearly false. That "pain" may be defined in different ways indicates very clearly that there is not just one type or class which is called "pain".

I agree the type exists only as in knowing how to use the word "pain" correctly; as the definition of the word "pain"; or as our agreed usage of the word "pain". — Luke

You seem to be overlooking the reality of the situation, that most of the time during language use we do not proceed based on "agreed" definitions, or "agreed" usage. If this is what constitutes the existence of a "type" then I suggest we need something other than types and tokens, to account for all the times when we are talking about type-like things (like sensations for example), which are not "types" according to what you say types are, as agreed upon definitions or use.

he word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. — Luke

No it doesn't, because "sensation" has many different meanings or definitions. What I've been telling you, is that in common usage of "sensation", the thing sensed, the object of a sensation (something seen for example), might be called a token of a type. Now, when you say that pain is a sensation, you conflate the object of the sensation with the act of sensing, to say that the act of sensing, "the sensation" (the pain) is itself the object of sensation. So you have no separation between the object being sensed, (which might be pain or something completely different), and the act of sensing which produces the sensation. Therefore you use "pain" to refer to a complexity which is both the object sensed, and the act of sensing it. This conflation which unites a passive object with an act, is just a confusion, a misunderstanding, which cannot have a token.

I disagree with this reading. The word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. And he clearly indicates at PI 244 that our reference to sensations is unproblematic: — Luke

Uh, I beg to differ. Reread 244 please. He distinctly says, there doesn't "seem" to be any problem here. Then he goes on to explain how there really is a problem. And that's the issue at 258, the problem he alluded to at 244, what does it mean to name a sensation. If sensations like pain exist as tokens, we ought to be able to name them, like applying a proper noun "S" for example, such that we might be able to distinguish one sensation from another, like we would distinguish one chair from another. Of course, the problem becomes evident, that sensations do not exists as things, (or tokens), which we can name with a proper noun.

.

He is referring here to the mistaken idea that "the connection between the name and the thing
named" can be established privately. He is not saying that this is a problem for the words "sensation" or "pain" as these are words of our public language. The problem is with the putative private word/sign "S". — Luke

There is no problem with the words "sensation" and "pain", because they refer to what you call types. The problem is in the attempt to name a particular instance of sensation (what you call a token), with a proper name like "S". Then there is an issue of distinguishing the supposed particular sensation, which is to be named with "S", from all other sensation. Since sensation is something inner, "private", there is no criterion for this naming process, because a criterion, or rule, by Wittgenstein's definition is necessarily public.

So the problem is not with the "private word/sign 'S'", as you state, it is with the assumption of a private object, thing, (what you call a token), which is supposedly named with that sign "S". The issue is not a problem with private symbols, or words. There is no problem there, someone could make up private symbols for things, and not tell anyone else, that's simple. The problem is with the supposed thing named by the symbols, being something private, "inner experience", "sensation". The use of the proper noun, "S" as a name to name a particular sensation, which is a supposed private thing (token for you) cannot be justified.

That is, what reason have we for calling the private sign "S" the sign of a sensation, given that the word "sensation" has a public meaning? — Luke

The problem is with your misreading, and misunderstanding. You refuse to acknowledge that when Wittgenstein talks about "a sensation", and "the sensation", he is proposing a particular thing (a token) to be named with the name "S" as a proper noun. The public use of "sensation" is to refer to a type-like thing, whereas "S" is proposed as referring to a token-like thing. What reason do we have for saying that "S" refers to a token of that type, "sensation"?

If there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type. That obviously contradicts how we use the word. — Luke

Right, Wittgenstein is trying to draw our attention to this type of usage, which he has said is an illness which needs philosophical treatment (254-255). People like you insist on taking the so-called PLA out of its proper context, to propose that its purpose is something else. What Wittgenstein is demonstrating is the reality of the situation, what you describe with: "there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type". That is the reality. But this reality is completely different from, even contradictory to, how we commonly use words. This is an illness which requires philosophical treatment. We cannot change the reality, only our usage of words.

Wittgenstein thus claims that the word ‘pain’ does make reference to a sensation, but does not describe it. So the actual sensation that you feel does not affect the meaning (ie public use) of the word, but whether or not there is a sensation being felt does. — Richard Floyd

It does more than just refer to a sensation. If it just referred to a sensation the word 'pain' would play no role. 'Pain' and 'S' are not the same. Pain, however incompletely, describes the sensation.

The case of pain is not like that of 'S'. As W. points out, the "stage-setting" is in place with the word pain. The same is not true of 'S'. When someone says they are or were or will be in pain we know what they are talking about. The sensation, like all sensation, is private but the language is public.

Floyd says:

... sensation words do not have sensations themselves as their meaning, and in fact the exact nature of the sensation has no bearing on the meaning (use) of the word whatsoever. The word merely indicates that a certain kind of sensation is present.

If the nature of the sensation has no bearing on the meaning of the word, then how does the word indicate a certain kind of sensation is present? To indicate the kind of sensation that is present is what the sensation word pain means.

I think what he means by "directly" here is that the word 'pain' cannot refer to the "exact nature" of the pain — Luke

What is the exact nature of the pain? Words are not a direct replacement for what is experienced.

It should be kept in mind that not all pain talk is an expression of pain. Discussions of pain management, for example, are not expressions of pain.

You agree that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation completely, or you agree only that most people tend to think this? — Luke

I don't think that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation, but some people do think this is the case.

OK, but by that logic I can say that the headache I had last second was not the same headache as this second. Or we could say that it changes by the nanosecond, or Planck length. Luke and I went through this already. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't read the whole conversation between you and Luke. If you've been through it already, then you've come out the other side no wiser. it seems. If I can make a reasonable distinction between the headache I have now and the headache I had then, then they are different instances of headache. There is no point bringing up nanoseconds; we don't distinguish nanoseconds.

If I have a headache now and I had one five minutes ago in the same region of my head, then it is probably the same headache. I may have become distracted and didn't notice it in the intervening five minutes. I could still say the current episode of pain is distinct from the episode of pain five minutes ago, just on account of the fact that there had been, for me, no continuity between them.

The headache I have today cannot be the same headache as I had last year, or when I was five years old, because I have not had a headache all that time. This is all so obvious that I can't imagine why you would want to argue against it.

We almost got back to the topic; Srap is right in saying

We each have our own type system, each have different meanings for the words we share. — Srap Tasmaner

...but this is oddly matched against a form of essentialism, where there is a determinate meaning for each and every word; and hence @Metaphysician Undercover sees the philosophers task as somehow identifying that essence.

There are problems that ensue form reading one section of PI too closely, with scant regard for the other bits, especially that which precedes it. I'd invite Meta, @Janus, @Luke and all to go back a few pages, especially to around §48 and the rejection of the atomism of the Tractatus. The notion of essences receives a very hard knock thereabouts. If we are to look to the use to which we put words rather than to some invisible meaning, then we are setting aside the notion that the meaning of a word forms or consists in some discernible essence.

I get a pain in my toes, usually after a day on my feet. IS it the same pain? that depends on what I'm doing. I might describe it as "the (singular) pain in my toe" were I asking a physician for advice. But in a different situation I might say that it is not the same as the pain I had last night, since it has moved to another toe. The point here is that there is no absolute, canonical, essential right or wrong to these differing descriptions.

Meta, so far as I've been able to make sense of his writings, fails to grasp this. Hence he fails to grasp what is going on in the private language argument, since this is the base from whence it derives - meaning as use, not definition.

As an aside, it's a problem seemingly related to Meta's failure to recognise that 0.99... is one, and that an object can have an instantaneous velocity. He seems to see the essence of 0.99... as distinct from the essence of one; the essence of velocity as involving movement. If he were able to get past this, he would be able to do physics, and perhaps to follow Wittgenstein's argument.

All those pages about tokens and types miss the point.

Srap is right in saying — Banno

I was describing my guess at MU's view, so you agree with him rather than me.

I was describing my guess at MU's view, — Srap Tasmaner

I understood that. The "He" of the first paragraph is Meta.

My apologies for the confusion.

If I can make a reasonable distinction between the headache I have now and the headache I had then, then they are different instances of headache. — Janus

A "reasonable distinction" does not constitute a criterion of identity, which is what Wittgenstein is talking about.

All those pages about tokens and types miss the point. — Banno

Agreed, this is what I kept telling Luke, who insisted on this type/token dichotomy, it's irrelevant and misses the point.

I was describing my guess at MU's view, so you agree with him rather than me. — Srap Tasmaner

Not a bad guess, but Banno seems unable to even manage a reasonable guess.

but this is oddly matched against a form of essentialism, where there is a determinate meaning for each and every word; and hence Metaphysician Undercover sees the philosophers task as somehow identifying that essence. — Banno

Why would you think that I'm focused on essentialism? That's been part of Luke's side of the argument. Didn't Luke just claim:

Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain". — Luke

To which I said "this is clearly false".

This is the principal feature of the difference between Luke's interpretation of the so-called private language argument, and mine. Luke believes that a word's meaning is based in rules, therefore Luke is drawn toward the reality of essentialism. So Luke thinks that Wittgenstein demonstrates that a private word cannot have meaning. As Luke says above: "The problem is with the putative private word/sign 'S'".

But I see he so-called PLA as involved with the problem of naming an object, rather than being involved with the meaning of a word. What 258 indicates directly is a problem in naming supposed private objects. You seem to agree with me on this point. But I take a step further, where you refuse to go, to say that the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public. This is the criterion of identity, as referenced by the example of the chair at 253. This means that the demonstration presented by Wittgenstein is not a "private language" argument at all, it is misrepresented as that.

However, I think you are absolutely on the right track to refer us back to 48. What is demonstrated here is the apparently unbridgeable gap between naming an object, and describing an order. This points to a huge discrepancy in metaphysical world-views. which manifests as differences in language use. What I propose is that the so-called private language argument (253-270) is intended to demonstrate a problem inherent in "naming" an object.

One thing of note in your posts is their mercurial nature.

Which serves to reinforce my disinclination to reply to them.

It seems you read §48 as being about the order of the squares. Have a look at the context - at least read §47 and §49, but preferably also the critique of ostensive definition - naming by pointing - in the pages before that.

Then help me to work out if naming is part of a language game or not.

It does more than just refer to a sensation. If it just referred to a sensation the word 'pain' would play no role. 'Pain' and 'S' are not the same. Pain, however incompletely, describes the sensation. — Fooloso4

I don't want to say that you can't call it a description, but I don't find the word apt. It's unclear to me what it is a description of. And is it the same description every time?

I am more amenable to stating it in these terms:

To indicate the kind of sensation that is present is what the sensation word pain means. — Fooloso4

But I wonder whether this account does not also submit to your argument regarding pain management; that it is not necessary for a pain to be present or expressed in order for us to use the word.

What is the exact nature of the pain? — Fooloso4

The exact nature is how it feels (to me), I guess, which ties back to why the word "pain" is not a description of my (or any particular person's) sensation. As Floyd puts it:

...we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is: if the word did refer to the sensation, the word would mean nothing to anyone but me (as a word in a private language would). — Richard Floyd

It's unclear to me what it is a description of. — Luke

It is a description of the sensation, although not an complete one.

... it is not necessary for a pain to be present or expressed in order for us to use the word. — Luke

Right, although one would expect that when there is an expression of pain, a pain would be present. This is why I said that the use of the word is not necessarily to express pain.

...we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is — Richard Floyd

I think these are two different things. The pain does refer to the sensation, but to refer directly is not to give someone else my pain.

if the word did refer to the sensation, the word would mean nothing to anyone but me (as a word in a private language would). — Richard Floyd

There is a difference between a word in a private language, 'S', and a word like 'pain'. There is no way for someone else to know what 'S' is, not because it is a sensation, but because unlike pain, no one else knows what the sensation. The word has no use. We all know what pain.

There is no way to know if our inner experiences are the same except through our common reactions to these experiences. It's our cries coupled with language that gives life to these experiences (e.g. pain experiences) in a public way. The evidence for the experience is the commonality of reaction, whether it's non-verbal or verbal. The same is true of consciousness itself, viz., how we know someone or some other living organism is conscious is by the way they act (acts referring to language or other kinds of nonverbal acts). So, these concepts don't describe pain or consciousness, they simply show that I'm having an inner experience of some kind, in which I react the same as you, or similar to how you react. We can't peer into the mind to observe these inner experiences, and looking at brain activity does little to help in the way of describing the experience.

That "pain" may be defined in different ways indicates very clearly that there is not just one type or class which is called "pain". — Metaphysician Undercover

Aren't we talking about the sensation of pain? What many different ways are there to define "pain" in this sense? (I'm not asking what many different types of pain there are).

You seem to be overlooking the reality of the situation, that most of the time during language use we do not proceed based on "agreed" definitions, or "agreed" usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fine, I'm happy to call it "common usage" as you proceeded to do. I never meant to suggest that we each signed a contract; only that the usage is conventional or commonly practised.

If this is what constitutes the existence of a "type"... — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". Like when Pluto was declassified as a planet. "Planet" is the type, the definition of the word. The rocks in our solar system are the concrete particulars that we classify as planets or not planets.

What I've been telling you, is that in common usage of "sensation", the thing sensed, the object of a sensation (something seen for example), might be called a token of a type. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I've told you multiple times is that the type-token distinction is independent of "things sensed"; the distinction is merely classificatory, distinguishing a class from its instances; a name from the things named.

Reread 244 please. He distinctly says, there doesn't "seem" to be any problem here. Then he goes on to explain how there really is a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover

He says there doesn't seem to be any problem of words referring to sensations, and that "we talk about sensations every day, and name them". Where does he "explain how there really is a problem" with words referring to sensations?

So the problem is not with the "private word/sign 'S'", as you state...
The use of the proper noun, "S" as a name to name a particular sensation, which is a supposed private thing (token for you) cannot be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

You start by saying the problem is not with "S" but end by saying the problem is with justifying the use of "S"...?

But I take a step further, where you refuse to go, to say that the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public. — Metaphysician Undercover

Meta's public language argument(!), which demonstrates the logical impossibility of a public language.

...All stated in a public language.

One thing of note in your posts is their mercurial nature. — Banno

I think I just tend to reflect back what gets thrown at me. Maybe it goes back with more force than it comes at me though.

Then help me to work out if naming is part of a language game or not. — Banno

Try this Banno. If something is composite, then we ought to be able to name its parts. But when we go to name the parts, the parts derive their identity from their position (order) within the the thing which they are parts of, as per the demonstration (48). In this case, the name doesn't really name a thing, it names the thing's position as a part of that larger complexity. But this is not really a naming of these things (the parts), it is a description of the complex thing which the parts are a part of.

So, if we distinguish between naming and describing (49), then true "naming" would seem to be prior to all description, names for the things, a requirement for the description of them. We'd need to identify and name the objects, or elements, so that the names would be fixed to them, independently of any context, any description, and this would be true naming, allowing us to proceed in describing them.

However, in the end, such a naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible, because the principal criterion of identity is a thing's spatial-temporal positioning. So we cannot get away from our reliance on description for naming, and description appears to be prior to naming, as naming is nothing more than describing, because we have no true criterion of identity.