Language formation occurs as the result of a priori rules hard wired into our DNA. I — Hanover

There are plenty of approaches within psycholinguistics that offer alternatives to this Chomskyesque view of language. Embodied and enactivist models embrace the later Wittgenstein while rejecting innatist and representationalist theoreis of language. — Joshs

Haven't read much of these alternative accounts in relation to language. Can these alternative accounts reasonably explain why humans which were not exposed to language in their preadolescent years cannot learn to speak grammatically correct language?

You could, however, make that information public. There is an object that is pointed to. The thing about a private language is that it cannot be made public. — Fooloso4

I get that I cannot point to an internal sensation, but what of non-nouns that I cannot point to, like run, put, beside, and without? What about nouns that I can't point to, like freedom, the United States, agency, Bigfoot, the current Queen of France, etc.?

Haven't read much of these alternative accounts in relation to language. Can these alternative accounts reasonably explain why humans which were not exposed to language in their preadolescent years cannot learn to speak grammatically correct language? — javra

If you fail to develop your language skills at an early age, they don't develop correctly. What other explanation is there?

If you fail to develop your language skills at an early age, they don't develop correctly. What other explanation is there? — Hanover

Hey, I agree! But being the fallibilist that I am, I asked out of curiosity.

Can these alternative accounts reasonably explain why humans which were not exposed to language in their preadolescent years cannot learn to speak grammatically correct language? — javra

There are a lot of capacities that we learn much more effectively in early childhood than in adulthood, such as a foreign accent and perceptual skills. . This would seem to be more a matter of the neural plasticity of a young brain rather than the effect of innate structures.

What about nouns that I can't point to, like freedom, the United States, agency, Bigfoot, the current Queen of France, etc.? — Hanover

These are things about which there is enough familiarity to discuss them.

The sensation that only I have that I name 'S' is not like that. Or maybe you too have a sensation you call 'S'. Are they the same or even similar? How could we tell?

There are a lot of capacities that we learn much more effectively in early childhood than in adulthood, such as a foreign accent and perceptual skills. . This would seem to be more a matter of the neural plasticity of a young brain rather than the effect of innate structures. — Joshs

I grant the explanation, but it leaves me, personally, far from convinced. We are by far the most behaviorally plastic species that we know of. Yes. But I don't find this fact to in any way dispel the reality that we too hold genetically innate behaviors. From our innate ability to engage in basic perception (e.g. of a basic behavior) to our innate imprinting on caregivers (e.g. of a complex instinctive behavior), innate activities in humans still play an important part of our behavior as a species. And I can find no reason not to include universal grammar in the list.

There are also other questions that could be asked, such as an explanation for creole languages:

The system used by the original speakers is typically an inconsistent mix of vocabulary items, known as a pidgin. As these speakers' children begin to acquire their first language, they use the pidgin input to effectively create their own original language, known as a creole. Unlike pidgins, creoles have native speakers (those with acquisition from early childhood) and make use of a full, systematic grammar. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_grammar#Presence_of_creole_languages

How does increased neural plasticity in youth in and of itself account for why creole develops from pidgin when pidgin is all that children are exposed to and when pidgin works well enough for the adult original speakers?

But to sum, I grant your explanation, but I find it very wanting.

knowledge by acquaintance — javra

This is interesting.

But this is a major theme: knowledge by acquaintance is problematic.

From the start of PI Wittgenstein examines ostension. He starts with a critique of Augustin's idea that pointing is fundamental to language. Pointing is as much a linguistic act as is asking a question, so it cannot stand as fundamental to language.

And knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge by ostension.

The argument is that you cannot doubt that the door is shut while you are standing looking at the door - or something along those lines. That you know the door is shut by acquaintance. But you can doubt that what you see is indeed a door - that the word "door" applies here. With this and other arguments Wittgenstein undermines the primacy of knowledge by acquaintance, showing it to be as much a part of our use of language as any other sentence. "Slab!

That I see a red cup is neither contingent on claims that I might make nor is it a reality I need to place my faith or trust in. It simply is. — javra

It's based on your use of "Red" "Cup" "I" and "See". It already embeds you in a language community.

Your belief that the cup is red is not justified by anything. The contention is that it is insufficient to count as knowledge, because doing so fudges the very useful distinction between belief and knowledge.

But further, if "the cup is red" were to count as knowledge by acquaintance, it must be justified by appeal to our common use of those words.

This is where @Sam26 and I differ slightly; I recall that he takes a stronger line in defining knowledge. It's a point of ongoing discussion.

. From our innate ability to engage in basic perception (e.g. of a basic behavior) to our innate imprinting on caregivers (e.g. of a complex instinctive behavior), innate activities in humans still play an important part of our behavior as a species. — javra

Are you arguing that pre-wired innate structures play a central role in the most complex kinds of adult human interactions? Could you give examples of this?

checking is possible in the private case too. — Hanover

Yes, that, I think, is a common objection, to which the first reply is : "… whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘correct’"; and the second, A repeat of my claim above; you used the word "dog" to privately refer to the first dog; now you have no basis to show that your referring to the second dog is a second instance of the same rule; all you may be doing is inventing a novel use of the word "dog".

This leads us to the generalisation of the private language argument to rules, in principle. That one is following a rule is not dependent on stating the rule, but in following it. This is complimentary to the theme of replacing meaning with use.

Wittgenstein as a phenomenologist. Presumably not of the Heideggerian school? — Banno

A precise answer to that question can be found here.

Wittgenstein was not promulgating coherentism. But I have an interest in reconciling Davidson - Quine's intellectual son - and Wittgenstein, so I'm interested, if confused.

Wittgenstein's so-called "Anthropological Holism"
— sime
Start there. What is it? Who called it that? — Banno

Fodor et al. as described here

For Wittgenstein, even the concept of a machine implementing an algorithm is relative to human customs, rather than what machines themselves are doing per-se. He is a logic anti-realist. Unfortunately, his understanding of rules as being ontologically dependent upon the background context of human customs for their recognition is perpetually misinterpreted as referring to meaning and rules being epistemically dependent on social feedback, something which isn't helped by the terrible wikipedia article on the subject.

I don't know any other word with which to describe Wittgenstein other than a coherentist, given his abandonment of foundationalism and recognizably Quineian stance towards semantics, nothing the 1951 publication date of the Two Dogmas of Empiricism that was two years prior to the posthumous publication of PI in 1953. There have been some recent attempts to divide their points of view, but I personally find them unconvincing.

I don't think the problem is that a rule is not being followed, but that ostensibly he is not pointing to anything at all. He may have this sensation but he is not pointing to anything that would allow us to know what that sensation is. — Fooloso4

IN the case of a private sensation, yes.

Thank you.

Your comparison with Quine came to mind as I wrote

The argument is that you cannot doubt that the door is shut while you are standing looking at the door - or something along those lines. That you know the door is shut by acquaintance. But you can doubt that what you see is indeed a door - that the word "door" applies here. With this and other arguments Wittgenstein undermines the primacy of knowledge by acquaintance, showing it to be as much a part of our use of language as any other sentence. "Slab! — Banno

I'm not sure "anthropological holism" is an accurate term. Partly because I am somewhat allergic to the use of such generalised terms in an argument, much preferring common language. While the term draws attention to similarities between Wittgenstein and Quine, I doubt it pays sufficient attention to their differences.

That is, I find it very difficult to decode sentences such as:

Unfortunately, his understanding of rules as being ontologically dependent upon the background context of human customs for their recognition is perpetually misinterpreted as referring to meaning and rules being epistemically dependent on social feedback, something which isn't helped by the terrible wikipedia article on the subject. — sime

I see a dog and I name it "dog," yet I tell no one and that private word exists for me. I then see another dog and I recall it is called "dog," and I say to myself "there is a dog," — Hanover

You must also then have invented the private words "there", "is" and "a". But how would you know what they mean without translating them into the public language you have been inducted into?

The argument is that you cannot doubt that the door is shut while you are standing looking at the door - or something along those lines. That you know the door is shut by acquaintance. But you can doubt that what you see is indeed a door - that the word "door" applies here. With this and other arguments Wittgenstein undermines the primacy of knowledge by acquaintance, showing it to be as much a part of our use of language as any other sentence. "Slab! — Banno

My dog has no language and yet knows the door is shut, so this argument fails to convince. Knowledge by acquaintance is indeed foundational; without it there could have been no language to begin with..

My dog has no language and yet knows the door is shut, — Janus

That is exactly what is in contention, so merely asserting it is not presenting an argument.

Does your dog know that you will shut the door at midday?

knowledge by acquaintance — javra

This is interesting.

But this is a major theme: knowledge by acquaintance is problematic.

From the start of PI Wittgenstein examines ostension. He starts with a critique of Augustin's idea that pointing is fundamental to language. Pointing is as much a linguistic act as is asking a question, so it cannot stand as fundamental to language.

And knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge by ostension. — Banno

I can understand that it can be problematic. I think this is primarily because it is a rather vague and thereby ambiguous term. We’re accustomed to abstracting. But the most concrete of knowns are simply that which we are directly aware of. And this devoid of communication, such that at least most of what we are directly aware of is not contingent upon our communicating it to others or to ourselves. I double checked the definition of “know” and “knowledge” to confirm common usage and, as I anticipated, some definitions rely on “to be aware of” or some such.

So while much of communication is contingent on ostension (communication of emotions via facial expressions as one example that isn’t), our direct awareness of givens is not. Furthermore, that which one is directly aware of is, as a percept, and via common usage of the term, known to oneself. How does one know that the orange juice one drinks tastes sweet to oneself if not via direct awareness, with no ostension required in this. Or, as a more extreme example, how does an animal know whether what they put into their mouths to taste tastes good to them and is thereby worth being eaten?

This is the form of “knowledge by acquaintance” which I have in mind. And, here, knowledge by acquaintance is not knowledge by ostension.

That I see a red cup is neither contingent on claims that I might make nor is it a reality I need to place my faith or trust in. It simply is. — javra

It's based on your use of "Red" "Cup" "I" and "See". It already embeds you in a language community. — Banno

I don't fully disagree. Language can and does shape our awareness to an extent. What might a wine connoisseur be devoid of the language that conveys the different subtleties of taste? Without this language, including the understanding of what it conveys, one would be clueless as to what a connoisseur knows. Nevertheless, a lesser animal with color vision can discern a red object from a non-red object too via its sight - without any language community required for this discernment. I don't find that we are so different from lesser animals that we'd be unable to so discern in the absence of our holding a language. After all, pre-linguistic children do. Here, again, both the lesser animal and human would know what is and is not red via acquaintance. So in this chicken and egg issue, I find that knowledge by acquaintance is prior to language, or even communication in general - though sometimes language can, for example, focus our perceptions so that they become more finely tuned.

So, again, there's disagreement with this:

But further, if "the cup is red" were to count as knowledge by acquaintance, it must be justified by appeal to our common use of those words. — Banno

There have been some recent attempts to divide their points of view, but I personally find them unconvincing. — sime

There are certainly some significant differences between Quine and Wittgenstein , such as their divergent views on the continuity of philosophy and science.

From our innate ability to engage in basic perception (e.g. of a basic behavior) to our innate imprinting on caregivers (e.g. of a complex instinctive behavior), innate activities in humans still play an important part of our behavior as a species. — javra

Are you arguing that pre-wired innate structures play a central role in the most complex kinds of adult human interactions? Could you give examples of this? — Joshs

Examples were give in the statement you quoted. Some of the most complex kinds of adult human interaction are in large part built upon them: perception and infant/child imprinting on caregivers (and the characteristics of such). We don't learn to perceive and we don't learn that we need to become attached to specific caregivers as young children (and, thereby, to their system of values which we tend to grow up with as individual humans).

To my eye you've missed a more interesting distinction - between knowing that... and knowing how...; knowing that the cup is red as against knowing how to ride a bike.

Knowing that... is inherently propositional.

Knowledge by acquaintance, if it is anything, is a form of knowing how.... Knowing by acquaintance that the cup is red is nothing more than knowing how to make use of the words "cup" and "red" in a sentence.

As such any special epistemic place it might be thought to have dissipates.

The dog knows how to go through the door, but does not know that "the door is closed" is true.

Knowing by acquaintance that the cup is red is nothing more than knowing how to make use of the words "cup" and "red" in a sentence. — Banno

You've overlooked what I said. Not very interesting, as you say.

Some of the most complex kinds of adult human interaction are in large part built upon them: perception and infant/child imprinting on caregivers (and the characteristics of such). We don't learn to perceive and we don't learn that we need to become attached to specific caregivers as young children (and, thereby, to their system of values which we tend to grow up with as individual humans). — javra

I don’t see why we need the assumption of such a pre-wired imprinting to explain the huge variety of adult social relations. All that’s needed is the assumption of humans as sense making creatures. Without. imprinting, how would social relations be different?

The dog knows the door is shut, he knows he can't go out so he whines a little because he knows that will get me to open the door for him. If I shut the door every day at midday, he will come to expect that. Otherwise how would he know I will shut the door at midday?

Knowledge by acquaintance, if it is anything, is a form of knowing how.... Knowing by acquaintance that the cup is red is nothing more than knowing how to make use of the words "cup" and "red" in a sentence. — Banno

You have it backwards . Knowing how and knowing that are forms of knowing by acquaintance; it is by familiarity with an activity that you come to know how. You know the cup is red by seeing it. It is simply the ability to distinguish between red and other colours; like the honeyeater who can recognize the red flowers that are her favorites.

You've overlooked what I said. — javra

My apologies. Point me to it.

The dog knows the door is shut — Janus

You can say that, but doing so fails to notice the very great difference between your dog's knowledge and your own.

I don't see that you are addressing the topic. It seems to me that you have simply bypassed the private language argument because you find it inconvenient. That's fine, and you might be able to work around it in an interesting way - although I think @Isaac makes a better case.

Do you find a metaphysical divide between humans and lesser animals? I don't, and, as such, I see no reason to deny generalized innate behaviors, such as that of imprinting, in the human species. No I don't hold definitive proof of it. But such is my view.

Without. imprinting, how would social relations be different? — Joshs

A complex topic were one were to get into it. I'm not Freudian leaning, no Oedipus or Electra complexes for me (!), but I do hold that we as adults, for example, tend to be attracted to partners that (for heterosexuals) embody the characteristics we saw our parent of the opposite sex hold during our formative years. This, again, due to what I believe to be our imprinting what a relationship ought to be from out parents. And it does explain the data that Freudian BS often makes use of.

How would social relations be different without imprinting? I imagine we wouldn't hold any subconscious preferences in who we find attractive. These often stubborn and sometimes unhealthy subconscious preferences are far more tedious to adequately explain via the assumption of blank-slate, sense-making creatures. But again, I do hold an absence of metaphysical division between humans and lesser animals, and I think we can agree the latter are not "blank-slates".

edited for mistypes

Point me to it. — Banno

OK: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/598040

You can say that, but doing so fails to notice the very great difference between your dog's knowledge and your own.

I don't see that you are addressing the topic. It seems to me that you have simply bypassed the private language argument because you find it inconvenient. That's fine, and you might be able to work around it in an interesting way - although I think Isaac makes a better case. — Banno

I do acknowledge the great difference between the dog's knowledge and my own; it's just that I understand them both as being founded on sensory experience.

I don't see how this relates to the PLA. As I've said a few times I think a private language is impossible, because in order to create a language uniquely my own I would need to translate the words, at least the non-ostensive words, that constituted that language into English in order to explain to myself what they refer to.I don't know if that is Wittgenstein's argument, though; I've never been able to work out just what his argument is.

Your belief that the cup is red is not justified by anything. The contention is that it is insufficient to count as knowledge, because doing so fudges the very useful distinction between belief and knowledge.

But further, if "the cup is red" were to count as knowledge by acquaintance, it must be justified by appeal to our common use of those words. — Banno

My view is that another way we justify beliefs is by linguistic training, i.e., we learn how to use words. How do I know that that is a cup and that it's red? First, we learn to use the words in social contexts, so (as I point to a cup) it's what we mean by cup, red, etc. Whether it makes sense to say "I know this is a cup," depends on the context. If someone was learning a language, we could imagine where one might appropriately doubt whether X is a cup or something else. In other words, the doubt is about the use of that particular word, and its referent.

So, I wouldn't claim that the cup example is an example of knowledge by acquaintance, you're making this assumption. This would be an example of justifying a belief based on linguistic training.