My position on this has evolved a bit since our first conversation. Your summary to invizzy would be closer to what my position was back when you and I were discussing Jack. After much consideration, I've sharpened it up a bit, so the summary is altogether mistaken now.

I am not saying anything at all about going back and changing what S would say at the time.

We can discuss things more later. For now though...

Let's start at the beginning of this particular famer's thought and belief formation process. Let's talk about how he goes from seeing a cloth to "there is a cow in the field". Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?

the summary is altogether mistaken now — creativesoul

@invizzy apparently he changed his views.

Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that? — creativesoul

Yep.

My apologies for not recognizing what all you've said here. — creativesoul

No problem. Thanks for your reply.

Ought we report what the farmer believes (that a piece of cloth is a cow), or what the farmer would likely say at that particular time (that he believes a cow is in the field)? — creativesoul

"Report" implies that we are talking to someone other than the farmer. So we report in the first way. If we were talking to the farmer, he would obviously not recognize what we would say. But to repeat to him the words he would use would suggest that we share his belief, so I can't use those. Before I can say anything to him, I have to ensure that we both understand the reference of the sentence. I must correct his mistake. “You know that cow in the field? Well actually it’s a piece of cloth.” or “I’m afraid that cow in the field is actually a piece of cloth” would do the trick.

I'm afraid I'm one of those who people who see every sentence as a (potential) speech-act so the context, including the audience, always needs to be considered.

I don't understand your diagnosis of Gettier's case 1. I think you've misremembered it. If I understand you rightly (and I'm not sure I have), your diagnosis of Case 2 is complicated by the fact that "P or Q" is true iff P is true or Q is true. So, according to Gettier and me, if Smith believes that P, they are justified in believing that P or Q. But, as you say P is false, yet, as Gettier tells us, Q is true. Smith's justification relies on P and the truth relies on Q. It's that mismatch that creates the problem. My solution to this example is to point out that Smith's justification fails and so he cannot know P or Q, which can be summarized as "no false lemmas".

I agree that at first sight it seems possible to construct an example without false lemmas. On second thought, however, I can't see how an example could be constructed without a false belief, so I am very sceptical of the possibility. There are some attempts, but they haven't convinced me.

In short, it seems to me that Gettier case ought to be possible. Perhaps the real Gettier problem is why it is so hard to develop one that commands general agreement or to articulate a general solution.

I think the Gettier paper is so lost for inquiry, that it appears naive.
When the driver thinks he's correct in seeing a barn merely from driving past it and
the connection of assumptions to who lands a job, what? Without proper inquiry for something that seems trivial and does not warrant the proper inquiry.
If we were to relate to important assumptions, we would put all scientific efforts to it and certainly not be satisfied with these naive beliefs from superficial investigations if there were lives at stake in seeing a barn instead of movie scenery or one guy landing a job instead of another guy, let's say for the President of USA. Would really the coins in a pocket be something?
So perhaps inside information from the employer would seem more convincing in terms of who lands a job.
Conclusion: the paper is naive.

the summary is altogether mistaken now
— creativesoul

@invizzy apparently he changed his views. — neomac

I changed how I present them.

Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?
— creativesoul

Yep. — neomac

Okay.

Do we agree that at time t1, the farmer believed that the cloth in the field was a cow, but he does not know that?

"Report" implies that we are talking to someone other than the farmer. So we report in the first way. If we were talking to the farmer, he would obviously not recognize what we would say. But to repeat to him the words he would use would suggest that we share his belief, so I can't use those. Before I can say anything to him, I have to ensure that we both understand the reference of the sentence. I must correct his mistake. “You know that cow in the field? Well actually it’s a piece of cloth.” or “I’m afraid that cow in the field is actually a piece of cloth” would do the trick. — Ludwig V

I understand the concerns with clarity, particularly when it comes to expressing one's views in a philosophical discussion with other philosophers. We can be a picky bunch. However, I no longer share any deep concerns at all over these matters we're currently discussing. To me, it is as plain and simple as the nose on my face. Gettier's Case I has everything to do with reference. That being said...

Sure, we could inform the farmer of his mistake by doing as you suggest or something similar. That would do the trick, if that amounts to allowing the farmer to become aware that he had false belief, unbeknownst to himself at time t1.

I'm afraid I'm one of those who people who see every sentence as a (potential) speech-act so the context, including the audience, always needs to be considered. — Ludwig V

Of course. That's a beneficial consequence stemming from your namesake's insistence upon looking at how we use language in order to ascertain the meaning. I do not foresee that as being a potential problem here.

I don't understand your diagnosis of Gettier's case 1. I think you've misremembered it. — Ludwig V

Well, that surprises me.

Okay. I just looked it up and you're completely right, I did misremember. My apologies, but the basic objection still stands. I just mixed up who Smith believed would get the job. Easy enough to correct. Thank you for pointing that out! Much better to report the Case correctly, especially given this discussion.

So, Smith justifiably believed that Jones would get the job, and he had counted the coins in Jones' pocket earlier. Gettier invoked the rules of entailment to have Smith go from "Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket" to "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". Smith got the job instead of Jones, and unbeknownst to Smith he too had ten coins in his pocket, so "the man with ten coins in his pocket", which is what Gettier reports as Smith's belief, turns out to be true even though Jones did not get the job, and Smith believed that Jones would.

Treating Smith's belief as a naked proposition is to change what sorts of things would make Smith's belief true. Smith did not believe that he would get the job. He believed that Jones would get the job. So, in Smith's mind the person referred to by "the man with ten coins in his pocket" was Jones, and no one else. Smith got the job, contrary to his own belief.

The difference between Smith's belief and the proposition when treated as a naked one is clear. The proposition would be true if any man with ten coins in their pocket got the job. Smith's belief is not about any man. It is about Jones, and no one else. Smith's belief would have been true only if, only when, and only because Jones got the job.

If I understand you rightly (and I'm not sure I have), your diagnosis of Case 2 is complicated by the fact that "P or Q" is true iff P is true or Q is true. So, according to Gettier and me, if Smith believes that P, they are justified in believing that P or Q. But, as you say P is false, yet, as Gettier tells us, Q is true. Smith's justification relies on P and the truth relies on Q. It's that mismatch that creates the problem. My solution to this example is to point out that Smith's justification fails and so he cannot know P or Q, which can be summarized as "no false lemmas".

Well, it doesn't seem to me that my diagnosis of Case II is complicated by the fact that "P or Q" is true if P or Q is true. Rather, that is precisely what makes the case.

Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jone's owned a Ford(because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false.

(P or Q) does not adequately take Smith's belief into account. Just like the first case, Smith's belief is not equivalent to the naked disjunction (Por Q). Rather, Smith believed that P or Q was true because P. Leaving out that last bit (because P) is to provide an accounting malpractice of Smith's belief. It is not equivalent to the naked proposition/disjunction.

I prefer to put Gettier's Case II in long form, for that's how those sorts of beliefs are best understood, and it's also much easier for the average Joe to register and/or otherwise understand the problem.

Smith believed that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" was true because Jones owned a Ford. It was not. To quite contrary, it was true because Brown was in Barcelona. Smith's belief was false. The conventional accounting practices used by Gettier leave all that completely neglected. Hence, I find those practices to be lacking in explanatory power when it comes to correctly reporting(taking account of) Smith's belief.

Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true.

Salva veritate.

In short, it seems to me that Gettier case ought to be possible. Perhaps the real Gettier problem is why it is so hard to develop one that commands general agreement or to articulate a general solution. — Ludwig V

Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices. From convention accounting practices' inability to properly render Smith's belief in both Gettier cases, to belief attribution practices(including but not limited to the de re/de dicto distinction) claiming that the farmer's belief statement is justified, when it is clearly not if we look carefully enough at what grounded that statement, to the practice of being far too strict with what ought only apply to some beliefs, and working from the presupposition/dogma that all belief ought be only rendered in terms amenable to belief as propositional attitude simply because openly espoused ones can.

There is a basic (mis)conception of meaningful human thought and belief in philosophy proper, and it's been there for a very long time. As a result of getting thought and belief wrong on such a basic level, we've gotten something basic wrong about everything ever thought, believed, spoken, and/or otherwise uttered when offering a report about their origin.

It's no wonder that there are no notions of belief at work(that I'm aware of) that are rendered in terms easily amenable to evolutionary progression. With all the talk about consciouness, it doesn't look hopeful for this to be corrected, in small part at the very least, any time soon. You'll have that.

I'm very busy in real life everyday practical financially rewarding endeavors, and I'm very lucky to have been fortunate enough to be the one who's currently in my shoes, so to speak. That being said, there is something that I get from doing philosophy well, and listening to others who also do, that simply cannot be gotten any other way. So, sometimes I piddle...

I appreciate your responses thus far.

Very professional. Oh...

And you're more than welcome for the earlier reply. It was my pleasure.

Do we agree that at time t1, the farmer believed that the cloth in the field was a cow, but he does not know that? — creativesoul

I agree to the extent we can derogate to the de-dicto way of reporting beliefs, as explained.

How does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"? How does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

How does the "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to state "there is a cow in the field"? — creativesoul

Not sure how to understand your questions, but I could say that there are 2 conditions to take into account: 1. perceptual evidences 2. justificatory practices. So e.g. the fact that available evidences fit enough into a cow-shape perceptual template, plus the fact that no other justificatory practice more reliable than judging by habit is applied may suffice to explain the mistaken belief.

I do understand and share the difficulty you have in fitting in the demands or ordinary life alongside pursuing philosophy. They explain why I sometimes disappear for a while. It's an inevitable part of the medium we are working in.

Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford (because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false. — creativesoul

I agree with this. There's a question you don't include in your summary - whether Smith was justified in believing that Jones owned a Ford. Gettier's answer is that he was. That's the situation that generates the confusion that people feel about these cases.

Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true. — creativesoul

But surely is one part of a disjunction is true, the whole disjunction is true. "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Jones owned a Ford. Yes? Also "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Brown is in Barcelona. Yes? That's all I'm saying.

Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices. — creativesoul

I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by conventional or unconventional accounting practices. Can you please explain?

I agree to the extent we can derogate to the de-dicto way of reporting beliefs, as explained. — neomac

I'm sorry, I don't understand what you mean by the de dicto (or de re) way(s) of reporting beliefs. I do know what di dicto and de re mean. Can you please explain?

I don't understand what you mean by the de dicto (or de re) way(s) of reporting beliefs. I do know what di dicto and de re mean. Can you please explain? — Ludwig V

I and Creativesoul had a very long exchange about his views a while ago so I’m reusing here expressions I clarified there (and without worrying too much about standard usage).
To make a long story short, “de dicto” belief-attributions refer to belief-attributions relative to a certain believer’s p.o.v. For example, in “the farmer believes that is a cow”, the subordinate clause "that is a cow" is rendering the farmer’s belief content exclusively according to the farmer’s point of view in the given circumstances.
In the case of “de re” belief-attributions, we refer to belief-attributions independently from a certain believer’s p.o.v. . For example, in “the farmer believes that piece of cloth is a cow”, the subordinate clause "that piece of cloth is a cow" is rendering the farmer’s belief independently from his point of view because the piece of cloth wasn’t identified as such by the farmer. Indeed, we have linguistic tools to non-ambiguously render “de-re” belief attributions: e.g. “the farmer believes of that piece of cloth that is a cow” where “of that piece of cloth” is referring to something outside the p.o.v. of the believer as rendered by the subordinate clause “that is a cow”.

Thanks very much for your explanation. It seems to me that is close to my approach, though I can't describe how it all fits together clearly.

"Of that piece of cloth" opens up another issue. I mean that as well as "believe of that piece of cloth", there is the use of believe as in "believe in". I'm not at all sure that either has any relevance to Gettier, and most people, confronted with them, want to reduce them to propositional beliefs of the traditional kind. I'm not at all sure about that. There are nuances going on here that I don't have any grip on.

I'm afraid I don't have any ideas about where we should go next.

On second thought, however, I can't see how an example could be constructed without a false belief, so I am very sceptical of the possibility. There are some attempts, but they haven't convinced me. — Ludwig V

That's how I see it as well.

In short, it seems to me that Gettier case ought to be possible. Perhaps the real Gettier problem is why it is so hard to develop one that commands general agreement or to articulate a general solution. — Ludwig V

I think part of the problem is that there are many different tracks along which disagreement and misunderstanding can occur and so care is needed to properly distinguish and relate them. Some of the philosophical and linguistic issues the Gettier problem raises are:

• What conception of knowledge are we talking about? Everyday, specialized, idiosyncratic?
• Can knowledge be decomposed at all? JTB, JTB+, knowledge-first?
• What is truth?
• What is justification? Certain, pragmatic, contextual?
• Relation to nearby epistemic puzzles? Lottery paradox, Harman-Vogel paradox.
• What points-of-view are applicable? Omniscient, stipulative, relative, subjective/objective?
• What is belief? Representational/functional, internal/external, de dicto/de re?
• How are perceptual terms used? Factive, sense-data, other philosophical usages?

You've shown a penchant recently for not answering questions posed to you. Try this...

Does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow?
Does the act of mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"?
Does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

You've shown a penchant recently for not answering questions posed to you. — creativesoul

Well due to our past exchange I don't trust your way of framing problems.

Does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? — creativesoul

Yes but there might be some catch in the term "follow" (between perceptual belief and propositional belief there is not narrow logic linking).

Does the act of mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"? — creativesoul

Yes but there might be some catch in the term "sufficient reason" (between perceptual belief and propositional belief there is not narrow logic linking).

Does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field? — creativesoul

I take "warrent" as a synonimous of "justify". As I pointed out we must agree on the notion of "justification" to discuss further the issue. In any case, I wouldn't claim "mistaking cloth for cow warrants concluding that there is a cow in field". I would claim "mistaking cloth for cow explains the belief that there is a cow in field"

I'm afraid I don't have any ideas about where we should go next. — Ludwig V

We could put some effort into clarifying the notion of "justification" according to an internalist epistemology. In that sense, I think "justification" is a normative term, not a descriptive one. Additionally, justificatory practices vary depending on the genesis of a belief and they have different degrees of reliability (which also means that we distinguish "valid" from "sound" applications). Since our beliefs are fallible, our knowledge and justificatory claims are fallible as well.

I would claim "mistaking cloth for cow explains the belief that there is a cow in field" — neomac

Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?
— creativesoul

Yep. — neomac

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow?

Mistaking that particular cloth for a cow is to believe that that cloth is a cow. That's the beginning of this particular farmer's thought and/or belief formation process. It makes no sense to judge whether or not the farmer's belief is justified unless we carefully examine what grounds that target belief. A case of mistaken identity grounds it.

The cottage industry cases completely neglect to include the beginning of the farmer's thought and/or belief formation process.

It does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow that one is justified in asserting/believing that "there is a cow in the field" is true.

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow. Starting at "there is a cow in the field" completely neglects to assess the belief underwriting the exclamation. Those give rise to "there is a cow in the field".

Besides that, "that's a cow" would be the first thing the farmer thought/believed upon looking at the cloth. Then, he may deduce "there is a cow in the field". It makes no difference. Neither follow from mistaking cloth for cow.

...the fact that available evidences fit enough into a cow-shape perceptual template — neomac

The cloth looked like a cow.

...plus the fact that no other justificatory practice more reliable than judging by habit... — neomac

As if any judgment habit counts...

Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford (because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false.
— creativesoul

I agree with this. There's a question you don't include in your summary - whether Smith was justified in believing that Jones owned a Ford. Gettier's answer is that he was. That's the situation that generates the confusion that people feel about these cases. — Ludwig V

I agree that Smith's belief was justified. I deny that it was true, because I deny that the target proposition/disjunction is equivalent to Smith's belief at the time. Looking at what makes them true shines clear light on this accounting malpractice of confusing belief with a naked proposition.

I'm pointing out that Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford. The disjunction was not true because Jones owned a Ford. It was true because Brown was in Barcelona. Thus, Smith's belief is justified, valid, and false. That poses no problem for JTB.

Case II has Gettier guilty of not getting Smith's belief right to begin with. Convention did not notice, because he followed all the rules of belief attribution/reporting practices. When we do get Smith's belief right, the 'problem' dissolves completely. As above, justified, valid, false belief is not a problem for JTB. Gettier was/is not alone. He merely followed the historical conventional practices of belief attribution based upon rendering all belief in propositional form. Convention still treats naked propositions as equivalent to belief when rendering an individuals' belief in propositional form. It manifests from the divorce/separation of truth and belief. That's the reason why Gettier's paper has persisted.

Another historical problem is the conventional mistake of treating belief as though it is equivalent to the naked proposition. It's not. We can know that by virtue of carefully comparing what it would take for the belief under consideration to be true with what it would take in order for the naked proposition to be true. They are not always the same. This is one such case. It's not the only one. Case I is yet another.


Smith's belief is not just that the disjunction is true. Rather, it is more about his knowing what makes the disjunction true. Think about what all it takes in order for an individual to do what Gettier suggests Smith does in his thought/belief formation process. Smith has to know enough to deliberately follow the S knows that P formula that Gettier was targeting. Gettier even goes so far as to openly claim that Smith knows the rules of disjunction as well as the rules of entailment, for it is the entailment that Gettier uses in order for him to claim that Smith knowingly deduced P or Q from P. Gettier even added that Smith was aware of the move, which presupposes that he intentionally and deliberately knowingly made it. Then he forgets all about that part. Odd, given he was supposed to be reporting Smith's belief.

Think about it in a way that's been sorely neglected. It's common sense.

If Smith believed that Jones owned a Ford, and he was adept enough to know that the rules of entailment would allow him to deduce "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" from his belief that Jones owned a Ford, then it only follows that he did not believe that the disjunction was true as a result of Brown's whereabouts. It was. To quite the contrary, he believed it was true regardless of Brown's whereabouts. It was not.

He only believed the disjunction was true because he believed Jones owned a Ford. He would never have uttered it otherwise. Belief that (P v Q) does not adequately take Smith's belief into account.

That is one historical accounting malpractice.

Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true.
— creativesoul

But surely is one part of a disjunction is true, the whole disjunction is true. "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Jones owned a Ford. Yes? Also "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Brown is in Barcelona. Yes? That's all I'm saying. — Ludwig V

Yes. The disjunction was true as a result of Brown's whereabouts, contrary to Smith's belief that it was true regardless of Brown's whereabouts. Gettier admitted as much, but neglected to take that into consideration when reporting Smith's belief. Smith only deduced the disjunction as a result of his believing it was true because Jones owned a Ford.

Belief that the disjunction is true because of P is false when the disjunction is true as a result of Q.

Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices.
— creativesoul

I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by conventional or unconventional accounting practices. Can you please explain? — Ludwig V

No worries.

This post touches upon and/or skirts around that aspect a bit more. Happy to answer any questions.

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow? — creativesoul

Yep. And?

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow. — creativesoul

So what?

As if any judgment habit counts... — creativesoul

For what?

After 10 posts of yours I still didn't get what your point is.

Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow?
— creativesoul

Yep. And?

Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow.
— creativesoul

So what? — neomac

Are you claiming that the farmer's belief that there is a cow in the field justified?

If you're not, then we're in agreement. If you are then now you know how to understand the following questions...

How does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow?
How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"?
How does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field?

Are you claiming that the farmer's belief that there is a cow in the field
justified? — creativesoul

Again, it depends on what one means by "justification". If justification must comply with the "no false lemma" (or equivalent) then the farmer is not justified, if justification must not comply with "no false lemma" (or equivalent) then the farmer could be justified. You didn't clarify your understanding of "justification". On the contrary, your wrote:

It makes no sense to judge whether or not the farmer's belief is justified unless we carefully examine what grounds that target belief. — creativesoul

as if you didn't want to talk about justification before talking about belief.
So again, what's your point?

My point is the following: since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge.

I take it that you do not have a position on the matter then. Mine has been made clear.

In the cottage cases, the target belief is not justified as a result of being neither, well-grounded nor validly deduced(if we stipulate S following the S knows that P as Gettier did). I've argued for that extensively and in more than one way. In Gettier's paper, which is remarkably different, the target beliefs are not equivalent to Smith's. I've argued extensively for that as well.

Since you refuse to take a position or offer valid criticism of mine, I suppose we have nothing left to discuss then.

Cheers. Be well.

we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow — neomac

We could say it. It would not make it so.

Belief that there is a cow does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow.

S begins with a case of mistaking cloth for cow. Cases of mistaken identity do not make for solid, sufficient, and/or otherwise adequate ground from which to reliably infer, deduce, conclude, and/or subsequently believe anything else at all.

Since you refuse to take a position — creativesoul

I took a position about the notions of "justification" and "knowledge". Here:

I think "justification" is a normative term, not a descriptive one. Additionally, justificatory practices vary depending on the genesis of a belief and they have different degrees of reliability (which also means that we distinguish "valid" from "sound" applications). Since our beliefs are fallible, our knowledge and justificatory claims are fallible as well (link)

since the distinction between justification+"no false lemma" and justification-"no false lemma" looks analogous to the distinction between sound and valid deduction, we could simply talk about sound vs valid justification depending on the context. So in the case of the farmer's false belief, we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow, but not soundly justified. And only the latter case can be called knowledge. (link)

or offer valid criticism of mine — creativesoul

I didn't even get what your point is. You didn't explain how you changed your views nor why.

We could say it. It would not make it so. — creativesoul

Again it depends on what "justification" means to you.

Belief that there is a cow does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow. — creativesoul

"Follow" means what? If "follow" means "come after", then it can follow. If "follow" means some causal link, then it can still follow. If "follow" means "justifies" then we are back to square one: what do you mean by "justification"?

I didn't even get what your point is. — neomac

I've made several accompanied by subsequent argument. You've chosen to neglect all that.

The latest point was that you could not back up your claims about "there's a cow in the field" being justified. You refuse to answer very basic questions regarding how? Instead, you feign ignorance and distract attention away from your own shortcomings by creating confusion regarding what is meant by the words that you must use in order to make your case. Like your herring a bit red, do you?

You've proven my last point rather nicely.

I'm still willing to see how "there is a cow in the field" satisfies your criterion for what counts as a justified belief. Valid criticism of my own position works too, but if you do not understand it, then it would be unreasonable of me to expect you to provide such.

I'm strongly asserting that it is not justified, and I've offered more than adequate/sufficient subsequent arguments and/or reasoning for that assertion. Those are all the parts you've left sorely neglected.