I could write much more, but I don't see any point. There are other philosophers who are expressing the same views or close to it, so it's not an interpretation that's absurd. Much of what I've argued for has not even been addressed.

Time for a break, at least I hope so, my mind sometimes works overtime on some of these arguments, and that gets tiring. Cheers from sunny Florida.

That's because "hinge-propositions" are a neurological phenomenon. Meaning, the acceptance of a truth value, much like logical validity itself, does not imply the accurate conclusion of truth value one way or the other. But, that such an acceptance must take place before action, and thereby function, can be initiated. — Garrett Travers

Sorry, but I don't really know what you're trying to say. Could you express it more plainly?

Sorry, but I don't really know what you're trying to say. Could you express it more plainly? — Luke

Yeah. Normal propositions in logic are written, and represent a simple argument that is either valid, or invalid based on certain straight forward rules. Hinge-propositions are not that at all. There propositions that emerge in thought, and are either accepted by us individually, or rejected. The acceptance or rejection of those propositions inform our behavior, and behavior is function.

Thus, if I'm to move to open a door to leave my home, I must have accepted the hinge proposition that the door will open in the first place to let me out. Furthermore, if I am leaving the house to go to whole-foods, the action is predicated on the belief of such a places existence. Does that make sense? That's what Witt's talking about.

Oddly, couple reasons why the concept kind of breaks down is because:

1. it has appropriated a clearly defined concept in logic that doesn't actually apply to itself
2. any given action one engages in is actually probably predicated on hundreds of these 'hinge-propositions' at base function

There is a kind of certainty that is expressed in our actions, i.e., as we act within the world, our actions show our certainty. However, this use is similar to subjective certainty above, but without the use of language. I act with certainty as I open the door. My actions show that I'm certain there is a door, that I have hands, etc. — Sam26

This is what I object to, as false, or unrealistic. Our actions do not demonstrate our certainty, and the randomness of an individual's mistakes shows this. Just because a person acts, and proves to be successful in that act, does not mean that the person was certain. In its extreme form, we have the practice of trial and error, in which a person acts without any degree of certainty, and there might still be success. So it is false to conclude that our actions express, or consistently demonstrate, certainty.

This is where justification enters the picture. Justification is what is used to demonstrate one's certainty. So, prior to an act for example, one might justify one's certainty concerning the act. But such justification is generally carried out with language, and that's where the problem lies, because using language, and justification itself, is an act. Therefore, there might not be certainty behind this act of justifying with the use of language. Now the problem, justification is an act designed to demonstrate certainty, but as an act, it is not necessarily based in certainty, so this undermines the concept of "justification" in a very fundamental way.

To resolve the issue one might propose hinge propositions, or other such propositions like self-evident truths, or analytic a priori, but none of these actually resolves the problem, in a way so as to remove the possibility of uncertainty. And the problem is that justification is fundamentally fallible because it is a human act which is not necessarily supported by certainty. This does not mean that it isn't most often supported by certainty, but it isn't always supported by certainty, therefore it is fallible. Because justification is fallible, it is necessary to distinguish between justified and true.

Given Wittgenstein's assumption that mathematics is a human construct, it follows that 1+1=2 is neither true nor false in that it not an empirical statement and so is outside the concept of truth as correspondence.

But is he going against his own admonition to just look? Does his theory of mathematics as well as modern number theory get in the way of what we actually do and say? For the ancient Greeks a number was not an abstraction but tells us how many of something. Saying how many is an empirical statement that is either true or false.

Given Wittgenstein's assumption that mathematics is a human construct, it follows that 1+1=2 is neither true nor false in that it not an empirical statement and so is outside the concept of truth as correspondence.

But is he going against his own admonition to just look? — Fooloso4

I believe W's view is that "1+1=2" is not counting, but is instead a rule or a preparation for counting, much like learning the meaning of a word is not actually using the word, but is instead a rule or preparation for the use of that word in a language-game. This also helps to explain why W considers it neither true nor false that the Paris metre is one metre long - because it is a rule or a preparation for making metric measurements and is not itself a measurement.

(And I still owe you a response to your previous post, which I am still considering)

Hinge-propositions are not that at all. There propositions that emerge in thought, and are either accepted by us individually, or rejected. The acceptance or rejection of those propositions inform our behavior, and behavior is function. — Garrett Travers

Not sure that I agree with this. Hinge "propositions" are not conscious judgments, so we do not accept/reject them in any rational or considered manner.

Thus, if I'm to move to open a door to leave my home, I must have accepted the hinge proposition that the door will open in the first place to let me out. Furthermore, if I am leaving the house to go to whole-foods, the action is predicated on the belief of such a places existence. Does that make sense? — Garrett Travers

Yes, this sounds more like it.

Not sure that I agree with this. Hinge "propositions" are not conscious judgments, so we do not accept/reject them in any rational or considered manner. — Luke

I genuinely don't know how you could have concluded that I asserted the opposite of what I specifically highlighted in the specific statement you quoted.

"There propositions that emerge in thought..."

They are conscious, but they are exclusively operating in the domain of your neural systems, not on paper in logical formality. They are the beliefs that proposals for behavior that one consideres rely upon to initiate that behavior.

Yes, this sounds more like it. — Luke

That's really all it is. Not that profound, and modern neuroscientific understandings of the actual process are astronomically more inspiring, enlightening, applicable, and relevant to human existence qua human existence.

They are conscious, but they are exclusively operating in the domain of your neural systems, not on paper in logical formality. — Garrett Travers

I don’t know what this means. They are conscious but they are not conscious?

I don’t know what this means. They are conscious but they are not conscious? — Luke

Hm, I can't imagine why that is appearing to you like that. No, I'm saying that formal logic is arranged in a systematic way, it's formulaic. Thought is organic and complex. A proposition in thought is not the samerigid process as the formality of actually doing logic on paper. Is that a bit more clear? The mind operates on very rapid analyses to induce action, it uses accepted or rejected facts of perceived reality to initiate those behaviors, it isn't formal. This is why using the term proposition is folly on Witt's part, it simply doesn't apply. It's better understood as: all human action is predicated on coherent networks of data for initiation.

I believe W's view is that "1+1=2" is not counting, but is instead a rule or a preparation for counting, much like learning the meaning of a word is not actually using the word, but is instead a rule or preparation for the use of that word in a language-game. This also helps to explain why W considers it neither true nor false that the Paris metre is one metre long - because it is a rule or a preparation for making metric measurements and is not itself a measurement. — Luke

There may be a point where I am no longer arguing about the correctness of your understanding of Wittgenstein and arguing against his understanding of arithmetic. This much seems to agree with what I said:

Put two apples on a bare table, see that no one comes near them and nothing shakes the table; now put another two apples on the table; now count the apples that are there. You have made an experiment; the result of the counting is probably 4. (We should present the result like this: when, in such-and-such circumstances, one puts first 2 apples and then another 2 on a table, mostly none disappear and none get added.) And analogous experiments can be carried out, with the same result, with all kinds of solid bodies.---This is how our children learn sums; for one makes them put down three beans and then another three beans and then count what is there. If the result at one time were 5, at another 7 (say because, as we should now say, one sometimes got added, and one sometimes vanished of itself), then the first thing we said would be that beans were no good for teaching sums. But if the same thing happened with sticks, fingers, lines and most other things, that would be the end of all sums.

(Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics)

The child does not learn a rule or preparation for counting, she learns how to count. If she learned correctly she not only affirms that it is true that there are 4 apples on the table, but by counting beans, sticks, fingers and other things she can affirm that it is true that 2 units + 2 units, or, in short, that 2+2=4.

The child does not learn a rule or preparation for counting, she learns how to count. If she learned correctly she not only affirms that it is true that there are 4 apples on the table, but by counting beans, sticks, fingers and other things she can affirm that it is true that 2 units + 2 units, or, in short, that 2+2=4. — Fooloso4

I don’t disagree with this, except to say that the expression “2+2=4” is not necessarily counting anything.

It's clear the discussion here is not exegesis.

You are on the right track here. There are two related language games, one in which statements are justified empirical, another in which they are justified by mathematical proofs. The justifications are different; the use of "true" and "false" are to some extent common.

I don’t disagree with this, except to say that the expression “2+2=4” is not necessarily counting anything. — Luke

Right, it is an abstraction, but we can determine whether it is true or false by counting. The rule is derived from counting.

I think you have it backwards. One needs to learn the rule first, and the meanings of the terms (“1”, “2”), before they can actually count anything. Just as one needs to learn how to use a word before they can (meaningfully) use it in a language game, or to learn how the pieces move before one can play chess.

it upturns a huge portions of my understanding of Wittgenstein's approach to truth — Isaac

That's a bit sad.

OC§607 sits in the context of a physicist giving evidence fr the boiling point of water... OC§202-620...

620. In particular circumstances one says "you can rely on this"; and this assurance may be justified or unjustified in everyday language, and it may also count as justified even when what was foretold does not occur. A language-game exists in which this assurance is employed.

It seems to me to be clearly about justification; and incidentally about the justification that such-and-such is true.

Let's look at the context:

196. Sure evidence is what we accept as sure, it is evidence that we go by in acting surely, acting without any doubt.

What we call "a mistake" plays a quite special part in our language games, and so too does what we regard as certain evidence.
197. It would be nonsense to say that we regard something as sure evidence because it is certainly true.
198. Rather, we must first determine the role of deciding for or against a proposition.
199. The reason why the use of the expression "true or false" has something misleading about it is that it is like saying "it tallies with the facts or it doesn't", and the very thing that is in question is what "tallying" is here.
200. Really "The proposition is either true or false" only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.
201. Suppose someone were to ask: "Is it really right for us to rely on the evidence of our memory (or our senses) as we do?"

§196-7 are about evidence - justification. "it tallies with the facts or it doesn't" - what else could "tally with the facts" be if not a justification? But still, the facts are what is the case.

But to the point, there is nothing here about propositions that are neither true nor false.

Reading Wittgenstein as anti-realist is a post hoc back construct; the term was invented long after his demise. It is not the only, nor the main, reading.

The larger problem for the anti-realist reading is that it has Wittgenstein positing a positive metaphysical theory: that there are no facts of the matter until the evidence is shown; and this is at odds with his overall dismissal of such philosophical pretences.

And the problem with anti-realism per se is Fitch's paradox; “all truths are knowable” entails “all truths are known”. Of corse, there may be ways to make sense of this.

Much of what I've argued for has not even been addressed. — Sam26

Indeed, I've not the stomach for the argument. Reading Wittgenstein as anti-realist is a post hoc back construct; the term was invented long after his demise. It is not the only, nor the main, reading. But if you must, then so be it. See my reply to Isaac above.

Ah, poor Sam. Yes, I've studied logic; intro to deductive logic was a prerequisite for a major in philosophy, and having some personal interest in the philosophy and foundations of logic I also took several intermediate/advanced courses.

So yes, I know exactly what I'm saying when I point out that your conclusion does not follow. Specifically, I pointed out that your premise contained an inference which doesn't follow, and I explained why. An explanation you refused to engage or rebut (I'm noticing a pattern here, in your refusal to meaningfully engage with what I say to you), preferring instead to speculate incorrectly about my background in logic (which, given your sloppy argument, is sort of an amusing pot/kettle situation).

But I get it, you can't really argue/defend your position and so I should stop badgering you to try. Fair enough, whatever floats your boat.

Oh, that's not my understanding of the deflationary position at all (which, for me, is admittedly mostly from reading Ramsey). Do you have to hand any sources you use for yours? — Isaac

Yes, "'P' is true iff P" (the classic example is "'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white") is the standard deflationary formulation. I linked the Stanford page for the deflationary theory, in that post (click on the word "deflationary").

One needs to learn the rule first, — Luke

What is the rule? How does one learn to count by being told that 1+1=2? What happens if they forget the rule? If they memorize the rule do they then need to be told that 1+1=1=3 and 2+1=3 and 1+2=3, for every combination of numbers?

What if a child does not accept the rule? Can it be demonstrated?

and the meanings of the terms (“1”, “2”), before they can actually count anything — Luke

It helps to learn the names of the numbers, but it is not necessary. A child can first learn that there are this many apples on the table, holding up the right number of fingers. We learn the meaning of "2" and "3" by counting, saying the name for the number that comes next. Correcting them when they get it wrong.

The multiplication table is a rule, but one does not need to memorize or consult the table in order to multiply. One need not remember the rule: 12x12=144 to figure it out.

But this may be getting us too far off track,

Geez, for someone who studied logic you didn't even know what a valid argument was. Yes, indeed, poor Seppo.

That depends.

We learn the meaning of "2" and "3" by counting, saying the name for the number that comes next. Correcting them when they get it wrong. — Fooloso4

But this is not really counting; it is teaching someone to count. Just like saying “this is red” to someone while exhibiting a red patch is, in many cases, not really using language in a language game, but teaching someone how to use the word “red”. Wittgenstein provides several examples in OC where stating rules like “this is a hand” in the course of an actual language game arrests the game, and why people might think you insane to say such things.

Nature does not teach us to call this “red”, this “a hand”, or this many “2”; these are arbitrary conventions.

I found the following example helpful in coming to understand the meaning of a hinge certainty, so I thought it might be helpful to others here:

...if I were to say to the cloakroom attendant as I hand him my token: ‘This is a token’, he would look at me nonplussed. That is not information for him, so why am I saying it? Nothing warrants my saying it. The information he requires in order to retrieve my coat is not that this is a token, but what the number on the token is. That this is a token is the ineffable hinge upon which his looking for the number on the token revolves. Our shared certainty that ‘this is a token’ can only show itself in our normal transaction with the token; it cannot qua certainty be meaningfully said. To say a hinge in an ordinary context is to suggest that it does not go without saying, that it needs support, grounding, context. To say a hinge within the language-game invariably arrests the game, produces a caesura, a hiatus in the game. Conversely, think of the fluidity of the game poised on its invisible hinges: I hand the attendant my token, he glances at the number on it and fetches my coat. Our foundational certainty is operative only in action, not in words. This is well conveyed by Wittgenstein’s image of a certainty which is like a taking hold or a grasp:

It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts. (OC 510)

And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to a sureness, not to a knowing. (OC 511) — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty

Moyal-Sharrock identifies this "sureness" with what Wittgenstein refers to as "objective certainty" (OC 194) (aka hinges), which Wittgenstein says is/are categorically different from knowledge (OC 308).

Thanks.

That's a bit sad. — Banno

I hope you mean 'sad' the way my generation uses the term, and not the way my children's generation do.

to the point, there is nothing here about propositions that are neither true nor false. — Banno

No, but that wasn't exactly what I was looking for. What i was looking for was evidence of Wittgenstein's understanding of truth being such that ""x" is true iff x". I'm not seeing it in what you've provided, but I'm not in a position to resolve the conflict between your exegesis and @Sam26's when he writes...

Wittgenstein had a more pragmatic idea of truth. It was never outlined as some are doing in this thread. It was never, something is true, iff such and such (unless you're thinking in terms of the Tratatus), — Sam26

Reading Wittgenstein as anti-realist is a post hoc back construct; the term was invented long after his demise. It is not the only, nor the main, reading. — Banno

I see. So how do you square, in Wittgenstein's conclusion that neither idealism nor realism were quite right, the bit where realism isn't quite right? He's not an anti-realist, he's not a realist. What is he?

And the problem with anti-realism per se is Fitch's paradox; “all truths are knowable” entails “all truths are known”. Of corse, there may be ways to make sense of this. — Banno

Indeed. One of which is Ramsey's deflationary position, which is something I thought Wittgenstein had some sympathy with. I've spent a lot of time with Ramsey, less so with Wittgenstein so don't have the knowledge to pick this apart. I'll defer to either your or Sam's better judgment, but at the moment it seems they are opposed...?

Yes, "'P' is true iff P" (the classic example is "'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white") is the standard deflationary formulation. — Seppo

From the SEP article you linked (my bolding)...

In the instances of schema (T) (sometimes called “Convention (T)”), the ‘X’ gets filled in with a name of the sentence that goes in for the ‘p’, making (T) a version of (ES). Tarski considered (T) to provide a criterion of adequacy for any theory of truth, thereby allowing that there could be more to say about truth than what the instances of the schema cover. Given that, together with the fact that he took the instances of (T) to be contingent, his theory does not qualify as deflationary.

Using the 'truth' of a belief as a criterion is non-deflationary, as is using a JTB definition of truth because both use truth as a property of some entity (a belief in this case), whereas deflationary positions hold that...

there is no property of being true at all, or, if there is one, it is of a certain kind, often called “thin” or “insubstantial”.

Notwithstanding those quotes, you've not provided the support for your view that later Wittgenstein was even of this sentential version of deflation and not the more eliminative Ramseyean version which would hold that there was no such property even in the insubstantial sense.

That this is a token is the ineffable hinge upon which his looking for the number on the token revolves. — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty

This is where Wittgenstein goes wrong with the idea of hinges. The proposition that this is a token is completely irrelevant, and not even taken into consideration when the person retrieves the coat. The person reads the number and gets the coat without considering whether it is a token or not. You could steal someone else's coat by making something which looks like a token, but is a false token, and the attendant would not even notice. So Wittgenstein's representation of what appears like things we take for granted, as hinges of our activities, is inaccurate. We may make our actions without having any idea of any underlying assumptions, therefore no sense of certainty involved with such.

At some point, in retrospect, one might analyze the action and say something like the idea that this is a token must underlie the attendant's action. But this is just a proposition produced from analysis, and does not necessarily represent the attendant's action. It simply represents the mode of analysis, which is to proceed from the particular toward the more general. That this is a faulty method is evident from the appearance of infinite regress, or getting to the most general, which is extremely vague. So Wittgenstein proposes hinges instead. In reality though, the action is grounded in a multitude of judgements concerning the circumstances of the particular situation, so the appeal to such general propositions is to proceed in the wrong direction. The coat check attendant reads the number, notices the person's gender, perhaps remembers the person, etc., and the action cannot be reduced by analysis to being based in any hinges of any game, because its supported by a synthesis of all sorts of different ideas and associations which for some reason seem relevant to the person in the situation.

At the risk of being banned for responding to you, MU:

The proposition that this is a token is completely irrelevant, and not even taken into consideration when the person retrieves the coat. The person reads the number and gets the coat without considering whether it is a token or not. You could steal someone else's coat by making something which looks like a token, but is a false token, and the attendant would not even notice. — Metaphysician Undercover

Being a token is irrelevant but being a false token is not?

At some point, in retrospect, one might analyze the action and say something like the idea that this is a token must underlie the attendant's action. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not the only certainty underlying the attendant’s actions, but one example. There are also the underlying certainties (e.g) that coat checking is a custom, that people own coats, that people have jobs, that there are other people, etc, etc. It’s unthinkable that any of these could be false or doubted. Of course it is imaginable, but not within the confines of our actual lives and what we know of life and society as it is today.

115. If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

232. "We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could not doubt them all."
Wouldn't it be more correct to say: "we do not doubt them all”. Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting.

It simply represents the mode of analysis, which is to proceed from the particular toward the more general. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nope.

I’m happy to discuss further if you think that my reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, but not if you think that Wittgenstein himself is incorrect.

its supported by a synthesis of all sorts of different ideas and associations which for some reason seem relevant to the person in the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not inconsistent with what Wittgenstein says except that many of these certainties are shared and are not purely subjective.

Being a token is irrelevant but being a false token is not? — Luke

Neither is relevant to the attendant, who will get the coat either way. That's the point, the attendant doesn't even consider whether or not the thing is a token, only looking at the number. So it could just as easily be counterfeit.

It is not the only certainty underlying the attendant’s actions, but one example. There are also the underlying certainties (e.g) that coat checking is a custom, that people own coats, that people have jobs, that there are other people, etc, etc. It’s unthinkable that any of these could be false or doubted. Of course it is imaginable, but not within the confines of our actual lives and what we know of life and society as it is today. — Luke

These are not necessarily certainties for the attendant. The attendant is not necessarily certain that coat checking is a custom, or that people own coats, or have jobs. It is wrong to describe such things as certainties to the person performing the act. A monkey might be trained to do the coat check.

In an analysis we might say that such things are implied by the person's actions. Then we might be inclined to say the person must take them for granted when acting, so they must be certainties within the mind of the person taking the action. But this is false, because the person doesn't even think about such things when taking action. So the analysis is proceeding in the wrong direction, using false assumptions. And when we look at the true reality of human actions we see no need for anything like hinge propositions. The concept of hinge proposition is a product of the faulty analysis.

I’m happy to discuss further if you think that my reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, but not if you think that Wittgenstein himself is incorrect. — Luke

Obviously I think Wittgenstein is incorrect, I've been saying that in all my participation in this thread. So if you're not ready to consider that possibility, then I don't think we should go any further with this.

I think what you're wanting to say is that hinge propositions aren't truth apt? I think fdrake said they aren't necessarily propositions. They can be ways we behave to which propositions are secondary.

But where they really are propositions (the content of the utterance of a sentence), whether they're truth apt depends on your theory of truth.

If you had a theory that says fiat statements can't be truth apt because they can't be verified, or they don't correspond to anything in the world, or they're only true relative to a particular game, and not true elsewhere, then you could say that by that theory, they aren't truth apt.

Per the folk theory of truth that we can attach to common uses of "true" they are truth apt. They're declared true by the playing of the game. Or the playing consecrates them, something like that.