We cannot know Moorean/hinge propositions. In order to be known, something must be both true and justified. So, our inability to know hinge propositions could be due to their inability to be true, their inability to be justified, or both. But the idea that they cannot be true doesn't seem to work since, among other things, a proposition which cannot be true is a contradiction. So it seems that our inability to know hinge propositions is because they cannot be justified.

And they cannot be justified because of the foundational role they play in the process of justification. If they form a part of the background against/upon which we justify propositions in general, then they cannot themselves be justified. And if they cannot be justified, they cannot be known... even though they can be true.

Okay, well, I've said my peace, that's all I can do. Have a good one.

Obviously you're free to disengage as you like, but I would have liked to hear where the above line of reasoning goes wrong.

The fact that you're saying, "From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital," demonstrates that you're not following my point. Obviously not knowing the truth of a statement, doesn't mean the statement isn't true. It just means that you have no justification, or no epistemic right to claim it's true. Any claim, without some kind of justification, is a claim that can either be true or false, not just true, as some want to say about Moore's propositions.

Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions. — Sam26

This is very curious. First you show that you understand knowledge, but then completely undermine yourself.

I have followed your point perfectly well, and here you demonstrate your continued misunderstanding. My example was just to show that an attack on a claim to know a proposition is not necessarily an attack on the truth of it. You agree with this at first, regarding the ordinary empirical statement, but then fail to apply the same understanding of knowledge with regard to hinges.

So this needs some additional argument:

Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions — Sam26

I asked you to argue for this, but you didn't. Seppo has dealt with it already, and very clearly, but I'll put it in my own words too. W's attack of M's use of "know" is not an attack on the truth of those propositions; it's an attack on the applicability of justification. If M cannot be said to be justified, he cannot be said to know. Knowing requires truth, as you point out, but it also requires justification, so you can attack the claim to know by pointing out the lack of--or rather, the inapplicability of--justification, without attacking the truth of the statements. This is what W is doing.

By the way, this interpretation, which is an interpretation I primarily arrived at on my own, is confirmed by other philosophers, who have arrived at the same interpretation. This doesn't make the interpretation right or wrong, but does, I think, show that it certainly seems to follow from one's reading of the text. — Sam26

Can you point me in the direction of the relevant philosophers and their work?

Knowing requires truth, as you point out, but it also requires justification, so you can attack the claim to know by pointing out the lack of--or rather, the inapplicability of--justification, without attacking the truth of the statements. This is what W is doing. — jamalrob

:up:

Can you point me in the direction of the relevant philosophers and their work? — jamalrob

There is much being written on this subject, but here is some of what I'm talking about. Sorry I didn't get back to you sooner.

https://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/2299/17388/Moyal_Sharrock_Animal_in_Epistemology_pre_imp_PdF.pdf?sequence=3

She's the best interpreter of On Certainty that I know of. :up:

I find that I agree with much of her interpretation.

Me too. I'll read it some time and say something about it here.

Pay close attention to how she talks about hinge-propositions and truth.

Of course.

Another similar paper in line with my own thinking of this subject, at least generally.

https://www.academia.edu/61206520/Wittgensteins_Hinge_Certainty

I suggest that Wittgenstein's use of the term 'hinge' is related to his interest in mechanics and architecture.That is to say, we should keep in mind the function of a hinge.

I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

(OC 152)

Lest the analogy be misunderstood:

And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house

(OC 248)

And:

Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

(OC 305)

There is no absolute fixed point around which things revolve:

It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.

The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is
right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at
another as a rule of testing.

And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.

(OC 96-99)

That such things are historically contingent is nicely, although inadvertently, illustrated here:

But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the
moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the
moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.

(OC 108)

To understand what hinge-propositions are, one needs to understand what beliefs are; and if you don't agree or understand this, then you won't fully grasp the nature of hinge-propositions.

Beliefs fall into two categories of actions, those that are non-linguistic, and those that are linguistic. Those that are non-linguistic, as the name implies, are acts that are quite separate from language. For example, the act of opening a door, shows that you believe that there is a door, a hand, a body, and all the surrounding things enabling you to perform the act within the world. Specifically, we're referring to contingent states-of-affairs that make up the world (this idea has it's roots in the Tractatus). These kinds of beliefs are not limited to humans, but can also be seen in animals, i.e., in their actions too.

The second category of belief is the one most of us are familiar with, viz., beliefs that are a function of language (statements/propositions). These are necessarily dependent on the first category of non-linguistic beliefs, without which, there would be no linguistic acts of believing. So, linguistic beliefs are born out of non-linguistic beliefs, and all the contingent surroundings that enable such beliefs. Non-linguistic acts (beliefs) are necessarily prior to linguistic acts and all that amounts to language.

Hinge-propositions, which Wittgenstein identified in OC, are not propositions in the strict sense, although in certain language-games they can function as propositions. I identify them, as do other philosophers, as basic beliefs, or foundational beliefs. However, one must be careful not to think of them in terms of the traditional ideas of foundationalism (for e.g. Plantinga's epistemology).

Once we see these non-linguistic basic beliefs (hinge-beliefs) in this way it follows that they are outside any talk of epistemology. This means that any reference to these beliefs in terms of knowledge, true or false, is meaningless. The problem of course, is that as soon as you start talking of these beliefs, you bring them into the linguistic arena and change their nature in some respects. You change their nature because now they have different functions depending on the language-game. Also, there is no precise way of defining these basic beliefs within language because they have so many different functions. It's like trying to define the essence of a game (as per Wittgenstein). There are just a group of family resemblances tying together the many uses that define hinge-propositions or basic beliefs.

What has intrigued me about hinge-propositions is that they usher in, I believe, a new kind of foundational epistemology. One that answers many questions about the nature of epistemology, and solves, for example, the infinite regress problem, and the problems of how to refer to such foundational beliefs. My epistemology now revolves around the ideas presented here, and gives epistemology a more solid footing.

Hinge-propositions, which Wittgenstein identified in OC, are not propositions in the strict sense, — Sam26

What could that mean, i wonder?

I already explained it above.

This means that any reference to these beliefs in terms of knowledge, true or false, is meaningless. — Sam26

You seem to think that hinge propositions are neither true nor false...

How can you validly make a deduction from a proposition that is neither true nor false?

@Banno @Sam26

I think the idea is that hinge propositions are not used in deductive logic. They are the background against which deductive logic and any other kind of coherent thought is feasible. On this view, statements such as "I know there is an external world..." or "I believe that some events have happened before other events..." or "I am currently doubting whether I have a body...." are as incoherent as their denials. Knowledge, belief, doubt and certainty do not apply.

This may be off-beam, but the discussion of an 'animal' (a-rational) aspect reminds me of the distinction between 'saying' and 'showing'. I cannot coherently say that I believe or know that there is an external world. However, I cannot live a human life without my every word and action showing that I 'hold' such a 'belief', the scare quotes meaning that it is not a 'proposition' as we usually understand propositions to be. This line of argument can end up with us saying that hinge 'propositions' lack most of the features of propositions, including truth-value.

All the above is 'for what it's worth'. I'm not on sure ground.

Maybe I'm not too off-beam -

Of course, their being ineffable does not prevent our hinges from showing themselves in what we say, but here too, certainty is animal. My hinge certainty that 'I have a body' is much the same as a lion's instinctive certainty of having a body. — Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, p8

First, I want to say that my view, although much the same as Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, was arrived at quite independent of her. I gave the link because @jamalrob wanted to know what other philosophers thought that hinge's were neither true nor false.

You seem to think that hinge propositions are neither true nor false...

How can you validly make a deduction from a proposition that is neither true nor false? — Banno

It's not that hinge's can't be used in deductive logic (@Cuthbert @Banno), it's that hinge's, in the language-game of being a hinge (think of Moore's propositions), isn't a proposition in the normal sense. However, there are language-games, deductive and inductive logic, where the hinge, can be used as a normal proposition. So, hinge's are not stuck in one particular role, no more than our use of game is stuck in one role, say, only chess games or board games.

Hinge's, however, in there most basic form have quite a different role, especially if you look at them as non-propositional or non-linguistic, they have no connection with language (logic is a language obviously) in this role. However, they do have an important function as Wittgenstein points out in OC.

So, yes, @Banno I do believe that hinge's, basic beliefs, bedrock beliefs, foundational beliefs, have the role of not being true or false. So, it's not that I seem to think this, it can be correctly applied to my thinking. In fact, if you remember there was another thread where I said that 2+2=4 was a hinge, i.e., that it's not true or false. I hadn't paid particular attention to certain mathematical propositions, so I began to doubt whether I was correct about this, but after considering my position again, I'm returning to that belief, with the caveat that, it depends on the language-game the proposition (mathematical or not) is being used in.

So, just as we shouldn't confuse language-games in terms of presenting the same use, i.e., as having the same meaning or function, we shouldn't confuse the language-games of hinge's. Again, in some language-games they do function as normal propositions, but generally I would say, they do not. In cases where they do not, then they are by definition, not true or false, as per basic belief status.

because jamalrob wanted to know what other philosophers thought that hinge's were neither true nor false. — Sam26

Note that this is not what I was criticizing. I even suggested a way for you to be able to treat hinges as neither true nor false, and this appears to be the route taken by Moyal-Sharrock.

But I won't be reading it in full until tomorrow at the earliest.

Well, then we just disagree.

What an odd thing to say. Kindly wait till I've read the papers, just as I waited for you to respond to my last substantive post. I'm still waiting for a good response, as it happens, aside from the links.

A key passage in OC is a quote from Goethe's Faust:

In the beginning was the deed.

(OC 402)

This is expanded upon:

But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

(OC 359)

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination.

(OC 475)

Language games are an extension of man's acting in the world. Primitive hinges are pre-linguistic. They are not language games, they are an essential part of the form of life in which language games come to play a part. It is not that they cannot be doubted, it is simply that they are not.

A mistake that is frequently made is to treat hinges as if they are all the same. There are propositional hinges and pre-linguistic hinges. Empirical hinges and mathematical hinges.

I think it is also a mistake to think that hinges can be neither true nor false. We do not generally question whether they are true or false. If we did they would not function as hinges, but it is possible to be wrong. We do not ordinarily question the ground beneath our feet, we simply stand and walk, but what is ordinary is not what is beyond being true or false.

Do I have to "kindly wait?" :wink:

I think what Wittgenstein demonstrates, is that the idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. Hinge propositions are simply something we want to assume the reality of, to prove to ourselves that our knowledge is adequately grounded, and quell the skepticism which constitutes the philosophical yearning of the human mind.

But when we investigate, as Wittgenstein did, we find that we must conclude that this assumption of hinge propositions is just not consistent with reality. The evidence for this conclusion is that when we try to describe the paradigm, or hold up anything as an example, of a hinge proposition, we find that it can never fulfil the criteria of what we want, as a hinge proposition. And the idea of hinge propositions remains fundamentally flawed.

I think what Wittgenstein demonstrates, is that the idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

What you have demonstrated is that your idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. When he says:

The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.

(OC 166)

it does not follow that hinge propositions are mistaken, but that:

This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

(OC 152)

This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

Eppur si muove. So the debate continues.

I think it is also a mistake to think that hinges can be neither true nor false. We do not generally question whether they are true or false. If we did they would not function as hinges, but it is possible to be wrong. We do not ordinarily question the ground beneath our feet, we simply stand and walk, but what is ordinary is not what is beyond being true or false. — Fooloso4

Isn’t the hinge proposition the condition of possibility for determinations of truth and falsity? That is, something is true or false relative to a more encompassing
framework that is take for granted. In order for a hinge proposition to be found true or false it would no longer function as a hinge proposition. It would have a different sense.

Isn’t the hinge proposition the condition of possibility for determinations of truth and falsity? — Joshs

If they are it is not in the Kantian transcendental sense.

That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

(OC 341)

That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

(OC 342)

If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

(OC 343).

337: “One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt. But that does not mean that one takes certain presuppositions on trust. When I write a letter and post it, I take it for granted that it will arrive - I expect this.”

343. “But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.”

Once one decides to question an assumption it changes its sense from being a hinge proposition to something directly investigated, and thus no longer an assumption.