Which is to say exactly that you are not to be trusted. For you there is, in effect, no truth, but only what you think "correct based on my consequentialist criterion." That makes you an immoral person. And you want proof you should be a moral person? That proof is all around you at all times. For reasons peculiar to you, you're not able to see it. It might help if you were to consider just how much of your life depends on truth.I think I'd be acting correctly based on my consequentialist criterion. — Amalac
That makes you an immoral person. — tim wood
And you want proof you should be a Kantian in ethics? That proof is all around you at all times. For reasons peculiar to you, you're not able to see it. It might help if you were to consider just how much of your life depends on truth. — tim wood
And to be sure, I do not see where K., above, argues against Kant's conclusion, but only against the argument. — tim wood
(Actually, due to blood loss to the brain, I’m in a perfectly euphoric state, reliving my fondest memories from a long, illustrious life....and that clown ended it all because of something that completely escaped his judgmental criteria.)
Immoral indeed. — Mww
This might exemplify Kolakowski’s inconsistency: a consequential moralist makes judgements on others predicated on his criteria; a deontological moralist makes makes judgements on himself using his own criteria. — Mww
To witness the behavior of the sufferer says nothing of the suffering. — Mww
The underlying idea here is that you claim to know best. Insofar as it is a claim that you make, we can ask you to prove that you know best.If I knew it was more likely that you wouldn't suffer in that state, rest assured I wouldn't shoot you. — Amalac
That you should be a moral person? All right. In arithmetic, if you accept arithmetic, 2+2 is/equals 4 and is provable. Nor should be nor ought to be, but is, and because is, must be. You are free to be ignorant of arithmetic, or to deny it. In that case, for you, 2+2=4 must be a meaningless proposition, for were it meaningful to you, then would understand it and assent to it. Of course, were this you, you could not be trusted with anything arithmetical, nor any of your judgments about such. Agree?Or how about you mention part of that proof that's “all around me”? — Amalac
The deontologist also makes judgements on others, since he thinks they are acting wrong when the lie, or borrow money. — Amalac
Insofar as it is a claim that you make, we can ask you to prove that you know best. — tim wood
That you should be a moral person? — tim wood
Of course, were this you, you could not be trusted with anything arithmetical, nor any of your judgments about such. Agree? — tim wood
There is dialectical argument, concerned with what is and is not, and rhetoric, concerned with and considering both sides of contradictories — tim wood
Kant arithmetized it, accomplishing a goal attributed at least to Socrates. The price of arithmetization being the limitation to general and not particular rules, his categorical imperative, in its various forms. And these do not tell us what to do, but instead how to test and evaluate our possible actions according to criteria of non-contradiction. — tim wood
These all tied in with his ideas of freedom, right, will, and good. And these all you can deny, ignore, be ignorant of, at the cost of your exclusion from the society of people concerned with freedom, right, will, and good. — tim wood
An example: you purchase for yourself and family expensive and hard-to-get tickets to a major athletic event. At added expense you all prepare yourself for the day but on arriving discover your tickets are forgeries, no good. Question: do you celebrate the skill and cleverness of the forger? Or were you wronged? — tim wood
I cannot, therefore, prove that my view of the good life is right; I can only state my view, and hope that as many (of those who care deeply about other people’s suffering and happiness) as possible will agree. — Russell (I added the part in black font)
A deontologist makes a discursive judgement on a behavior not his own by his cognitive criteria, which is an experience. That experience informs by means of a aesthetic judgement as to whether he would or would not behave in similar fashion under the same conditions, measured exclusively by how such behavior would make him feel about himself. — Mww
When you think something is for the best, you think a good as it is for yourself. — Mww
If you use the thinking for what is good for yourself, but apply it to another, as would a typical consequentialist, you are in effect using that other as an end for your own good. To use others for your own good can never be justified as a universal law. — Mww
What does the categorical imperative say here? Should the deontologist truthfully answer that question, or is he allowed to stay silent? — Amalac
If the imperative says to tell the truth he should answer that you tell the truth to the poor man. He can also remain silent. He doesn't lie then. — Raymond
if I ask a deontologist if he thinks it was wrong for me to lie to the man on his deathbed about his son’s condition, would he answer with a “yes” or a “no”? — Amalac
That's after I have already lied. — Amalac
That's called murder.If not, then it's better to shoot them. — Amalac
Then it seems at least you agree there is something called suffering, and evil. But the forger had his own criteria - as do you - what do you have to say to him? That he was evil and caused suffering? As a consequentialist he may assure you that his happiness was both greater and more worthwhile than your suffering which in any case the existence of which he could only speculate on. I am not arguing for the forger, only that he can refute anything you say by noting sauce for the goose - what works for you works for him, and why not!I wouldn’t celebrate it since he would have caused me and my family to suffer by stealing from me and denying us the chance to assist to that event. Skill and cleverness don’t matter to me if they are used for evil purposes. — Amalac
if I ask a deontologist if he thinks it was wrong for me to lie to the man on his deathbed about his son’s condition, would he answer with a “yes” or a “no”? — Amalac
What does the categorical imperative say here? Should the deontologist truthfully answer that question, or is he allowed to stay silent? — Amalac
When you think something is for the best, you think a good as it is for yourself.
— Mww
In a sense yes, in so far as another person’s suffering would also make me suffer more, and their happiness make me happier. — Amalac
Is that “using another as an end for my own good”? Maybe, but why is that bad? — Amalac
I wouldn’t want psychopaths who feel nothing when they watch or contemplate the sufferings of others to adopt a consequentialist criterion — Amalac
That's called murder. — tim wood
But the forger had his own criteria - as do you - what do you have to say to him? — tim wood
As a consequentialist he may assure you that his happiness was both greater and more worthwhile than your suffering which in any case the existence of which he could only speculate on. — tim wood
I would think that what he did to me is wrong, because he has caused other people to suffer just so he could get money. But I freely admit that he might not be persuaded If I confronted him about it, since he might be one of those people who, unlike me, feel or care little or nothing for the sufferings of others, in which case it’d be a waste of time to try and convince him that what he did to me is wrong, there’s nothing to say to those people. Just as I’d be wasting my time if I tried to persuade Jack the Ripper or another serial killer that his gruesome murders are abominable.
And by the way, I wouldn’t want such wicked people to follow my consequentialist criterion if they didn’t feel bad when contemplating or watching other people’s suffering, since that would probably lead them to cause more suffering just so they can gain more pleasure. I disagree with Bentham’s doctrine of “enlightened self-interest”, interpreted as meaning that if one acts only for one’s own interest, in the long run that will also benefit the others, since that’s only true in some cases. I state it only for those who share my values about empathy as well as an ethical criterion similar to mine, hoping they agree with my views:
I cannot, therefore, prove that my view of the good life is right; I can only state my view, and hope that as many (of those who care deeply about other people’s suffering and happiness) as possible will agree.
— Russell (I added the part in black font) — Amalac
I donate significant amounts money (as far as my income and expenses allow me) to charity so that people suffer less, which in turn makes me happier, not because of any abstract universalization. Is that “using another as an end for my own good”? Maybe, but why is that bad? — Amalac
If the imperative says to always tell the truth, shouldn't he obey?
— Raymond
If that's the case, he would be making a judgement on me. But Mww says deontologists don't make such judgements on others, but only on themselves. So what exactly does he mean by “judgement”? — Amalac
I would not have lied. — Mww
To stay silent is not to lie. — Mww
The imperative is merely a formula, determined by principles held by the subject. Only the subject knows what the imperative commands. — Mww
The former is mere inclination, the latter is lawful obligation. — Mww
And how would you ever make that preventable? You cannot, so what matters what you want? — Mww
And certainly if you contribute in order to feel good, then while there may be considerable benefit, you don't get virtue points. — tim wood
Bill Gates, for example, gives huge amounts of money to charity. I do not think he does it to feel good or even cares about that. He has so much money that I'm pretty sure he can afford to contribute as he does because it is categorically right to do so. And a further guess, that what he cares about is if his money is well used and helps to accomplish the goals of the charity — tim wood
Kant would simply observe that your criteria are deficient — tim wood
Which is to say you don't like it that he hurt you, but in terms of merit, apparently it's all his, right? — tim wood
And what's wrong with “depending on their actions” in that sense? Again, is it likely that everybody, or at least a majority of people will suddenly all start lying any time soon? No, that's probably never going to happen. So why should that hypothetical world in which everybody lies matter in the least? I'm not trying to justify liars, I just don't think lying always or very often is wrong for the reasons Kant thinks it is. — Amalac
I don't think it follows that if you reject Kant's criterion for living what he considers an ethical live, then you can do anything you want. It just means you move on to some consequentialist criterion for determining how you should act. — Amalac
And why should the person provide general rules for others, why can't he just have a personal and private ethic? Even if he did provide general rules about how he thinks everybody ought to act, it's not likely that others will change the way they act by what some random person tells them, the reality is that most people simply won't give a damn about it, unless it's someone close to them, someone famous or someone influential. — Amalac
Also Kant concludes — if I'm not mistaken — that lying is wrong no matter what the circumstances are. And I think that's just wrong, as is shown in the example I gave of a man on his death bed asking if his son is ok, when the other person knows that their son is dead. — Amalac
Here's another example: suppose someone's son is terminally ill, and the doctors tell the man that his son will almost certainly die soon. A few days later he goes to visit his son in the hospital, and the boy fearfully asks him if he's going to die. Would the father be doing something wrong or unethical if he lied to his son, telling him that he is ok and that he will recover soon, so that he wasn't terrified and would suffer less? I don't think so. — Amalac
Once, walking in the field, I saw a weary fox, on the verge of total exhaustion, but still struggling to keep running. A few minutes later I saw the hunters. They asked me if I had seen the fox and I said yes. They asked me where it had gone and I lied to them. I don't think I would have been a better person if I had told them the truth.
The hypothetical world does not matter as an actual possible world, but as a purely logical possibility. — Tobias
He takes away the boy's dignity as a rationally thinking being. — Tobias
His duty is to be there for the boy in his dying moments as an acceptance of that fate. — Tobias
The point is you cannot refute Kant's idealist ethics with consequntialism or by appealing to majority opinion. — Tobias
If it becomes common knowledge that is such a situation we would lie to the dying father, then dying fathers cannot ask that question anymore because he will never know if he gets an honest answer. So we 'sacrifice' the feelings of the dying father in order to keep our framework, that we answer truthfully, intact. So other dying relatives may ask that question and not face the perennial anxiety of not knowing. — Tobias
I would not have lied.
— Mww
But I didn't ask him what he would have done, I asked him if he thinks what I did is wrong. So that doesn't answer the question. — Amalac
To stay silent is not to lie.
— Mww
I didn't mean to imply that it was, I was just wandering if the deontologist was forced to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative, or if he could stay silent. — Amalac
do you think most such people spend a significant amount of time pondering about their actions and philosophizing? I don't. — Amalac
The question of whether I think another’s acts are right or wrong is irrelevant, — Mww
The problem with this consequentialist approach is, I am judging the effect of my deceit on another subject, in which such effect can never be properly understood, for if it was I could claim to know his thoughts, which is impossible. — Mww
Also, for the sake of consistency, “to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative” has the proverbial cart before the horse. — Mww
Spellchecker: can’t live with it, can’t kill it. (Sigh) — Mww
What I don't understand is why this mere logical possibility in some hypothetical world has any relevance to how we should act in the actual world, — Amalac
You've made it clear that your "ethics" permit you when you feel like it to lie and murder - and to be so hypocritical that you object if others decide to do as you do, to you!Maybe to you it is, but not to me. — Amalac
The question of whether I think another’s acts are right or wrong is irrelevant,
— Mww
Maybe to you it is, but not to me. — Amalac
I should have said: Is it his duty to tell the truth about how he thinks I should have acted, according to the imperative? — Amalac
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