What I don't understand is why this mere logical possibility in some hypothetical world has any relevance to how we should act in the actual world, where that almost certainly won't happen in any near future. The criterion of “universalization” as a way to distinguish good acts from bad ones just seems arbitrary to me.
Why is it that if an action can be universalized without contradiction, then the action is morally/ethically justified, and morally/ethically reprehensible otherwise? Without circular reasoning, I mean. — Amalac
I prefer that over making him terrified and sad/depressed. — Amalac
Why does he have to learn about his fate in the first place? If he doesn't, he won't be terrified by his imminent death. It is more likely that he will suffer less if he doesn't learn about his fate, so I think it's better to lie to him. — Amalac
And yes, I know deontologists don't care about the probable effects of actions, but I still find that unreasonable. They themselves use probabilistic criterions all the time: when they get out of their house, they don't give serious consideration to the idea that it might be better to stay home because a meteor might fall on their head if they get out, or that suddenly it'll start to rain heavily leading to them being struck by lightning when they get out — although they can't be certain those things won't happen — because such events are very unlikely to happen. And the same is true for almost all of their beliefs in daily life. — Amalac
Yet when it comes to ethical considerations about the effects of each action, they suddenly seem to stop caring about the probable consequences of each action, and just care about following the categorical imperative, only because we can't be completely certain about the consequences of each of our actions, and because some elaborate and unlikely scenarios in which the actions lead to bad consequences are possible (not always though, sometimes they do mention possibilities which aren't that unlikely, and should be taken into account). — Amalac
I'm not trying to refute Kantian ethics, I just think its core criterion is arbitrary. Nor do I think that an act is good because most people think it is (“ad populum”), the examples where intended to make people question whether a criterion that leads them to act in that way is really the best one at their disposal, in accordance with their basic moral intuitions. — Amalac
Your examples are actually arguments ad populum, not Kant's.the examples where intended to make people question whether a criterion that leads them to act in that way is really the best one at their disposal, in accordance with their basic moral intuitions. — Amalac
Supposing it became common knowledge (which is not likely, so long as there are deontologists suggesting a different course of action) I think the suffering they would feel after finding out about their son's dead outweighs the suffering caused by the anxiety they may feel for not being able to get an answer to that question. — Amalac
If it becomes common knowledge that is such a situation we would lie to the dying father, then dying fathers cannot ask that question anymore because he will never know if he gets an honest answer. So we 'sacrifice' the feelings of the dying father in order to keep our framework, that we answer truthfully, intact. — Tobias
Not answering means ignoring and also means not taking the dying father seriously as an autonomous agent. — Tobias
One doesn't owe the man any answers, respect or one's attention. The fact that the man is dying doesn't create a special situation where that would be the case. — Tzeentch
Why would ignoring someone be a good act? — Tobias
Why would I not answer? — Tobias
The claim was made (or at least the impression was given) that answering the man truthfully or not answering the question was bad.
I disagreed. — Tzeentch
Not to answer is to choose non-interference, and such is one's right. — Tzeentch
The man will suffer his anxiety until the bitter end and will not even know, whereas he did ask.... You have decided he should suffer that fate. — Tobias
No, he decided that fate for himself, however tragic that may be. — Tzeentch
There's no reason the cause of his worries and emotions should be projected on some innocent bystander. — Tzeentch
No, he asked the question, so he wanted to know. — Tobias
You deliberately did not help him and thereby violated an imperfect duty. — Tobias
Nor is there if you just told the man the truth. He asked for it, you gave it, what can be wrong. Instead you chose to make yourself the owner of the problem by not telling him. — Tobias
Isn't the crux of the dilemma that telling the truth would cause the man significant emotional harm, and thus it was not a question he truly wanted answered?
If that's not the case, then what are we even here for? If the man wants to know the painful truth, then it certainly isn't bad to tell it to him, and lying would be even more clearly wrong. — Tzeentch
What duty? — Tzeentch
Well, if one no longer takes the position that telling the truth causing significant harm, disproportionate to the harm of telling a lie, then there is no dilemma. — Tzeentch
But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention. — Tzeentch
What if an imperfect duty, say taking care of the moral well being of others conflicts with the perfect duty not to lie, as in Amalac's case. — Tobias
I'm looking at Lectures on Ethics. I don't see feelings. I feel safe wagering that what Kant means by feelings is not what I or most people understand, and with reference to various parts of the Lectures...., not at all.Much depends on what would be the true want of each according to his own feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself. — Mww
If you decide he really does not want it answered, you violate his autonomy. — Tobias
The imperfect duty to help. — Tobias
In another thread you argued that context does not matter. — Tobias
You are an inconsistent Kantian. — Tobias
But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention. — Tzeentch
Because you were asked a question. Not answering a question is an act too. You make it seem like it is not an act. That is a wrong assumption. If I ask you in the street "may I ask you a question?" and you are basically ignoring me, you are being rude, or you did not hear it, or you were in a hurry, but at least I am going to think about why you plainly ignored me. — Tobias
That's not a violation of someone's autonomy. Whether one decides to answer or not isn't a matter of someone else's autonomy, but of one's own! — Tzeentch
And that duty is one you have taken upon yourself, or do you also impose it on others? — Tzeentch
I am not a Kantian at all. — Tzeentch
They're two entirely different discussions. — Tzeentch
One is not entitled to my response, my time, attention or even basic politeness, just because they asked a question. What gives one the right to impose any of these things? — Tzeentch
Further, inaction is not an act. Not giving a response is not an action - it is inaction, and thereby fundamentally different. — Tzeentch
The relative texts in Kant’s corpus make clear to lie is always an affront to a good will, from which is derived to lie is never a moral practical objective. From that, it is just as clear the perfect duty is always more compelling. — Mww
I would rather be responsible for a guy’s possible torment that may not even manifest seriously, or that torment which subsides over time, than to jeopardize my moral character by lying in order to not cause it. — Mww
What if an imperfect duty, say taking care of the moral well being of others conflicts with the perfect duty not to lie, as in Amalac's case. What to do? — Tobias
Wisdom that "might be engraven on a Queen Anne's farthing.., which necessitates a vast volume of commentaries to expound it" (Melville).The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions. — Mww
And feelings as pleasure and pain?! Perhaps the jewel bearing in this watchwork, on which the thing pivots and ticks, is the "true."Much depends on what would be the true want of each according to his own feelings, and it must be left to each to determine this for himself. — Mww
This makes him in my perception a somewhat harder and less soft man than I supposed — tim wood
And feelings as pleasure and pain?! Perhaps the jewel bearing in this watchwork — tim wood
But unbeknownst to you, the victim went out your back door and went home, and you have in effect killed him! Kant argues that with your lie, you make yourself part of the problem, and thus take on a share of responsibility and liability that the truth or silence would not have imposed. — tim wood
Kant is concerned with the pure formulations of duty, understanding that between the rule and its application could be considerable slip twixt cup and lip.
As to what to do in the case of conflict, in his Metaphysics of Morals he is explicit. If CIs conflict, then the better rules and the lesser falls away - there being then no conflict. From Mww again,
The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions.
— Mww
Wisdom that "might be engraven on a Queen Anne's farthing.., which necessitates a vast volume of commentaries to expound it" (Melville). — tim wood
Cite? The ideas of one right answer is naive. In some cases there might well be one right answer, but certainly not always. I read Kant as saying that where there are seeming multiple answers, you take the best of those, the better of them, as best you can determine it. And this reflective of the plain fact that often there is no best answer to be found, as if like the solution to a math problem, but instead a choice to be made from contingent possibilities - a whole different kind of questioning.I believe Kant himself refused to accept conflicts of duties always claiming there is one right answer. — Tobias
Cite? The ideas of one right answer is naive. In some cases there might well be one right answer, but certainly not always. — tim wood
If you think that, then you should have no difficulty telling me exactly what to do or not do on all occasions. Or maybe all too many. How about one occasion. Can you adduce any CI that tells me what to do or not do on any occasion?The problem of a categorical imperative is that it is well categorical, applicable in all cases. — Tobias
Yes but you decide by assuming he does not want to have the answer. That is the violation of autonomy ... — Tobias
It is imposed on others via the categorical imperative (at least according to Kant). — Tobias
Well either ethics is context dependent and then it matters that there are different discussions, or it is not and then it really does not matter what the case at hand is. In the other thread you answered it was not, lying was always wrong. — Tobias
Whether you like it or not we live in a world with others and with social expectations. — Tobias
I gave you an argument, namely that the situation is different when you walk past someone who asked you a question or whether you walked past someone without him asking a question. — Tobias
Luckily you are not a lawyer because you would have a damn hard time wrapping your head around crimes of omission. — Tobias
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