Do you suppose that the Kremlin would hand (what they now (formally) consider³) a piece of Russia over to Kyiv? — jorndoe
And what then of their deNazification irredentist genocide⁶⁷ revanchist rhetoric (again)? — jorndoe
↪boethius Do you believe the reporting that Russia has suffered around 60,000 KIA? — RogueAI
So apparently, the Ukrainian attack into Kursk Oblast was not just a larger cross border raid. Ukrainian troops are apparently still fighting in Russia.
It's possible they're opportunistically exploiting a situation of course and planning to retreat as soon as opposition is stiffening. Too early to tell really.
If this is a sustained operation it's notable in that it would be Ukraine widening the front, which so far they've tried to avoid. A change of strategy? — Echarmion
Do you suppose that the Kremlin would have handed (what they (formally) consider³) a piece of Russia over to Kyiv at that time², after 8 years of efforts¹? Perhaps insist on a new Kharkiv Pact⁴? Didn't Mearsheimer (and Drennan⁵ by the way) argue that Crimea remains a critical geo-political-power-military asset to Russia?
Whatever the case, something here doesn't quite add up.
This is why they talk about 'denazification'. They mean ultranationalist militias like the Azov Batallion. — Tzeentch
Do you suppose that the Kremlin would have handed (what they (formally) consider³) a piece of Russia over to Kyiv at that time², after 8 years of efforts¹? Perhaps insist on a new Kharkiv Pact⁴? Didn't Mearsheimer (and Drennan⁵ by the way) argue that Crimea remains a critical geo-political-power-military asset to Russia?
Whatever the case, something here doesn't quite add up.
Apologetics to make their (deNazification irredentist genocide⁶⁷ revanchist) stories fit your narrative? — jorndoe
Eventually, the American public soured on Vietnam, and by the time we left, we'd lost just about 60,000 soldiers. At what point is the Russian public going to sour on Ukraine? — RogueAI
↪boethius My sense is that a total collapse is unlikely, unless the Russians dramatically shift their military operations to a more manoeuvre-style approach. — Tzeentch
Probably they will stick to their slow & steady war of attrition, which leaves enough breathing room for the Ukrainians to stave off collapse. — Tzeentch
↪boethius I bring up KIA because the Ukraine situation is becoming oddly similar to America's adventure in Vietnam. In both cases, you have a strong power taking on a weak country, with the weak country being supplied and funded by other strong powers. A proxy war, in other words. Eventually, the American public soured on Vietnam, and by the time we left, we'd lost just about 60,000 soldiers. At what point is the Russian public going to sour on Ukraine? — RogueAI
Seems to make some sense, what say ye? — unenlightened
I don't understand what the military objective is. In fact, if anything, what this is gonna do is detract from their effort in the eastern part of Ukraine to stimey the Russian steamroller, which is consistently moving forward every day and attriting the fighting units the Ukrainians have arrayed on that eastern front.
What the Ukrainians should be doing with those forces that they sent into Russia in the Kursk area, is those forces should have been sent to the frontlines in the eastern part of Ukraine to buttress the forces that are buckling underneath the Russian steamroller.
It makes no sense to attack into Kursk. What are they gonna gain from doing this? Are they gonna, you know, help win the war? Not at all. So this is a foolish, last-minute gamble from my perspective, on the part of the Ukrainians, to try and turn things around. — John J. Mearsheimer
Seems to make some sense, what say ye?
— unenlightened
Ukraine's actions in Kursk make no military sense. — Tzeentch
Russia said Wednesday that it strengthened security at the Kursk nuclear power plant amid Ukraine's assault in the region.
The Russian Guard Corps said it took additional measures to ensure the safety of the plant, including the deployment of additional units in the area. — yourlink
Herewith, a little talk about the possible aims of the Ukrainian Offensive. Seems to make some sense, what say ye? — unenlightened
I don't understand what the military objective is. In fact, if anything, what this is gonna do is detract from their effort in the eastern part of Ukraine to stimey the Russian steamroller, which is consistently moving forward every day and attriting the fighting units the Ukrainians have arrayed on that eastern front.
What the Ukrainians should be doing with those forces that they sent into Russia in the Kursk area, is those forces should have been sent to the frontlines in the eastern part of Ukraine to buttress the forces that are buckling underneath the Russian steamroller.
It makes no sense to attack into Kursk. What are they gonna gain from doing this? Are they gonna, you know, help win the war? Not at all. So this is a foolish, last-minute gamble from my perspective, on the part of the Ukrainians, to try and turn things around. — John J. Mearsheimer
Clearly this incursion is going to be crushed in time. — Tzeentch
You wonder why the Ukrainians ever bothered to resist at all. They must be crazy berserkers. — unenlightened
If Ukraine is neutral, and the West shows a sincere interest in peace, I think the Russians could have possibly been persuaded to agree to some sort of special status for Crimea.
But that was back then. Today it is unthinkable they would give back Crimea and the landbridge that leads to it. — Tzeentch
The US has no legitimate security concerns in Ukraine.
You cannot invade the US from Ukraine.
If Russia went and built up forces hostile to the US in Mexico, obviously the US would respond to that. — boethius
As for Ukraine, when you are a weaker nation beside a much stronger nation, your security is not served by forming military cooperation with another major power thousands of kilometres away that (precisely because you are of no relevance to their actual security) is not going to actually send any armies to come defend you if you get invaded due to becoming hostile to your more powerful neighbor.
For example, Mexico's security is not served by becoming a vassal to Russia to get a supply of arms to then lose a war to the United States. — boethius
A smaller state's security is served through a combination of defensive deterrence and diplomacy, without being a threat. Canada and Mexico coexist with the far more powerful United States because they don't threaten the US. — boethius
As I've explained numerous times, rights are insufficient to determine justification.
Russia has both a right and can actually justify preemptive military action against a smaller state: because it is likely to win.
A smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win. — boethius
That "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" is not a justification for trying to do so if the likely result is being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians. — boethius
If Ukraine's "rights" actually were sufficient justification, then the West would have all their militaries in Ukraine right now, but they don't because tying rights to justifications is a fallacy. What are the consequences of doing this or that also matter in forming a justification for actions. The West doesn't like the consequences of actually sending our armies to defend "Ukrainian rights" so we don't consider it justified on that account, and so we don't do it. — boethius
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