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↪Joshs So, would you say the Logical Positivists, and the Analytics whose main concern is with propositional and modal logic, are the odd ones out (are there others?) islands cut off from the diverse mainland of philosophy? — Janus

I would say that any school of philosophy that understands its inquiry in isolation from the biological and cultural niches that produce it will erect arbitrary walls between it and other schools of philosophy.

The positivists made everyone dumber. If you want to do science, do science. — Jackson

I don't disagree. Both Wittgenstein and Popper, for quite different reasons, refused to be identified as part of that school.

I would say that any school of philosophy that understands its inquiry in isolation from the biological and cultural niches that produce it will erect arbitrary walls between it and other schools of philosophy. — Joshs

I can't argue with that!

I would say that any school of philosophy that understands its inquiry in isolation from the biological and cultural niches that produce it will erect arbitrary walls between it and other schools of philosophy. — Joshs

The difference between science and philosophy seems to be that science is a much greater complex of different investigative disciplines, and although there are changes of paradigm, in various ways within those disciplines, most of Science's progression seems to consists in building on the previous edifices of knowledge, and in shifts of focus, rather than in, so to speak, demolishing the whole building and reconstructing from scratch.

Both Wittgenstein and Popper, for quite different reasons, refused to be identified as part of that school. — Janus

And Wittgenstein rejected those who thought they were following his agenda.

And Wittgenstein rejected those who thought they were following his agenda. — Jackson

You're referring to those in the Vienna School who thought that?

You're referring to those in the Vienna School who thought that? — Janus

I don't remember their names anymore. But it was a group which W. was attending and told them he did not agree with them.

I don't remember their names anymore. But it was a group which W. was attending and told them he did not agree with them. — Jackson

Yes, that rings a bell. I remember reading somewhere that ( at least some) of the Positivists saw him as their mentor and wanted him to participate in their meetings, but he disabused them of the notion that they were doing something along the lines of what he was, I can't remember specific names either, and I can't be bothered looking it up.

Yes, that rings a bell. I remember reading somewhere that ( at least some) of the Positivists saw him as their mentor and wanted him to participate in their meetings, but he disabused them of the notion that they were doing something along the lines of what he was, I can't remember specific names either, and I can't be bothered looking it up. — Janus

Yes, exactly. That is what I was referring to.

Yes, exactly. That is what I was referring to. — Jackson

I think it was in Monk’s biography of Witt

I can't be bothered looking it up. — Janus

Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Folly of Logical Positivism, Stuart Greenstreet.

Cheers.

Art is largely founded on the subjective, so pulling out an objective result faces its own challenges.
— Philosophim

Then all of everyone's life is "subjective." — Jackson

I think you misunderstood. Currently art is considered subjective. Finding an objective explanation for art is one of the challenges philosophy has to yet solve.

Currently art is considered subjective. Finding an objective explanation for art is one of the challenges philosophy has to yet solve. — Philosophim

Unless of course both art and science are intersubjective, but in different ways, as Thomas Kuhn argues. That’s why he concludes that if the idea of progress in the arts is ambiguous, then it is in science also:

“The most persuasive case for the concept of cumulativeness is made by the familiar contrast between the development of science and that of art. Both disciplines display continuity of historical development –
neither could have reached its present state without its past – yet the relation of present to past in these two fields is clearly distinct.
Einstein or Heisenberg could, we feel sure, have persuaded Newton that twentieth-century science has surpassed the science of the seventeenth century, but we anticipate no remotely similar conclusion from a debate between, say, Rembrandt and Picasso.
In the arts successive developmental stages are autonomous and self-complete: no obvious external standard is available for comparisons between them.

The creative idiom of a Rembrandt, Bach, or Shakespeare resolves all its aesthetic problems and prohibits the consideration of others. Fundamentally new modes of aesthetic expression emerge only in intimate conjunction with a new perception of the aesthetic problem that the new modes must aim to resolve. Except in the realm of technique, the transition between one stage of artistic development and the next is a transition between incommensurables. In science, on the other hand, problems seem to be set by nature and in advance, without reference to the idiom or taste of the scientific community. Apparently, therefore, successive stages of scientific development can be evaluated as successively better approximations to a full solution. That is why the present state of science always seems to embrace its past stages as parts, which is what the concept of cumulativeness means. Guided by that concept, we see in the development of science no equivalents for the total shift of artistic vision – the shift from one integrated set of problems, images, techniques, and tastes to another.”

Kuhn disagrees with this cumulate e model of science:

If we are to preserve any part of the metaphor which makes inventions and discoveries new bricks for the scientific edifice, and if we are simultaneously to give resistance and controversy an essential place in the development of science, then we may have to recognize that the addition of new bricks demands at least partial demolition of the existing structure, and that the new edifice erected to include the new brick is not just the old one plus, but a new building. We may, that is, be forced to recognize that new discoveries and new theories do not simply add to the stock of pre-existing scientific knowledge. They change it. (Kuhn M2, p. 7)19

Often a decision to embrace a new theory turns out to involve an implicit redefinition of the corresponding science. Old problems may be relegated to another science or may be declared entirely “unscientific.” Problems that, on the old theory, were non-existent
or trivial may, with a new theory, become the very archetypes of significant scientific achievement. And, as the problems change, so, often, does the standard that distinguishes a real scientific solution from a mere metaphysical speculation, word game, or mathematical play. It follows that, to a significant extent, the science that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible, but often actually incommensurable, with that which has gone before. Only as this is realized, can we grasp the full sense in which scientific revolutions are like those in the arts. (Kuhn M1, pp. 17)

Currently art is considered subjective. — Philosophim

By you. I see no argument for that.

Currently art is considered subjective.
— Philosophim

By you. I see no argument for that. — Jackson

What would be helpful is for you to point out objective measures of art. I can give one, "The golden ratio" for example. Of course, there's the question of why that's considered so appealing in art. What creates a situation where art is involved? What are the degrees of art. Why are some things considered more artistic than others? There are lots of questions that I am not aware of any definitive answers to them. Feel free to enlighten me!

Feel free to enlighten me! — Philosophim

Sure. The objective/subjective dichotomy is meaningless. If there were no subjects no art would exist because no humans would exist. So, humans make objects.

What are the degrees of art. Why are some things considered more artistic than others? — Philosophim

I don't even understand the question.

Sure. The objective/subjective dichotomy is meaningless. If there were no subjects no art would exist because no humans would exist. So, humans make objects. — Jackson

So what I mean by objective is something that exists apart from a human's personal experience. Think of a ruler for example. Whether I or someone else uses the ruler, the measurement will objectively be the same.

Back to art, what are the objective commonalities of art across all human experience? Why are a bunch of colored sguiggle lines slopped on a canvas considered art compared to a realistic picture of a lake? Is there a morality in art? Objectively good and bad art that we should encourage or inhibit? Questions like these had no objective answer back when I investigated years ago. Perhaps things have changed. If so, feel free to let me know, I'm always willing to hear of new things.

So what I mean by objective is something that exists apart from a human's personal experience. — Philosophim

Art is about a human's personal experience.

Art is about a human's personal experience. — Jackson

Could you go into more detail? Does this mean all of my personal experiences are art? Is breathing an art? My heart beat? Driving my car to work? Try to engage with more than one sentence Jackson. We're here to think right? Its not about winning, losing, or being smart. We're just juggling ideas, no judgement.

Why are a bunch of colored sguiggle lines slopped on a canvas considered art compared to a realistic picture of a lake? — Philosophim

Again, no idea what you are referring to by "slopped on a canvas considered art." Can you give an example?

Try to engage with more than one sentence Jackson. — Philosophim

What you are saying is extremely elementary and boring. Try to say something worth responding to. You want this?

What you are saying is extremely elementary and boring. Try to say something worth responding to. You want this? — Jackson

If you're going to be a snide person who just cares about your ego, we're done. If you want to chat, engage without the insults.

Does this mean all of my personal experiences are art? — Philosophim

Do you know what the word "about" means?!

You get what you ask for.

Have you read my posts?

If you want to chat, engage without the insults. — Philosophim

Philosophy is not "chat." And writing a bunch of questions is not having a dialogue.

You must confuse me with somebody else.

Addendum to &

There are no facts, only interpretations. — Freddy Z. re: philosophy

The difference between science and philosophy seems to be that science is a much greater complex of different investigative disciplines, and although there are changes of paradigm, in various ways within those disciplines, most of Science's progression seems to consists in building on the previous edifices of knowledge, and in shifts of focus, rather than in, so to speak, demolishing the whole building and reconstructing from scratch.

This is a good point. Most science is iterative. When there is a major paradigm shift (ala Kuhn) though, it tends to be that philosophy or mathematics is getting involved more directly in science. For example, two of the biggest "revolutions" across the sciences since the second half of the 20th century have been the emergence of chaos theory and information science. Both have shaken firmly held convictions in multiple fields about "the way things are" and remade prevailing paradigms. For a specific example, information science has dramatically changed how biologists define life and challenged the central dogma of genetics (i.e. that genes are the primary, perhaps only movers in evolution).

In those two examples, philosophy played some role, but it was the introduction of new mathematics, a way of mathematically defining information on the one hand, and new mathematics for defining complex dynamical systems, fractional dimensions, etc. on the other that really fueled the "revolutions." However, Einstein's revolution, the replacement of Newtonian absolute space and time with space-time, seems to have a lot more to do with challenging previously unanalyzed philosophical preconceptions.

I think it's fair to say that work in mathematics and philosophy differs quite a bit from science. It's interesting how, despite being so different, the disciplines can support each other so well, even science supporting math; as computers have gotten more powerful, experimental mathematics has become a thing. Also, how science can plug away with the same methods, safely ignoring most of what goes on in academic mathematics and philosophy, building knowledge, until some limit is hit or a paradigm begins to show serious weaknesses. Then the three get back together to build something new.

Most science is iterative. When there is a major paradigm shift (ala Kuhn) though, it tends to be that philosophy or mathematics is getting involved more directly in science. For example, two of the biggest "revolutions" across the sciences since the second half of the 20th century have been the emergence of chaos theory and information science. Both have shaken firmly held convictions in multiple fields about "the way things are" and remade prevailing paradigms. For a specific example, information science has dramatically changed how biologists define life and challenged the central dogma of genetics (i.e. that genes are the primary, perhaps only movers in evolution). — Count Timothy von Icarus

That makes sense. Relativity theory is another example, where non-Euclidean geometry played a seminal part in its genesis. Evolutionary theory is an example where philosophy perhaps played a significant role in that the idea of a creator was already in question, and the valorization of empirical investigations;searching for material conditions to explain observed phenomena, well under way.