Something exists only if there is a suitable description of that thing. — Banno
You see the point? If it's real, it must be out there - i.e. 'existing in time and space'. Whereas, I'm of the view that intelligible objects (such as number) are real - same for everyone - but not existent - they're not out there somewhere. But if they're not 'out there' then where are they? — Wayfarer
...aren't universals the determinates of predication? — Wayfarer
Insofar as the mind is capable of grasping universals, then it is able to specify what that thing is. — Wayfarer
spacetimes are just a special kind of objects. — litewave
Perhaps we infer universals from particular instances. — Banno
Of course. But I question the naturalistic assumption that there's a clear-cut division between 'in the mind' (subjective, internal) and 'in the world' (objective, external). What that sense is, in actuality, is one of the underlying dynamics of 'the human condition' - that sense of otherness or separateness from the world (recall Alan Watts' books). You do find, in classical philosophical literature, scattered references to the 'union of knower with known' - which harks back to the insight that transcends this 'illusion of othernesss'. And that, I say, is something lost to modern philosophy, due to its incompability with individualism. — Wayfarer
I'm of the view that intelligible objects (such as number) are real - same for everyone - but not existent - they're not out there somewhere. But if they're not 'out there' then where are they? Aha, comes the conclusion, 'in the mind'. But they're the same for all minds, do they're not subjective, either. In fact, neither subjective nor objective - but those two categories exhaust our instinctive ontology of what the world must be like.
So, in pre-modern and early modern philosophy, 'phenomenon' was one of a pair, the other term being 'noumenon' (not necessarily in the strictly Kantian sense) meaning appearance and reality. So my sense is that due to the overwhelming influence of empiricism and (broadly speaking) positivism, that we now have a conviction that only phenomena are real - that the totality of the universe comprise phenomena, 'out there somewhere', and apart from that, there's only the internal, private, subjective domain. — Wayfarer
Yes, each individual is unique; and has their own unique set of variations on the universal themes (some more interesting than others, of course).. — Janus
Perhaps we infer universals from particular instances. — Banno
That is a figure of speech. It might make no difference in terms of manipulating the concepts required to understand relativity theory, but it's the kind of difference that philosophy ought to consider. — Wayfarer
Object 1. a material thing that can be seen and touched.
"he was dragging a large object"
2. a person or thing to which a specified action or feeling is directed.
"disease became the object of investigation"
But you're still using the term 'objects' metaphorically. Numbers, space-time, the wave equation - none of these are actually 'objects' in the literal sense. — Wayfarer
It is this "union of knower with known" that is difficult for me because it insinuates a division (knower/known). — Merkwurdichliebe
Knowledge presupposes some kind of union, because in order to become the thing which is known we must possess it, we must be identical with the object we know. But this possession of the object is not a physical possession of it. It is a possession of the form of the object, of that principle which makes the object to be what it is. This is what Aristotle means when he says that the soul in a way becomes all things. Entitatively the knower and object known remain what they are. But intentionally (cognitively) the knower becomes the object of his knowledge as he possesses the form of the object, That is why Aquinas says with reference to intellectual knowledge:
Intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. — Summa
Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.
….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too.
Is it as simple as saying humankind has a dual nature (appetitive and rational) which directly relates to the dual nature of reality (the perceptual and the intelligible)? — Merkwurdichliebe
And, although they are objects in the metaphorical sense, they have literal existence in the same way a cup does. — Merkwurdichliebe
I am not using the word 'object' metaphorically but generally, as 'something' — litewave
I'm not saying I believe it but I'm very interested in understanding it, and also in understanding criticisms of it. — Wayfarer
the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Wayfarer
Is it as simple as saying humankind has a dual nature (appetitive and rational) which directly relates to the dual nature of reality (the perceptual and the intelligible)? — Merkwurdichliebe
Is that a simple thing to say? — Wayfarer
Then take as real only concrete collections as opposed to generalized collections (properties). — litewave
although I know it's controversial. — litewave
If you would be so generous, what is the greatest criticism you've heard of the traditional view? I always assumed it was dismissed in our time, not because of any major deficieny in itself, but because of modern arrogance. — Merkwurdichliebe
Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild
If you get that, you're seeing the point. — Wayfarer
Well, for the sake of argument we might regard properties as thoughts or words that represent certain similarities between particular objects. — litewave
But it does seem to me that properties are "out there" in the objects that have them. — litewave
Even then though, it seems that we are not able to apprehend them directly but rather in the form of usual or typical examples of them and in the feeling that the similarity of the examples evokes in our minds. — litewave
For example, you can't imagine a general circle because it is not even a spatial object, but you can imagine particular circles and have an experience of their similarity. — litewave
You're not wrong! The roots go back to the disputes about universals in medieval times, between the scholastic realists (Aquinas and others) the nominalists (Ockham, Bacon) and then later the empiricists (who were mainly nominalist.) And history was written by the victors. All of it happened so long ago that collectively we've forgotten about it. — Wayfarer
there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild
Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild
(Unfortunately (or so it seems to me) this kind of critique is often associated with social conservatism, which I am not really comfortable with, but it's a matter of 'let the chips fall where they may'.) — Wayfarer
Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild
Mathematical objects are in many ways unlike ordinary physical objects such as trees and cars. We learn about ordinary objects, at least in part, by using our senses. It is not obvious that we learn about mathematical objects this way. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we could use our senses to learn about mathematical objects. — IEP
Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies. — IEP
There are many, many streams. — Janus
The more important streams are those concerned with giving us the tools to understand what life is for us, and with ethics, with wisdom as to how to live. — Janus
But the retrograde idea that there is just one answer is pernicious, toxic: it invites authority to the table, and authority and wisdom are terrible bedfellows; one or other of them will always be kicked out of bed. — Janus
It is not denying that there are many streams in modern philosophy, it is saying that out of all those streams, its highest aspiration is in securing veridical cognitive events. — Merkwurdichliebe
. However, those things are clearly not a priority in the modern philosophical paradigm, and I don't see it giving us many of those tools to work with. — Merkwurdichliebe
I don't see much wisdom coming from man-as-the-measure of all things, especially combined with the upsurgence in the right to individual opinion. I would argue that the present world could use a little authoritative and life-altering wisdom to balance things out a bit. — Merkwurdichliebe
As you're seeing the point, — Wayfarer
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