Something exists only if there is a suitable description of that thing. — Banno

Right. And aren't universals the determinates of predication? Insofar as the mind is capable of grasping universals, then it is able to specify what that thing is. 'No entity without identity'. That is the subject of the Kelly Ross essay on my profile page, Meaning and the Problem of Universals.

You see the point? If it's real, it must be out there - i.e. 'existing in time and space'. Whereas, I'm of the view that intelligible objects (such as number) are real - same for everyone - but not existent - they're not out there somewhere. But if they're not 'out there' then where are they? — Wayfarer

And where is space and time? In general, an object does not need to be in a space or in a time (and time is just a special kind of space according to theory of relativity, a dimension of spacetime). An object just must have relations to other objects, and spatiotemporal relations are just a special kind of relations between objects inside a spacetime, and spacetimes are just a special kind of objects.

...aren't universals the determinates of predication? — Wayfarer

I don't understand what that means. Are you saying there are no particulars? Or that we cannot predicate to a particular? But "Wayfarer" designates a particular, and "Wayfarer wrote the post to which this is a reply" predicates writing a post to you, so that does not seem right.

Insofar as the mind is capable of grasping universals, then it is able to specify what that thing is. — Wayfarer

But might this not be arse about? Perhaps we infer universals from particular instances. Indeed, one comes to understand "Cat" from dealing with particular cats, and in contrast to particular dogs and trees.

I don't see much promise in what you are suggesting.

spacetimes are just a special kind of objects. — litewave

That is a figure of speech. It might make no difference in terms of manipulating the concepts required to understand relativity theory, but it's the kind of difference that philosophy ought to consider.

Perhaps we infer universals from particular instances. — Banno

says John Stuart Mill, and the other empiricists, but I do realise that we're at the boundary of what you consider acceptable, so I won't press the point.

Fine. I see your post has attracted the quantum enthusiasts, so you will have your work cut out for you. So we might just note that there are modal implications in your idea that might be worth addressing sometime.

Of course. But I question the naturalistic assumption that there's a clear-cut division between 'in the mind' (subjective, internal) and 'in the world' (objective, external). What that sense is, in actuality, is one of the underlying dynamics of 'the human condition' - that sense of otherness or separateness from the world (recall Alan Watts' books). You do find, in classical philosophical literature, scattered references to the 'union of knower with known' - which harks back to the insight that transcends this 'illusion of othernesss'. And that, I say, is something lost to modern philosophy, due to its incompability with individualism. — Wayfarer

It is this "union of knower with known" that is difficult for me because it insinuates a division (knower/known). And when I reconcile it by saying the knower directly apprehends the known, I feel like it is too simple of a solution. I would love to say: that is simply the way it is and be done with it...but the human in me wants to go further and explain the mechanism by which it all works. And that always leads into the Kantian nightmare.

I'm of the view that intelligible objects (such as number) are real - same for everyone - but not existent - they're not out there somewhere. But if they're not 'out there' then where are they? Aha, comes the conclusion, 'in the mind'. But they're the same for all minds, do they're not subjective, either. In fact, neither subjective nor objective - but those two categories exhaust our instinctive ontology of what the world must be like.

So, in pre-modern and early modern philosophy, 'phenomenon' was one of a pair, the other term being 'noumenon' (not necessarily in the strictly Kantian sense) meaning appearance and reality. So my sense is that due to the overwhelming influence of empiricism and (broadly speaking) positivism, that we now have a conviction that only phenomena are real - that the totality of the universe comprise phenomena, 'out there somewhere', and apart from that, there's only the internal, private, subjective domain. — Wayfarer

If this false sense of separation is part of the human condition, I'm interested in how an unseperated pair is unified. Is it as simple as saying humankind has a dual nature (appetitive and rational) which directly relates to the dual nature of reality (the perceptual and the intelligible)?

Yes, each individual is unique; and has their own unique set of variations on the universal themes (some more interesting than others, of course).. — Janus

Don't forget about the blessed nomenalists, they only have access to their own unique set of variations on particular themes :smirk:

Perhaps we infer universals from particular instances. — Banno

Universals have little significance in nominalist views. They are nothing but particulars we call by the same name.

If universals exist at all, then all particulars are subordinate.

That is a figure of speech. It might make no difference in terms of manipulating the concepts required to understand relativity theory, but it's the kind of difference that philosophy ought to consider. — Wayfarer

Structurally, a spacetime is a pure set like any other object. One of many objects in set theory or mathematics.

But you're still using the term 'objects' metaphorically. Numbers, space-time, the wave equation - none of these are actually 'objects' in the literal sense.

Object 1. a material thing that can be seen and touched.
"he was dragging a large object"

2. a person or thing to which a specified action or feeling is directed.
"disease became the object of investigation"

They're objects in the sense of 'objects of thought' but they're not literally objects.

But you're still using the term 'objects' metaphorically. Numbers, space-time, the wave equation - none of these are actually 'objects' in the literal sense. — Wayfarer

They are intelligible objects, apprehended in the mind. And, although they are objects in the metaphorical sense, they have literal existence in the same way a cup does (minus the perceptual component). In fact all universals are non-objective and literal realities.

It is this "union of knower with known" that is difficult for me because it insinuates a division (knower/known). — Merkwurdichliebe

There is an actual division, isn't there? When I see the proverbial [apple/tree/cup] then there's a distinction between the knowing subject and the known object, surely?

The way it is explained in terms of traditional realism (as I understand it) is that the senses apprehend the material thing, but the rational mind realises the form.

Knowledge presupposes some kind of union, because in order to become the thing which is known we must possess it, we must be identical with the object we know. But this possession of the object is not a physical possession of it. It is a possession of the form of the object, of that principle which makes the object to be what it is. This is what Aristotle means when he says that the soul in a way becomes all things. Entitatively the knower and object known remain what they are. But intentionally (cognitively) the knower becomes the object of his knowledge as he possesses the form of the object, That is why Aquinas says with reference to intellectual knowledge:

Intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. — Summa

As expressed by a classics scholar:

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too.

Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism, 39:00

I'm not saying I believe it but I'm very interested in understanding it, and also in understanding criticisms of it.

Is it as simple as saying humankind has a dual nature (appetitive and rational) which directly relates to the dual nature of reality (the perceptual and the intelligible)? — Merkwurdichliebe

Is that a simple thing to say? Besides, the two principles are generally described as sensible (sense-able) and intelligible, i.e. what can be apprehended by the senses and what can be known by the mind.

And, although they are objects in the metaphorical sense, they have literal existence in the same way a cup does. — Merkwurdichliebe

Ah, but do they? I'm saying that @litewave is glossing over the issue by saying that e.g. 'time and space are objects'. In fact, the nature of time and space are unresolved questions, and arguably not scientific questions at all. Time and space may be regarded as 'objects' (or parameters) for the purposes of mathematical physics but it doesn't make them objects in the literal sense. Same with other intelligible objects. Whereas most empirical philosophers will deny that they have any kind of existence except as mental acts.

I am not using the word 'object' metaphorically but generally, as 'something'. And any 'something' is either a collection of 'somethings' or a non-composite 'something' (empty collection).

I am not using the word 'object' metaphorically but generally, as 'something' — litewave

It's too general a distinction for the purposes of philosophy. I agree that abstract objects are real, but many do not agree with that, on the basis that they have no concrete or objective existence. There is a difference between the sense in which the [tree/apple/chair] exists, and the sense in which prime numbers exist, because the latter can only be deduced by an act of counting and reasoning, not perceived by the senses.

I'm not saying I believe it but I'm very interested in understanding it, and also in understanding criticisms of it. — Wayfarer

Me too. I'm mostly interested in ethics, but this issue is the one nonethical philosophical issue I can't let go

the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Wayfarer

Hopefully you can help me understand more, you're obviously better informed than me.

Is it as simple as saying humankind has a dual nature (appetitive and rational) which directly relates to the dual nature of reality (the perceptual and the intelligible)? — Merkwurdichliebe

Is that a simple thing to say? — Wayfarer

The current generation of philosophers would have us believe it. But no, it appears simple, but it holds as much weight as any other school.

If you would be so generous, what is the greatest criticism you've heard of the traditional view? I always assumed it was dismissed in our time, not because of any major deficieny in itself, but because of modern arrogance. Please correct me if I'm wrong

Then take as real only concrete collections as opposed to generalized collections (properties). For example, concrete trees as opposed to a generalized (Platonic) tree. It seems to me that properties are "out there" just like non-properties (and not just like words or thoughts) although I know it's controversial.

Then take as real only concrete collections as opposed to generalized collections (properties). — litewave

But then you necessarily rule out the reality of rational thought... along with the capacity for apprehending intelligible objects. It diminishes human existence to a particularized absurdity.

although I know it's controversial. — litewave

:up: If you get that, you're seeing the point.

If you would be so generous, what is the greatest criticism you've heard of the traditional view? I always assumed it was dismissed in our time, not because of any major deficieny in itself, but because of modern arrogance. — Merkwurdichliebe

You're not wrong! The roots go back to the disputes about universals in medieval times, between the scholastic realists (Aquinas and others) the nominalists (Ockham, Bacon) and then later the empiricists (who were mainly nominalist.) And history was written by the victors. All of it happened so long ago that collectively we've forgotten about it.

Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.

In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild

That essay is a good starting point, although by no means an easy read (it used to be posted online but the site is no more. (Unfortunately (or so it seems to me) this kind of critique is often associated with social conservatism, which I am not really comfortable with, but it's a matter of 'let the chips fall where they may'.)

The other book I found really helpful, I read pretty well straight after discovering philosophy forums, there's a very good reader review here. It's a revisionist history of how modernity got to be how it is.

Well, for the sake of argument we might regard properties as thoughts or words that represent certain similarities between particular objects. But it does seem to me that properties are "out there" in the objects that have them. Even then though, it seems that we are not able to apprehend them directly but rather in the form of usual or typical examples of them and in the feeling that the similarity of the examples evokes in our minds. For example, you can't imagine a general circle because it is not even a spatial object, but you can imagine particular circles and have an experience of their similarity.

If you get that, you're seeing the point. — Wayfarer

Now that I think about it, I am not sure that "generalized collection" even makes sense. A particular tree is a particular collection (of atoms or whatever) but a generalized tree is what collection? It seems that a property (generalized object) can't be identified with a collection and so a property is not a collection; it can however be represented, and in this sense defined, by its concrete examples, which are collections. This also applies to numbers, which are inherently generalized objects; for example number 3 can be represented by any collection that has 3 members. A particular space, however, is not a generalized object and so it is a collection (it can be identified with a particular collection).

Well, for the sake of argument we might regard properties as thoughts or words that represent certain similarities between particular objects. — litewave

That is the basic nomimalist view. when I compare it to the traditional view it is obviously more problematic. For instance, things like mind, justice, love, happiness, &c. can only be inferred from concrete particulars so that they have no actual reality in themselves, but have existence only as abstractions (i.e. concrete particulars to which we apply a conventionalized name).

But it does seem to me that properties are "out there" in the objects that have them. — litewave

I agree. These properties inhere in the object, and humans possess the appropriate faculties to apprehend the sensible and intelligible properties of what is out there.

Even then though, it seems that we are not able to apprehend them directly but rather in the form of usual or typical examples of them and in the feeling that the similarity of the examples evokes in our minds. — litewave

It only seems that we do not apprehend them directly because our modern culture has confused what apprehends and what is apprehended. Is it out of the question that there could be qualitatively different modes of apprehending the same thing, or qualitatively different properties constituting the thing in itself?

For example, you can't imagine a general circle because it is not even a spatial object, but you can imagine particular circles and have an experience of their similarity. — litewave

Actually, it is the optical distortion in the human eye which makes it virtually impossible to percieve a perfect circle in spacetime. But geometrically speaking, adobe photoshop can technically render a perfect circle. This properly illustrates how qualitatively different the sensible and intelligible are.

You're not wrong! The roots go back to the disputes about universals in medieval times, between the scholastic realists (Aquinas and others) the nominalists (Ockham, Bacon) and then later the empiricists (who were mainly nominalist.) And history was written by the victors. All of it happened so long ago that collectively we've forgotten about it. — Wayfarer

Well, shit! Great excerpt there.

there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild

Indeed, Platonic hierarchy of forms. The purpose of philosophy (traditionally speaking) is to make this ascent, and best exemplified in the accounts of Socrates.

Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild

That is on point and very well put. It's a terrible tragedy that philosophy has become such a lowly enterprise for the modern consciousness.

(Unfortunately (or so it seems to me) this kind of critique is often associated with social conservatism, which I am not really comfortable with, but it's a matter of 'let the chips fall where they may'.) — Wayfarer

That is why this debate is so important. Philosophy has real consequences for the sociological predispositions of its adherents, regardless of whether they adhere consciously/volitionally or not.

Unfortunately, it seems that the traditional view defaults into a position of social conservatism. Yet, I'm not so sure the alternative (based in the modern paradigm) is any better - so much creative/destructive power, and so little wisdom. It is really a question of lesser evils.

Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. — What's Wrong with Ockham, Joshua Hothschild

This is a an example of simplistic thinking at its worst. Philosophy today is not just one thing. There are many, many streams. The more important streams are those concerned with giving us the tools to understand what life is for us, and with ethics, with wisdom as to how to live. But the retrograde idea that there is just one answer is pernicious, toxic: it invites authority to the table, and authority and wisdom are terrible bedfellows; one or other of them will always be kicked out of bed.

In a logic proof such as in the lambda calculus, the counterpart of a 'universal' is a term or formula that can be reduced, via computation, to some constant term standing for a particular. This process is known as beta-reduction.

For example, a mathematical function such as f(x)= 2x can be regarded as a 'universal' term that when applied to the 'particular' object 2 is eliminated to produce the 'particular' object 4.

Beta reduction a useful analogy for understanding the cognition of language; For example, if i am looking for my red jumper, then I understand "red jumper" in the sense of a universal until as and when I find the particular object i am looking for - in which case "red jumper" reduces to an indexical such as this, which points directly without further linguistic mediation to the non-linguistic 'term' concerned.

:up:

'nihil ultra ego'

"red jumper" reduces to an indexical such as this, which points directly without further linguistic mediation to the non-linguistic 'term' concerned. — sime

Interesting, but only speaks to the philosophical implications by way of analogy, I think.

As you're seeing the point, I'll flesh out a bit more detail of where I'm up to in this quest. As we discussed, the status of mathematics - 'invented or discovered' - is an interesting philosophical conundrum. The typical modern view is that mathematics has to be a human invention, something that is created by us, for our purposes, because it can't see how the Universe has an innately mathematical structure.

There's an encyclopedia article I often refer to, The Indispensability Argument in the Philosophy of Mathematics, which is a useful summary of some of the main arguments. Briefly, it starts with reference to paper by a well-known math scholar, Paul Benacerraf, on the topic. According to this paper 'Standard readings of mathematical claims entail the existence of mathematical objects. But, our best epistemic theories seem to debar any knowledge of mathematical objects.'

What are these 'best epistemic theories' and why do they 'seem to debar' such knowledge? Reading on, we learn that:

Mathematical objects are in many ways unlike ordinary physical objects such as trees and cars. We learn about ordinary objects, at least in part, by using our senses. It is not obvious that we learn about mathematical objects this way. Indeed, it is difficult to see how we could use our senses to learn about mathematical objects. — IEP

So this is a hint that 'our best theories' are empiricist, namely, that knowledge is only acquired by sensory experience, and that there is no innate facility for knowledge, of the type that mathematical reasoning appears to consist in. The point is elaborated below.

Some philosophers, called rationalists, claim that we have a special, non-sensory capacity for understanding mathematical truths, a rational insight arising from pure thought. But, the rationalist’s claims appear incompatible with an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies. — IEP

So, if the 'rationalist philosophers' are correct then we're not physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies! The horror! When 'our best theories' are all premised on the fact that we are! That's the motivation behind this whole argument. Because if number is real but it's not physical, then this defeats materialism, so it's acutely embarrasing for mainstream philosophy. Especially because the 'mathematicization of nature' has been so central to the ballyhoed advance of modern science (hence it's 'indispensability').

This lead me to look into why the faculty of reason was attributed with divine powers by Greek philosophy. Now there's a research topic for the ages.

There are many, many streams. — Janus

It is not denying that there are many streams in modern philosophy, it is saying that out of all those streams, its highest aspiration is in securing veridical cognitive events.

The more important streams are those concerned with giving us the tools to understand what life is for us, and with ethics, with wisdom as to how to live. — Janus

I agree, the most important philosophical threads are indeed concerned with giving us the tools to understand what life is for us, and with ethics, with wisdom as to how to live. However, those things are clearly not a priority in the modern philosophical paradigm, and I don't see it giving us many of those tools to work with.

But the retrograde idea that there is just one answer is pernicious, toxic: it invites authority to the table, and authority and wisdom are terrible bedfellows; one or other of them will always be kicked out of bed. — Janus

I don't see much wisdom coming from man-as-the-measure of all things, especially combined with the upsurgence in the right to individual opinion. I would argue that the present world could use a little authoritative and life-altering wisdom to balance things out a bit.

It is not denying that there are many streams in modern philosophy, it is saying that out of all those streams, its highest aspiration is in securing veridical cognitive events. — Merkwurdichliebe

And I think that's a simplistic and egregious generalization. The common aspiration of all philosophy is to understand, and if that were all that was meant by "veridical cognitive events" then I could agree. The point is there are many different kinds of understanding in many different contexts.

. However, those things are clearly not a priority in the modern philosophical paradigm, and I don't see it giving us many of those tools to work with. — Merkwurdichliebe

I disagree I think it's just that we often cannot relate to different understandings so they seem irrelevant to how we might conceive the human situation. People vary; it's "horses for courses".

I don't see much wisdom coming from man-as-the-measure of all things, especially combined with the upsurgence in the right to individual opinion. I would argue that the present world could use a little authoritative and life-altering wisdom to balance things out a bit. — Merkwurdichliebe

Man as the measure of all things is very much what is promoted primarily by those of an idealist bent. I think it's a complex issue, and there are ways in which humanity is the measure of all things, at least for us; or perhaps more accurately: 'man is the measurer of all things'. Because we are undoubtedly the measurers, the idealist (or as Meillassoux would say "the correlationist") argument is that we are also the measure, insofar as all we are held to know is our measurements (ratios, rationality, judgements).

If there is a cure for the pernicious aspect of this mindset it would be philosophical naturalism, not the kinds of idealist or religious philosophies that take humanity to be special, to be the privileged "crown of creation".

As you're seeing the point, — Wayfarer

You might be the only relevant philosopher on TPF who consistently argues on this point. It is such a different view that it is nearly impossible to get through to one who is inured with the modern paradigm, I give you credit. I have a deep affinity for Platonism, but my philosophical acuity is not sophisticated enough to argue with the modern mind from the platonic perspective. It's just easier to fall back on phenomenology. But you are really helping me to sort it out.

...

Glad to be not just another voice in the wilderness ;-)