And I think that's a simplistic and egregious generalization. The common aspiration of all philosophy is to understand, and if that were all that was meant by "veridical cognitive events" then I could agree. The point is there are many different kinds of understanding in many different contexts. — Janus
I disagree I think it's just that we often cannot relate to different understandings so they seem irrelevant to how we might conceive the human situation. People vary; it's "horses for courses". — Janus
Man as the measure of all things is very much what is promoted primarily by those of an idealist bent. I think it's a complex issue, and there are ways in which humanity is the measure of all things, at least for us. — Janus
Well, I was delighted with his general statement of the theory that a thing is for any individual what it seems to him to be; but I was astonished at the way he began. I was astonished that he did not state at the beginning of the Truth that ‘Pig is the measure of all things’ or ‘Baboon’ or some yet more out-of-the-way creature with the power of perception. That would have made a most imposing and disdainful opening. It would have made it clear to us at once that, while we were standing astounded at his wisdom as though he were a god, he was in reality no better authority than a tadpole—let alone any other man. — Theaetetus160b
If there is a cure for the pernicious aspect of this mindset it would be philosophical naturalism, not the kinds of idealist or religious philsophies that take humanity to be special, to be the privileged "crown of creation". — Janus
Would you say that a philosophy that makes you a better and happier person is superior to one that doesn't? I would argue it is more than likely that some philosophies can do this much better than others. — Merkwurdichliebe
Plato certainly shows little favor towards "man as the measure" in Theaetetus. He goes so far as to have Socrates mock it sarcastically: — Merkwurdichliebe
Why philosophical naturalism? It has just as many, and arguably worse, pitfalls as the others. — Merkwurdichliebe
Why philosophical naturalism? It has just as many, and arguably worse, pitfalls as the others. — Merkwurdichliebe
The typical modern view is that mathematics has to be a human invention, something that is created by us, for our purposes, because it can't see how the Universe has an innately mathematical structure. — Wayfarer
So this is a hint that 'our best theories' are empiricist, namely, that knowledge is only acquired by sensory experience, and that there is no innate facility for knowledge, of the type that mathematical reasoning appears to consist in. — Wayfarer
So, if the 'rationalist philosophers' are correct then we're not physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies! When 'our best theories' all all premised on the fact that we are. That's the motivation behind this whole argument. Because if number is real but it's not physical, then this defeats materialism, so it's acutely embarrasing for mainstream philosophy. Especially because the 'mathematicization of nature' has been so central to the ballyhoed advance of modern science. — Wayfarer
This lead me to look into why the faculty of reason was attributed with divine powers by Greek philosophy. Now there's a research topic for the ages.
I agree "M > P" which, to me, implies that M – P = nothing but extrinsic, mere possibilities, which necessarily cannot be actualized – necessarily are not actual – à la Spinoza's first kind of knowledge.M = set of mental objects and P = set of physical objects. — Agent Smith
I agree "M > P" which, to me, means that M – P = extrinsic mere possibilities, which necessarily cannot be actualized – necessarily are not actual (in P terms) – à la Spinoza's first kind of knowledge. — 180 Proof
I don't think so. Nature's "filter" sifts the adapted from the maladapted and Reason's "filter" sifts the intelligible from the unintelligible, in/defeasible truths from fictions, signals from noise ... possible versions of actuality from 'mere possibilities' from impossibilities, etc. — 180 Proof
"Something" is a subset of "everything", so your formulation of the "conundrum" makes no sense. Why is there anything at all? There is no why avoids begging that question. :fire: — 180 Proof
Sure, but what makes some better and happier may make others worse and unhappier. How can we justify saying that some philosophies are "superior" tout court? Couldn't we only justify such an opinion if we could show that adherence to such a philosophy would make everyone better and happier? — Janus
But just because we cannot verify it, it does not mean that it is not the case that one philosophy is superior to another. — Merkwurdichliebe
I don't know what it could mean for one philosophy to be superior to another in any absolute sense, since it could not be verified, and superiority is nothing more than a value judgement, which is always going to remain subjective or at best, if much agreement exists, inter-subjective. I don't see how there could be any objective fact of the matter about it. — Janus
why should I be convinced on account of it? What relevance, for example, do pigs or baboons have for the question? For pigs perhaps it is pigs that are the measure of all things, and for baboons, baboons. Why then for men, should men not, in some senses, be the measure of all things? — Janus
So, remember before I said it is a complex issue. In relation to any person, who is responsible for determining their views if not the person, assuming that they find themselves capable of thinking for themselves? Is it desirable that others should overrule and impose their authority against the freethinking individual (provided of course that the indivdual is not seeking to impose their own views on others)? — Janus
What kind of hierarchy are you positing? — Janus
Intelligibility is apparent and not in question; even animals find their environments intelligible, a fact which is made obvious by their ability to function and act purposively.
I know what it means to think one philosophy is superior to another. I agree that one philosophy cannot be proven or demonstrated, to be superior to another. I don't know what it could mean for one philosophy to be superior to another in any absolute sense, since it could not be verified, and superiority is nothing more than a value judgement, which is always going to remain subjective or at best, if much agreement exists, inter-subjective. I don't see how there could be any objective fact of the matter about it. — Janus
Why should there be any superiority of one value judgement over another, other than in the practical sense that some judgements are in productive of social harmony, or at least not productive of disharmony, and are therefore adaptive, and others are antisocial and hence maladaptive? — Janus
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