I'm sorry about the length of reply. — RussellA
and see thatImagine at a particular place and time in the world there is something. The public name "two" is attached to this something by the authorities. From my observation of this something, in my mind I have the private concept two. Someone else observing the same thing will also have the private concept two. However, it may well be that my private concept two is different to their private concept two, but as we are both part of the same community, we will both name our private concepts as "two". — RussellA
...those private aspects of the concept two make no difference — RussellA
On the other hand we have accounts of how numbers are used in our everyday practices, which can include, for the mathematicians amongst us, quite complicated and sophisticated machinations. Numbers are to be understood not by setting up definitions from first principles, but by learning to make use of them. — Banno
We would verify his definition by comparing it to our use of the number two, checking that what Russell defines is indeed adequate for the everyday tasks we set for that number. We would verify or falsify his definition by comparing it to our use of "two". after all, any stipulated definition is evaluated by comparison with the empirical facts of language use.
That is, the use of the number two has priority over any contrived stipulation. — Banno
So we have here two differing approaches to the nature of the apples being purchased at our grocer. On the one hand we have Russell's view that the apple consists in a concatenation of "constituents with which we are acquainted", something like "Green or red and round and waxy and smooth and tart or sweet". On the other hand we might set out the nature of an apple by setting out the roles it might play as we go about our daily activities: The thing we pick, sell, bite, stew, bake in a pie and so on. — Banno
Ok, but I take exception to compound conceptions. I know what is meant by it, but I think it a misunderstanding. Some thing, with a set of properties in the form of conceptions subsumed under it, is still represented only by its own conception. — Mww
My tentative explanation of how Ideas interact with Real things is similar, but based on a philosophical simulation of Quantum & Information Theory. The dual entities are distinct only in the sense that the same mind can distinguish between a Thing and the idea of the Thing. Real & Ideal things are conceptually distinctive, but not epistemologically exclusive -- they are not in parallel worlds, but in the same world. You don't have to go out of this world to create an imaginary replica of a physical object.The chief difficulty with Platonism is that while proposing a distinct type of reality of mathematical entities, it must then explain how this reality interacts with everyday things. — Banno
Good question What do you think of the following explanation for explaining interaction? . . . .
In this view, mathematical entities are not a distinct type of reality. They are ideas, just like “tree.” — Art48
...perhaps both are needed... — RussellA
But I think this a bit too fast. While a baby has the potential to distinguish many colours, that potential is developed and reinforced over time by their interaction with the world. They learn to treat green and red differently because treating them differently has different results. The difference between red and green has public consequences. If the difference between harlequin green and neon green had similar consequences, she might learn to differentiate them before red and green. We know from studies of colour names across cultures that what counts as a significant difference in colour is at least partly dependent on where one grows up. While we are born with the potential to differentiate many colours, the ones we actually differentiate are dependent on our culture and environment. If it made no difference to us if the apple was red or green, we might well never make the distinction....the function of schools is not to teach children how to distinguish between green or red, round or square, etc as these abilities are innate — RussellA
Wittgenstein there called into question whether a single, unequivocal notion of simplicity or a final state of analysis can be found (e.g., secs. 46–49, 91), and questioned the utility of an ideal language (sec. 81). Wittgenstein also called into question whether, in those cases in which analysis is possible, the results really give us what was meant at the start: “does someone who says that the broom is in the corner really mean: the broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed in the brush?” (sec. 60). — Kevin Klement
The capacity to differentiate colour is there, but it is trained by our interaction with others. — Banno
Is it the colours here that are the simples? Or are the colours irrelevant, and the fact that there are squares instead of circles what is important? Or that the grid is three by three, and not two by four? The point is that what is significant here is far from clear until one understands what is at stake. — Banno
I think of consciousness as what is aware of the sensations. — Art48
I'd call consciousness the act (activity) of having sensations, thoughts, and so on; a more active notion than taking it as a thing that does the experiencing. A step further form the homunculus. — Banno
...there is no observable act of the body which could be called the act of being conscious. — Metaphysician Undercover
I'd call consciousness the act (activity) of having sensations, thoughts, and so on — Banno
All that presupposes “I think” has some irreducible meaning. Whether we actually do think or not, is irrelevant, insofar as the very seeming of it requires an account. — Mww
….the unity of apperception in the mind is mysterious. — RussellA
….each thought (…) is a distinct unified whole and as a unified whole is not only irreducible but has meaning. — RussellA
The problem is that you refer to a number of very different acts "sensations, thoughts, and so on", and conclude that they comprise a single act called "consciousness". Don't you think that the unification of these vastly varying acts requires something like a "homunculus"? Or do you appeal to magic as the source of such a unification? — Metaphysician Undercover
I think Wittgenstein's approach can wholly replace Russell's — Banno
The capacity to differentiate colour is there, but it is trained by our interaction with others. It follows that what is to count as an "elementary colour" is not entirely innate, but learned by interaction with the world. Similarly, what counts as an elementary concept, a simple, is dependent on one's interactions with the world, including other people, and language. — Banno
One of the major differences between the Tractatus and the Investigations was Wittgenstein's realisation that what is to count as a simple is dependent on the task at hand. The meaning of "simple" varies with use. — Banno
In place of this I offer a picture of "two" as part of a family of activities that we engage in together. What is significant in these activities is what is shared, since the activity is that sharing. What is not shared, is not part of that public activity, and so of no significance.Imagine at a particular place and time in the world there is something. The public name "two" is attached to this something by the authorities. From my observation of this something, in my mind I have the private concept two. Someone else observing the same thing will also have the private concept two. However, it may well be that my private concept two is different to their private concept two, but as we are both part of the same community, we will both name our private concepts as "two". — RussellA
So the homunculus is only a logical problem if we're using it to explain something about consciousness. — frank
I really don't see why the homunculus is a logical problem, maybe you could explain this problem for me. — Metaphysician Undercover
. I realize consciousness presents us with a problem, but I think it's more of a problem of premises rather than a problem of logic. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the homunculus is inconsistent with some other premise, maybe it's the other premise which is the problem. — Metaphysician Undercover
In place of this I offer a picture of "two" as part of a family of activities that we engage in together — Banno
The idea of a Cartesian theatre is subject to the development of an infinite regress if we imagine that the stream of data coming into the CNS is being witnessed by an internal person. — frank
Yes, the faulty premise is that the psyche is a full fledged being that is somehow independent of the body and the body's environment. For a lot of reasons, we know that can't be what's happening. The homunculus fallacy is just part of that. — frank
You'll be a very different person in each of these cases, — frank
I’ve had a dozen occupations, both professional and incidental, yet I’m still just lil’ ol’ me. — Mww
Can the interest which makes one good at something, and conversely the lack of it that makes him not so good, be predicated on cultural or environmental influences? — Mww
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