It looks like you're pretty firmly wedded to the idea of a Cartesian theatre. — frank
I'm not, but it does occasionally jar me to know that I'm a product of chemicals and customs. :grimace: — frank
We know that a rigid designator picks out the very same individual every possible world. — Banno
I'm surprised you remember. — frank
:roll:There is no such thing as the same individual in different possible world — Metaphysician Undercover
An individual cannot exist in numerous possible worlds. — Metaphysician Undercover
Individuals need not have an essence.
— Banno
According to Kripke, they always do. — frank
An individual cannot exist in numerous possible worlds. If the designator picks out something which is common to numerous possible worlds, it is clearly not an individual. — Metaphysician Undercover
Kripke brought up possible worlds as an aid to understanding how modality works. There are ways of parsing modal expressions that turn them into nonsense, and I think MU would be inclined to do that. He'd say we can't assert that Nixon could have lost, because if he lost, that wouldn't be Nixon.
I think this confusion arises from trying to do something ontological with modal expressions, when that's not the intent behind them. We're generally just playing with logical or metaphysical possibility, and that's the way possible worlds should be taken: as logical hypotheses. — frank
So yes, an individual "exists" in numerous, maybe even uncountable, possible worlds, because there are numerous, maybe even uncountable, logically-possible propositions, predicates, etc that we can say of a given individual. — busycuttingcrap
An individual cannot exist in numerous possible worlds. — Metaphysician Undercover
According Kripke, his wooden lectern is made of wood in every possible world where that lectern exists. There are all sorts of properties we could change and still have the same lectern, but being wooden isn't one of them.
It's an essential property. Do you disagree with him about this? — frank
Oh, yes. But the lectern is identified via it's description - being wood - so in effect he is saying "the wooden lectern is necessarily made of wood".
The example is found in the article Identity and necessity, not Naming and Necessity. Bottom of p.178. (the link is a dreadful PDF - anyone have a better copy?). — Banno
But the lectern is identified via it's description - being wood - so in effect he is saying "the wooden lectern is necessarily made of wood". — Banno
↪Mww ...the property of being made from H₂O is true of water in every possible world, but is known a posteriori. — Banno
Yes, that's exactly the point, "an individual" speaks of something in a completely different ontological category from what a "logical hypothesis" speaks of. So Banno's attempt to bring the individual into the logical hypothesis was a category mistake.
We see this same mistake quite often when people speak of "possible worlds". They will say for instance, that one of the possible worlds is the actual world. But the possible worlds are just representations, logical hypotheses, and although one of the possible worlds might be judged as the correct representation, or some feature might be common to a whole set of possible worlds, it is still not the actual world, as this is a distinct category from the representation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure it does, because "existing in a possible world" isn't an existence claim about other worlds, despite appearances to the contrary. Replace "existing in a possible world" with "being logically possible/self-consistent", and your objection disappears.No, that's the category mistake described above. An individual does not exist in any possible worlds.
Carry on with your terribly misguided philosophy (if one can call it that) then. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, what happens when we move from the demonstrative pronoun to the definite article. — RussellA
It seems like you didn't hear me the first time. Every time you read "there is/exists a possible world such that X, Y, or Z", mentally substitute "it is not contradictory/inconsistent that X, Y, or Z". Possible-world semantics isn't actually making an ontological claim (at least, not if you're not David Lewis), its making a claim about logical consistency. And so obviously, the actual world is a possible world, since "being a possible worlds" means "not being contradictory/logically inconsistent". And the actual world is not self-contradictory or logically inconsistent, so, it is a possible world. I mean, obviously, how could the actual world be actual, if it wasn't possible? — busycuttingcrap
Sure it does, because "existing in a possible world" isn't an existence claim about other worlds, despite appearances to the contrary. Replace "existing in a possible world" with "being logically possible/self-consistent", and your objection disappears. — busycuttingcrap
Understanding how certain technical terms are actually used in the relevant sub-field is actually just about the opposite of misguided philosophy: its trying to understand what philosophers mean, on their own terms. So its sort of necessary for a proper understanding of any philosopher. But I was admittedly tentative about engaging with you on this, because you are, frankly, sort of known for being stubborn about these things and not amenable to correction. But I assure you, as someone who spent most of their undergrad philosophy degree focusing on contemporary analytic philosophy and philosophy of language (so, for instance, folks like Saul Kripke), you're simply misunderstanding what these terms usually mean, in the context of contemporary philosophy/modal logic. — busycuttingcrap
OK, I understand what you are saying here. Now the problem is that when someone like Banno says that X,Y, or Z refers to "an individual" this is an ontological claim. So you can have your X, Y, and Z referring to nothing if you like, or even refer to a type, and claim logical consistency, but as soon as you say that one of these refers to an individual then you need to account for the existence of that individual because you have made an ontological claim. — Metaphysician Undercover
This does not solve the problem, because Banno's claim was that the designated individual exists in numerous possible worlds. — Metaphysician Undercover
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.