Individual minds, that all operate under the same conditions and parse experience in the same way. Mind is ‘collective’ in the sense that we’re all members of the same language group, culture, and so on. — Wayfarer
Individual minds, that all operate under the same conditions and parse experience in the same way. Mind is ‘collective’ in the sense that we’re all members of the same language group, culture, and so on. Hegel made a lot out of that, didn’t he? — Wayfarer
your opposition derives entirely from the fact that our mathematical models , assuming number is real, have been extremely successful in predicting previously unknown facts about the world. — Isaac
My argument for mathematical platonism more generally is simply that number (etc) is real, but not materially existent. Numbers, and many other 'intelligible objects', are real, in that they are the same for anyone who can grasp them, but they're only able to be grasped by a rational intelligence. So they're independent of your mind or mine, but are only real as objects of the intelligence. — Wayfarer
these intelligibles [numbers, which are real] are not a product of the mind — Wayfarer
the only reality we know is constructed by the activities of the intellect — Wayfarer
How do you square those two? If the only reality is "constructed by the activities of the intellect", then how can real numbers (which you claim are a part of reality), be "not a product of the mind"?
Either reality (part of which you claim includes numbers), is a product of the mind or it isn't. — Isaac
But whatever it is that appears as the empirical world cannot be said to be mind-dependent unless God or some universal or collective mind is posited. — Janus
Consider this. All of the vast amounts of data being nowadays collected about the universe by our incredibly powerful space telescopes and particle colliders is still synthesised and converted into conceptual information by scientists. And that conceptual activity remains conditioned by, and subject to, our sensory and intellectual capabilities — determined by the kinds of sensory beings we are, and shaped by the attitudes and theories we hold. And we’re never outside of that web of conceptual activities — at least, not as long as we’re conscious beings. That is the sense in which the Universe exists ‘in the mind’ — not as a figment of someone’s imagination, but as a combination or synthesis of perception, conception and theory in the human mind (which is more than simply your mind or mine). That synthesis constitutes our experience-of-the-world.
Another example from Western philosophy is provided in an account of Schopenhauer’s philosophy:
“The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied [by idealism] than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room [or the reality of Johnson’s rock]. The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper” ~ Bryan Magee, Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, p105.
What we need to grasp is that all we know of existence — whether of the rock, or the pen, or the Universe at large — is a function of our world-making intelligence, the activity of the powerful hominid forebrain which sets us apart from other species. That’s what ‘empirical reality’ consists of. After all, the definition of ‘empirical’ is ‘based on, concerned with, or verifiable by observation or experience.’ So, asking of the Universe ‘How does it exist outside our observation or experience of it?’ is an unanswerable question.
So there is no need to posit a ‘supermind’ to account for it, because there’s nothing to account for. — Mind at Large
I'm attempting to argue ... that knowledge comprises a synthesis of experience and intellect. ... that some fundamental ideas ... are apprehended or discovered by the mind - that they're not a product of the brain — Wayfarer
Yeah, Schopenhauer is not arguing that objects have subjectivity, only that they have an inner aspect, the inaccessible object-in-itself. He calls it will or will-like on the basis that the thing-in-itself is undivided, so what is inmost in us, being part of the wider thing-in-itself, is what is inmost in everything. — Jamal
We know there can be no way of definitively choosing between those two possibilities, but one or the other might seem more plausible. What seems more plausible to individuals comes down to what their grounding assumptions are, that is it is a matter of taste; and there is no way to show that it could be anything more than a matter of taste. — Janus
But saying it's a matter of taste is again tantamount to making it a matter of opinion, which it isn't. — Wayfarer
But saying it's a matter of taste is again tantamount to making it a matter of opinion, which it isn't. — Wayfarer
From our necessarily dualistic intelligence we want to account for the fact that humans (and animals) share a common world and the only two possibilities we can think of are a mind-independent actuality or an actuality produced by a collective or universal mind. — Janus
By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. — Kaccayanagotta Sutta
That is why I say that it is 'the idea of the non-existence of the world' that gives rise to the perceived necessity of there being a 'mind-at-large' which is thought to sustain it. It is thought that in the absence of this global mind, the world would not exist if not being perceived. But, says the Buddha, that is to fall into the 'polarity' of supposing that the world either 'truly exists' or 'doesn't exist'. 'When one sees the arising of the world' means, I think, attaining insight into the unconscious process of 'world-making' which the mind is continually engaging in. It is seeing through that process which is the aim of Buddhist philosophy.
(I expect you might find some discussion of this in the book you mentioned on non-dualism by David Loy — Wayfarer
It's something, sure. Schopenhauer conceived of Will as this something. — schopenhauer1
It was basically introspection writ large. — schopenhauer1
Surprisingly this seems to be consonant with some aspects of logical positivism, although of course the positivist idea that empirical hypotheses and theories, which go beyond merely observational claims, can be verified, is itself nonsensical — Janus
If you lift your eyes from this [screen], what is revealed to you is a spread-out world of objects of many shapes, colors and kinds. Perhaps what you see are the familiar furnishings of your room, and if you look out a window you may see houses and trees, or a distant panorama of hills and fields. In fact, the word panorama is very apt: The root of the word is orama, the Greek word for what is seen with the eyes, and the prefix is pan, as in pantheism, meaning all. What you behold is a comprehensive display of the things before you, and this display is given to you as a single, undivided experience.
Constructivism is a philosophical theory about the nature of knowledge and reality. The central idea behind constructivism is that knowledge and reality are constructed by human beings, rather than discovered. According to constructivism, our experiences and interactions with the world shape our understanding of it, and our perceptions and beliefs are constructed as a result of these experiences.
In other words, constructivists argue that there is no such thing as an objective reality that exists independently of our perception and interpretation of it. Instead, they maintain that our understanding of reality is shaped by our experiences and the mental structures we use to process and interpret those experiences. — ChatGPT
HOWEVER, where I see conundrums in Schop's metaphysics is when he starts discussing the Forms as the "immediate" object of Will. This smuggling in of Plato, gets problematic as we now have to ask "Why?" and there seems to be little answer, other than the post-facto that we know objects exist. Also, how do these Forms turn into the sensible world of "phenomenon" that is of the PSR variety? All of this just gets confusing.
ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1
ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1
I would say that the independent Forms are of God's Will, and the phenomenal representations of them are of the human will, as basic idealism, though I am very unfamiliar with Schopenhauer in particular.
If we remove God, then any proposed independent Forms are unsupported and meaningless conjecture. The only "world" or "worlds" are those created by human wills, and there is nothing to justify anything external. — Metaphysician Undercover
Buddhists have a much broader definition of what constitutes 'experience', based on the experience arising from the jhanas. Even though Buddhists themselves wouldn't describe those states in terms of 'the supernatural', the Buddha himself is described as 'lokuttara' translated as 'world-transcending'. And the jhanas clearly exceed the boundaries of what would pass for 'empirical experience' in the modern sense. — Wayfarer
What you behold is a comprehensive display of the things before you, and this display is given to you as a single, undivided experience.
Yet you can say that it is within this domain of the subjective unity of experience, that we 'make sense' of experience. Isn't this where the observation of cause and effect actually takes place? Isn't this the domain in which order is sought and connections are made? And where is that domain? Is it 'out there', in the world, or 'in here' in the observing mind? Or both? Or neither? Not claiming to have an answer, but I think it's an interesting question. — Wayfarer
ARE the forms and the phenomenal representation of them mediated from the PSR "primary" along with the WILL? He did say, the World as Will AND Representation, afterall. If it is primary with the Will, how could the Will be "objectified"? It was then ALWAYS objectififed. — schopenhauer1
Will is blind striving. But is it? Let me examine… — schopenhauer1
Schop posits Forms as immediate objects of the will. So what this could mean is that forms are created in order to have desires to achieve so the goals can be directed towards something. — schopenhauer1
So in a way, Will does have a telos, that is, to create never ending goals for itself in the goal of completion. — schopenhauer1
So this is backward. "Will" implies goals. The goals don't need to be directed toward something, because they are what actions are directed toward. The actions are the means, the goals are the ends. So subjugated goals are means, and the goal which the means are directed toward is logically prior to the means. Therefore the object which the goals are directed toward, if it is supposed to be a Form, is prior to the goals which are directed toward it, as these are the means. — Metaphysician Undercover
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