But the notion of language is wider than English. It's sense-making. Perceptions of the world without words is thought to be a part of our overall meaningful experience -- so meaning, Big-L Language, is still a part of our cognitive apparatus just by the fact that we're able to discriminate at all. There are, after all, parts of the world we had to develop instruments to be able to discriminate. And those instruments get folded into Big-L Language and sense-making. — Moliere

This is too often ignored in place of thinking about actual words or the formation of speech.

The notion of identifiable concepts, objects with properties - this is an inherently social thing (not necessarily only human, but only social). There's an advantage to my reacting to the world in a similar way to you, it makes you more predictable to me, you're less of a surprise, and we can cooperate on joint enterprises, opening up niches which would be unavailable otherwise.

So it's important we have these public entities which we collectively agree on the properties of. the 'tree' cannot be 'my tree' and 'your tree' because we can't then cooperate in gathering it's fruit. It's instead 'the tree', the one we both share and considerable effort goes into the process of constant checking to make sure we're talking about the same tree (indeed most of that effort constitutes talking). Without this need, there's just no need for these firm bounded concepts. The chick doesn't need to have 'mummy bird' or even 'beak' It will peck at any blob of red in any format expecting food, it just needs to respond, not form a 'representation' of anything.

But social creatures have shared objectives, so they must respond to a shared world full of cups, and trees, and red-things, and blue/white/red/gold dresses...

See how you are holding me to linguistic norms, asking me to justify/defend my moves in social space ? — plaque flag

I agree with you that linguistic norms are part of the language game in social space. However, as your own resource sensibly laid out - here - linguistic norms are not part of what Direct Realism is about.

As we can talk about "The Big Bang" without suggesting that linguistic norms were part of what "The Big Bang" was about, we can talk about Direct Realism without suggesting that linguistic norms are part of what Direct Realism is about.

People should be held to linguistic norms when talking about something, but because we use linguistic norms when talking about something, this doesn't mean that what is being talked about has linguistic norms.

Why would it ? No one promised a clear line of sight to every intentional object.

This is why I consider 'we talk about the cat and not about our image of the cat' as a less confusing approach to direct realism. — plaque flag

The problem I have is with your use of "direct realism" to describe your position. You accept that I don't directly see the cat but that it is nonetheless the intentional object that we talk about. So you should accept that there is a meaningful difference between saying that we directly see some object and saying that some object is the intentional object that we talk about. Direct realism, as ordinarily understood, and as the position that indirect realists argue against, makes a claim about what we directly see, not about what is the intentional object that we talk about. Why repurpose an existing label to argue for something different? It just causes confusion as evidenced by this discussion.

And it's not inconsistent to argue that experience is constituted of some private (even if only in practice) mental phenomena (even if reducible to physical phenomena) and that external world objects are the intentional objects that we talk about. I feel cold and talk about the Arctic air. I feel pain and talk about the fire. I see shapes and colours and talk about the tree. So one can be an indirect realist and still accept your claim that we talk about cats rather than our image of cats.

I don’t usually say “I believe it’s raining”. I just say “it’s raining”. I don’t usually say “I believe I’m in pain”. I just say “I’m in pain”. — Michael

What would it mean to say “I believe it is raining” when looking outside while it is raining. This is nonsense.

There may be circumstances where it might make sense, due to some hallucinogenic substance impairing judgment, but this is the exception.

You accept that I don't directly see the cat — Michael

No, I don't accept that. For me subjects are normative and discursive entities. They aren't in the brain waiting for sense-data. The subject is something performed within/by human communities. While a healthy brain and its sense organs are necessary for the performance of a subject, they are not this subject, no more than a dance is simply a pair of legs. Concepts are norms. They are 'material.' Bots have learned them, just from reading examples.

It seems to me that you leave your subject undefined. What is this 'I' that sees the cat ? What is a self to which seeing can be attributed ?

Why repurpose an existing label to argue for something different? It just causes confusion as evidenced by this discussion. — Michael

I defend a minimal version of direct realism by analyzing the discursive self to which perception is attributed.

So one can be an indirect realist and still accept your claim that we talk about cats rather than our image of cats. — Michael

Sure. I just don't think it's the best way to go about things.

When we talk about the tree it's directed at the shared world. When we talk about our feelings it isn't. — Michael

It still very much is.

Feelings / motives play a central role within the manifest image. Because he was enraged, he through the coffee pot into the wall. He wrote them a check for half of his savings, so he does care about the environment.

The metaphor is that each of us have tiny magical rooms in the world into which only we can enter. This is where toothaches and good intentions live.

Concepts only have grip or meaning in the first place if they figure in (potentially) binding inferences. No isolated thing has genuine or veritable being/meaning. (There are no isolated things, for things 'mean' there relationships to other things, to put it poetically.)

Let me reiterate.

DIRECT REALISM
I see the apple and not an image of the apple.

Now we can get clever and think about what this 'I' is supposed to be and what seeing is supposed to be.

I see talk about the apple and not an image of the apple.

Why this shift toward talk ? Why not babble on about seeing ? Because it's too vague, too close to pretending we are psychologists. Because the entity that sees is oh-how-conveniently undefined.

One needs a larger picture in which this issue can begin to make sense. One needs to appropriate what a philosopher is in the first place.

Why this shift toward talk ? — plaque flag

Because your position throughout this thread has been that "what really matters are linguistic norms", where these linguistic norms are "within/by human communities", yet linguistic norms have nothing to do with the nature of Direct Realism.

A surgeon uses his hands, wields a scalpel.

A metaphysician 'introspects' and talks about 'Experience' and 'Representation,' which are understood to be private and immaterial and impossible to see from the outside.

How did this seems-like-mysticism catch on ? There are reasons. But how does it remain so popular ? It's not like no one is calling attention to its problems around here.

A metaphysician 'introspects' and talks about 'Experience' and 'Representation,' which are understood to be private and immaterial and impossible to see from the outside. — plaque flag

Wittgenstein's para 293 of Philosophical Investigations and the beetle in the box analogy may be able to answer your question better than me.

No, I don't accept that. — plaque flag

I said "I’m aware of the cat hiding under the covers. Doesn’t mean I directly see it."

You responded with "Why would it ? No one promised a clear line of sight to every intentional object."

Was this not you agreeing with me that I don't directly see the cat (because it's hiding under the covers)?

Because he was enraged, he through the coffee pot into the wall. — plaque flag

There are two parts to this statement

1. He was enranged
2. He threw the coffee pot into the wall

These mean different things. Both are true. The latter is a consequence of the former. And it is perfectly possible to be enraged and not throw the coffee pot into the wall. I'm concerned about 1). I don't know why you keep talking about 2). It's a separate matter entirely.

Was this not you agreeing with me that I don't directly see the cat (because it's hiding under the covers)? — Michael

You don't see the cat at all.

Yes you can refer to it, thought you cannot see it. We are referring to it now, though it is only a fictional entity.

You don't see the cat at all. — plaque flag

And yet it is still the intentional object that we talk about. Which is why your argument that we talk about trees has nothing to do with the epistemological problem of perception. The epistemological problem of perception concerns what we see, not what we talk about.

The latter is a consequence of the former. — Michael

:up:

That's the point. Anger is caught up in the inferential nexus.

That's the point. — plaque flag

The point is that him feeling enraged is a real thing that happens, independent of any overt action he may perform as a consequence.

He can be enraged and act out. He can be enraged and do nothing. Either way there is an "inner" feeling (which may be reducible to brain activity) that we can, and do, talk about.

Which is why your argument that we talk about trees has nothing to do with the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael

That doesn't sound right.

I claim that it's better to talk of seeing cats than to talk of seeing internal images of cats.

I see the cat and not an image of the cat.

I talk about the cat (in the world, our cat) and not my cat (an internal image.)

Just to be clear, this isn't mathematics. We are appealing to current semantic norms in order to apply leverage to those same norms, both arguing for different strategies.

The point is that him feeling enraged is a real thing that happens, independent of any overt action he may perform as a consequence. — Michael

:up:

Yes. It's in his body. It's 'material.' It is a disposition. It's all connected to the rest of the world, not hidden away in some box which is causally and logically isolated.

I don't know if we even could talk anything but nonsense about something isolated in such a way.

I see the cat and not an image of the cat. — plaque flag

These aren't mutually exclusive. I feel pain and I feel the fire. I feel cold and I feel the Arctic air. I see shapes and colours and I see the cat.

Yes. It's in his body. It is a disposition. It's all connected to the rest of the world, not hidden away in some box which is causally and logically isolated.

But it is hidden away in practice, given that you don't look inside people's heads and examine their brains and endocrine system.

These aren't mutually exclusive. I feel pain and I feel the fire. I feel cold and I feel the Arctic air. I see shapes and colours and I see the cat. — Michael

I get that we are tempted to talk about qualia, the raw feels, the utterly subconceptual thereness of sensation.... It's not how but that the world colors exist that it the mystical.

But it is hidden away in practice, given that you don't look inside people's heads and examine their neural activity. — Michael

I don't see atoms with the naked eye either, but I reason about them. For context, I lean toward inferentialism. I think concepts get their meanings from the inferences in which they are involved. Norms govern in their blurry way which inferences are allowed.

So claims (judgments) are semantic 'atoms.' Concepts are more like protons in this analogy. They mean nothing without judgements / claims made by a social entity like one of us.

Wittgenstein's para 293 of Philosophical Investigations and the beetle in the box analogy may be able to answer your question better than me. — RussellA

I'm familiar. That's where he shows those with eyes to see that meaning is public, concepts are norms. Beetles don't supply meaning. Back then, it made more sense to think Wittgenstein was crazy. Now we have bots smarter than the average person in many ways. Either they have access to Platonic Meanings or meaning is there [ materially , embodied ] in the linear structure of chains of words.

The issue is that we can talk about and understand each other's feelings, as distinct from any consequential overt activity, and that these feelings are hidden from us in practice. And we can talk about and understand this even if we don't know anything about the brain and its role. Young children can understand being (secretly) sad, and can understand other people being (secretly) sad, and can talk about it all.

As I brought up before, it's just like Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box, except that we can in principle look inside each other's boxes but in practice never do. So how does that affect his reasoning and your view on language?

So how does that affect his reasoning and your view on language? — Michael

This is what I mean by Motte and Bailey. Ryle doesn't use that metaphor, but he covers the confusing shift between casual mentalist talk and the metaphysical kind that goes 100% ghost.

Our ordinary mentalistic talk is fine [the motte]. This happens in what Sellars calls the manifest image. It's a world of people and marriages and motives that we reason about constantly. 'He didn't call me back, so he must still be pissed.' No problem whatsoever with this. We can't help doing folk psychology. As an inferentialist, I think these inferences are where typical mentalistic talk gets its genuine meaning.* The convention of the normative-discursive self lives here, though it takes a Brandom to make it explicit.

But if one leaves the zone where inferences make sense [into the bailey], there's just no grip. That's what Wittgenstein attacks, though frankly he doesn't make it clear in that parable. The inverted spectrum, the Chinese room, etc. They touch on the weirdness. We can go into that if you want. Both Wittgenstein and Heidegger seem to value such talk in their own way.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motte-and-bailey_fallacy

*Note that logic pretty much is the way we happen to do things. Not God but the weight of convention, presumably tested by time and life like ordinary language.

You need to spell out how that fallacy is relevant to what I'm saying. My argument is simple:

1. I sometimes feel sad
2. This sadness is reducible to the firing of certain neurons
3. The firing of my neurons is in practice hidden from other people
4. Other people can talk about me being sad
5. Therefore, other people can talk about things which are in practice hidden from them

I didn't mean to accuse you of the fallacy. I just wanted to use the metaphor system, which was linked a fallacy.

5. Therefore, other people can talk about things which are in practice hidden from them — Michael

I never denied this. Of course. I can talk about the dark side of the moon.

I'd just say that I don't think we can talk sensibly about anything inferentially isolated.

This is why Kant's 'thing-in-itself' stuff doesn't float.

I never denied this. — plaque flag

Then why is it that we can talk about something that's hidden in practice but not hidden in principle?

Again with Wittgenstein's beetle-in-a-box. In one scenario we can look inside each others' boxes but never do. We can talk about the thing inside each others' boxes. In another scenario we can't look inside each others' boxes. Therefore we can't talk about the thing inside each others' boxes? I don't see why it would make any difference. If we can talk about something that's hidden from us in practice then we can talk about something that's hidden from us in principle, and so even if there is such a thing as hidden-in-principle first-person consciousness/qualia, we can still talk about it.

The point is that the norms for applying concepts are impersonal, public.

'I fucking hate getting wet, so I ran naked into the rain' does not make sense, does not compute. We would think the person did not know English.

If we can talk about something that's hidden from us in practice then we can talk about something that's hidden from us in principle, and so even if there is such a thing as hidden-in-practice first-person consciousness/qualia, we can still talk about it. — Michael

Yes, though the last part is tricky.