But it's not. I claim that you've simply adopted bad assumptions from a more primitive era of philosophy. — plaque flag
The self this side of the senses may be in part shaped by what is on the other side of the senses from information passing through the senses, but the self doesn't exist the other side of its senses.
That is, not unless one has the belief in telekinesis, psychic empathy and the paranormal. — RussellA
Animals of all sort have no conception of pain but do a good job of avoiding fire. — Richard B
As I see it, the whole idea that the self is some gremlin in a control room, redeyed peeping at screens, only guessing at what lives outside its bunker, is a wacky viral meme. — plaque flag
The problem is, how do we know what exists on the other side of our senses independently of our senses, when all the information about what is on the other side of our senses comes through our senses. — RussellA
Your use of we is a tacit acknowledge of that inferential norms are public — plaque flag
Hegel was setting up that bowling pin to knock it down. — plaque flag
Solipsism can be seen as parasitic upon common sense because it relies on common sense assumptions in order to even be formulated. — plaque flag
It is absurd to make the sense organs the product of the sense organs because it is a circular
argument. — plaque flag
You challenge me (within the norms of politeness too, another ethical frame) in the name of inferential norms, calling upon me to defend my claim. Indeed, in making that came, I have indeed committed myself to its defense. If I can't defend a strong challenge, it's my duty to withdraw or modify the claim. — plaque flag
One supports this approach phenomenologically, which is to say by simply bringing us to awareness of what we have been doing all along. Scan this forum. See us hold one another responsible for keeping our stories straight. See which inferences are tolerated, which rejected. Bots can learn this stuff from examples, just as children do. — plaque flag
I am also not allowed to contradict myself, for the self is the kind of thing (almost by definition) that ought not disagree with itself --- must strive toward coherence, to perform or be a unity. — plaque flag
Society is disapproving of animal cruelty because society accepts that animals do have the concept of pain, even if the animal has no verbal language to express it. — RussellA
Your pet does not need a concept of digestion in order for it to digest food — Richard B
Is it socially acceptable to hit a machine that is providing medical assistance to a human being? Probably not, and it would be nonsense to assume the machine has a concept of human pain. — Richard B
As an Indirect Realist, I directly see a tree, I don't see the image of a tree. — RussellA
Doesn't it strike you as odd, the assumption that a person can believe in something impossible? — sime
(When interpreted with empathy, do Flat-Earther's really exist?) — sime
From the perspective of an engineer who has a causal understanding of AI technology — sime
any agent of finite capacity can only learn to play well at one language game at the expense of doing worse at the others. — sime
each belief can nevertheless be considered to be "true" at the time of it's construction without entailing contradiction with any of the other beliefs, — sime
When you find yourself disagreeing with the beliefs of your earlier self, are you really contradicting your earlier self? — sime
Say what now ? Is that a typo ? — plaque flag
We talk about the object and not some private internal image of the object — plaque flag
I directly see a tree. There is no doubt about this. The question is, in what world is this tree. There are different worlds, i) the world in my mind ii) the world in the minds of a community iii) the world external to any mind iv) the world as a sum of all these. — RussellA
For example, Wittgenstein in Tractatus para 1 writes "the world is all that is the case.", and creates unnecessary debate by never explaining where this world is. — RussellA
Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing. — RussellA
In the world in my mind I directly see a tree and in the world that exists independently of me I indirectly see a tree. — RussellA
In your support of Direct Realism you referred to Hegel. Hegel clearly sets out the problem with Direct Realism in the passage linked to above. — RussellA
But what is Hegel's solution to the problem of how can we know what is truly the other side of our senses, when our senses alter what we know about what is the other side of our senses ? — RussellA
There is just the one world that we all live in and see and talk about. — plaque flag
Yes we need our nervous systems to do this, but we are not trapped behind or in that nervous system — plaque flag
The world is all that is the case because it is the articulated world we talk about, the shared world we articulate — plaque flag
Yes, I need light to come from the apple to my retina. That's part of how I see the apple. But I don't see an image of the apple, and I don't see a private world in which the apple is given directly. I see the apple right there in our world, the world — plaque flag
He opens by sketching indirect realism. Then he makes fun of it. He says fear of error becomes fear of truth. — plaque flag
His solution is to point out that we aren't on the other side of our sense to begin with ---that this was all just a silly unjustified assumption from the beginning. — plaque flag
Yes, I need my nervous system to do this. But my eyes and brain let me see this apple in our world directly. Yes, I need light to come from the apple to my retina. That's part of how I see the apple. But I don't see an image of the apple, and I don't see a private world in which the apple is given directly. I see the apple right there in our world, the world. And I talk about that apple. It is the case that an apple is there in front of me. — plaque flag
The world that we live in and the world that we talk about refer to different worlds. — RussellA
There is also the world as experienced by each individual. It must be the case that each individual perceives the world differently. I cannot believe that the world as experienced by a thirteen year old growing up in Soweto is the same world as experienced by a fifty year old merchant banker in Wall Street, as you seem to be suggesting. — RussellA
Let's restart with something simple. Do we see colours? — Michael
We see red apples, the blue sky. We can talk about colors (as adjectives, concepts,...) — plaque flag
To say that the Indirect Realist's position that we are separated from the external world by our senses is a silly unjustified assumption is not a very strong argument. — RussellA
Is the redness of an apple a mind-independent property of the apple? — Michael
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.