I don't think 'mind-independent' is a very clear term. — plaque flag
The world that exists outside language is certainly very different to the world existing within language. — RussellA
Then forget that term. Is the redness a property of that bundle of matter which is the apple? — Michael
I don't think the scientific image is the Real beneath some paintjob of color and values. — plaque flag
There must be a stronger argument against Indirect Realism that that. — RussellA
So you’re not a scientific realist? You believe in something like colour realist primitivism? — Michael
If it is either fictionalism or antirealism then in no sense is it direct realism. In fact in no sense does it address the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael
I really don't think you've grasped my approach to this issue yet. — plaque flag
Our articulation of the world is deeply historical and constantly being revised, but we live in that articulation. The scientific image describes relatively stable features of our world. But even its concepts evolve (Kuhn, etc.)
Reid noted that, as soon as this picture is in place, the question naturally arises as to just how far our ideas might diverge from their causes. Indeed, it begins to seem that we are completely cut off from reality, stuck behind a veil of ideas. This is a counter-intuitive conclusion, and Reid thinks it indicates that the original positing of ideas, as things we perceive that are distinct from the objects was misguided (here, the view echoes that of Antoine Arnauld in his debate with Nicolas Malebranche). Common sense, he argues, dictates that what we perceive just are objects and their qualities. — plaque flag
You're right, because I don't know what you're trying to say below: — Michael
The world is counterintuitive. Quantum mechanics has shown that. His reasoning appears question-begging. — Michael
Our ordinary life in which we shop for groceries, promise to walk to the dog, return books to the library....is real. — plaque flag
Reid's picture, however, is more complex than such general statements of it may suggest. For Reid continues to accept Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects. Locke held that, among our ideas of objects, some (such as shape) do resemble qualities of the objects that produce them, while others (such as color) do not. Of course, Reid cannot accept the distinction in those terms, so he does so in terms of 'sensations.' When we perceive objects, Reid claims, we find in ourselves certain sensations. Sensations are the effects of the causal influence of objects on us, and these are what lead the mind to perceive the object. Yet sensations themselves, being feelings, cannot resemble their objects (in this, Reid echoes Berkeley's famous claim that nothing can be like an idea except another idea). When, for instance, we perceive though touch that some object is hot, we feel a certain sensation. We know that feature of the object caused us to have that sensation, but we may not know anything about the feature other than that (unlike the case of the extension of the object, which we perceive directly). The feature of the object which produces the sensation of heat is a secondary quality, and all other secondary qualities are individuated in the same manner: via some sensation we have.
That's not relevant to the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael
And you missed a paragraph from that description of Reid's philosophy: — Michael
and whether or not the properties they are perceived to have are properties they have even when not being perceived. — Michael
And this is to be understood in a realist, literally true sense, not in some fictionalist (e.g. pragmatic narrative) or antirealist sense. — Michael
This is a matter of how best to talk about this stuff. — plaque flag
This is a silly question !
"Best" as in "pragmatic" or "best" as in "true". We're concerned with what's true. — Michael
Does gay marriage exist or not ? — plaque flag
And direct realists do say that the properties we perceive objects to have are the properties they have even when not being perceived. — Michael
Does the apple being red depend on us (on the way we perceive and talk about the world) or does it being red have nothing to do with us and everything to do with its innate nature? — Michael
If I close my eyes, the apple is still red. — plaque flag
I reject the idea of 'innate' nature. — plaque flag
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