The P-zombie case, as specified would seem to be the very opposite to that, in that the zombie would say that they had seen, heard, felt, tasted, etc., while not having actually had any experience of anything at all. — Janus

But the sights, tastes, sounds, etc had to be detected in some way. That set of of detected things will be remembered, and that's what the experience is to them.

So, in the zombie case the sights, sounds, feelings, emotions and so on were detected but never consciously, even though the zombie is able to report about what was detected in as much detail, and with as much nuance as we are.

In contrast the "blind experiencer" can detect the sights sounds and so on, perhaps not as reliably and with as much subtlety of detail as the conscious experiencer, but they cannot report on it because they believe that they have detected nothing. Let's say this is a failure of connections between brain regions or functions.

So, now it looks like the zombie and the blind-experiencer are actually similar, except that the zombie who has no experience at all nevertheless speaks as though it does, whereas the other consciously believes it has no experience, which amounts to saying it, like the zombie, has no conscious experience. However in fact it does have experiences albeit unconsciously.

The question then seems to be as to how it would be coherent to say in the case of the zombie, that all these feelings, experiences, sights, sounds and so on can be detected and yet to simultaneously say that nothing was experienced, when the zombie itself speaks about he experiences.

Another point that comes to mind is that I think we are not consciously aware of probably almost everything we experience, in the sense of "are aware of' like when, for example, we drive on autopilot.

I think information is of extreme importance for consciousness. But I don't have a clear idea on various specifics. What do you mean by "consciousness is informational"?

n the zombie case the sights, sounds, feelings, emotions and so on were detected but never consciously — Janus

This depends on how one defines "conscious". If it's defined as a state that necessarily includes qualia, then it's true. But a qualia-absent being could have something very similar.

Representationalists say that qualia are "representational states": pain represents body damage, with an acuteness proportional to the damage; a physical texture represents some physical property of the object; a visual image represents the surroundings we are within...

If those representations could be made in computable ways, without qualia, this arguably results in a form of consciousness. They could even have unconscious experiences: capturing representations of aspects of the world, but only storing them in memory- not in active use by the executive function.

P-Zombies. It's often held out as a gotcha for those who think consciousness could be separate from brain activity (or at least emergent from it, rather than synonymous).