Many people who are leaders in relevant fields - people like Anil Seth, Antonio Damasio, Peter Tse, Brian Greene, Donald Hoffman, and David Eagleman - most of whom think physicalism must be the answer, say we don't have a theory, and don't even have any idea what such a theory would look like. — Patterner

The problem is that consciousness is informational, not physical. Explaining consciousness in physical terms runs into the same problem that explaining any informational process in physical terms does. Imagine starting with the notion of computation, or the notion of War and Peace,
and trying to leap directly to a physical explanation of these. You need to first construct an informational narrative, and only then explain how this narrative is instantiated physically.

You’re treating the wavefunction as if it were the state of an object with determinate properties, and then explaining measurement as a change in those properties. Basically declaring that the experiment itself is an object. But the fundamental object in question remains undetermined. The formal role of the wavefunction doesn’t, by itself, supply a foundational ontology.

I can relate to the idea that consciousness is everywhere, but not necessarily that physical material is conscious, as I regard it as an artificial construct.

As you noted, naturalism is more open-ended. Materialism is less so, and physicalism is most restrictive. More restrictive= a more parsimonious ontology, which is why I go with it.

I can see that and I can’t deny that it is compelling. I just feel it misses a lot, for me physical material is an accretion, a world of surfaces and doesn’t tell us anything about what is real. So I’m coming from the complete opposite position from you.