Many people who are leaders in relevant fields - people like Anil Seth, Antonio Damasio, Peter Tse, Brian Greene, Donald Hoffman, and David Eagleman - most of whom think physicalism must be the answer, say we don't have a theory, and don't even have any idea what such a theory would look like. — Patterner

The problem is that consciousness is informational, not physical. Explaining consciousness in physical terms runs into the same problem that explaining any informational process in physical terms does. Imagine starting with the notion of computation, or the notion of War and Peace,
and trying to leap directly to a physical explanation of these. You need to first construct an informational narrative, and only then explain how this narrative is instantiated physically.

You’re treating the wavefunction as if it were the state of an object with determinate properties, and then explaining measurement as a change in those properties. Basically declaring that the experiment itself is an object. But the fundamental object in question remains undetermined. The formal role of the wavefunction doesn’t, by itself, supply a foundational ontology.

I can relate to the idea that consciousness is everywhere, but not necessarily that physical material is conscious, as I regard it as an artificial construct.

As you noted, naturalism is more open-ended. Materialism is less so, and physicalism is most restrictive. More restrictive= a more parsimonious ontology, which is why I go with it.

I can see that and I can’t deny that it is compelling. I just feel it misses a lot, for me physical material is an accretion, a world of surfaces and doesn’t tell us anything about what is real. So I’m coming from the complete opposite position from you.

I can relate to the idea that consciousness is everywhere, but not necessarily that physical material is conscious — Punshhh

Can you elaboate on what you mean by "the idea that consciousness is everywhere"?

It seems kind of crazy that a primary particle can have mass and charge. How can that be? What are physical properties that primary particles can have more than one? Brian Greene doesn't even know what mass or charge are.

There's no way to rule out the possibility that there is another property there. Not a physical one, but an experiential property.

That's obviously not evidence to support my position. It's just speculation. But it's not more speculative than something non-physical emerging from physical arrangements,

I regard it as an artificial construct. — Punshhh

What do you mean by artificial?

That's a good point. I think the issue - and this is one thinkers like Sam Harris, ever the peddler of parsimony - tend to miss: if you're going to take this bent, you best be open to truly, honestly considering the theories that come across your desk. Most will be easy to dismiss, but to become jaded is to enter into an essentially dishonest critique of your challengers. I think.

I, on the other hand, have had to do the opposite and reign in my penchant for the weird.

The problem is that consciousness is informational, not physical. Explaining consciousness in physical terms runs into the same problem that explaining any informational process in physical terms does. Imagine starting with the notion of computation, or the notion of War and Peace,
and trying to leap directly to a physical explanation of these. You need to first construct an informational narrative, and only then explain how this narrative is instantiated physically. — hypericin

Do you think DNA is encoded information, and protein synthesis is an example of information processing? I would ask the same of many other things. Are the electrical signals that arrive at certain parts of the brain carrying information from the retina about a light source?

If you answer Yes to either, how does "You need to first construct an informational narrative" apply?

I would ask for more information about how that same part of your sentence applies to consciousness, but perhaps I'll gain some understanding from your response to the above.

You’re treating the wavefunction as if it were the state of an object with determinate properties, and then explaining measurement as a change in those properties. — Wayfarer

The wavefunction does define the quantum state of the system, mathematically: it quantifies the probability of each possible measurement outcome; ontologically, the system is in a particular quantum state. The true ontology is unknown, but I'll illustrate it in terms of superposition of eigenstates with wavefunction collapse.

Prior to the measurements, there exists an eigenstate corresponding with each of the possible measurements, all existing in superposition. The measurement entangles with one eigenstate. Let's assume that this reflects a collapse of the wave function - such that the other eigenstates disappear. In this analysis, the classical property (a definite position) did not come into existence ex nihilo- it was present in superposition with all the other eigenstates. But it is now a classical relational property because of the collapse.

The formal role of the wavefunction doesn’t, by itself, supply a foundational ontology. — Wayfarer

Of course! Formally, it is just a mathematical tool for making predictions. But clearly, it reflects the actual (unknown) ontological basis.

I would indeed be open to other theories, were they to come my way. I've studied Thomist metaphysics a bit, but judge that it makes a number of assumptions that seem unnecessary, and it centers around a very large assumption - the one it was designed around (God).

But what typically comes my way are hypotheses about some narrow metaphysical issue. Example: libertarian free will. I acknowledge it's possible, but since it's inconsistent with physicalism, I lean strongly away from it.

I understand. None of us can avoid the subjectivity of our own judgement.

I further narrow it down to the thesis that everything that exists has a common ontological structure: a particular with intrinsic properties — Relativist

However

The true ontology is unknown, — Relativist

You had seemed to be suggesting that QM was inconsistent with a state of affairs ontological theory. I showed that it is consistent with it.

I have never claimed the theory is provably true; I merely said one can justifiably judge it an inference to best explanation.

You can’t stipulate your way out of the uncertainty principle.

What are you alleging I stipulated?

This post. You’re treating “the experiment” or “the state of affairs” as the object that perdures, so objecthood on this context is not in question. But, as you already acknowledged, the 'true ontology' is unknown. What this means is that there is not some 'actual state of affairs' or 'object with determinate properties' at the fundamental level. And this is something broadly acknowledged about quantum theory. It is why Roger Penrose is always saying that it must be false or incomplete - because, he says, it should - again, stipulative - provide a true description of what is really there, prior to any act of measurement.

I'm not going to continue to argue this point, which is simply this: that 'the thesis that everything that exists has a common ontological structure: a particular with intrinsic properties' cannot be sustained on the basis of physics.

----------------

After this post, I'll be offline a couple of days.

You’re treating “the experiment” or “the state of affairs” as the object that perdures, so objecthood on this context is not in question. — Wayfarer

(FWIW: A state of affairs does not perdure. Perdurance applies to individual identities).

Yes, of course "objecthood" (state-of-affairs-hood) is not in question - it's a first principle of the ontological theory. You had alleged that the theory is incompatible with QM. If this were true, it would falsify the theory. But I demonstrated that it IS consistent.

But, as you already acknowledged, the 'true ontology' is unknown. What this means is that there is not some 'actual state of affairs' or 'object with determinate properties' at the fundamental level. — Wayfarer

You're misinterpreting what I said. I was referring to the "true ontology" of QM. As you know, there are a number of interpretations - each of which is an ontological hypothesis. Our lack of knowledge which one is correct does not entail that it is NOT a state of affairs with determinate* properties! See this:

"according to textbook quantum mechanics, there are two different ways that wave functions can behave. When they are not being measured, they obey the Schrödinger equation. That behavior isn’t too much different from what we encountered in classical mechanics: wave functions evolve smoothly, reversibly (information about the state is conserved), and deterministically. But at the moment of measurement, we throw Schrödinger out the window. The wave function collapses suddenly, irreversibly, and indeterministically, in accordance with the Born rule.

The measurement problem is, essentially, “What’s really going on when we measure a quantum system?”
"Quanta and Fields: The Biggest Ideas in the Universe", Sean Carroll, P38

"Indeterminism" arises at the point of measurement. This doesn't entail indeterminate properties of any state of affairs (both the pre-measurement and post measurement states of affairs have deterministic properties); it's consistent with a law of nature with a probabilistic outcome.

_____________________________________
* The fact that the unmeasured wavefunction evolves deterministically implies the system's properties are determinate. "Fixed position" is not a property of the wavefunction. It's analogous property is of a non-localized position and momentum:

"the essence of the uncertainty principle isn’t about measurements at all. It has implications for measurements—if we measure either position or momentum precisely, the wave function will collapse and we will have no idea what the other one would be immediately thereafter—but it’s really a feature of quantum states even before we measure them. The point is not that you inevitably bump into a quantum system while measuring it and therefore change it. It’s that there do not exist any states in which both position and momentum are highly localized at the same time. This is hard to internalize if we remain stuck with classical intuition, thinking of position and momentum as things that really exist; it’s easier to swallow if we think of them as sets of possible observational outcomes that we derive from an underlying quantum state." - Carroll, p55

Can you elaboate on what you mean by "the idea that consciousness is everywhere"?

I don’t know, I thought that was your position.
For me it’s more a case that consciousness is fundamental in the higher (subtle) realms. Not necessarily physical realms.

It seems kind of crazy that a primary particle can have mass and charge. How can that be? What are physical properties that primary particles can have more than one? Brian Greene doesn't even know what mass or charge are.

I thought the idea was that mass and energy and everything else like charge and extension were all interchangeable in Einstein’s spacetime.

What do you mean by artificial?

A construction by a being or intelligence to carry out a purpose.

I don’t know, I thought that was your position. — Punshhh

It is. But if you don't mean it the way I do, I wondered how you mean it. Although I'm not really sure what you mean, I guess "the higher (subtle) realms" is the answer.

I thought the idea was that mass and energy and everything else like charge and extension were all interchangeable in Einstein’s spacetime. — Punshhh

Could be? I don't know anything about that stuff. :grin:

A construction by a being or intelligence to carry out a purpose. — Punshhh

An intelligence wants to do something that it needs consciousness to accomplish, so it constructs consciousness?

I guess "the higher (subtle) realms" is the answer.

It is quite difficult to explain, but is also quite simple.
I’ll approach it in two ways, firstly, imagine a spectrum like the electromagnetic spectrum. The spectrum is a scale of different wavelengths from very long at the bottom end and very short at the top end. Physical matter is near the bottom and as you go further up, you get mind, then soul, then spirit. The soul and the spirit are in subtle realms like heaven in the bible. They are all the same thing, material, but at different frequencies, or wavelengths. Due to the nature of the universe these different wavelengths present in different ways.

Secondly, from the top down. Pure being expresses itself in more and more complex ways as you go down the spectrum until at the bottom you get the most complex, almost infinitely complex as physical matter. Necessarily it is a complex story being expressed at this point.

I’m saying that consciousness is the ground from the soul upwards and consciousness below this point requires a living entity to be grounded there. Which hosts it. That this physical material is an artificial construct to ground consciousness in such a dense kind of expression. It is artificial because consciousness can’t function as a ground there and consciousness is an essential ground for being. So for consciousness and being to be there an artificial realm is generated, in which they are hosted.

An intelligence wants to do something that it needs consciousness to accomplish, so it constructs consciousness?

Yes, that’s pretty much it.

but since it's inconsistent with physicalism, I lean strongly away from it. — Relativist

Why is physicalism inconsistent with a libertarian free will account?

Because physicalism (at least the specific form of it that I defend) entails determinism - either strict determinism, or probabilistic. By definition, LFW is not deterministic.

(at least the specific form of it that I defend) — Relativist

Right, so I would need a reason that physicalism, on every interpretation, entails determinism; or alternatively, a reason why your specific form of physicalism is the correct one (were I to agree with you that determinism is entailed by physicalism).

I accept a version of physicalism created by by David Armstrong. It is a comprehensive, consistent metaphysical theory, As such, I embrace the theory as an inference to best explanation: it explains all facts, and does so parsimoniously and a minimum of ad hoc assumptions. So...I would change my mind if a better comprehensive theory was available.

One could easily identify alternatives to components of this theory, but it would raise other questions that aren't dealt with- there's not a lot of comprehensive theories.

The being would have experiences, that created memories that might affect its future behavior - so in that sense, it would be a sort of first-person experience. — Relativist

So, it would be no different than the LLMs in that they are changed by their experiences.

Pretty much, except that a Zombie would have more direct experiences with the real world. If their body is damaged, it wouldn't feel pain, but it would behave as if it had pain (eg wincing), and register some analogue, like a score, that they would remember.

Do you think P-zombies are a real possibility or merely something we imagine we can imagine?

Do you think DNA is encoded information, and protein synthesis is an example of information processing? I would ask the same of many other things. Are the electrical signals that arrive at certain parts of the brain carrying information from the retina about a light source?

If you answer Yes to either, how does "You need to first construct an informational narrative" apply? — Patterner

Good follow-up questions, that forced me to clearly think through what I'm trying to say. I would answer 'Yes' to both.

Lets just take DNA for now. When you talk about DNA, your perspective is toward a phenomenon that has already been well explained. This is not where we are at with consciousness.

By the time that there was a search for a molecular mechanism, it was already well understood that the transmission of traits was informational. And, how the logic of genetic recombination functioned was shockingly well understood, all deduced from behavior alone. Here is an illustration of gene crossover, from 1916:



What I was really trying to say, is that for phenomena that are fundamentally informational, there are two sequential questions:

1. How can this phenomenon be understood informationally?
2. How is this informational schema we now understand be instantiated physically?

With DNA, the answer to 1 began with Mendel, and was completed by the time images like the above were made. Crucially, only by answering 1, can 2 be answered. Without answering 1, 2 cannot even be properly posed. This is exactly what we see all the time with consciousness:

1. How can consciousness be instantiated physically?

This is the wrong question. Lacking insight into how consciousness can be realized informationally, we cannot begin to look for that realization physically. We just don't know what we are looking for.

It seems possible, although the technology isn't available today.

I bite that bullet.

No doubt you are aware of the phenomenon of blindsight where people are able to navigate environments even though they are not conscious of being able to see anything at all.

Imagine extending that syndrome to experience as a whole where someone would say they were not aware of experiencing anything, even though being able to navigate environments, guess correctly what has been said to them, guess what they had just tasted or smelt or what kind of object they had felt or touched and indeed respond to the question as to whether they experienced anything. all; without any conscious awareness of having experienced anything at all.

The P-zombie case, as specified would seem to be the very opposite to that, in that the zombie would say that they had seen, heard, felt, tasted, etc., while not having actually had any experience of anything at all.

While the experience-blindness case seems weird in that experience is occurring without being conscious of it, the zombie case seems altogether impossible in that they would be reporting experiences which, by stipulation, they didn't have.

Not sure which bullet you are referring to...