Hi , good post.

Leontiskos Thanks, that helps. You’ve raised some complex and difficult issues here. — J

Yes, it's a bit haphazard, but it's one way in. :smile:

Here, “indifferent” is being used in the sense of having no preference, overall, between truth and falsity. Aside from a certain former president, I agree that it’s difficult to imagine such a person doing this continually. But I don’t read you as describing a person who doesn’t know the difference between truth and falsity. Indeed, you speak of them as intending truth when speaking truthfully, and falsity when not. So that’s one sort of indifference: I can tell X from Y but have no preference or allegiance or “ordering to” one over the other. — J

Right, it's a bit like the roulette wheel which is indifferent to odd or even outcomes.

Let's first look at this idea of indifference. You are presenting the idea that there are two different kinds of indifference at play. The first sense is statistical or preferential indifference, where outcomes do not provide evidence of a pattern. The second is indifference to two options in the sense of ignorance of these options. If I attend to truth as often as falsity then I am indifferent to them in the first sense. If I do not know truth or falsity then I am indifferent to them in the second sense (but probably also in the first sense).

They would consider foundational principles like the principle of non-contradiction false as often as they considered them true. — Leontiskos

Here, I think, “indifference” is being applied in a new sense. Now the speaker doesn’t know the difference. They’re not merely indifferent as to their choice; they can’t tell them apart. Here I’m with you and Aristotle and Nagel: I can’t believe in a person who can explain the law of non-contradiction but not acknowledge its validity. — J

But I am using it in that same statistical sense. "They would consider [them] false as often as they considered them true." You speak of "validity," but I think we should speak of truth. You presumably believe the principle of non-contradiction is true, and that's my point. We know that it is true, and we believe it on that basis.

Perhaps you are thinking, "But it's not possible to believe the principle of non-contradiction is false, and therefore we are ignorant of such a counterfactual." I would say that in one way that's the point, and what is necessarily false is never possible. It's just easier to see in this instance. In another way people can and do act contrary to the principle of non-contradiction, but they end up paying a price of one sort or another and often amend their thinking or acting.

It’s not that one might “just as well” desire to be unhealthy because one is indifferent to health, or can’t tell the difference between good health and illness. Rather, one has made a choice to value something else more. — J

I think you are pointing to a hierarchy: "I prefer to be healthy more than I prefer to be unhealthy, but I prefer the taste of candy more than I prefer to be healthy." I don't have a problem with this, but I don't want to descend into your more complicated questions just yet...

My point about indifference is meant to exclude the option you prefer, "You ought to believe this sound argument if you care about such things as holding beliefs that are based in [truth]" (). It seems to me that the prima facie reading of that claim (call it "(1)") implies that we are indifferent to truth. "Believe this sound argument if you like truth. Disbelieve it if you don't. It's up to you." That notion of indifference is my first target.

Now I'm not really sure how to address the rest of your post, because there's a lot of interesting things to respond to. I will probably have to leave some for another day, returning to them later. But I think this is the general argument you are making (again, taking (1) and (2) from above: ):

"It depends on the case. Some cases align with (1) and some align with (2). The former are indifferent or hypothetical, whereas the latter are necessitated."

Now I see a spectrum rather than an either-or, where there is a middle ground between (1) and (2), but that should be obvious. In any case, my primary response here is that it is not legitimate to use this case-based logic. Consider our initial inquiry: “This is a sound argument, therefore you ought to believe it” (). This is a uniform claim which applies to all cases of putatively sound argument. It is not a bifurcated claim about two different case-models. The simpler formulation is even more obvious, "This is true, therefore you ought to believe it." This is a uniform claim which is intended to apply to both sorts of cases (e.g. self-evident truths and obscure truths; necessary truths and contingent truths; etc.).

...So I'll just leave it there for now so that you can respond, lest I have assumed too much.

Another central argument you present is the idea that, if it is not necessitated, then it must be hypothetical (if it is not (2) then it must be (1)). Obviously this will need to be addressed, but for the sake of length I will just make a preliminary observation:

The nonbeliever can always reply, “I quite agree that humans have evolved this way, and I certainly practice this most of the time. However, I am not hardwired to do so in non-apodictic truth-claim situations, and in this case, I will choose not to.” — J

I concede that the nonbeliever can do this. “If duties could not be ignored or argued against, then they would not exist” (). Similarly, people can deny the principle of non-contradiction, or that 2+2=4. Our argument surely must ride on something more than what human beings are capable of doing.

To say a tiny bit more, a normative case for truth must be more than evolutionary. I think Nagel's point holds true in light of our ordering to truth, the only difference is that the "gravity" of a self-evident truth is so strong that it cannot be ignored. But on the other hand there are people—even (especially!) professional philosophers—who will attempt to deny things like the principle of non-contradiction. Maybe that fact presents the more productive route for our discussion, because you seem to agree with Nagel that such people are not at their rights to do such a thing.

I want to fess up to something that has really started to puzzle me, though. I’m starting to think that the whole “you ought to believe X” thing is kind of unreal, a philosopher’s thought-experiment. What exactly would it mean to “not believe” something, if you also thought it was true? What are the actual examples of this? — J

I think at a very basic level we are simply considering instances of disagreement and/or persuasion, which are common. For example:

• "You ought to support the war in Ukraine."
• "You ought to vote for so-and-so."
• "You ought to accept a middle ground between (1) and (2)."
• "You ought to get the answer of 67 for this math problem."
• "You ought to accept that the Earth is not flat."
• "You ought to propose to your girlfriend."
• "You ought to abide by the speed limit."

(It is of course possible that this is a haphazard mixture of the speculative and the practical, and maybe that's just another can of worms. But we usually think of practical advice being grounded in truth. For example, the first example is predicated on the claim that Ukraine is deserving of support; the second on the claim that so-and-so is the best candidate, etc. Those are the truth-claims that end up being argued about.)

As you say, the “ought” question is huge and deserves its own thread/book/library. So does Kant’s view about imperatives. I appreciate the light you shed on the possible nuances between categorical and hypothetical oughts, and for what it’s worth, I find some nuances in Kant as well. I’ll watch for the next Kantian ethics discussion. — J

Sounds good. I realize we are only scratching the surface, and that the questions you are asking are fairly obvious and deserve answers. As for Kant, I am familiar with his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and his treatise on lying, but I haven't read his other ethical works.

There's a lot of good stuff here and I probably need to reply piece by piece, as this week is starting to get the better of me. So, to begin:

I think at a very basic level we are simply considering instances of disagreement and/or persuasion, which are common." — Leontiskos

Yes, and I have no trouble making sense of the kind you go on to list. Where I'm starting have doubts concerns statements like "You ought to believe that water is H2O because it's true." Surely all the persuasion would take place at the prior claim of "Water is H2O." Once you're persuaded that this is the case, what more am I asking you to do if I say to you, "Now, believe it, because it's true"? I initially thought there was some conceptual (not psychological) space between "acknowledging truth" and "believing," but now I'm wondering if this is an illusion. If you know X is true, then you need no further reasons to believe it. (You might require some psychological assistance, of course, if it's a weird or humiliating truth.) And if you don't know, my asking you to believe it seems to be asking you to take my word for its truth. This is all very unsatisfactory somehow, and I'd welcome anyone to straighten it out.

BTW, this has obvious parallels to the question of whether the statements "X" and "It is true that X" have the same propositional content.

Yes, and I have no trouble making sense of the kind you go on to list. Where I'm starting have doubts concerns statements like "You ought to believe that water is H2O because it's true." Surely all the persuasion would take place at the prior claim of "Water is H2O." Once you're persuaded that this is the case, what more am I asking you to do if I say to you, "Now, believe it, because it's true"? — J

I think you are right about this. When you <originally> used that formulation I thought you were trying to bring out something which usually remains implicit ("...because it is true"). We don't usually speak that way. But yes, truth is sufficient grounds for belief.

I initially thought there was some conceptual (not psychological) space between "acknowledging truth" and "believing," but now I'm wondering if this is an illusion. If you know X is true, then you need no further reasons to believe it. — J

It seems to me that everything which one holds to be true is believed, but not everything that is believed is held to be true. We can believe things with all sorts of different levels of certitude, and many of these relate to evidence and truth, but some seem to be related more to things like fear, hope, or desire.

But I am using it ["indifference"] in that same statistical sense. "They would consider [them] false as often as they considered them true." — Leontiskos

Possibly I just misunderstood; I thought you had confused two kinds of indifferent people. The first kind, Ms. Nihil, can tell the difference but doesn't care, so chooses randomly. The second kind, Mr. Ignorant, can't tell the difference and so also chooses randomly. This guy, to me, is the roulette wheel: The wheel not only makes "choices" at random, it also has no idea what the difference is between red and black. A model for Ms. Nihil might be a person who's asked to select an assortment of candies she likes, and there are only two choices. Turns out she likes both equally, so while she knows perfectly well the difference between caramel and chocolate, she decides to make random choices because she doesn't care.

The outcomes would be the same: randomness, "indifference" in either sense. But there'd be a huge moral difference if the choice was between, say, right and wrong. A person who can't (ever) tell that difference would, I suppose, be pitied, or hospitalized. But someone who knows the difference, can recognize it when they see it, and still doesn't care about choosing right over wrong -- we'd judge Ms. Nihil pretty harshly here, I think.

Possibly I just misunderstood; I thought you had confused two kinds of indifferent people. The first kind, Ms. Nihil, can tell the difference but doesn't care, so chooses randomly. The second kind, Mr. Ignorant, can't tell the difference and so also chooses randomly. This guy, to me, is the roulette wheel: The wheel not only makes "choices" at random, it also has no idea what the difference is between red and black. A model for Ms. Nihil might be a person who's asked to select an assortment of candies she likes, and there are only two choices. Turns out she likes both equally, so while she knows perfectly well the difference between caramel and chocolate, she decides to make random choices because she doesn't care. — J

Yes, good explanation. I was thinking of Ms. Nihil. I was thinking of the indifference that attaches to your (1) (). Because (1) represents a hypothetical imperative, and hypothetical imperatives only function when one has knowledge of the ends/goals, therefore we must be talking about Ms. Nihil rather than Mr. Ignorant.

So the "they" in question in this statement is Ms. Nihil:

They would consider foundational principles like the principle of non-contradiction false as often as they considered them true. — Leontiskos

I happen to agree regarding her marital status. :grin:

"This is true, therefore you ought to believe it." This is a uniform claim which is intended to apply to both sorts of cases (e.g. self-evident truths and obscure truths; necessary truths and contingent truths; etc.). — Leontiskos

Just to pick up this thread for a moment: The unease I was describing above has to do with whether it makes sense to use "ought" in this way. You've persuaded me that the claim is indeed a uniform one, not separated into "Nagel truths" (self-evident, apodictic) and more complex inferences. OK, so the idea is that, if X is a true statement, I ought to believe it. But what I now wonder is: Exactly what would the alternative be? Does the phrase "disbelieve a truth" make sense? In psychological terms, sure -- we all know how hard it can be to really take on board a difficult truth. But I don't think that's what either of us is talking about here. We want a situation in which I understand and acknowledge the truth of statement X, but also claim that I don't believe it. And if you begin to sympathize with me about how hard this can be sometimes (perhaps X is one of those "difficult" truths), I deny that this is the problem. I'm not experiencing any inner resistance of that sort, I reply; I simply do not believe X.

Is this thinkable? If you then asked, "Why not?" what could I reply? This hypothetical situation is meant to evoke a rational response. And if I've excluded any personal, subjective reasons for disbelief, then we seem to have hit bedrock. What more can I say except "I just don't"?

So, this suggests that belief follows from truth, and Nagel is right not just about self-evident logical principles like the law of non-contradiction, but about any truth that is understood as such. If so, then in such a case "you ought to believe," even though it seems to be a good English sentence, is meaningless, since I already do. Or, more accurately, its only meaning would arise in urging me to investigate and overcome whatever non-rational, psychological reasons are preventing me from believing what I acknowledge to be true. Does this make sense to you? Is this what you have in mind when you imagine saying to someone, "You ought to believe X"? If so, I can certainly go along with that.

A final, interesting point about a statement like "I acknowledge X to be true but I don't believe it": Is this self-validating in some way? Do I have direct, introspective knowledge of what I believe and don't believe? Must it be the case that, if a person says, "I don't believe X", they really don't? Or may they be mistaken? We can be mistaken about "I know," "I remember," "I see," and even "I feel," sometimes. More subtly, we can use "I wish," I desire," "I promise," in circumstances where it's reasonable for a listener to doubt our self-knowledge. Where does "I believe" fit, in this collection? J. L. Austin probably has this somewhere; perhaps I can find it.

Can someone give me an example of a "final cause" that cannot be eliminated for initial causes?

The examples that Aristotle provides, e.g the functions of the human body, aren't examples because they can be eliminated for the initial causes of Darwinian evolution.

I'm not sure I understand your question. Let's take an example: the final cause of an acorn is an oak tree. Presumably you are positing that there is some "initial cause" which makes this final cause superfluous?

But what I now wonder is: Exactly what would the alternative be? — J

If so, then in such a case "you ought to believe," even though it seems to be a good English sentence, is meaningless, since I already do. — J

I think there are two basic philosophical questions at stake in this. The first is how to account for error and false opinion. The second is how to account for learning. Both are quite difficult. The paradox of learning is set out in the Meno:

I know what you want to say, Meno. Do you realize what a debater's argument you are bringing up, that a man cannot search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? He cannot search for what he knows—since he knows it, there is no need to search—nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for. — Meno, 80e, (tr. Grube)

Exactly what would the alternative be? Does the phrase "disbelieve a truth" make sense? [...] We want a situation in which I understand and acknowledge the truth of statement X, but also claim that I don't believe it. — J

I think we could recast the statement, "X is true, therefore you ought to believe it," with, "X is true, therefore you ought to see that it is true (and then you will believe it)." If someone is capable of learning, then they are able to see that something is true which they did not previously believe to be true (whether or not they believed it to be false). We could then equally say, "You ought to learn that X is true."

Is this thinkable? If you then asked, "Why not?" what could I reply? This hypothetical situation is meant to evoke a rational response. And if I've excluded any personal, subjective reasons for disbelief, then we seem to have hit bedrock. What more can I say except "I just don't"? — J

The first thing we would do is assess the argument, and this goes back to my thread on "Argument as Transparency." If I assert and you counter-assert, Monty Python-style, then there is no hope for understanding. But if I give an argument, then, instead of counter-asserting, you ought to point out where and why the argument fails. Recall that our initial question regarded arguments, not truths, and this is because we persuade via argument.

If so, then in such a case "you ought to believe," even though it seems to be a good English sentence, is meaningless, since I already do. Or, more accurately, its only meaning would arise in urging me to investigate and overcome whatever non-rational, psychological reasons are preventing me from believing what I acknowledge to be true. Does this make sense to you? Is this what you have in mind when you imagine saying to someone, "You ought to believe X"? If so, I can certainly go along with that. — J

If I tell you that you ought to attend your friend's wedding, you might respond with several questions. "Why should I go?" "How would I get there?" etc. Telling someone that they ought to believe something is a bit like that, where we are prescribing an end point and prescinding from the means needed to get there. In fact in the usual course of things we do not give an isolated injunction, and instead provide reasons or arguments for the injunction. If I gave an order, "Believe that the sun is at the center," you could only respond by saying that you already do so believe, or else you cannot so believe (in your current state). Such an order is pointless without an argument to accompany it.

Do I have direct, introspective knowledge of what I believe and don't believe? — J

I want to say that we do, but this all hangs on the various debates concerning the nature of belief. That is, I think different camps actually define belief differently. In our context I think we are just thinking of assenting to explicit propositions presented in arguments, and that sort of assent is directly and infallibly known.

I'm not sure I understand your question. Let's take an example: the final cause of an acorn is an oak tree. Presumably you are positing that there is some "initial cause" which makes this final cause superfluous? — Leontiskos

Yes. To say that an oak tree is a "final cause" of an acorn is to speak informally about the evolutionary feedback that determined the chemistry of Dendrology, which when applied to a given acorn refers only to a directed chain of causality whose conclusions are fully determined by initial conditions.

I feel like you are making a category error with respect to 'final cause'. What do you mean by that term and why does your 'initial cause' make that meaning superfluous? Surely Aristotle was not "speaking informally about evolutionary feedback" when he used the term, given that he was not aware of Darwinian evolution.

I feel like you are making a category error with respect to 'final cause'. What do you mean by that term and why does your 'initial cause' make that meaning superfluous? Surely Aristotle was not "speaking informally about evolutionary feedback" when he used the term, given that he was not aware of Darwinian evolution. — Leontiskos

Had Aristotle known about evolution, then he could have explained the regularity of nature without appealing to final causes and only to adaptive feedback in the cycle of life. His arguments don't amount to a proof of the necessity of final causes, but to the insufficiency of causal models that don't take into account adaptive feedback.

Had Aristotle known about evolution, then he could have explained the regularity of nature without appealing to final causes and only to adaptive feedback in the cycle of life. His arguments don't amount to a proof of the necessity of final causes, but to the insufficiency of causal models that don't take into account adaptive feedback. — sime

I feel like you are making a category error with respect to 'final cause'. What do you mean by that term and why does your 'initial cause' make that meaning superfluous? — Leontiskos

I feel like you are making a category error with respect to 'final cause'. What do you mean by that term and why does your 'initial cause' make that meaning superfluous? — Leontiskos

To use the SEP's description of Aristotle's causal ontology:

The material cause or that which is given in reply to the question “What is it made out of?” What is singled out in the answer need not be material objects such as bricks, stones, or planks. By Aristotle’s lights, A and B are the material cause of the syllable BA.

The formal cause or that which is given in reply to the question “"What is it?”. What is singled out in the answer is the essence or the what-it-is-to-be something.

The efficient cause or that which is given in reply to the question: “Where does change (or motion) come from?”. What is singled out in the answer is the whence of change (or motion).

The final cause is that which is given in reply to the question: “What is its good?”. What is singled out in the answer is that for the sake of which something is done or takes place.

Let us define a final cause to be reducible to the first three causes if there exists a causal model that reproduces the effects attributed to the final cause, that consists only of the first three causes applied to one another in an adaptive feedback loop.

I am asserting that all final causes are reducible in the above sense. This is equivalent to asserting the existence of a computer simulation of all phenomena attributed to final causes.

I think we could recast the statement, "X is true, therefore you ought to believe it," with, "X is true, therefore you ought to see that it is true (and then you will believe it)." — Leontiskos

This nicely captures the problem. I agree that the recasting doesn’t ask us to create any “rational space” between understanding and believing. So my misgivings about whether such a space really exists are avoided. In the recast version, “and then you will believe it” is meant to describe a (necessary?) consequence or perhaps even a definitional identity between “see the truth” and “believe it”. We’re not left wondering whether we can still not believe!

But what is the force of the “ought,” in the recast statement? Is “You ought to see that X is true” the same thing as “You ought to believe X”? I don’t think so. I read the two statements as saying quite different things. “You ought to believe X” wants to claim that the truth of X gives us a reason to believe X, a reason that should be heeded. Whereas “You ought to see that X is true” could be saying a couple of different things. It could mean, “If you understand X, then you ought to accept its truth.” Or it could mean, “You have an obligation, under the circumstances, to understand X so as to affirm its truth.” What sort of obligation? Perhaps an important decision is at stake; perhaps time is running out on an ethical dilemma.

The point is, neither interpretation of “You ought to see that X is true” is offering a reason to believe it, in the way that “You ought to believe X” does (claim to) offer a reason for belief. The original, unrecast version is claiming that a space is available between truth and belief, and from within that space a person can be adjured to choose belief on the grounds of an allegedly compelling reason, namely that X is true. The recast version doesn’t make this claim.

I remain uneasy about whether such a space makes sense, but I don’t think we can eliminate it in the manner you were suggesting.

I am asserting that all final causes are reducible in the above sense. — sime

This is very clear and helpful. I’ll let Leontiskos pursue the evolutionary biology question, but I want to raise a problem concerning the more common use of “final cause” -- that is, as a reason for doing something. Are you saying that a proper analysis of the first three causes, taken together, would also eliminate or correct a statement like “I raised the flag to show my support for our troops” as an answer to the question, “Why did you raise the flag?”?

Reason is surely teleological. — Leontiskos

And yet, when reasoning we do not all reach the same conclusions.

It is ordered towards truth. — Leontiskos

Quite often it is ordered toward defense or justification or persuasion, to what can be made to seem to be true rather than to demonstrate or determine what is true.

Thomists might like to think that the correct use of reason leads to the truth, but when there is doubt, an appeal to the authority of revelation sets things right. Even if reason is ordered toward the truth, it may not get us there.

Aristotle, of course, did not take recourse in revelation. But then again he did not rely on the authority of reason either. With regard to questions and problems, especially with regard to what is most fundamental, it becomes clear that reason can lead to aporia.

Even if we are ordered to truth it does not follow that what we say, even to ourselves, is what is true. It does not mean we even always want to know what is true.

The irony is that Aquinas' argument is ordered toward a conclusion that may be false.

This nicely captures the problem. I agree that the recasting doesn’t ask us to create any “rational space” between understanding and believing. So my misgivings about whether such a space really exists are avoided. In the recast version, “and then you will believe it” is meant to describe a (necessary?) consequence or perhaps even a definitional identity between “see the truth” and “believe it”. We’re not left wondering whether we can still not believe! — J

Yes, I think that's right.

The point is, neither interpretation of “You ought to see that X is true” is offering a reason to believe it, in the way that “You ought to believe X” does (claim to) offer a reason for belief. The original, unrecast version is claiming that a space is available between truth and belief, and from within that space a person can be adjured to choose belief on the grounds of an allegedly compelling reason, namely that X is true. The recast version doesn’t make this claim.

I remain uneasy about whether such a space makes sense, but I don’t think we can eliminate it in the manner you were suggesting. — J

Your first point is about a "reason to believe," and I would point you to what I said about argument in my last post. These truncated statements are only preliminary, and real reasons to believe only occur (dialectically) in the form of arguments. "You should believe X because [of this argument]."

Your second point is about "space between truth and belief," and I would point you to what I said about learning in my last post. The relevant and fundamental fact is that we are able to learn, and therefore there is space between truth and belief. We come to believe things that were already true. The complement of belief/assent in the sense we are taking it is therefore a failure to learn. (Knowledge is an act, but its opposite, error, is not. You are searching for the opposite of assent/belief in the realm of acts, where it does not exist. The opposite is a kind of privation.)

Let us define a final cause to be reducible to the first three causes if there exists a causal model that reproduces the effects attributed to the final cause, that consists only of the first three causes applied to one another in an adaptive feedback loop.

I am asserting that all final causes are reducible in the above sense. This is equivalent to asserting the existence of a computer simulation of all phenomena attributed to final causes. — sime

Okay, so you assert that final causes are reducible to Aristotle's other causes.

Had Aristotle known about evolution, then he could have explained the regularity of nature without appealing to final causes and only to adaptive feedback in the cycle of life. His arguments don't amount to a proof of the necessity of final causes, but to the insufficiency of causal models that don't take into account adaptive feedback. — sime

Does not adaptive feedback presuppose final causality? It would seem that the final cause of Darwinian evolution is something like the survival of life.

This is equivalent to asserting the existence of a computer simulation of all phenomena attributed to final causes. — sime

I think the question is whether the simulation itself involves final causality.

Yes. To say that an oak tree is a "final cause" of an acorn is to speak informally about the evolutionary feedback that determined the chemistry of Dendrology, which when applied to a given acorn refers only to a directed chain of causality whose conclusions are fully determined by initial conditions. — sime

Supposing an acorn is fully determined to become an oak tree by initial conditions, this does not undermine final causality. Final causality means, among other things, that the acorn is determined to become an oak tree and not a poplar or ash tree. It is about the determinate end that its development is ordered to. Now I think Aristotle might say that the formal cause contains the final cause in fieri, and perhaps you could argue from this that the final cause is unnecessary. But the response would probably be that simply looking at the acorn and its initial state is not going to tell you anything about its final state.

Quite often it is ordered [...] to what can be made to seem to be true... — Fooloso4

Yes, as often as Sophists operate.

...an appeal to the authority of revelation sets things right. — Fooloso4

Who said anything about revelation? You're engaged in axe-grinding.

The irony is that Aquinas' argument is ordered toward a conclusion that may be false. — Fooloso4

You can attempt to give an argument for such a conclusion if you like.

Thomists might like to think that the correct use of reason leads to the truth, but when there is doubt, an appeal to the authority of revelation sets things right. — Fooloso4

The exclusion from consideration of anything that is associated with the domain of revealed truth is also a factor in current philosophical discourse. This shows up in many of the debates about ‘cause’, ‘purpose’, and ‘meaning’ in the presumption that the universe world must always be considered absent of them as a kind of axiom.

Quite often it is ordered [...] to what can be made to seem to be true...
— Fooloso4

Yes, as often as Sophists operate. — Leontiskos

It is often overlooked how close the sophist and philosopher are.

More generally, the problem is our inability to make the distinction between what seems to us to be true and what might be true.

Who said anything about revelation? — Leontiskos

I put these pieces together:

the Aristotelian tradition. — Leontiskos

But as a Christian — Leontiskos

The intuitive opinion follows Aquinas in claiming that the human being is intrinsically ordered to truth — Leontiskos

Summa Theologiae, — Leontiskos

For the Thomist the Aristotelian tradition is typically the Thomist tradition. Even without reference to Aquinas, I recognized the claim as Aquinas' rather than Aristotle's. It occurs often in the argument of Thomists.

You're engaged in axe-grinding. — Leontiskos

Nope. Just following where that ordering leads.

You can attempt to give an argument for such a conclusion if you like. — Leontiskos

You miss the point. That reason does not lead to the truth of God cuts both ways.

I put these pieces together: — Fooloso4

You stitched four clauses together and added a double serving of non sequitur for taste? This is why I don't often respond to your posts.

The exclusion from consideration of anything that is associated with the domain of revealed truth is also a factor in current philosophical discourse. — Wayfarer

The interesting thing here is that Aquinas is rather precise about when a revealed premise* is being used and when it is not. This reflects not only his natural precision, but also the historical situation, in which Aristotelianism was under intense scrutiny. To conflate a revealed conclusion with a non-revealed conclusion would have been fatal given the fact that the whole academic enterprise of that time was scrutinizing the Aristotelians for precisely such slips. So Fooloso's assumption that anything that comes from Aquinas must be revelation-based is not only faulty reasoning, it is also almost exactly backwards.

* A premise derived from Christian revelation as opposed to simple natural reason.

You stitched four clauses together and added a double serving of non sequitur for taste? This is why I don't often respond to your posts. — Leontiskos

No need to stitch together what for Aquinas belongs together.

So Fooloso's assumption that anything that comes from Aquinas must be revelation-based is not only faulty reasoning, it is also almost exactly backwards. — Leontiskos

I have made no such assumption.

You seem to have lost the thread of the argument. You claim that reason is teleological. By teleology you say you mean how the term is understood within the Aristotelian tradition. You go on to say, that it is Aquinas who says that the human being is intrinsically ordered to truth.

Teleology is the movement toward something's completion. The completion of reason accordingly would be the truth. Aquinas, however, says that God reveals things that transcend human reason. In other words, the completion of reason does not yield the whole truth. For this revelation is needed.

All this is very far from what you accuse me of. I suspect your defensiveness is getting in the way.

The completion of reason accordingly would be the truth. Aquinas, however, says that God reveals things that transcend human reason. In other words, the completion of reason does not yield the whole truth. — Fooloso4

You are committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent, claiming that because reason is ordered to truth therefore (all) truth must be derivable from unaided reason. A revealed truth does not undermine the thesis that the telos of reason is truth.

It's as if I said that all bears are animals, and you responded by saying, "But Aquinas claims that some animals are not bears, therefore your claim can't be right."

You are committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent, claiming that because reason is ordered to truth therefore (all) truth must be derivable from unaided reason. — Leontiskos

Nope. What I am saying is that if, as you assert, there is a telos of reason, then it has to date failed to complete or realize itself.

Aquinas and I are in agreement that reason has a limit. Where Aquinas and I differ is with regard to where to draw that limit. Although I cannot say where to draw that limit I can say that he allows for it to extent much further than I do. Where he claims that the truth of God is known to reason, I deny it.

if, as you assert, there is a telos of reason, then it has to date failed to complete or realize itself. — Fooloso4

Not all acorns become oaks.

But some do.

There are no examples of reason completing itself. Although Thomists might believe it does in some limited way, because they believe that through it we can know that God exists, a great many highly capable and reasonable people do not agree.

Why the lack of agreement? If it were simply a matter of reason there would be no such disagreement.

Why the lack of agreement? If it were simply a matter of reason there would be no such disagreement. — Fooloso4

"Why is rational agreement so elusive?"