Instrumentality is the translation of an abstract into a concrete idea, I think. Ultimately, the instrument does not create the desired outcome so much as it comes to embody it. — Pantagruel
Aristotle characterizes the soul as the end of this body. So, although it is not so much the concept of function that is at stake here (although entelecheia seems to be associated with energeia and therefore with functioning), in the background teleology still plays a role. — Pantagruel
Well, without the value of the vision of the goal, the goal itself has no value. So it is the idea that creates the value that realizes the goal. — Pantagruel
to give an account of being — tim wood
Instrumentality is the translation of an abstract into a concrete idea, — Pantagruel
Hmm. What is a concrete idea? And how does reason (itself) do any work? I.e., translation requires a translator, yes?I'd say that reason is ultimately instrumental. — Pantagruel
I'd say that reason is ultimately instrumental. Basically, consciousness is teleology. — Pantagruel
That said, I don't quite see how teleology and instrumentality are the same thing. Perhaps you can elaborate? — Leontiskos
Thomas Nagel has some really good descriptions of the ways in which reality seems to have fundamentally teleological aspects. — Pantagruel
Instrumentality is the translation of an abstract into a concrete idea, — Pantagruel
Where, in particular? I’ve read some of his work, which has impressed me deeply, but I can’t recall this discussion in particular (although I do know that the idea of ‘the universe become self aware’ was part of his Mind and Cosmos.) — Wayfarer
Thus a teleological entity need not possess intention. — Leontiskos
It's one of the main theme's of Mind and Cosmos. As I mentioned, it's a very short book and more than pays back the time invested to read it. — Pantagruel
Well, Aristotle articulates a kind of non-intentional teleology. However we are again begging questions. The notion that there could be purpose without intention to me is just "autologically unsound." As soon as you allow purposiveness, you have intention. — Pantagruel
If I present you with a sound argument, then you ought to assent to the conclusion. — Leontiskos
The word telos means something like purpose, or goal, or final end. According to Aristotle, everything has a purpose or final end. If we want to understand what something is, it must be understood in terms of that end, which we can discover through careful study. It is perhaps easiest to understand what a telos is by looking first at objects created by human beings. Consider a knife. If you wanted to describe a knife, you would talk about its size, and its shape, and what it is made out of, among other things. But Aristotle believes that you would also, as part of your description, have to say that it is made to cut things. And when you did, you would be describing its telos. The knife’s purpose, or reason for existing, is to cut things. And Aristotle would say that unless you included that telos in your description, you wouldn’t really have described – or understood – the knife. This is true not only of things made by humans, but of plants and animals as well. If you were to fully describe an acorn, you would include in your description that it will become an oak tree in the natural course of things – so acorns too have a telos. Suppose you were to describe an animal, like a thoroughbred foal. You would talk about its size, say it has four legs and hair, and a tail. Eventually you would say that it is meant to run fast. This is the horse’s telos, or purpose. If nothing thwarts that purpose, the young horse will indeed become a fast runner.
Much as I would like to derive a genuine, non-hypothetical “ought” from “is” here, I don’t think we can. It seems like two responses are possible. — J
2) There is actually no choice in the matter at all, since to understand the soundness of an argument is to believe it. This is Nagel’s position, by the way, in regard to logical truth. — J
Which of the two responses do you prefer? — Leontiskos
There is actually no choice in the matter at all, since to understand the soundness of an argument is to believe it. This is Nagel’s position, by the way, in regard to logical truth. — J
This seems to entail the instrumentality of reason. — Pantagruel
Holy cow, what a difference between you and me. This is one of the many books I've started, and am soon in over my head. I keep going as best I can for some time, hopefully absorbing little bits here and there. Then I move on to the next book, and do the same. Regardless of the difficulties, I absolutely love the book.It's one of the main themes of Mind and Cosmos. As I mentioned, it's a very short book and more than pays back the time invested to read it. — Pantagruel
But I don't know what force the "ought" could have for those who don't. — J
It seems like two responses are possible. 1) The statement is shorthand for “You ought to believe this sound argument if you care about such things as holding beliefs that are based in reason/soundness/fact etc.” 2) There is actually no choice in the matter at all, since to understand the soundness of an argument is to believe it. — J
Even the bluntest and most heartfelt uses of "ought" ("You ought to do the right thing, just because it's the right thing", "You ought to believe X because it's true") still seem to me to refer back to an unspoken conditional of some sort. Not everyone cares about right things or truth or being rational. — J
As far as I can understand the concept of "ought" in philosophy and ordinary discourse, it is always conditional or hypothetical. — J
The intuitive opinion follows Aquinas in claiming that the human being is intrinsically ordered to truth — Leontiskos
There are many interesting and insightful things in your post that I'd like to respond to, but I have to confess my almost complete ignorance of Thomism. So first, could you expand on what Aquinas means by "intrinsically ordered to truth"? I'm guessing it has something to do with an essential nature of human beings, possibly involving an Aristotelian telos? But I'd welcome some help here. — J
If someone were indifferent to truth they would say false things as often as they say true things, and they would intend to say false things as often as they intend to say true things, and they would do this even when “talking to themselves” or reasoning privately. — Leontiskos
They would consider foundational principles like the principle of non-contradiction false as often as they considered them true. — Leontiskos
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