That's a very interesting thought. I'm not quite sure where to go with it, though. I'm sure Ryle does talk about the idea, but I can't remember where. I'm sure that orthodox science would be most unhappy with the idea - at least, I expect "science" would prefer a monochrome (single-storey) universe. Perhaps not. I usually think of the phenomenon as a kind of contextualisation, except in the giant leap from causal to rational explanation patterns, which I see as a change of category.

Come to think of it, there is a live issue where this might be relevant. At present, it tends to focus on Searle's Chinese room argument. It is the relationship between the description of physical states of a computer and the "interpretation" of them by people. (I'm not quite sure what the description of the software would apply, but I'm inclined to think that we have to think of that as a bridge between the two categories. It can't be a translation because the physical states of the computer are not a language.)

By extension, one might then see the relationship between brain and mental states as a similar problem, which, come to think of it is exactly the problem that Ryle puts at the summit of the mountain he is climbing in "Dilemmas". That's a hot topic (or is it the same topic?) as the computer issue.
By the way, I'm not intending to downplay the importance of levels of description in ethics.

I suppose that Anscombe's multiple descriptions of a single action would correspond to the fact that politics is everything, and art is everything, and physics is everything. We could put this by saying that everything has a political, artistic, physical aspect. That would address my discontent with Ryle's image of the artist and the geologist doing different things - which is not wrong, but provokes me to point out that they both work - and co-exist - in the same world. The mountain is, in a sense, the link between them.

@Banno

Is he moving his arm up and down? Pumping water? Doing his job? Clicking out a steady rhythm? Making a funny shadow on the rock behind him? Well, it could be that all of these descriptions are true. — SEP Anscombe

Cause in the way I was using it in my thread is agnostic to which approach you take in defining it. All that matters is a set of events that excludes other sets of events. A is not B, X is not Y. These set of gametes are not those set of gametes. Obviously, object in some level has to exist. So a red herring would be discussing what is X and what is Y.. Like everything is particles, so we cannot make such distinctions.

I need to revise the first sentence. The original gave the wrong title for the lecture. The correct title is:-

The title of lecture VI is "Technical and Untechnical Concepts"

Ryle gives a good summary of his own lecture towards the end of it:- “Our alarming and initially paralysing question was this. 'How is the World of Physics related to the Everyday World?' I have tried to reduce its terrors and dispel its paralysing effect, by asking you to reconstrue the question thus, 'How are the concepts of physical theory logically related to the concepts of everyday discourse?'” (p. 91/92)

He traces the problem back to the revolutions in science in the 17th century – Galileo, Descartes and Newton and the doctrine that “a scientific theory has no place in it for terms which cannot appear among the data or the results of calculations.” (p. 82) The catch is where “colours, tastes, smells, noises and felt warmth and cold” belong. He cites Aristotle and Boyle and the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities as responsible for the banishing of colours and tastes from physics. (p. 84)

Well, they are not so much banished as marginalized. “The chemist, the geneticist and the wielder of the Geiger counter, in apparent defiance of this ostracism of sensible qualities, may indeed base their special theories on the smells and tastes of chemical compounds, on the colours of sweet-peas and on the clicks heard from the Geiger counter”. They are permitted as “a reliable index” of physical facts, but still, somehow, not themselves physical facts. (p.84)

He starts with a direct challenge to one view of all this (without actually accusing anyone of adopting it). “It is not true that what is not and cannot be mentioned in a formula is denied by that formula.” He points out that “ .. Again, it is not because algebraical equations will have nothing to do with numbers, that they mention none of them. Rather it is because they are impartially receptive of any numbers you please.” (pp. 83/84)

Next, there is a diagnosis of “one intellectual motive” for “construing a logically necessary impartiality as a logically necessary hostility.” – the tradition of Aristotelian logic. It seemed obvious that what was measured by thermometer or ruler and colour or taste were both “qualities” of an object. So the distinction was drawn (by Boyle, he thinks) between primary and secondary qualities. But it is a mistake to classify both in the same way. (p. 84/85)

This is a new idea (and a new one in these lectures). Expressions like “‘Quality', ‘Property', ‘Predicate', ‘Attribute', ‘Characteristic', ‘Description' and ‘Picture'” – the latter is a survivor from the previous lecture – push together concepts of very different kinds, and this is what constitutes the dilemmas that result. (p. 85) Ryle calls them "smother-words". The only perplexing thing in the situation is whether we ought to say that being a trump-card is a 'property' or 'attribute' of the Queen of Hearts. …. This is not a Bridge-player's worry but a logician's worry. (p. 86)

We cannot answer the question what the Queen of Hearts can and cannot do unless we know the game that’s being played. (p. 86) This leads him to the concept of “theoretical luggage” or “theory-ladenness” as the critical factor in creating the illusion of a puzzle.

He distinguishes the card-playing example which he pursues throughout the lecture from the scientific theories. But acknowledges that card games and physics (or economics) are activities of very different kinds. First, we can participate or not in card games but physics and economics are part of all our lives and second, the “thinking” involved in card games is about how to win, but in economics, for example is how to get the best bargains; thinking about physics is different again. (p. 88)

And so he moves on to the main issue – perception.

And so he moves on to the main issue – perception. — Ludwig V

Why do you think it the main issue?

Why do you think it the main issue? — Banno

That remark was a bit off the cuff and I'm prepared and happy to be wrong, if I am wrong. I found myself picking up breadcrumbs. Put it this way - I remember the book as a collection, not a path, and was interested by the discovery that it isn't. I is an introduction, II is clearly a throwaway and III almost entirely historical. The topics gradually gets more interesting - more "live". (Over this many years, that's quite remarkable, isn't it?)

In a way, calling VI the main issue is over-simplification. The main issue is methodological, but the explanation of it is demonstration rather than analysis, and VI brings the methodology to a live issue and demonstrates that it really can help with a real issue.

The beginning of IV:-
"THE two specimens of logical litigation that we have so far considered in detail, namely, the fatalist issue and Zeno's issue, have been in a certain way academic dilemmas. We almost deliberately let them worry us just because we found them intellectually interesting. They were, up to a point, like riddles to which we want to get the answers only because getting the answers is good exercise. From now on I want to discuss issues which are more than riddles, issues, namely, which interest us because they worry us; not mere intellectual exercises but live intellectual troubles." IV p.54

Which is reinforced at the start of V:-
"You will have felt, I expect and hope, that the fatalist dilemma, Zeno's dilemma, and my puzzles about pleasure are all, though in different ways, somewhat peripheral or marginal tangles - tangles whose unravelling does not promise by itself to lead to the unravelling of the tangles that really matter, save in so far as it may be instructive by example. Henceforward I shall be discussing a spider's-web of logical troubles which is not away in a corner of the room, but out in the middle of the room. This is the notorious trouble about the relations between the World of Science and the Everyday World." V p. 68

Actually, from memory, this was, let's say, not a dead issue back in the day. But it doesn't seem to bother anyone these days. "Science tells us what the world is really like." If only they would read Austin and Ryle.

The end of V is linked to VI:-
"But you will not and should not be satisfied with this mere promise of a lifebelt. Can it be actually produced and thrown to us in the precise stretch of surf where we are in difficulties? To one particular place where the surf is boiling round us I shall now turn." V, p.81

VI leads us to VII:-
"But now I must move on to a certain very special tangle or tangle of tangles, which is, I think, for many people somewhere near the centre of their trouble about the relations between the World of Physical Science and the Everyday World. We can call this 'the Problem of Perception'. I shall not unravel the whole tangle, for the simple reason that I do not know how to do it. There are patches in it, and important ones where I feel like a bluebottle in a spider's web. I buzz but I do not get clear." VI p.92

By the way, do you think there's a link between Ryle and Wittgenstein here, or just a good idea occurring independently? (I know it doesn't matter, but there is that issue about Ryle and Austin never mentioning Wittgenstein. Not that W had published much at the time, so perhaps it doesn't really need explanation.)

And in Vii, we find a link back to IV:-
"In this one negative respect seeing and hearing are like enjoying. It was partly for this reason that on a former occasion I discussed the notion of enjoyment at such length, namely to familiarize you with the idea that well understood autobiographical verbs can still be grossly misclassified. I argued that some theorists had tried to fit the notions of liking and disliking into the conceptual harness which suits such terms as 'pain' and 'tickle'. They had misclassified liking and disliking with sensations or feelings." VII p.102

VIII reads to me like a coda - picking up the methodological theme. It isn't woven in to the structure in the same way.