You want to segregate out the interaction from the individuation. Perhaps they are not distinct.

But my suspicions rest more on what "causal history" might be. It's this that you think somehow "necessary".

How, I don't understand.

Ok, so I guess I'm going to read up on Anscombe's view on causality..

It just came up in a thread about God, in answer to a question from @jgill.

But my suspicions rest more on what "causal history" might be. It's this that you think somehow "necessary". — Banno

Yes, it is the causal history that is necessary.
I've explained it, but I am sure it looks a bit like word-salad, so I'm going to try to be more deliberate:

First: This came about from the Ryle lecture on determinism. I said that some parts in there reminded of an earlier thread I created on the notion that people often use the expression, "What if it was the case that I was born under different circumstances". What ensued was unpacking what the implications of this could mean. That is to say, one can imagine being born under a different circumstance, but can that imaginative exercise ever "really" be the case? When I examined the idea in the earlier thread that somewhat paralleled Ryle's questions, I noticed that indeed, you really cannot have even been the very person looking back on their life to ask "What if I was born in different X circumstances", because if anything changed prior to this, you would not have been that "person" looking back at their life.

Next: I discussed this line of thought further with @Ludwig V, as to what this could mean. This started to become a discussion about identity, as we can ask ourselves, "If anything had changed even slightly in our past, would that be a different person than the one currently existing in the present"? During this discussion, it dawned on me that, indeed it seems like there is a "point in time" so-to-speak in which there absolutely had to be a "hard stop" for which a person to have become the individual that they would eventually be looking back in their life- and that was conception. Prior to conception, if the parents even had one change to circumstances, there would be no individual even in the POSSIBILITY of existing as they are in the present. Why? Because that sperm and that egg would not have conceived and thus, even if that couple had another child, that child would be another individual, not this one looking back right now on their life.

Third: Now, anything after that conception can be up to debate. Indeed, I even think it is up for debate as to "personal identity". And here you can bring in ideas of choice and institutional facts and how language is used to define and individual within a language community, etc. However, prior to conception, you would not even have the possibility for the person who now exists to exist in the first place, let alone the range of other possibilities that may or may not still be "this person so identified as such".

The "substance" part of this, is simply that the point of conception isn't just an empty causal a priori thing. It is an actual physical event of some kind, of a substance of chemicals and atoms and whatever thing you want to add there of this combination of gametes. But this is simply a result of the causal event itself.

Concluding thoughts: So again, it at the point of the conception of a specific gametes at a point in time and space whereby this individual can become the range of possibilities for that individual (including the actual person that is looking back at his life), and not any time before or after.

Thanks. that's pretty much as I'd understood the sequence. For my part I was initially reluctant to engage with the topic, because there are so very many issues bumping up against one another.

The obvious issue, clear again in what you just wrote, is the difference between counterpart theory and transworld identity - between David Lewis and Kripke. That's no small thing.

Another issue is potential confusion between an individual - the thing picked out by a proper name - and a person - what it is to be schopenhauer1 and not someone else. These are not the same, and it is not a simple matter to set out their interaction.

And there's also the anachronistic notions of essence and substance that will need cleaning.

I became involved when it was clear that there was insufficient distinction being made between individuals and kinds. That at least is handleable.

Each of these is at least an essay, or a thesis, rather than a post.

But to cut to the chase, I don't think it inevitable that genetics determines personhood. Rather that's one approach amongst many.

But there are simply too many threads here.

Thanks. that's pretty much as I'd understood the sequence. For my part I was initially reluctant to engage with the topic, because there are so very many issues bumping up against one another. — Banno

:up:

The obvious issue, clear again in what you just wrote, is the difference between counterpart theory and transworld identity - between David Lewis and Kripke. That's no small thing.

Another issue is potential confusion between an individual - the thing picked out by a proper name - and a person - what it is to be schopenhauer1 and not someone else. These are not the same, and it is not a simple matter to set out their interaction. — Banno

Yep, and I think this is all related. To clarify, I think my theory has a causal-theme running through it, that happens to involve substance, and not the other way around.. And both of these theories of "identity" are rather more to do with objects and their relations. Even though it started as a sort of transworld-esque discussions of personal identity in various worlds, it became more of a counterpart theory of what about an object (even if its human) across all possible worlds. As we discussed earlier, more Kripke less Lewis (or so the discussion revealed as I was unpacking the ideas).

I became involved when it was clear that there was insufficient distinction being made between individuals and kinds. That at least is handleable. — Banno

My distinction was causal-historical AND substance for individual and substance only for kinds. And I can explain that more if needed. But as you say...

And there's also the anachronistic notions of essence and substance that will need cleaning. — Banno

Agreed, but I am not going to discount substances as part of the equation. Even Kripke Hilary Putnam (I believe?) uses "H2O", as an example. Why can't that substance be used to describe this kind of essentialist notion?

Causal-historical: Point in time and space when all possibilities of a person can occur, including the actual one now. This is only allowable due to its
Substance: Gametes meeting at that point in time.

Each of these is at least an essay, or a thesis, rather than a post. — Banno

Absolutely, but I don't mind a continual dialectic on it to see where it goes, as it hits on so many relevant philosophical topics at once.

But to cut to the chase, I don't think it inevitable that genetics determines personhood. Rather that's one approach amongst many. — Banno

Only if it is discounted why it is that these gametes and not others would by necessity have to be involved in someone even existing as they are, right now.

But there are simply too many threads here. — Banno

I don't mind unpacking each one and seeing how or if they fit.

But then it seems a bit too clever. It's not like I don't understand what people mean by these terms even though these distinctions can be brought up. — Moliere

I tend to think that anywhere a valid distinction can be drawn then it should be drawn, while keeping in mind that in some contexts the distinction probably doesn't matter.

Let's take a different track and listen to Granny Weatherwax in conversation with her nostalgic one-time lover Mustrum Ridcully.

‘Do you remember—’
‘I have a … very good memory, thank you.’
‘Do you ever wonder what life would have been like if you’d said yes?’ said Ridcully.
‘No.’
‘I suppose we’d have settled down, had children, grandchildren, that sort of thing …’
Granny shrugged. It was the sort of thing romantic idiots said. But there was something in the air tonight …
‘What about the fire?’ she said.
‘What fire?’
‘Swept through our house just after we were married. Killed us both.’
‘What fire? I don’t know anything about any fire?’
Granny turned around.
‘Of course not! It didn’t happen. But the point is, it might have happened. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened. You might think something’d be good, but for all you know it could have turned out horrible. You can’t say “If only I’d …” because you could be wishing for anything. The point is, you’ll never know. You’ve gone past. So there’s no use thinking about it. So I don’t.’ — Terry Pratchet

Counterfactuals are recondite. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened.

Pratchett, Terry. Lords And Ladies: (Discworld Novel 14) (Discworld series) (pp. 162-163). Transworld. Kindle Edition.

I think my point in the context of this post here is that if "personal identity" is not objective then the gamete point is trivial because there is no objective fact of the matter that the possibilities belong to a single individual. At the same time there is the strange counterexample of two possible world where everything in someone's life was the same except for the fact that in one world that individual had been conceived with different gamete that had identical genetic information. The difference the gamete brings here then seems about as significant as if one day that person had decided to put on a different pair of socks. You could say that the person is not the same but given that everything else in the world is identical, surely there is claim to say that this is a version of that person in another world. Looking at your Ryle considerations, in general I think often there is no fact of the matter about what makes these counterfactuals the case. We infer that things could have been otherwise purely through our ability to imagine things and there seems no bounds on what could have been the case without having to place an artificial restriction on what seems plausible or not. There's nothing to substantiate these.

We carve up nature — Apustimelogist

A popular matephor, but wrong. Nature does not sit out there (wherever that is), like a joint of meat, waiting to be carved up and served up. Nor are we separate from nature, hovering over it looking for the joins. Nature prods us and we prod it back. Interaction, all the time. Nothing is possible without it.

neurons work like efficient coding. — Apustimelogist

It’s pretty much inevitable that we will articulate our research in terms of that model. And it is sensible to take what we do understand and try to apply it to things we don’t understand. Plato was not an idiot to try and apply the mathematical models that he did understand to the empirical reality that he did not understand. We can’t even say that he was wrong, since we continue to do the same thing. It was his implementation that was problematic.
It goes back to the question whether we can say that computer calculates or speaks. Unlike Searle (if I understand him right) I think we not only do say that but that it is not a mistake to do so.
Nonetheless, I’m sure that in the end, we will have to recognize the limitations of this model/metaphor, if only so that we can get round them.

But only if. — Banno

The problem arises because people love to move from “if p, then q.” to “p”. Perhaps there ought to be a formal fallacy, which I would dub “suppressing the antecedent”. Certainly, in Toulmin's terms, we can assert that suppressing the antecedent results in an unwarranted assertion.

The same answer the Spartans gave Athens — Banno

I’m afraid my memory fails me. I know there is such a story, but I can’t remember the details. Could you remind me of the details of this story?

So again, it at the point of the conception of a specific gametes at a point in time and space whereby this individual can become the range of possibilities for that individual (including the actual person that is looking back at his life), and not any time before or after. — schopenhauer1

The trouble is this: at the point of conception, there is no individual that can become anything. The possibility (even probability) that an individual can become (grow) does indeed arise at that point. But an acorn is not an oak-tree; it is the possibility of an oak-tree. An egg is not a bird; it is the prospect of a bird. After the acorn has sprouted or the egg has hatched, we can look back and say that acorn (now gone) was the origin of this tree (now present) and so on. It goes back to Ryle and the battle of Waterloo.

Perhaps the concept of a life-cycle will be helpful here. A butterfly’s life-cycle is sufficiently complicated and public to be useful. First there is the egg (but no butterfly and no caterpillar), then the caterpillar (but no butterfly), then the chrysalis (and still no butterfly) and finally the butterfly - and then there is a dead butterfly. There’s a continuity between these stages that makes it helpful to call this process the life-cycle of the butterfly, rather than of the egg, the caterpillar or the chrysalis. In that way, we can recognize the continuity of the process and the changes that occur.

Part of the point of this is that as things grow new possibilities arise. Neither egg, nor caterpillar, nor chrysalis can possibly fly. The possibility only arises at the last stage. Young children cannot reach the top shelf. It is not possible. Ten years later, they can – it has become possible. When people go to school, some of them can read and some of them can’t. After some time, most people will have learnt and it has become possible for them to read. Why on earth do you think that all the possibilities of my life only arise at the moment of conception?

You can’t say “If only I’d …” because you could be wishing for anything. The point is, you’ll never know. You’ve gone past. So there’s no use thinking about it. So I don’t.’
— Terry Pratchet
Counterfactuals are recondite. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened. — Banno

I agree with that, in a way, and that's where possible worlds could be helpful because it could enable us to take into account what else, apart from the stated counterfactual supposition, would have to be different as well. (Though, of course, Putnam and others frequently rule that interesting and helpful possibility out so that their thought experiments can drive us to the conclusion that they hope for.)
But as a generalization, it doesn't make sense. Surely it is perfectly OK for me to say “If only I had checked the oil in the engine, we would not have broken down miles from help in the middle of a snowstorm.”? To be sure, it might turn out that I’ve avoided crossing the bridge at the moment that it falls down, but that’s most unlikely, and the problems I’m actually facing are quite clear.
It is true that I’m making an assumption - that checking the oil before driving through a snow-storm does not require any radical difference between myself as I am and myself as I would need to be in order to check the oil before I leave. For example, the supposition that I would have to be a bit less absent-minded or distracted than I actually was doesn't seem implausible. On the other hand, imagining what it is like to be a bat does require that I be something radically different from what I am and those differences mean that I would experience everything differently, so the project fails.

Counterfactuals are recondite. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened.

Pratchett, Terry. Lords And Ladies: (Discworld Novel 14) (Discworld series) (pp. 162-163). Transworld. Kindle Edition. — Banno

Nice quote. I'm a big Pratchett / Discworld fan myself.

trivial because there is no objective fact of the matter that the possibilities belong to a single individual. At the same time there is the strange counterexample of two possible world where everything in someone's life was the same except for the fact that in one world that individual had been conceived with different gamete that had identical genetic information. The difference the gamete brings here then seems about as significant as if one day that person had decided to put on a different pair of socks. You could say that the person is not the same but given that everything else in the world is identical, surely there is claim to say that this is a version of that person in another world. Looking at your Ryle considerations, in general I think often there is no fact of the matter about what makes these counterfactuals the case. We infer that things could have been otherwise purely through our ability to imagine things and there seems no bounds on what could have been the case without having to place an artificial restriction on what seems plausible or not. There's nothing to substantiate these. — Apustimelogist

So this focuses solely on the gametes, and not the causal-historical aspect. That event (not another one, even in another possible world), necessitates that this actual person would at least be actualized. Without that causal-historical event occurring, THIS person would not be THIS person, they would be another person THIS person wouldn't exist PERHAPS another person would.

Part of the point of this is that as things grow new possibilities arise. Neither egg, nor caterpillar, nor chrysalis can possibly fly. The possibility only arises at the last stage. Young children cannot reach the top shelf. It is not possible. Ten years later, they can – it has become possible. When people go to school, some of them can read and some of them can’t. After some time, most people will have learnt and it has become possible for them to read. Why on earth do you think that all the possibilities of my life only arise at the moment of conception? — Ludwig V

Ok good question.

Let me ask another question, if anything changed even a tiny bit prior to conception, would even the possibility of you actually have existed? No, because whatever else you are (personal identity-wise), it is also fused to some extent with a genetic code which is this set of gametes at this causal-historical event. That is all I am saying. After the conception, if everything followed the way it did, you would be the present you right now. Perhaps we can say, in some way, if events in your life went differently, that you would be "another person", but we can only say that after conception. Before conception, there wouldn't even have been this possibility of the "you" looking back now to begin with.

Could you remind me of the details of this story? — Ludwig V

I misremembered - it was Philip of Macedon, apparently, who on conquering southern Greece sent a message to Sparta asking if he should come as friend or foe. The Spartans replied "neither".

To which Philip sent a second message saying that if he conquered them he would cast them off their land. To which they replied , "If".

A popular matephor, but wrong. Nature does not sit out there (wherever that is), like a joint of meat, waiting to be carved up and served up. Nor are we separate from nature, hovering over it looking for the joins. Nature prods us and we prod it back. Interaction, all the time. Nothing is possible without it. — Ludwig V

Yes, I agree this is a much better way of looking at it.

It goes back to the question whether we can say that computer calculates or speaks. Unlike Searle (if I understand him right) I think we not only do say that but that it is not a mistake to do so.
Nonetheless, I’m sure that in the end, we will have to recognize the limitations of this model/metaphor, if only so that we can get round them. — Ludwig V

What do you mean on this bit?

Yes but my point is that if there is no objective identity then this seems trivial in the sense that it is trivial that we are always constantly changing. Its trivial different events have different consequences. Its not trivial how to objectively construe those consequences as a self-contained identities with continuity over time amidst changes.

Its not trivial how to objectively construe those consequences as a self-contained identities with continuity over time amidst changes. — Apustimelogist

Ok well, Im saying what is relevant is the causal-historical event whereby if there was any slight change to that event, there could not in any possibility be you. It would be another person, if another person at all was born from the same parents. This is not transposable. Certain things are conceivable but not possible.

I think we both more or less agree about what is happening in the picture physically and causally in the scenario you are talking about so maybe there is not much more to be said. I just have a kind of "No-Self" kind of view (" " from wikipedia personal identity page) which makes me view those events differently - the causo-historical significance is for the components of the system but nothing about those components or their causal relationships carves out an objective self-boundary. But again, I think we agree on what is happening here physically.

it was Philip of Macedon, apparently, who on conquering southern Greece sent a message to Sparta — Banno

Thanks for that. The Spartans always prided themselves on being laconic. I see the point now. The exchange took place in 346 BCE. Sadly, Philip proceeded to invade Laconia, devastate much of it and eject the Spartans from various parts of it. (See Wikipedia article on him).

What do you mean on this bit? — Apustimelogist

The information processing theory simplified is comparing the human brain to a computer or basic processor. It is theorized that the brain works in a set sequence, as does a computer. The sequence goes as follows, "receives input, processes the information, and delivers an output".

WIkipedia - Information processing theory

For example, the eye receives visual information and codes information into electric neural activity, which is fed back to the brain where it is “stored” and “coded.” This information can be used by other parts of the brain relating to mental activities such as memory, perception, and attention. The output (i.e., behavior) might be, for example, to read what you can see on a printed page.

Simply Psychology - information processing

My remark about recognising the limitations of the model is based on two issues. First, all this simply assumes that we can count a causal process as a cognitive or symbolic activity. But there's an issue about whether this is legitimate. Second, the example is fascinating because it simply ignores the so-called "hard problem".

Ok well, Im saying what is relevant is the causal-historical event whereby if there was any slight change to that event, there could not in any possibility be you. — schopenhauer1

What you don't seem to recognize is that whether any slight change means that the causal-historical events cannot result in me existing is a decision taken by you. If you check the detail, you will find that differences in the 98% of our DNA that is, as they say politely, non-coding, will make no difference to the outcome. Which other changes make a difference is something we have to assess on a case-by-case basis - brown eyes rather than blue eyes are unlikely to count.

But again, I think we agree on what is happening here physically. — Apustimelogist

The outline of the process is clear enough, and I think it is true that the spatio-temporal and causal history of the body is an important element in our identity. But there's a disagreement about how that is described. It seems to me unlikely that will be resolved any time soon. But one lives in hope.

Before conception, there wouldn't even have been this possibility of the "you" looking back now to begin with. — schopenhauer1

I don't understand you at all. Before conception, there were many possibilities of many conceptions, some of which would have resulted in someone much like me. So what you say here is simply false.

Ok well, Im saying what is relevant is the causal-historical event whereby if there was any slight change to that event, there could not in any possibility be you. It would be another person, if another person at all was born from the same parents. — schopenhauer1

I don't see a problem in saying that I might have been born with fair hair and blue eyes. If I had been, it would have been because of a variation in my DNA. Other possibilities would be more problematic.

My remark about recognising the limitations of the model is based on two issues. First, all this simply assumes that we can count a causal process as a cognitive or symbolic activity. But there's an issue about whether this is legitimate. Second, the example is fascinating because it simply ignores the so-called "hard problem". — Ludwig V

:up: This falls right into another thread I made about how people often (unintentionally) assert mental states in the equation when trying to account for physical states, mix and matching them, without explaining how one is the other. You rightly pointed out that fallacy here, something akin to a homunculus fallacy.

What you don't seem to recognize is that whether any slight change means that the causal-historical events cannot result in me existing is a decision taken by you. If you check the detail, you will find that differences in the 98% of our DNA that is, as they say politely, non-coding, will make no difference to the outcome. Which other changes make a difference is something we have to assess on a case-by-case basis - brown eyes rather than blue eyes are unlikely to count. — Ludwig V

It's not a decision "made by me", or so I am theorizing. Rather, causal-history is essential to that identity, because it is necessary. Any other causal-history is someone else. Even twins or clones are someone else, as I am not asserting only gametes as the necessary component. However, it is the physical substantiation of the causal-historical event. It isn't all some empty case of causality. It is a causal-historical event of something (the substance of the set of two gametes in this instance).

I don't understand you at all. Before conception, there were many possibilities of many conceptions, some of which would have resulted in someone much like me. So what you say here is simply false. — Ludwig V

Then let me clarify. This determination can only happen in hindsight. That is to say, whatever the "present you" that is looking back now, that is the person in question. Prior to conception, any outcome that led to another set of gametes would not have been you. The actualized you right now, had to come from this set of gametes and no other, otherwise, you don't exist, or that isn't you, or whatever the valid way to phrase that is.

I don't see a problem in saying that I might have been born with fair hair and blue eyes. If I had been, it would have been because of a variation in my DNA. Other possibilities would be more problematic. — Ludwig V

Now, I think this is just false. Whatever sperm or egg was fertilized, that conception could not have led to the person presently looking back on their life.

But an acorn is not an oak-tree; it is the possibility of an oak-tree. — Ludwig V

Yes, but a particular acorn and the oak tree it becomes (if indeed it does so, of course) are linked, and hence their identities are linked, in a way that neither is linked with other acorns and oak trees. They are linked as phases of a particular process of growth and transformation; a unique history so to speak.

My remark about recognising the limitations of the model is based on two issues. First, all this simply assumes that we can count a causal process as a cognitive or symbolic activity. But there's an issue about whether this is legitimate. Second, the example is fascinating because it simply ignores the so-called "hard problem". — Ludwig V

Oh I see, quite right; however, I was not trying to invoke that kind of model of the brain or mind. I wouldn't say efficient coding necessatily entails that kind of idea and my views of the brain and mind don't hinge strongly on symbol or representation.

I wouldn't say efficient coding necessarily entails that kind of idea and my views of the brain and mind don't hinge strongly on symbol or representation. — Apustimelogist

Fair enough. I notice that many people have no problem speaking of brain-states as symbols of representations. But a symbol is always a symbol of something and a representation is always a representation of something. But in the case of mental states, we have no access to the "something" in either case.

They are linked as phases of a particular process of growth and transformation; a unique history so to speak. — Janus

Yes, quite so. This is why I started speaking about life-cycles. Then I can reconcile the fact that some states and processes that are not a person (such as DNA) are part of the processes that you are talking about.

You rightly pointed out that fallacy here, something akin to a homunculus fallacy. — schopenhauer1

Yes, that is often committed. But that fallacy is the product of a complex structure of ideas, which may change. Newton posited gravity as an essential part of his theory, in spite of the fact that such a concept violated the then-orthodox ideas of causality and (whether this was him or not, I don't know) redefined what physical/material means. So what looks to us like illegitimate mix-and-match could be abandoned. I think it needs to be. The short version of this is that the "hard problem" is the result of the way that various concepts are defined. No solution is possible. It follows that the definitions need to change.

Rather, causal-history is essential to that identity, because it is necessary. Any other causal-history is someone else. — schopenhauer1

I understand that is your proposition. What you don't seem to have noticed is that the status of those proposition is your decision. You treat them as "hinge" for the debate - everything turns round them.

Now, I think this is just false. Whatever sperm or egg was fertilized, that conception could not have led to the person presently looking back on their life. — schopenhauer1

That depends on how you define that person's identity. I agree that, given that I have brown eyes, it is not now possible for me to have blue eyes. But I might have developed blue eyes at some point in the past and if that had happened, it would not now be possible for me to have had brown eyes. You are suppressing the antecedent in Kripke's proof.

One is born with a constitution, not an identity, the constitution varies in the human species, and hopefully, one's constitution is appropriate to the context it finds itself in. This context is the mold the constitution is molded by. This process is the living of life in its context mold, and it's through this process that constitution forms an ever-changing identity. When one is born, one is potential constitution and identity is its evolutionary process of an extended life moving through its context. It is natural selection, how is that constitution fitted to society, and how is it's society fitted to the natural world, same process.

Genetics is the formula for the making of the constitution, and it is being played upon by the earth and the cosmos as its instrument, the melody that these elements play constitutes the character of the individual. Free will is an absurd concept.

:up:

That depends on how you define that person's identity. I agree that, given that I have brown eyes, it is not now possible for me to have blue eyes. But I might have developed blue eyes at some point in the past and if that had happened, it would not now be possible for me to have had brown eyes. You are suppressing the antecedent in Kripke's proof. — Ludwig V

Then you aren’t getting me because you’re focused on the genetics and not the causal history part which is uniquely an event that is tied to the person. No that other set of gametes won’t do. This one only does. Otherwise, no you.

Then you aren’t getting me because you’re focused on the genetics and not the causal history part which is uniquely an event that is tied to the person — schopenhauer1

OK. Forget the business about DNA. There are many people in my life who I meet only sporadically. I don't know what happens to them when I'm not there; I may or may not have sporadic second-hand information about what has happened to them. When I meet them, how do I know they are the same person? (You can stipulate, if you like, that I assume that there is, in fact, a continuous causal history covering the time when I was not there. I will stipulate that I don't know what that history is.)

No that other set of gametes won’t do. This one only does. Otherwise, no you. — schopenhauer1

I thought you were saying that I am over-focused on gametes, yet here they are again, front and centre stage.

When one is born, one is potential constitution and identity is its evolutionary process of an extended life moving through its context. — boagie

We clearly have the same approach to this. I just have one question. Surely, one has an identity from the moment one has a constitution, even if one's identity changes and develops over time?

No, at birth one is just that which has the potential to experience, the arrival has no memories which constitute identity. I have personally experienced briefly but often, a total lack of memory, and thus identity. The individual new born has no identity and only gains it through it interactions with its environmental context, context defines, and if one did not choose one's context, one did not choose one's identity. As a species we have a particular pattern, that of human beings, but DNA is a faulty pattern maker, so the life patterns change over time in adapting to the world context. Constitution however does have particular aspects, tastes, and potentials that will or will not be brought forward by a demanding environment context. We draw our identity from the success and failures of our life in
context.

OK. Forget the business about DNA. There are many people in my life who I meet only sporadically. I don't know what happens to them when I'm not there; I may or may not have sporadic second-hand information about what has happened to them. When I meet them, how do I know they are the same person? (You can stipulate, if you like, that I assume that there is, in fact, a continuous causal history covering the time when I was not there. I will stipulate that I don't know what that history is.)

No that other set of gametes won’t do. This one only does. Otherwise, no you.
— schopenhauer1
I thought you were saying that I am over-focused on gametes, yet here they are again, front and centre stage. — Ludwig V

It's not that they are gametes so much, as that they are this set of gametes. There is a difference.

As to the aspect of a continuous identity, that isn't an issue. Rather, as long as you admit that your life has been actualized in some fashion, that actualized history could not have been that actualized history without that set of gametes. It is largely irrelevant how those gametes themselves operate to create your identity. It is simply that that substrate of substance is that substrate and not another.