But my suspicions rest more on what "causal history" might be. It's this that you think somehow "necessary". — Banno
Thanks. that's pretty much as I'd understood the sequence. For my part I was initially reluctant to engage with the topic, because there are so very many issues bumping up against one another. — Banno
The obvious issue, clear again in what you just wrote, is the difference between counterpart theory and transworld identity - between David Lewis and Kripke. That's no small thing.
Another issue is potential confusion between an individual - the thing picked out by a proper name - and a person - what it is to be schopenhauer1 and not someone else. These are not the same, and it is not a simple matter to set out their interaction. — Banno
I became involved when it was clear that there was insufficient distinction being made between individuals and kinds. That at least is handleable. — Banno
And there's also the anachronistic notions of essence and substance that will need cleaning. — Banno
Each of these is at least an essay, or a thesis, rather than a post. — Banno
But to cut to the chase, I don't think it inevitable that genetics determines personhood. Rather that's one approach amongst many. — Banno
But there are simply too many threads here. — Banno
But then it seems a bit too clever. It's not like I don't understand what people mean by these terms even though these distinctions can be brought up. — Moliere
Counterfactuals are recondite. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened.‘Do you remember—’
‘I have a … very good memory, thank you.’
‘Do you ever wonder what life would have been like if you’d said yes?’ said Ridcully.
‘No.’
‘I suppose we’d have settled down, had children, grandchildren, that sort of thing …’
Granny shrugged. It was the sort of thing romantic idiots said. But there was something in the air tonight …
‘What about the fire?’ she said.
‘What fire?’
‘Swept through our house just after we were married. Killed us both.’
‘What fire? I don’t know anything about any fire?’
Granny turned around.
‘Of course not! It didn’t happen. But the point is, it might have happened. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened. You might think something’d be good, but for all you know it could have turned out horrible. You can’t say “If only I’d …” because you could be wishing for anything. The point is, you’ll never know. You’ve gone past. So there’s no use thinking about it. So I don’t.’ — Terry Pratchet
A popular matephor, but wrong. Nature does not sit out there (wherever that is), like a joint of meat, waiting to be carved up and served up. Nor are we separate from nature, hovering over it looking for the joins. Nature prods us and we prod it back. Interaction, all the time. Nothing is possible without it.We carve up nature — Apustimelogist
It’s pretty much inevitable that we will articulate our research in terms of that model. And it is sensible to take what we do understand and try to apply it to things we don’t understand. Plato was not an idiot to try and apply the mathematical models that he did understand to the empirical reality that he did not understand. We can’t even say that he was wrong, since we continue to do the same thing. It was his implementation that was problematic.neurons work like efficient coding. — Apustimelogist
The problem arises because people love to move from “if p, then q.” to “p”. Perhaps there ought to be a formal fallacy, which I would dub “suppressing the antecedent”. Certainly, in Toulmin's terms, we can assert that suppressing the antecedent results in an unwarranted assertion.But only if. — Banno
I’m afraid my memory fails me. I know there is such a story, but I can’t remember the details. Could you remind me of the details of this story?The same answer the Spartans gave Athens — Banno
The trouble is this: at the point of conception, there is no individual that can become anything. The possibility (even probability) that an individual can become (grow) does indeed arise at that point. But an acorn is not an oak-tree; it is the possibility of an oak-tree. An egg is not a bird; it is the prospect of a bird. After the acorn has sprouted or the egg has hatched, we can look back and say that acorn (now gone) was the origin of this tree (now present) and so on. It goes back to Ryle and the battle of Waterloo.So again, it at the point of the conception of a specific gametes at a point in time and space whereby this individual can become the range of possibilities for that individual (including the actual person that is looking back at his life), and not any time before or after. — schopenhauer1
I agree with that, in a way, and that's where possible worlds could be helpful because it could enable us to take into account what else, apart from the stated counterfactual supposition, would have to be different as well. (Though, of course, Putnam and others frequently rule that interesting and helpful possibility out so that their thought experiments can drive us to the conclusion that they hope for.)You can’t say “If only I’d …” because you could be wishing for anything. The point is, you’ll never know. You’ve gone past. So there’s no use thinking about it. So I don’t.’
— Terry Pratchet
Counterfactuals are recondite. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened. — Banno
Counterfactuals are recondite. You can’t say “if this didn’t happen then that would have happened” because you don’t know everything that might have happened.
Pratchett, Terry. Lords And Ladies: (Discworld Novel 14) (Discworld series) (pp. 162-163). Transworld. Kindle Edition. — Banno
trivial because there is no objective fact of the matter that the possibilities belong to a single individual. At the same time there is the strange counterexample of two possible world where everything in someone's life was the same except for the fact that in one world that individual had been conceived with different gamete that had identical genetic information. The difference the gamete brings here then seems about as significant as if one day that person had decided to put on a different pair of socks. You could say that the person is not the same but given that everything else in the world is identical, surely there is claim to say that this is a version of that person in another world. Looking at your Ryle considerations, in general I think often there is no fact of the matter about what makes these counterfactuals the case. We infer that things could have been otherwise purely through our ability to imagine things and there seems no bounds on what could have been the case without having to place an artificial restriction on what seems plausible or not. There's nothing to substantiate these. — Apustimelogist
Part of the point of this is that as things grow new possibilities arise. Neither egg, nor caterpillar, nor chrysalis can possibly fly. The possibility only arises at the last stage. Young children cannot reach the top shelf. It is not possible. Ten years later, they can – it has become possible. When people go to school, some of them can read and some of them can’t. After some time, most people will have learnt and it has become possible for them to read. Why on earth do you think that all the possibilities of my life only arise at the moment of conception? — Ludwig V
Could you remind me of the details of this story? — Ludwig V
A popular matephor, but wrong. Nature does not sit out there (wherever that is), like a joint of meat, waiting to be carved up and served up. Nor are we separate from nature, hovering over it looking for the joins. Nature prods us and we prod it back. Interaction, all the time. Nothing is possible without it. — Ludwig V
It goes back to the question whether we can say that computer calculates or speaks. Unlike Searle (if I understand him right) I think we not only do say that but that it is not a mistake to do so.
Nonetheless, I’m sure that in the end, we will have to recognize the limitations of this model/metaphor, if only so that we can get round them. — Ludwig V
Its not trivial how to objectively construe those consequences as a self-contained identities with continuity over time amidst changes. — Apustimelogist
Thanks for that. The Spartans always prided themselves on being laconic. I see the point now. The exchange took place in 346 BCE. Sadly, Philip proceeded to invade Laconia, devastate much of it and eject the Spartans from various parts of it. (See Wikipedia article on him).it was Philip of Macedon, apparently, who on conquering southern Greece sent a message to Sparta — Banno
What do you mean on this bit? — Apustimelogist
WIkipedia - Information processing theoryThe information processing theory simplified is comparing the human brain to a computer or basic processor. It is theorized that the brain works in a set sequence, as does a computer. The sequence goes as follows, "receives input, processes the information, and delivers an output".
Simply Psychology - information processingFor example, the eye receives visual information and codes information into electric neural activity, which is fed back to the brain where it is “stored” and “coded.” This information can be used by other parts of the brain relating to mental activities such as memory, perception, and attention. The output (i.e., behavior) might be, for example, to read what you can see on a printed page.
What you don't seem to recognize is that whether any slight change means that the causal-historical events cannot result in me existing is a decision taken by you. If you check the detail, you will find that differences in the 98% of our DNA that is, as they say politely, non-coding, will make no difference to the outcome. Which other changes make a difference is something we have to assess on a case-by-case basis - brown eyes rather than blue eyes are unlikely to count.Ok well, Im saying what is relevant is the causal-historical event whereby if there was any slight change to that event, there could not in any possibility be you. — schopenhauer1
The outline of the process is clear enough, and I think it is true that the spatio-temporal and causal history of the body is an important element in our identity. But there's a disagreement about how that is described. It seems to me unlikely that will be resolved any time soon. But one lives in hope.But again, I think we agree on what is happening here physically. — Apustimelogist
I don't understand you at all. Before conception, there were many possibilities of many conceptions, some of which would have resulted in someone much like me. So what you say here is simply false.Before conception, there wouldn't even have been this possibility of the "you" looking back now to begin with. — schopenhauer1
I don't see a problem in saying that I might have been born with fair hair and blue eyes. If I had been, it would have been because of a variation in my DNA. Other possibilities would be more problematic.Ok well, Im saying what is relevant is the causal-historical event whereby if there was any slight change to that event, there could not in any possibility be you. It would be another person, if another person at all was born from the same parents. — schopenhauer1
My remark about recognising the limitations of the model is based on two issues. First, all this simply assumes that we can count a causal process as a cognitive or symbolic activity. But there's an issue about whether this is legitimate. Second, the example is fascinating because it simply ignores the so-called "hard problem". — Ludwig V
What you don't seem to recognize is that whether any slight change means that the causal-historical events cannot result in me existing is a decision taken by you. If you check the detail, you will find that differences in the 98% of our DNA that is, as they say politely, non-coding, will make no difference to the outcome. Which other changes make a difference is something we have to assess on a case-by-case basis - brown eyes rather than blue eyes are unlikely to count. — Ludwig V
I don't understand you at all. Before conception, there were many possibilities of many conceptions, some of which would have resulted in someone much like me. So what you say here is simply false. — Ludwig V
I don't see a problem in saying that I might have been born with fair hair and blue eyes. If I had been, it would have been because of a variation in my DNA. Other possibilities would be more problematic. — Ludwig V
But an acorn is not an oak-tree; it is the possibility of an oak-tree. — Ludwig V
My remark about recognising the limitations of the model is based on two issues. First, all this simply assumes that we can count a causal process as a cognitive or symbolic activity. But there's an issue about whether this is legitimate. Second, the example is fascinating because it simply ignores the so-called "hard problem". — Ludwig V
Fair enough. I notice that many people have no problem speaking of brain-states as symbols of representations. But a symbol is always a symbol of something and a representation is always a representation of something. But in the case of mental states, we have no access to the "something" in either case.I wouldn't say efficient coding necessarily entails that kind of idea and my views of the brain and mind don't hinge strongly on symbol or representation. — Apustimelogist
Yes, quite so. This is why I started speaking about life-cycles. Then I can reconcile the fact that some states and processes that are not a person (such as DNA) are part of the processes that you are talking about.They are linked as phases of a particular process of growth and transformation; a unique history so to speak. — Janus
Yes, that is often committed. But that fallacy is the product of a complex structure of ideas, which may change. Newton posited gravity as an essential part of his theory, in spite of the fact that such a concept violated the then-orthodox ideas of causality and (whether this was him or not, I don't know) redefined what physical/material means. So what looks to us like illegitimate mix-and-match could be abandoned. I think it needs to be. The short version of this is that the "hard problem" is the result of the way that various concepts are defined. No solution is possible. It follows that the definitions need to change.You rightly pointed out that fallacy here, something akin to a homunculus fallacy. — schopenhauer1
I understand that is your proposition. What you don't seem to have noticed is that the status of those proposition is your decision. You treat them as "hinge" for the debate - everything turns round them.Rather, causal-history is essential to that identity, because it is necessary. Any other causal-history is someone else. — schopenhauer1
That depends on how you define that person's identity. I agree that, given that I have brown eyes, it is not now possible for me to have blue eyes. But I might have developed blue eyes at some point in the past and if that had happened, it would not now be possible for me to have had brown eyes. You are suppressing the antecedent in Kripke's proof.Now, I think this is just false. Whatever sperm or egg was fertilized, that conception could not have led to the person presently looking back on their life. — schopenhauer1
That depends on how you define that person's identity. I agree that, given that I have brown eyes, it is not now possible for me to have blue eyes. But I might have developed blue eyes at some point in the past and if that had happened, it would not now be possible for me to have had brown eyes. You are suppressing the antecedent in Kripke's proof. — Ludwig V
OK. Forget the business about DNA. There are many people in my life who I meet only sporadically. I don't know what happens to them when I'm not there; I may or may not have sporadic second-hand information about what has happened to them. When I meet them, how do I know they are the same person? (You can stipulate, if you like, that I assume that there is, in fact, a continuous causal history covering the time when I was not there. I will stipulate that I don't know what that history is.)Then you aren’t getting me because you’re focused on the genetics and not the causal history part which is uniquely an event that is tied to the person — schopenhauer1
I thought you were saying that I am over-focused on gametes, yet here they are again, front and centre stage.No that other set of gametes won’t do. This one only does. Otherwise, no you. — schopenhauer1
We clearly have the same approach to this. I just have one question. Surely, one has an identity from the moment one has a constitution, even if one's identity changes and develops over time?When one is born, one is potential constitution and identity is its evolutionary process of an extended life moving through its context. — boagie
OK. Forget the business about DNA. There are many people in my life who I meet only sporadically. I don't know what happens to them when I'm not there; I may or may not have sporadic second-hand information about what has happened to them. When I meet them, how do I know they are the same person? (You can stipulate, if you like, that I assume that there is, in fact, a continuous causal history covering the time when I was not there. I will stipulate that I don't know what that history is.)
No that other set of gametes won’t do. This one only does. Otherwise, no you.
— schopenhauer1
I thought you were saying that I am over-focused on gametes, yet here they are again, front and centre stage. — Ludwig V
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