Our ordinary perceptions, and against these the seeing things indirectly through tinted glasses, distorting mirrors, telescopes, radar, periscopes and so on make sense. — Janus

This is answering the wrong question: "what is the relationship between the world and the organism's body?" This can be direct, or indirect, per your examples. But this is trivial.

The problem of perception asks, "what is the relationship between perception and the world". In the indirect realist answer, there is an indirection in addition to the (potential) indirection you mention.

Even though the same word "see" is used, these are not the same operations. We don't see our visual representations in the same way we see objects. Rather, we can choose to attend to the visual representation itself, instead of attending to the object it represents. — hypericin

Wouldn't the position of the indirect realist be that we can only "attend to" (or "see") visual representations and are unable to choose otherwise? That is, the indirect realist can only ever directly "experience" or "attend to" or "see" representations and can never directly see objects.

Even if our eyes were windows, direct passthroughs to some sort of humonculus, they would still introduce bias by being only on the front of our heads. We'd see the world differently if we had eyes on our hands for instance. Surveillance cameras can introduce this same sort of bias into court cases by only recording from one perspective.

The question of bias seems like one that goes all the way down. It even shows up in basic chemical reactions. Physicists have moved to defining physical systems in terms of all the information required to fully describe them — all the differences that make a difference. But which ontic differences make a discernible difference depends on the context. Enzymes tend to treat isotopes as identical for example. In that context, the extra neutrons might as well not be there; it's akin to the human blindspot or our inability to see UV light.

With things like Rovelli's relational quantum mechanics you get a view of nature where context seems to be an essential element of "what exists" to some degree. But then I'd argue that the direct/indirect distinction is based on a false intuition about what a "direct" interaction could be.

But then I'd argue that the direct/indirect distinction is based on a false intuition about what a "direct" interaction could be. — Count Timothy von Icarus

For me, it's really simple: when I was a little kid, I thought I opened my eyes and there was just -the world-. Later, I learned that I open my eyes and light hits my retina and my retina sends signals to my brain and my brain does a whole lot of stuff and crafts my visual experience.

The former view point is what I now reject. My experience, of sight or of smell and so on, is an experience entirely created inside my head. The data for the experience comes from outside, but the experience is crafted inside. And that's why I don't agree with "we experience reality as it is ".

This is answering the wrong question: "what is the relationship between the world and the organism's body?" This can be direct, or indirect, per your examples. But this is trivial.

It isn’t trivial if perception involves the body. If perception involves the senses, and the senses are in direct contact with the rest of the world, there is less and less room for the indirect realist’s intermediary.

And why does that mean the scientific understanding of perception is incorrect? I'm pretty sure the scientific understanding of perception is aware of these illusions, these distortions. — flannel jesus

I haven't said the scientific understanding of perception is incorrect. I've said that if the assumption is that perception as such distorts reality then the scientific understanding of perception, which is itself based on perception, cannot be trusted. To trust it and base arguments on it, would on that assumption, be a performative contradiction.

I am at al loss here as I don't know what you are trying to say.

Wouldn't the position of the indirect realist be that we can only "attend to" (or "see") visual representations and are unable to choose otherwise? That is, the indirect realist can only ever directly "experience" or "attend to" or "see" representations and can never directly see objects. — Luke

No, this is a misconception. We see objects, just indirectly. Just as in another sense of indirection we see objects in a mirror. We can choose to attend to objects, or to their visual representation itself (with difficulty, since we are so accustomed to attending to objects).

There is nothing problematic about attending to things that are only available indirectly. When reading you attend to words and ideas, even though only glyphs on a page are directly available. When watching a movie you are attending to characters and action in a fictional world, even though only flickering images in your room are directly available.

That is, the indirect realist can only ever directly "experience" or "attend to" or "see" representations and can never directly see objects.
— Luke

No, this is a misconception. We see objects, just indirectly. — hypericin

That's what I said.

Indirect realists claim that we see objects indirectly because we can only see their visual representations.

We can choose to attend to objects, or to their visual representation itself — hypericin

You cannot attend either to objects or to their visual representation when you can only see their visual representation.

Indirect realists claim that we see objects indirectly because we can only see their visual representations. — Luke

We can only directly "see" (I don't like this ambiguous usage of "see", I prefer "experience".)

You cannot attend either to objects or to their visual representation when you can only see their visual representation. — Luke

Not true. First, to the indirect realist we see objects in the everyday sense. It's just that everyday seeing involves indirection. Second, indirection does not preclude attention. Again, let's go to the example of a book. When reading a book, do you attend only to the physical shapes of letters on the page? No, you probably never do, and instead attend to words, sentences, and above all their meaning. Even though, only those shapes are directly available to you (I'm traveling in Taiwan atm, and this fact is painfully clear). Anything more you get from the book is your mental (re)construction.

I think this is a pretty good analogy to the indirect realist perspective.

To trust it and base arguments on it, would on that assumption, be a performative contradiction. — Janus

I agree.

Both direct and indirect realists of course accept the account of perception provided by science. The difference is not one of fact, so much as of expression; that is, it is a philosophical difference.

I've said that if the assumption is that perception as such distorts reality then the scientific understanding of perception, which is based on perception, cannot be trusted. — Janus

Ok well the scientific understanding of perception is very aware of the illusions I mentioned, so does that mean science is inherently self refuting?

Ok well the scientific understanding of perception is very aware of the illusions I mentioned, so does that mean science is inherently self refuting? — flannel jesus

Not the science, but the assumption that you never see the world, only illusions and delusions while referring to science as if it would support the assumption. It doesn't.

For example, you see a bent straw in a glass of water because you see it as it really is under conditions as they really are: a straight straw bent by refraction. If you never see the straw, then neither you nor the science would have a clue of what is seen, nor what is going on under those conditions.

I'd say that the science of perception supports the converse assumption that we do see the world as it really is, including optical illusions under various conditions.

I am at al loss here as I don't know what you are trying to say. — Janus

The indirection you mention happens, but it does not seem interesting or relevant to the problem of perception. The interesting part happens when sense data arrives at the organism's body, not before. The indirection in indirect realism happens in addition to the indirection you described.

What about the other illusion i mentioned? The one that doesn't involve a physical change of light, and must only happen in the brain.

I'd say that the science of perception supports the converse assumption that we do see the world as it really is, including optical illusions under various conditions. — jkop

Yep. But I don't think we need the "really". We (sometimes, just for Flannel) see the world as it is.

we do? https://images.app.goo.gl/cD15bqprQLBHiYek9

What about the other illusion i mentioned? The one that doesn't involve a physical change of light, and must only happen in the brain. — flannel jesus

Right, so the illusion doesn't involve refraction or the like, just some light that projects a grid on the retina. The grid, however, is not an ordinary object of perception but a pattern that can evoke the illusion of dots that emerge and disappear within the pattern.

As soon as you look closer, the illusion disappears, and when you relax, the illusion emerges. Not unlike a dream. In ordinary vision, however it's the other way around, when you look closer you see things more clearly. A real dot wouldn't evade observation.

The illusion is not evidence of a defective or misleading visual system but an active and working system responding to manipulation.

From manipulation of the visual system it doesn't follow that we never see things as they are. Hence the futility of arguments from illusion or hallucination against direct or naive realism.

I don't think we need the "really". — Banno

Ok :cool: I like the naive sound of it. Like 100% real.

The fact that you see things that aren't there means... you aren't just seeing raw reality as it is. That's an oversimplistic view, given these types of illusions. There's clearly *more than just reality as it is* involved in our experience of vision.

The experience is created in the brain, and isn't just a raw channel to reality-as-it-is. If it was, this illusion wouldn't work.

you aren't just seeing raw reality as it is — flannel jesus

How would you know unless you sometimes see reality as it is? You know of illusions because you sometimes see things look weird, and then find out it's because of optics or intricate patterns that mess with the ability.

All experiences are created by the brain, but objects of perception exist outside the process.

How would you know unless you sometimes see reality as it is? — jkop

we know because we know that image isn't animated. You can print it on a piece of paper and have a visual experience of seeing it wooshing around, while knowing that it's not really wooshing around.

All experiences are created by the brain — jkop

Wonderful, we agree on that very central point. That sentence is what "indirect realism" means to me.

objects of perception exist outside the process — jkop

I have no problem with this either.

we know because we know that image isn't animated. — flannel jesus

'cause no one knew about illusions before Micky Mouse.

The argument from illusion:

• We sometimes see things as other than they are,
• Therefore we never see things as they are

It is clearly invalid. Indeed, it is inept.

As has been pointed out, by myself and others, that we know we occasionally see things as other than they are implies that we know how things are, and if one accepts empiricism, that we at least occasionally see things as they are. If you insist both that the only way we know stuff is through our senses and yet that we can never see things as they are, you have some explaining to do.

Again, we can reject the juxtaposition of direct and indirect experiences entirely, and admit that we do sometimes see (hear, touch, smell...) things as they are; and that indeed this is essential in order for us to be able to recognise those occasions in which we see (hear, touch, smell...) things in the world erroneously.

We do, on occasion, see, hear, smell or touch the world as it is, and thereby make true statements about things in the world. It is true that you are now reading a sentence written by me.

And again, I commend the SEP article The Problem of Perception.

The question, now, is not so much whether to be a direct realist, but how to be one. — SEP

Ok well the scientific understanding of perception is very aware of the illusions I mentioned, so does that mean science is inherently self refuting? — flannel jesus

The science of perception doesn't claim that perception is illusory: that would be self-refuting.

:up:

I'm not sure what you are referring to when you say "the indirection I described". I don't deny that perception is a process, what I deny is that the process can coherently be thought of as inherently distortive or illusory or that what we see are representations.

I have very much enjoyed the spirited discussions going on here. But, surprising and alarming no one, I take my leave.
This has become a roundabout of unhelpful disagreements about facts, with everyone pretending to agree on the facts.

G'luck fellas :)

I've been unable to follow hypericin's account.

Take the following:

All we know directly is perception, reality itself could potentially be anything. — hypericin

I don't see him claiming we have *no* access to the world, just no direct access. Indirection still allows access to empirical facts, just not absolute certainly about those facts: everything could always be a simulation, or whatnot. But absolute certainty is overrated. — hypericin

The world could be anything, yet we somehow have access to empirical facts...?

Sure, certainty is overrated; but hereabouts, even more so, doubt. You are presently reading this sentence. An empirical fact? Call it what you will, it is... difficult... to see how it might be coherently doubted.

Sure, certainty is overrated; but hereabouts, even more so, doubt. — Banno

There's just two possibilities: absolute certainty, or the possibility of doubt. You are placing yourself in the philosophically dubious absolute certainty camp.

You are presently reading this sentence. An empirical fact? Call it what you will, it is... difficult... to see how it might be coherently doubted. — Banno

That is difficult to doubt, because I experienced it directly. What can be coherently doubted is the realism; in principle, I might be in a very vivid dream. In practice, I don't waste my time on such doubts. But because we don't have direct access to reality, the door is open to this kind of doubt. Our experiences are multiply realizable: the familiar realist account might be (and probably is) true, or, we might be dreaming, living in a simulation, and so on.

This situation is not unique to perception. Take the case of other people. Since we only have direct access to people's behaviors, their inner lives can only be deduced, never known with certainty. Our loved ones might be who we think they are, or, they might be p-zombies, aliens inhabiting human bodies, or malignant psychopaths feigning normalcy. Any of these can in theory realize the behaviors we know with certainty.

The point is not to seriously entertain these possibilities, but to recognize the epistemic limitations imposed by our indirect relationships with the world.

There's just two possibilities: absolute certainty, or the possibility of doubt. — hypericin

Why are you so certain of this?

I put it to you that you know you are not having a vivid dream - you really do not want to admit to be dreaming of me, do you?

I put it to you that you also sometimes know how things are - not all the time, and sometimes you are indeed wrong, but sometimes, you get it right - which is to say, you occasionally speak the truth. I hope you will agree with me at least on this.

Whether that amounts to having "direct access to reality" or not is by the by.

So far as other people are concerned, if you doubt their existence, then they should not stop you walking naked through the local shopping mall. Their gaze can be quite convincing.

The point is not to seriously entertain these possibilities... — hypericin

Indeed. So, don't.

Perhaps the direct/indirect framework is misleading you.

First, to the indirect realist we see objects in the everyday sense. It's just that everyday seeing involves indirection. — hypericin

I agree that everyday seeing involves indirection. However, the position of the indirect realist is not merely that perception involves indirection, such that we can choose to perceive either directly or indirectly. The position of the indirect realist is that all perception is indirect and that we cannot perceive the world directly.

Perhaps this is the source of much of the disagreement. The debate is a factual one; about whether we do or do not perceive the world directly. The direct realist position is that we do perceive the world directly; the indirect realist position is that we do not.

However, there is also the question of whether it is possible or impossible to perceive the world directly. Indirect realism entails the impossibility; that we cannot perceive the world directly. Direct realism entails not only the possibility but also the necessity; that we can and must perceive the world directly.

Therefore, given the factual nature of the debate, direct realists cannot make any compromise that, although we perceive the world directly, it is possible that we may also perceive it indirectly at times. Likewise, indirect realists cannot make any compromise that, although we perceive the world indirectly, it is possible that we may also perceive it directly at times.