…..it doesn't follow that experience is in the brain. — Janus
The implication being, it is possible experience is not in the brain, which is the same as outside the brain, or in a place where the brain is not. If one maintains that he experiences things in the world, in conjunction with the implication his experiences are not in the brain, and, if he maintains all his experiences belong to him alone, then it is necessarily the case he himself is not in his own brain.
I’m sure you do not hold with that perfectly justified logical deduction, or at least its conclusion. So which is the false premise? — Mww
claimed (1) that everyday material objects, such as caterpillars and cadillacs, have mind-independent existence (the “realism” part); (2) that our visual perception of these material objects is not mediated by the perception of some other entities, such as sense-data (the “direct” part); and (3) these objects possess all the features that we perceive them to have (the “naïve” part)
— https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0340.xml
The issue is that people will easily reject 3, many will reject 2, few will reject 1. — Lionino
Why would the brain represent the world to you if you weren’t to view the representation? — NOS4A2
The implication being, it is possible experience is not in the brain, which is the same as outside the brain, or in a place where the brain is not. — Mww
Experience exists within the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, therefore distal objects do not exist within experience. — Michael
Most of that capacity is actualized without the involvement of phenomenal consciousness, so it's not clear to me what this direct realist is saying exactly. — frank
While many elements of our perceptual capacities are indeed actualized without conscious attention or at a sub-personal level, this doesn't undermine the direct realist view. The key point is that perception is an active, embodied process that unfolds over time, not just a matter of passively receiving and internally representing sensory inputs. — Pierre-Normand
Consider the example of walking in a city. As we walk, we periodically glance at the ground ahead to guide our footsteps, while also attending to the store fronts and other features of the environment. The character of our phenomenology shifts as our attention moves from one aspect of the world to another. This highlights how perception is a dynamic process of engaging with and exploring the environment, not just a static representation in the brain. — Pierre-Normand
The brain is certainly crucial in enabling this dynamic interaction, but it is the whole brain-body-environment system that constitutes the basis of perceptual experience. The various neural subsystems - from the cerebellum to the sensory and motor cortices - work in concert with the body's sensorimotor capacities to enable us to grasp and respond to the affordances of our environment. — Pierre-Normand
So while much of this process may occur without conscious attention, this doesn't mean that perception is just a matter of what's represented in the brain, as the indirect realist view suggests. The direct realist alternative is that perception is a matter of the whole embodied organism dynamically attuning to and engaging with its environment over time. — Pierre-Normand
The brain is certainly crucial in enabling this dynamic interaction, but it is the whole brain-body-environment system that constitutes the basis of perceptual experience. The various neural subsystems - from the cerebellum to the sensory and motor cortices - work in concert with the body's sensorimotor capacities to enable us to grasp and respond to the affordances of our environment. — Pierre-Normand
All this affordance stuff is still going on inside our heads. We could be brains in vats artificially having our sensory receptors stimulated and experience the same things as if outside of the vat. — Apustimelogist
The learning of the causal connection between them is then done by the neurons in our head. — Apustimelogist
models that are populated by sensory input? — frank
I've taken up the "direct" side, but only lightly. Others' have been doing the heavy lifting. — Moliere
So you don't believe the brain in a vat could have the same experiences? — Apustimelogist
I am not exactly sure what you mean by this but the picture I was painting I wasn't necessarily implying anything about representation. I am a bit agnostic about representation in the sense that I don't think you need the concept of representation to explain how the brain works but I am not necessarily adverse to using this concept, especially as it is so intuitive. I just am not necessarily sold on the idea of some kind of inherent orintrinsic, essentialistic representations with intentionality in the brain. Neither do I think we should take it literally when neuroscientists attribute representation to the kinds of correlations that they detect in particular experiments. — Apustimelogist
To be honest I am not entirely sure what direct realism means. — Apustimelogist
I would kind of agree with both but I don't have a strong opinion because I am disinclined against realism. I think the notion of indirect realism is kind of a functionally useful way of talking about the brain though. I feel like it is implied by models in neuroscience, even if minimally or if one doesn't want to attach too much metaphysical implication to it. — Apustimelogist
In that thought experiment the BiV has to have the same experiences. That's the whole idea. — Moliere
But that does not mean that metaphysically perception exists in the head. — Moliere
if perception is an intermediary between myself and the object, and all experience is perception rather than the object, then I'm not sure why there couldn't be another intermediary between myself and my perception -- a perception of perception. — Moliere
it could just be a direct link between me and the world. — Moliere
if you artificially stimulate sensory receptors of a brain with identical DNA to you in a way which is identical to the history of organic sensory stimulations you have personally encountered in your life, it will have the same experiences as you have had. — Apustimelogist
What is your alternative? Through an extended mind framework where the mind encompasses the body and environment, etc? — Apustimelogist
It dependa what you mean by object here. My instinct is to interpret object here as in some hypothetical object in the outside world. From my point of view, perception and myself are essentially not distinguishable. What you commonsensicallg would call your self are just sensory experiences pretty much imo. — Apustimelogist
I guess the main arguments against this is illusions and misperception. — Apustimelogist
I don't like to assign locations to things like ideas or experiences — Janus
I am no dualist, though, except when it comes to our thinking and judging. — Janus
I think I'd say perception is an activity, and just like any activity -- like nailing boards or riding a bike -- we can make mistakes. These mistakes do not imply we are separate from the world, though, but rather that we are part of a world that interacts with us (disappoints us) — Moliere
I don't think so, no. Maybe? but also maybe the only way to do so is to envat the brain in a body that lives a life. — Moliere
Banno — Moliere
I mention this because it's a contender for realism that I'm still wrapping my head around, but it's definitely different from the old in/direct debate. — Moliere
"outside world" is the part I'd question. There is no "outside" world -- the old external world of philosophy -- just as there is no "internal" world, at least metaphysically. I think these are turns of expression meaning something other than the ontological implications -- that I exist, that I interact with my perceptions and only my perceptions, and these perceptions interact with objects outside of me that I make inferences about. — Moliere
I am my perceptions, and my perceptions are of objects, and therefore there's a direct realtionship between myself (perceptions) and objects — Moliere
I think I'd say perception is an activity, and just like any activity -- like nailing boards or riding a bike -- we can make mistakes. These mistakes do not imply we are separate from the world, though, but rather that we are part of a world that interacts with us (disappoints us) — Moliere
I think the BiV is a thought experiment that updates Descartes' Evil Demon to a scientific world. — Moliere
Granting the success of the argument, my sensations are caused by an external material world. But for all the argument shows – for all the broader argument of the Meditations shows, up to this point – my mind might be joined to a brain in a vat, rather than a full human body. This isn’t an oversight on Descartes’ part. — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/
"Expectations" in attention are mediated by the modulation of neuronal membrane activity - where is the representation explicitly in this other than a useful metaphor? — Apustimelogist
This kind of thinking is probably reflective of my view that I don't think representations are inherent. — Apustimelogist
I talk about neurons a lot but I think even on the level of experiences, I was convinced by the types of analyses from the likes of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations that representation cannot be pinned down here either and experience is even somewhat mechanistic as a flow of one experience to the next which can sometimes seem completely involuntary, unanticipated, inexplicable. — Apustimelogist
The more I think about it, the less I think representationalism makes sense. — frank
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