It is only when the philosophers rule and take on the business of the city that the city stays out of his business. — Fooloso4

Plato was well aware that the politics of the soul and the politics of the city are not the same in all respects. — Fooloso4

But the city has no business of its own, or rather the business of the city is the sum of everybody's business. So when the philosopher takes on the business of the city, he takes on the business of everybody. That's because each person's business is dependent on other people's business and other people's business depends on each person's business. Interdependence, not agglomeration. This applies also to individuals and their parts.
He thinks that analysing something consists entirely of taking it pieces, and doesn't realize that it is necessary to understand the relationship between them. Agglomeration is all he knows.

Had you thought what life would be like for the ordinary people in his city? It's a tyranny. From their point of view, it would be a Machiavellian society run by force and deception. It could count as a benevolent tyranny if only he could think of how things would look from the point of view of the subject citizens. But he can't do that, because he can't recognize most of them as people, because the elements of people are not people and he's stuck in his analogy. The relationship between a citizen and the city is not like the relationship between someone's appetites and them.

He seduces us by telling the story from a stand-point of someone who is not a citizen of his city and focusing on the philosopher, so we imagine his city from the point of view of the philosopher and we follow his point of view. But the people who live in the city have their own points of view and that matters more than Plato's greater good.

A consistent theme throughout the Dialogues is that the best relationship amongst these parts is the source of virtue and true happiness. The pursuit of that relationship is deemed more worthy than the expression of traditional norms. — Paine

The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration.

And does Socrates/Plato know who the best people are? He doesn't even trust his own philosophers, since he expects to foist his "noble lie" (a mistranslation if ever there was one) even on them.

The oracle did not say that Socrates was the wisest, it said that no one was wiser, that is, that others might be as wise as him. — Fooloso4

True There might indeed be others as wise as him, but only if they know that they don't know. But they don't know that, so they are less wise than him. And has he spoken to everyone, to make sure that there is no-one apart from him who knows that they don't know?

But the city has no business of its own, or rather the business of the city is the sum of everybody's business. — Ludwig V

The business of the city, over and above that of the citizens, is the good of the whole. This is why the philosopher, contrary to his own interests, is compelled to return to the cave.

This applies also to individuals and their parts. — Ludwig V

Here too it is the good of the whole and not the sum of the parts.

Agglomeration is all he knows. — Ludwig V

Just the opposite. It is question of who or what rules. In the just city and soul reason rules. In other cities and souls some other part, spirited or appetitive, leads.

Had you thought what life would be like for the ordinary people in his city? — Ludwig V

First, the city in speech is intended to make it easier to see what justice is. It is not intended to be a blueprint for an actual city. Such a city is neither possible nor desirable. More on that in a moment. Second, the ruling class, followed by the spirited, are the least free. The appetitive class is the most free to mind its own business.

So why so much time and effort painting the picture of a city that is neither possible nor desirable? Because, contrary to some interpretations, the argument is anti-ideological. The first city that Socrates makes is rejected as too austere. It is, Glaucon complains, a city fit for pigs. (372b) And so, Socrates revises it to make a city more suitable for human beings by conventional standards. In other words, we cannot start with a city as it should be, even if that is what is best. We must start with human beings as they are. Analogously, we cannot start with human beings as they should be ideally if they are to be the best human beings, but with human beings as they are.

The question of what it would take for a city or soul to be truly just leads to consideration of both the possibility and desirability of such a city or soul. Actual cities and souls, even the best of them, must be a compromise. But the city Socrates makes as a compromise with its luxuries and relishes is still not a city we would wish to live in. It is, in fact, in some ways a less desirable city then the first city.

And does Socrates/Plato know who the best people are? He doesn't even trust his own philosophers ... — Ludwig V

You have conflated two very different things, the people of an actual city and the mythological philosophers of the Republic. It is not that he does not trust these philosophers, it is that in order for them to become the guardians of the city as part of their education they must believe the story. The truth is, all societies have their stories, their myths, their lies.

"noble lie" (a mistranslation if ever there was one) — Ludwig V

This is how the term is translated in most, including what are generally considered our best translations. While it is true that the term lie is not found in that phrase, it is preceded by:

we might contrive one of those lies we were referring to earlier

the reference is to 382a

In case anyone too quickly concludes that my interpretation of Plato is an idiosyncratic distortion of the text, I happened upon this today while reading about Thucydides:

Read in light of Thucydides, the Republic emerges as a cautionary tale regarding the susceptibility of men, living in the midst of great political and moral decay, to grand visions of political and personal transformation, to redemptive and salvific projects both in this life and the next. It is often remarked that the Republic is a book on the limits of politics. This is indeed the case, as Glaucon accepts time and again Socrates’ shocking solutions to the perennial problems of politics. We come to see thereby that, though political judgment admits of better and worse, though there are real goods and harms in how we handle these problems, nevertheless we must on some level learn to live with them.

(https://alexpriou.substack.com/p/platos-republic-in-its-thucydidean context)

I feared we might end up with a discussion that is more than I can handle right now. I would have to re-read the Republic first in any case. Some comments:-

In case anyone too quickly concludes that my interpretation of Plato is an idiosyncratic distortion of the text, I happened upon this today while reading about Thucydides: — Fooloso4

I hope I never accused you of being idiosyncratic or distorting anything. I thought it was a question of how we interpret the text. But it is true that the line between interpreting the text and what the text actually says is uncomfortably fine. Which is not to say that this interpretation is not of great interest, though I think you will admit it is not the traditional interpretation, or at least not the interpretation I was given when I learnt about all this.

On the question of the translation "noble lie", I knew, of course that it is the standard translation. I was questioning whether it was appropriate. There is a case for it, especially in 382, justifying something useful if it is "serviceable" (in Burnet's translation). Whether, and how far, that argument works is the issue.

But the city Socrates makes as a compromise with its luxuries and relishes is still not a city we would wish to live in. It is, in fact, in some ways a less desirable city then the first city. — Fooloso4

I could agree with that.
I'm not sure about the relationship between justice in the ideal city and in actual cities. But you are right, that Plato's project is not to outline either an ideal or an actual one. It is stated, for example, in 382:-

“I will tell you,” I said: “there is a justice of one man, we say, and, I suppose, also of an entire city.” “Assuredly,” said he. “Is not the city larger than the man?” “It is larger,” he said. “Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend.

Part of the project (though not explicitly stated) is to provide a diagnosis of the various deviant forms of the city, which he tracks back to dominance by a faction other than the rational one. What he has got right here is that when things go wrong, it is because the city is dominated by a faction.

But my objections, I would think, go deeper than that. To start with, he posits a parallel (analogy) between the structure of the person and that of the city. Each has an appetitive element &c. But his analysis is presented as if were a dissection. But insofar as it is correct, or not wrong, it is not a dissection. It is not a question of parts parts of the city or parts of the person. Even it were, the relationship between a city and its citizens and a person and their parts (I'm thinking mainly of physical parts here) is not the same. I'm not sure how far the theory of Forms is involved in this, but it seems plausible to suppose that it is.

The business of the city, over and above that of the citizens, is the good of the whole. — Fooloso4

The parts of a person are not people and have no rights of their own. I am obligated to my body, not for its own sake, but for my sake. The parts of a city are people and they do have rights of their own. The city is obligated to its people, for their own sake, not merely for the role they play in society. There is no business of the city over and above the good of its citizens. If it cannot maintain or improve that, it has no business.
Here's the thing. Each person (even, I think, on Plato's own account) is complete, with an element (if a weak one) of reason, "thumos" and appetite. So the city cannot (without injustice) treat anyone as if they were pure appetite or pure anything else.

It is question of who or what rules. In the just city and soul reason rules. In other cities and souls some other part, spirited or appetitive, leads. — Fooloso4

What matters more is the system and how it works - or, better, how the citizens (including the rulers) make it work.

I think you will admit it is not the traditional interpretation — Ludwig V

Yes, but the "traditional" interpretation continues to change. Two quick examples of recent changes. There is now a greater awareness and serious attention to what the Phaedrus calls “logographic necessity” (264b). The dialogues are not doctrines surrounded by window dressing. The dramatic setting and action are important, not to be ignored or abstracted from when Plato is discussed in terms of theories and doctrines. There is also a shift in attention from the supposed period during which a dialogue was written to the dramatic time in which the dialogue takes place. Perhaps most significantly, consideration should be given to the fact that the Parmenides takes place when Socrates was young. Typically the focus is on whether this is a middle or late period dialogue with the assumption that this marks a change in Plato's views of the Forms. Rather than a change in Plato's view, the dramatic setting implies that what Plato has Socrates say about Forms in the dialogues was from early on informed by what he learned from Parmenides in that imaginary dialogue.

Whether, and how far, that argument works is the issue. — Ludwig V

If noble lie is accepted as the correct translation then the issue is whether and why such a lie is needed.

To start with, the theory of forms sits in the background ... — Ludwig V

I do not see it as "the theory of forms" but as the problem of knowledge of justice, or, rather our lack of such knowledge. Unless what justice is is something known then we are in the realm of opinion. This is our natural starting point. The task then is to try and determine what seems to be the best opinion when it comes to matters of justice and the just life.

But his analysis is presented as if were a dissection. — Ludwig V

If I understand you correctly the point is that there is no clear divisions. I agree with that, but I think Plato points to that problem rather than maintaining the divisions. A world of Forms is not the world we live in. A world populated by people who are either rational or spirited or appetitive is not the world we live in. Our world is, as Socrates says, messy, things are mixed and blended.

The parts of a person are not people and have no rights of their own. — Ludwig V

He is, of course, speaking metaphorically. But we are often at odds with ourselves. If I want to be healthy I should not sit on the couch eating cake. I might claim that I am free to do this or not do it, and even though there is a part of me that does not want to do it, I may end sitting on the couch eating cake anyway.

The city is obligated to its people, for their own sake, not merely for the role they play in society. — Ludwig V

That is the view of modern liberalism. We might endorse and defend this view, but it is a matter of political philosophy not a matter of fact or even settled agreement. It is not a one way street. There are things we owe to the city.

There is no business of the city over and above the good of its citizens — Ludwig V

As individuals? What stands as the good of the people? What I might regard as good for me might not be what you regard as good for you.

The dialogues are not doctrines surrounded by window dressing. The dramatic setting and action are important, not to be ignored or abstracted from when Plato is discussed in terms of theories and doctrines. — Fooloso4

I'm all in favour of that. I was delighted when that approach began, though I have lost touch somewhat with how it has developed. It was a relief to be relieved of the chronology question. It was never clear enough to be helpful and the arguments for it were always suspiciously circular.

If I understand you correctly the point is that there is no clear divisions. I agree with that, but I think Plato points to that problem rather than maintaining the divisions. A world of Forms is not the world we live in. A world populated by people who are either rational or spirited or appetitive is not the world we live in. Our world is, as Socrates says, messy, things are mixed and blended. — Fooloso4

Well, that goes at least part of the way towards what I'm hammering at.

If noble lie is accepted as the correct translation then the issue is whether and why such a lie is needed. — Fooloso4

No, it's not that simple. We have to re-calibrate our view of Plato's view of the value of truth. You might say it is a welcome element of pragmatism, but that implies quite a change.

I do not see it as "the theory of forms" but as the problem of knowledge of justice, or, rather our lack of such knowledge. Unless what justice is is something known then we are in the realm of opinion. This is our natural starting point. The task then is to try and determine what seems to be the best opinion when it comes to matters of justice and the just life. — Fooloso4

I'm not sure I quite understand that. I think that the criteria for a just society will not be the same as the criteria for a just person. I think that the analogy between society and people is tempting, but radically misleading - just as the analogy of the ship of state is tempting but misleading.

But we are often at odds with ourselves. If I want to be healthy I should not sit on the couch eating cake. I might claim that I am free to do this or not do it, and even though there is a part of me that does not want to do it, I may end sitting on the couch eating cake anyway. — Fooloso4

Tell me about it. But if there is a part of me that wants to do it, and another part that does, I am not in conflict with myself, and the problem is misrepresented. Although the temptation to describe the unwanted behaviour as not really me is almost irresistible.

There are things we owe to the city. — Fooloso4

Sure. But the city as an institution has neither heart nor soul of its own; it is what it is because of the people who live in and by it. People are an end in themselves; the city is not, nor is any other social institution.

As individuals? What stands as the good of the people? What I might regard as good for me might not be what you regard as good for you. — Fooloso4

What stands as the good of the people is a difficult question. I have another - what good is a good of the people that benefits no-one? Can anything that benefits only some of the people count as the good of the people?
It can be better for one of us to die - even unwillingly - if it saves many other lives. But that's not the real problem. The puzzle is why people will sometimes put the good of the city above their own or anyone else's good.
What I admit is a difficult problem that people often identify with an institution, so that they feel that they have benefited if the institution benefits. It's not exactly selfish, but it's not exactly altruistic either. Yet it seems to be an inescapable part of living in a society. The idea that we can have a neat division between individual rights and obligations and the rights and obligations of an institution is quite wrong, because we are inherently social creatures. Plato's argument - and I think the standard argument in ancient Greece - was that we cannot be self-sufficient, but it is more than that.

We have to re-calibrate our view of Plato's view of the value of truth. — Ludwig V

I do not think it is a question of the value of truth but of the problem of certain political truths around the natural interest in what one's own versus those of the city. The truth may be that about certain things at certain times sometimes it is better to lie. It is not simply a matter of pragmatism but of the good.

I think that the criteria for a just society will not be the same as the criteria for a just person. — Ludwig V

That may be, but if we do not know what justice is in the one and the other we cannot say what the criteria should be. When Socrates suggestion that:

“Then, perhaps, there would be more justice in the larger object and more easy to apprehend.

my response is: perhaps not! The opposite is likely to be the case. Unless we are very unjust we are likely to encounter more injustice in the city than in ourselves.

But if there is a part of me that wants to do it, and another part that does, I am not in conflict with myself, and the problem is misrepresented. — Ludwig V

Do you mean another part that does not? In that case you both want to do it and not do it. Isn't that a conflict?

But the city as an institution has neither heart nor soul of its own — Ludwig V

In line with the question of noble lies consider allegiance to the fatherland and/or mother earth. Patriots consider their state or country or homeland as more than just an institution. It is their own.

The puzzle is why people will sometimes put the good of the city above their own or anyone else's good. — Ludwig V

The noble lie is a solution to this puzzle. People come to believe that the good of the city is their own good. All one big happy family.

The truth may be that about certain things at certain times sometimes it is better to lie. — Fooloso4

Well, I don't subscribe to Kant's view. I guess it depends on circumstances, with a bias towards telling the truth.

The truth is, all societies have their stories, their myths, their lies. — Fooloso4

"Myth" is complicated. For me, a myth is a story that has acquired so much significance that it no longer matters much whether it is true or false. Yes, every society has those.

Do you mean another part that does not? In that case you both want to do it and not do it. Isn't that a conflict? — Fooloso4

Yes, it is. The idea of separate parts is a way of dissociating and avoiding it. But what is needed is a resolution of the conflict or at least a way of living with it.

In line with the question of noble lies consider allegiance to the fatherland and/or mother earth. Patriots consider their state or country or homeland as more than just an institution. — Fooloso4

Ah, yes, so they do. But it too often means very undesirable things, such as thinking that behaviour that would be immoral between individuals is ok between cities. Or thinking that criticism of one's city is always to be rejected. It isn't necessarily a good thing.

People come to believe that the good of the city is their own good. — Fooloso4

But is it? Anyway, their reason for believing that is not true - i.e. a bad reason.

But is it? Anyway, their reason for believing that is not true - i.e. a bad reason. — Ludwig V

What is at issue is the education of the guardians. It consists of gymnastics for the body, the proper kind of music to moderate their spiritedness, and the noble lie. They must believe that the good of the city is their own good if they are to protect it even if they die doing so. It there reason for believing is not true that is an indication that a lie is needed. A mercenary will only fight if it benefits them.

What is at issue is the education of the guardians. — Fooloso4

Why doesn't he worry about the education of everyone else?

They must believe that the good of the city is their own good if they are to protect it even if they die doing so. — Fooloso4

The best way - and the only safe way - to get them to believe that the good of the ciry is their own good is to ensure that the good of the city really is for their own good.

It there reason for believing is not true that is an indication that a lie is needed. — Fooloso4

No. It is an indication that reform of the city is needed. The lie just hides the problem.

A mercenary will only fight if it benefits them. — Fooloso4

That makes them no different from the guardians.

Apparently Daniel Dennett's sailboat was named Xanthippe.

Thanks for that snippet.

I wish we could know what lies behind it.