If the name Xanthippe was just dreamed up by Xenophon — Ludwig V

It is not a name he makes up but one he plays off of. This was and remains a common practice.

As it is, I think you are reading too much into this. — Ludwig V

Perhaps, but it may be that it is a mistake to not read into him enough. One is easily fooled by his apparent simplicity and straight forward writing style. Xenophon was once widely read but fell out of favor. Machiavelli was an exception. A great admirer of Xenophon. Both are strategic writers. Xenophon has more recently received renewed interest and attention. One area of focus is his use of humor and irony.

What I know of Xenophon doesn't suggest a man likely to make jokes of this kind. — Ludwig V

Of some other kind then? From the IEP:

In a long set-piece, Socrates is shown visiting a beautiful and famous prostitute named Theodote, and conversing with her about friendship and how to treat one’s friends. This highly interesting passage, unique in ancient philosophy in presenting a conversation between a working woman (of dubious social standing even!) and a well-known male philosopher, is full of humor and double-entendre but ends with Socrates inviting Theodote to come philosophize with him and his ‘girlfriends’ any time (Memorabilia III.xi).

That doesn't sound like he's thinking of training horses. — Ludwig V

I agree. As I pointed out from his book on horsemanship he says that the horseman should leave the training to others, but the analogy between the horse (Xanthippe) and the rider (Socrates) along with the problem of educating horses and wives holds. Antisthenes' challenge to Socrates was with regard to educating her. Socrates does not answer and tacitly affirms that she is:

... a wife who is the hardest to get along with of all the women there are ...

My suggestion is he does not answer because he cannot educate her. If they, horses and wives, are not first broken they cannot be educated.

So I don't doubt that I'm justified in disrupting their doubt. — Ludwig V

This is one thing you don't doubt. I agree. Having fought this battle many times over the years I now usually leave it to others.

You can take a horse to the water, but you can't make it drink. — Ludwig V

Or as Xenophon might have it, a wife to water. In the Oeconomicus he also makes the uses the analogy of horses and wives.

, , it remains that Xanthippes' presence was undoubted.

I also like it a lot. But commitment is tricky. I don’t think one can do it in advance. No matter what ceremony is supposed to establish the commitment, it needs to be maintained, or perhaps performed from day to day and even from hour to hour. If and when circumstances change, it may need to be renewed – life throws things you did not sign up for at you. — Ludwig V

This reminds me of Foucault, who speaks of the "art of partnership" in his Care of the Self. Foucault traces the changing ideas about marriage from the Classical writers to contemporary thinkers. One theme he develops is how the reciprocal nature of companionship leads to its own recognition of the "solitary" as a matter for care. Respect for the other strengthens the union in the business of the world as well as personally improving the life of the mate.
The book argues that the "art of partnership" has its own life in the different ethical standards it works within. But it does not live outside of those.

In terms of being a bachelor, Foucault depicts them as being less restrained than married men but still living in the fabric of the social reality continued through marital life. Not too many accounts of bachelorettes tripping the lights fantastic, however.

For what it's worth, I believe you'll find it in Bk 6 of Nichomachean Ethics. A lot of any such argument is a sort of stipulation of intuitive principles, so of course the premises are debatable. I think the general idea is that contemplation produces the most universal, principles of theory, and these are required to ground practical principles, and practical principles are required for moral actions. Therefore contemplation produces the highest principles because these are a requirement for all the other virtues. So contemplation is the highest virtue. Then, he moves to show how contemplation is consistent with "happiness" at the end of Bk 10. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thanks for the references. I knew it was in the NE but had forgotten which book(s).

My suggestion is he does not answer because he cannot educate her. If they, horses and wives, are not first broken they cannot be educated. — Fooloso4

Well, it is certainly possible that this is a Taming of the Shrew scenario. I don't know the texts well enough to argue with you.

My most recent encounter with him was reading his Apology of Socrates and finding that Socrates, in that text, says that he was feeling his age and preferred to be executed by the Athenians rather than endure the long, horrible process of dying of old age. Very different from the flim-flam that Plato treats us to. Of course, the two explanations are not totally incompatible. But the down-to-earth attitude of Xenophon's account seems to me to fit well with the Anabasis - just as the high-falutin attitude of Plato's is entirely typical of his writing. Not enough to contradict you, but enough to explain why I'm sceptical.

it remains that Xanthippes' presence was undoubted. — Banno

Do you mean that there is no doubt that Xanthippe existed? I don't know what the evidence is, I'm afraid. It is true that no-one questions it. But if it just rests on Xenophon's account, some scepticism is not unjustified.

Foucault, who speaks of the "art of partnership" in his Care of the Self. Foucault traces the changing ideas about marriage from the Classical writers to contemporary thinkers. One theme he develops is how the reciprocal nature of companionship leads to its own recognition of the "solitary" as a matter for care. Respect for the other strengthens the union in the business of the world as well as personally improving the life of the mate. — Paine

I like the idea of an art of partnership. But the themes you mention seem to me to be more about what partnership should be than what it is. Would that be unfair?

In terms of being a bachelor, Foucault depicts them as being less restrained than married men but still living in the fabric of the social reality continued through marital life. — Paine

Yes, if I've understood this right, the life of the unmarried (in the traditional view) does seem to be going on in the context of the family, hence the married life of others; it is also regarded as a stage of life, with the expectation that marriage will supervene at some point in the not-too-distant future. No doubt that was the reality for many, but one wonders whether it was for all. But then, if those who didn't fit the pattern were marginalized and forgotten, it would simply demonstrate how powerful the orthodox pattern was.

I like the idea of an art of partnership. But the themes you mention seem to me to be more about what partnership should be than what it is. Would that be unfair? — Ludwig V

Results do vary. I have had enough good fortune to say it is true. I have had enough bad fortune to deeply appreciate what "lack of care" is like. One of the virtues of Foucault's book is that he constantly attends the consequences of things going south.

There is that matter of expectation to consider regarding bachelors' options, but one interesting element of Foucault's analysis is that couples have more power than singles in shaping the possibilities in particular places. Having patrons or an institution to help a single makes a big difference.

Do you mean that there is no doubt that Xanthippe existed? — Ludwig V

No.

It is true that no-one questions it. — Ludwig V

Just that.

it remains that Xanthippes' presence was undoubted. — Banno

And, at least in the case of the Phaedo, unwanted.

My most recent encounter with him was reading his Apology of Socrates and finding that Socrates, in that text, says that he was feeling his age and preferred to be executed by the Athenians rather than endure the long, horrible process of dying of old age. Very different from the flim-flam that Plato treats us to. — Ludwig V

I think this should be looked at in light of Socrates' megalegoria, his "big talk". The Athenians intend to punish him, but in response he is in effect claiming they are doing him a favor by his not having to suffer from old age. But not everyone suffers from old age and there is no indication of decline in the case of Socrates. If there is to be a decline it will be at some time in the future, perhaps many years in the future. He also mentions being wasted by disease, which can occur at any age.

Both Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates look forward to his death.

Both Plato's and Xenophon's Socrates look forward to his death. — Fooloso4

That's perfectly true. What's interesting is the different take on the trial.

I sympathize with him. Seventy was a great age in those days. It is still well over the hill, and for most, in sight of the end. One does get more concerned and pessimistic about one's health as the years tick by.

Plato's Socrates is the founding myth of philosophy. Naturally, Plato smoothed out, - tidied up - the story and, equally naturally, I like anything that gives me a sense of something more real. Xenophon gives me that sense. So does the scene with Xanthippe at the trial.

As I said before, it's perfectly possible - even likely - that Socrates did what he did for both reasons. After all, given that they were very likely to impose impossible conditions on him even if they didn't kill him, it was win/win. It was a great opportunity to send his message to the city, and even to posterity and he wasn't that bothered about staying alive.

PS. As an example of Plato's editing of the story, why don't you read the end of the Phaedo and then look up the symptoms of hemlock poisoning?

And, at least in the case of the Phaedo, unwanted. — Fooloso4

Otherwise, by your account, Socrates actively sort out her company. Xanthippe may have been making the point that Socrates would have no further opportunity to educate his friends after the hemlock, perhaps in an attempt to have him make an effort to save himself.

Seventy isn't that bad...

Take care that it really is parsley...

I like to think that there are others reading but not commenting. — Fooloso4

I think that too. In this case however, anyone who has been introduced to philosophy can tell the article is silly, exposition was never needed.

Otherwise, by your account, Socrates actively sort out her company. Xanthippe may have been making the point that Socrates would have no further opportunity to educate his friends after the hemlock, perhaps in an attempt to have him make an effort to save himself. — Banno

It may be that her reputation for being difficult is due entirely to Xenophon. I don't know why he might do this. With regard to the scene in Plato's Phaedo, it may be that Socrates no longer wanted her present simply because she had become distraught. We do not know how long she had been there before this or what their private conversation was like. The comment: "you know her" (60a) might be taken in different ways. This is the only mention of her in Plato's dialogues.

In this case however, anyone who has been introduced to philosophy can tell the article is silly, exposition was never needed. — Lionino

I'll leave that up to the reader to decide. Opinions vary.

This is the only mention of her in Plato's dialogues. — Fooloso4

Hmm. I wonder if this is more about Plato than Socrates?

Interesting. Thanks for the discussion with .

Seventy was a great age in those days. — Ludwig V

Socrates did have a young child when he was put to death. Neither Plato nor Xenophon give us any indication of failing health mental or physical. I am suspicious of Xenophon's claim about Socrates fear of failing health. This strikes me as cowardly. Elsewhere he talks about Socrates courage.

Xenophon himself lived to at least seventy-four. I am not aware of any account of him suffering any of the things he attributed to Socrates fearing.

Hmm. I wonder if this is more about Plato than Socrates? — Banno

I'm not sure that you mean by "this". For me, what is most interesting is the difference between two representations of the same event. Assuming that neither side is lying, but that both are selecting, we might expect to get a more balanced view of what actually happened.

This strikes me as cowardly. Elsewhere he talks about Socrates courage. — Fooloso4

This takes us to the heart of the euthanasia issue. I'm with Marcus Aurelius in his Meditations. I hope I will have the courage to recognize when my time is up; I would welcome the opportunity to choose to make a dignified exit. There is something cowardly about clinging desperately on to the last shreds of life, though I admit that from another perspective all we can ever do is postpone death. But this may only be the result of my life experience.

Given that Socrates was actually in good health, you may be right. But what were the real likely outcomes of the trial?

Socrates gives something of an answer in the Crito, but frames it in the context of his violation of his (implicit) contract with the Laws. But I think it was unrealistic to think that this accusation and this trial could possibly be the end of the matter. The trial was the result of a long persecution, as Socrates tells us in the Apology; that would not have ended. Exile would not have resolved the issue, especially when he started practising his philosophy in the place he was exiled from or even when his reputation followed him. (He talks about having to constantly move on from one city to another.)
Socrates frames his questioning process as a collaborative exploration in which each participant helps the other(s). But it is not difficult to see that they might see the process as entirely combative and even dishonest (for goodness sake, we all know what piety or courage is, even if we can't define it!). That's the heart of the problem.

With regard to the scene in Plato's Phaedo, it may be that Socrates no longer wanted her present simply because she had become distraught. — Fooloso4

Perhaps. I think it is more complicated than that. Plato wants to present an inspiring scene (or version of the scene). The philosopher meets his end with calm and courage. Xanthippe disrupts that, but, in the presentation, reminds us that this is the scene of a disaster. By being escorted away, she is prevented from disrupting the project. Whether we see that as a rather brutal exclusion of his wife or a protection of Socrates is another matter.

It may be that her reputation for being difficult is due entirely to Xenophon. — Fooloso4

Yes. It seems to me that there is a great deal to be said for Xanthippe's bad temper. He irritated everyone else, why would he not irritate his wife? All that time spent in futile debate with strangers, when he could be earning a living. For Xanthippe, that would not have been a marginal issue. How did Socrates pay the bills? Though if there were two women in his life (Myrto), perhaps her issue with him was simpler than that. We'll never really know.

Don't get me wrong. Plato succeeded in creating a story which has turned out to be the founding myth of philosophy. It was the first philosophical text I ever read, and still works well with beginning students. It's just that it would not be philosophical to refrain from exploring what a less sympathetic stance would look like.

He did, however, on Plato's telling have some concern for the welfare of his children. I don't know if there is a correlation with his teachings, but it does seem that he preferred to hang out in the marketplace rather than at home with her. — Fooloso4

There is a correlation in Laws, where the qualifications for a suitable bride is discussed:

So when any man, having turned twenty-five years of age, upon due consideration by himself and by others, believes 772E he has found a bride that suits him personally, and is also suitable for companionship and for begetting children, he should marry, indeed everyone should do so before they turn thirty-five. But first he should be told how to find a suitable and fitting bride, for as Cleinias says, every law should be preceded by an introductory preamble of its own. — Plato, Laws, Bk 6, 772D

The matter of a union beneficial to the City is discussed as a balance of dispositions of the couple as well as the development of the children:

Ath: It’s nice of you to say so. Now, to a young man, from 773A a good family we should say the following: you should enter into the sort of marriage that meets the approval of sensible folk. These people would advise you neither to shun marriage to a poor family, nor chase eagerly after wealthy connections and, all other considerations being equal, always prefer to enter a union with someone who has less resources. For this approach would be beneficial both to the city itself, and to the families involved, since balance and proportion are much more conducive to excellence than unbridled excess. And someone who realises that he himself is too impulsive and hasty in all his actions should look for 773B connections to a well behaved family, whereas someone with the opposite natural tendencies should pursue connections of the opposite sort. And there should be one rule for all marriages: each person is to seek a marriage that is beneficial to the city, not the one that pleases himself. Everyone is always drawn somehow, by nature, to a person who is most like himself, and so the city 773C as a whole develops an imbalance of wealth and character traits. That’s how the consequences we wish to avoid in our own city, certainly befall most other cities. Now to prescribe explicitly, by law, that the wealthy are not to marry the wealthy, the powerful are not to marry the powerful, that the slower characters have to look for marital unions with the quick witted, and the quicker with the slower, would not alone be ridiculous but would anger a lot of people. For it is not easy to appreciate that a city should be 773D blended after the manner of a wine bowl, in which the wine, when first poured, seethes madly, but when it is restrained by the good company of another, more sober god, it forms a good, duly measured drink. Now it is virtually impossible for anyone to discern that this is happening in the case of the blending of children, and that’s why we should omit such matters from our laws. We should try instead to charm each person into placing more value upon the equipoise of their own children, than the marital property equality which is insatiable, using words of reproach to deter anyone who is intent upon marrying for money, rather than forcing them via a written law. — ibid. 772E

The limits of legislation noted here is quite different from the language of the Republic. It does echo the concern for the children's well-being in Phaedo. It also points to the threshold separating the public and private aspects of marriage addressed by the OP.

It also points to the threshold separating the public and private aspects of marriage addressed by the OP. — Paine

AN interesting quote. It does indeed point to the threshold between public and private aspects, or at least between what should be prescribed and what left up to the parties. (I'm not sure exactly what you mean by the reference to the OP.)

However, Plato also sticks to one of his fundamental principles here:-

And there should be one rule for all marriages: each person is to seek a marriage that is beneficial to the city, not the one that pleases himself. — ibid. 772E

It's one thing to recommend marrying prudently or at least taking prudence into account. But it's quite another to prioritize the "city" in making the decision.

For me, what is most interesting is the difference between two representations of the same event. Assuming that neither side is lying, but that both are selecting, we might expect to get a more balanced view of what actually happened. — Ludwig V

There are different ways to represent an event. Neither of them is writing history in the modern sense. Aristotle tells us that:

... poetry is something more scientific and serious than history, because poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts.

(Poetics 1451b)

Plato and Xenophon are both concerned with the truth of the matter. The truth of what actually happened does not lie in the particulars of the event. More generally what is represented is the character of Socrates, the philosophical way of life, and the tension between the city and the philosopher.

We should also consider an author's audience, who he is addressing. Plato and Xenophon are not simply relating events, they are giving a defense of the Socratic way of life to an audience that may include members of the jury who are hostile to Socrates or ambivalent about their decision, and those who may be attracted to philosophy but were concerned about the city's hostility to it.

Xenophon begins his Apology:

It seems to me fitting to hand down to memory, furthermore, how Socrates, on being indicted, deliberated on his defence and on his end. It is true that others have written about this, and that all of them have reproduced the loftiness of his words,—a fact which proves that his utterance really was of the character intimated;—but they have not shown clearly that he had now come to the conclusion that for him death was more to be desired than life; and hence his lofty utterance appears rather ill-considered.

It should be noted that Xenophon relies on the testimony of Hermogenes. Xenophon's Memorabilia is also about the trial. He begins:

I have often wondered by what arguments those who drew up the indictment against Socrates could persuade the Athenians that his life was forfeit to the state.

Here he speaks in his own name. The tone of the work is quite different. With regard to old age Socrates councils:

In this way, I think, you are most likely to escape censure, find relief from your difficulties, live in ease and security, and obtain an ample competence for old age.

(Memorabilia, 2)

The irony, of course, is that Socrates himself suffered censure. If he had not been convicted would this concern with his possible decline have been at issue? If so, then at what age does it become an issue?

But what were the real likely outcomes of the trial? — Ludwig V

In both Plato's and Xenophon's Apology Socrates refuses to allow his friends to pay a penalty. Socrates refused this option because do so would be an admittance of guilt. The larger concern for Socrates was not his own fate but the fate of philosophy.

The trial was the result of a long persecution, as Socrates tells us in the Apology; that would not have ended. — Ludwig V

Socrates is referring to Aristophanes comic play "The Clouds". There is not indication that at the time it amounted to more than a few good laughs. Metetus, Anytus, and Lycon brought changes 24 years later in order to serve Anytus' political ambitions. During that time Socrates continued to live unimpeded.

It was the first philosophical text I ever read, and still works well with beginning students. — Ludwig V

And seasoned professionals as well. It really is remarkable how much attention is paid to Plato today.

Plato, who Midgley says:

... right up to his death, always kept the irritable sensibility of the adolescent in resisting the claims of temperaments alien to his own.

had, as is evident from the passages you quoted, a far more penetrating, encompassing, and public minded notion of marriage then Midgley gives him credit for.

In the words of another bachelor:

Marriage: thus I name the will of two to create the one that is more than those who created it. Reverence for each other, as for those willing with such a will, is what I name marriage. Let this be the meaning and truth of your marriage.

(Nietzsche. Zarathustra, XX).

It does indeed point to the threshold between public and private aspects, or at least between what should be prescribed and what left up to the parties. (I'm not sure exactly what you mean by the reference to the OP.) — Ludwig V

It seems to me that the acknowledgement of not being able to explain the peculiar alchemy that brings a benefit (both publicly and privately) to children speaks to an awareness counted by Midgley to be a terra incognita for bachelors like Plato.

It's one thing to recommend marrying prudently or at least taking prudence into account. But it's quite another to prioritize the "city" in making the decision. — Ludwig V

The City has the prerogative to expect that from citizens. There is a tension in Plato about how love and friendship occur within this prerogative. The personal dynamic seen in Phaedrus and Symposium is absent in Laws except as horizons.

Observing this tension caused me to recommend The Care of the Self to the discussion. As a "history of philosophy", Foucault directly addresses how ideas about marriage changes through different articulations. It is a condition with a history and future challenges.

It seems to me that the acknowledgement of not being able to explain the peculiar alchemy that brings a benefit (both publicly and privately) to children speaks to an awareness counted by Midgley to be a terra incognita for bachelors like Plato. — Paine

Perhaps so. At least it seems that he is acknowledging that such alchemy exists. Though quite a lot of his argument here is prudential rather than principled.

The personal dynamic seen in Phaedrus and Symposium is absent in Laws except as horizons. — Paine

I wouldn't have objected to that difference, since they are clearly focusing on one or the other. I know very little about the details of the Laws. More or less by accident, I do know that his treatment of atheists does not suggest any respect for individuals. Neither does the Republic. I have a feeling that he didn't recognize that society is for the benefit of the individuals comprising it, not the other way about and I mind a great deal about that.

Observing this tension caused me to recommend The Care of the Self to the discussion. As a "history of philosophy", Foucault directly addresses how ideas about marriage changes through different articulations. It is a condition with a history and future challenges. — Paine

Yes, that is important. Arguably, we should never talk about marriage simpliciter, but always marriage in its social context - and even then should generalize cautiously.

but they have not shown clearly that he had now come to the conclusion that for him death was more to be desired than life; and hence his lofty utterance appears rather ill-considered.

Yes, that's right. Plato's Socrates says that he doesn't fear death because nothing can harm a good person. I understand the argument, but I don't put any stock in it.

If so, then at what age does it become an issue? — Fooloso4

There are two possibilities. It becomes an issue when others use one's age to marginalize one's opinion. It also becomes an issue, but rather later, when one's decline actually sets in. No fixed age.

Socrates is referring to Aristophanes comic play "The Clouds". There is not indication that at the time it amounted to more than a few good laughs. — Fooloso4

Yes, but the laughs are at the expense of the sophists and Socrates is made out to be one. Doctrines which he did not hold are put into his mouth and mocked. Are you saying that Socrates was not maligned?

Are you saying that Socrates was not maligned? — Ludwig V

What I am saying it that the trail was not

...the result of a long persecution — Ludwig V

As to him being maligned. What is clear is that Aristophanes lumps Socrates with the sophists. Plato distances Socrates from the sophists in some respects, but also leads us to question in what ways they do not differ. The sophists were a diverse group. Note that in the trilogy of related dialogues Sophist, Statesman, Theaetetus we might expect the third to be Philosopher. Why is there no dialogue Philosopher? The Sophist asks "what is the sophist?" and the statesman "what is the statesman?", but the Theaetus asks "what is knowledge?". It is up to us to ask "what is the philosopher?"

Malign or align?

I like to imagine that Socrates enjoyed the play. Recognizing it as both a serious challenge and appreciating the playful humor.

Neither does the Republic. I have a feeling that he didn't recognize that society is for the benefit of the individuals comprising it, not the other way about and I mind a great deal about that. — Ludwig V

The dialogues are a far cry from stating "All men are created equal." There are many contested "histories" looking into how that talk came about. The dialectic did not start there.

But I disagree with saying that the benefits of individuals were not of paramount concern.

The opening dispute in the Republic is over whether the administration of justice is an arbitrary rule disguised as a universal truth. The model of the good city is built from the analogy of a person living the best possible life, not the other way around.

The limits to our knowledge of the Good expressed in the Republic are echoed in the Laws.

The discussion of pleasure in the Philebus is centered on the intersection of universal conditions and the experience of an individual human being.

The resistance to the philosophers as an assault upon traditional values was expressed in many different ways by different authors at the time. Talk about educating children was itself found to be offensive. The Meno gives a taste of that.

My two drachmas. Er, four, to be exact.

What I am saying it that the trail was not
...the result of a long persecution
— Ludwig V — Fooloso4

In a sense, you are right, and Socrates doesn't explicitly say that it is. He does say that his hardest task is not to refute that actual accusations, but hard to remove the effects of what people have been saying about him for a long time. Sorry, I wasn't careful enough in what I said.

Malign or align? — Fooloso4

Both, I would say, depending on your point of view. Of course the real situation - even what little we know about it - is more complicated than that. But Socrates' description is in a specific situation focusing on the effects on the jury and his task defending himself.

I like to imagine that Socrates enjoyed the play. Recognizing it as both a serious challenge and appreciating the playful humor. — Fooloso4

I don't rule out Socrates enjoying it - as a caricature. But a caricature is not necessarily harmless.

The model of the good city is built from the analogy of a person living the best possible life, not the other way around. — Paine

Yes. Arguably, that was Plato's big mistake. The relationship between part and whole is quite different in the two cases. He assumed it was the same.

The resistance to the philosophers as an assault upon traditional values was expressed in many different ways by different authors at the time. — Paine

Well, it was, in many ways. But the assault did not come only from philosophy. Exactly how important other factors (such as the rise of the Persian Empire or the effects of overseas trade &c.) were is hard to determine.

Are you saying that all of those points support any particular conclusion?

He does say that his hardest task is not to refute that actual accusations, but hard to remove the effects of what people have been saying about him for a long time. — Ludwig V

This was not something to be addressed in a court of law. His way of life was his defense of his way of life. He identifies what he actually does as the real source of his reputation:

The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom.

(20d)

He goes on to talk about the oracle at Delphi. Socrates' irony should not be overlooked. He is on trial defending himself against charges of impiety and he tells a story of how he set out to refute the oracle (21c). He does this by refuting everyone who had a reputation for being wise.

In addition, he changes what the oracle said:

This man is wiser that I, but you declared that I was the wisest

(21c)

The oracle did not say that Socrates was the wisest, it said that no one was wiser, that is, that others might be as wise as him.

I don't rule out Socrates enjoying it - as a caricature. But a caricature is not necessarily harmless. — Ludwig V

It runs much deeper than a caricature. The first problem taken up at the beginning of the Sophist is not the identity of the sophist but the identity of the philosopher. At the start of the dialogue Theodorus calls the Stranger "a real philosopher". Socrates responds:

I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men—I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers—appear disguised in all sorts of shapes, thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind ... sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen,and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad.

(216c)

The philosopher appears to be what he is not. If the Stranger is a philosopher then he may appear to be what he is not. It is only by successfully identifying the philosopher that we can identify the imitator. Socrates then asks if the sophist, statesman, and philosopher are one or two or three. (217a)

Yes. Arguably, that was Plato's big mistake. The relationship between part and whole is quite different in the two cases. He assumed it was the same. — Ludwig V

There are problems with making the argument that justice is the same in the individual and the city. My point is that the individual is seen as being made up of components that have different means and ends. A consistent theme throughout the Dialogues is that the best relationship amongst these parts is the source of virtue and true happiness. The pursuit of that relationship is deemed more worthy than the expression of traditional norms.

And so we have Socrates goading Antyus:

Soc: Isn’t it obvious that, if excellence can be taught, this man would never have had his own children taught these subjects whose instruction costs money, 94D and not have had them taught the very subjects that produce good men, when that instruction costs nothing? Or was Thucydides perhaps a mediocre fellow after all, who did not have so many friends among the Athenians and her allies? He also belonged to an important family, and he had great influence in the city and throughout the rest of the Greek world. So, if excellence were indeed teachable, he would have found someone to make good men of his own sons, some fellow-citizen or some stranger, 94E if he did not have time to do it himself because of his civic concerns. In any case, friend Anytus, it seems that excellence is not teachable.

Any: Socrates, you seem all too ready to speak ill of people, so I would like to give you some advice, if you are prepared to heed me. Be careful, because in any city it is probably easier to do a person harm rather than do them good, but this is especially 95A so in this city. But I think you know this yourself. — Meno, 94C

Yes. Arguably, that was Plato's big mistake. The relationship between part and whole is quite different in the two cases. He assumed it was the same. — Ludwig V

There are different respects in which something can be the same. Plato was well aware that the politics of the soul and the politics of the city are not the same in all respects. This difference is central to the problem of justice. The freedom of the philosopher in the city is not the same as freedom from internal discord. The philosopher is by his philosophical nature not part of but apart from and at odds with the city. This is what is at play in the definition of justice as "minding your own business". In order for the philosopher to mind his own business he is forced to mind the business of the city because the city will not allow him to philosophize, as is evident in Socrates own case. It is only when the philosophers rule and take on the business of the city that the city stays out of his business.

In the Crito Plato asks whether we belong to the city, whether it and its laws are our master. Through the laws the city answers that we do belong to the city and it and its laws are our master. But the argument is full of holes. It is, as Socrates says:

The best people, whose opinions are more worthy of consideration.

(44c)

The opinions of the best people may be at odd with the opinion of the laws and city. In addition, the citizens of the Athenian democracy, that is, the multitude, are the very ones whose opinions Socrates scorns.