- Maybe ask yourself the question of whether handwashing rose to the level of a "moral act" during COVID-19.

Maybe ask yourself the question of whether handwashing rose to the level of a "moral act" during COVID-19. — Leontiskos

I doubt it. Hands are not a major vector in the transmission of Covid; airborne particles are. (Don't assume it's over!) The refusal to wear a mask in public when one did not know whether one was a carrier would certainly count as immoral. This is not a question of personal hygiene; this is a question of following or refusing to follow medically advised guidelines in an epidemic. It's situational and specific. As a general rule, hand-washing doesn't figure in moral codes.

- Ebola, then. :roll:

I would say that ↪Lionino is correct. — Leontiskos

The answer lies on whether one sees morality in the act itself or in the person/intention. If the former, alcoholism is immoral as it involves self-harm, besides being a waste of money and whatnot. If the latter, alcoholism is only immoral if the person is already made aware of the consequences of his action.

As by my first answer, the answer to the OP is surely "no" if one is an utilitarian or perhaps even a deontologist.

The answer lies on whether one sees morality in the act itself or in the person/intention. — Lionino

In responding to @fdrake’s claim I pointed to volition. Acts, intentions, and habits are all moral insofar as they are volitional. There is no exclusive dichotomy between the morality of acts, intentions, and habits.

What this means is that, in assessing alcoholism, it doesn’t matter a great deal whether alcoholism is viewed in terms of acts, intentions, or habits. What matters is whether it is volitional, and for this reason @fdrake’s A2 is central. He is viewing it as non-volitional, and for this reason your rejoinder stands.

TB, leprosy, polio - whatever. The moral issue is not personal hygiene but public safety. Getting drunk is not immoral; driving while drunk is. Having unprotected sex with a consenting adult is not immoral; having unprotected sex when you have a STD is.

- So your position is that when I wash my hands to remove germs I am addressing personal hygiene, but when I wash my hands to remove ebola germs I am only addressing public safety? Apparently you are forced to conceive of these two things as entirely different acts, with no overlap, such that the latter act does not involve personal hygiene.

Your position is strange, to say the least. Again, I would suggest giving these issues a bit more thought than you have.

Apparently you are forced to conceive of these two things as entirely different acts, with no overlap, such that the latter act does not involve personal hygiene. — Leontiskos

Nope. Not the acts. The moral judgment.
Stay in your house, alone, be as dirty as you like and nobody condemns you.
Break quarantine, greet people, it doesn't matter how clean your hands are, you're a carrier.

Nope. Not the acts. The moral judgment. — Vera Mont

The moral judgment judges an act, and therefore your evasion fails. By being unable to specify the acts, you are automatically unable to specify the moral judgments of those acts. As it turns out, personal hygiene and germs are closely related.

By being unable to specify the acts, — Leontiskos

These acts?

Break quarantine, greet people, — Vera Mont

They look specific to me.

As it turns out, personal hygiene and germs are closely related. — Leontiskos

Certainly. And it's not immoral to become ill due to lack of personal hygiene. It is immoral to make other people ill by having contact with them when one is carrying disease germs.

It's not immoral to be mistaken or to reject information - even scientific information; it's immoral to broadcast disinformation and persuade others to disregard sound advice. It's not immoral to believe vaccines are a means of spying on the citizenry; it is immoral to persuade others to refuse inoculation. It's not immoral to believe that climate change is hoax perpetuated by China, but it is immoral to block mitigation initiatives that will save other people.

I can't make the distinction between risking harm to self and causing harm to others any clearer.

What this means is that, in assessing alcoholism, it doesn’t matter a great deal whether alcoholism is viewed in terms of acts, intentions, or habits. — Leontiskos

I think it does matter, because that is the central distinction between consequentialism and non-consequentialist ethics. For the virtue ethicist, alcoholism, or any sort of self-harm would generally not be deemed as immoral if the subject did not know of the facts surrounding alcoholism.

The consequentialist will say that it is immoral for an ignorant child to touch the hot stove.

At the end, this is a matter of semantics as to what situations the word "moral" applies to or not, but it remains that it is not desirable to put our hands on a hot stove. Therefore, OP's question boils down to "what normative ethical theory do you subscribe to?".

I think it does matter, because that is the central distinction between consequentialism and non-consequentialist ethics. For the virtue ethicist, alcoholism, or any sort of self-harm would generally not be deemed as immoral if the subject did not know of the facts surrounding alcoholism.

The consequentialist will say that it is immoral for an ignorant child to touch the hot stove. — Lionino

It seems to me that the virtue ethicist and the consequentialist will agree that if volition is involved, then what is occurring may be immoral (and this will relate to "knowledge of the facts surrounding alcoholism"). Some consequentialists may hold that volition is not necessary for an act to be immoral (and that the child's ignorance does not excuse), but many other consequentialists would disagree. In fact both virtue ethicists and consequentialists are able to distinguish between culpable evil and inculpable evil (e.g. knowingly harming and unknowingly harming).

I would say that the key to this thread is to think about what is necessarily non-moral. There are many things that are non-moral in certain circumstances, but nevertheless are not necessarily non-moral. Alcoholism is one such thing, and @fdrake erroneously presented it as necessarily non-moral. Further, I think all moral theories are capable of coming to the conclusion that alcoholism is not necessarily non-moral, consequentialism included.

No. If you don't want to be the kind of person that does X, then by definition you deem X immoral. — Leontiskos

Jesus Christ. No.
There are simply things I find unbecoming, and not immoral. Aesthetic disagreement is not moral. I don't want to wear bright Orange pants, or be the kind of person who would do so. Doesn't mean anyone who does is even on my bad side.

Obviously, its by society. A mischievous fellow who follows your every move who transcended the plurality of the many to confine itself it to your head to critically examine every action or step taken. Perhaps with a gritty or dark monologue or two. Its obviously not you because the big "M", Morality, isn't owned by any one person? — substantivalism

I'm not really sure I'm making of all this (despite noting its probably in Jest).

If 'society' is the light, then its merely mob rule. Morality isn't owned by anyone. It's a free-floating ideal which alters person-to-person and is used internally to guide one's behaviour. Social 'morality' is just "Oh, most of us agree so here's a policy. Nice".

Jesus Christ. No.
There are simply things I find unbecoming, and not immoral. Aesthetic disagreement is not moral. I don't want to wear bright Orange pants, or be the kind of person who would do so. Doesn't mean anyone who does is even on my bad side.

Exactly. In the heirarchies of decision making, moral vs immoral (like legal vs illegal) are rarely used in Real Life. Most decisions are preferences ie like vs dislike, among moral (and legal) choices. Thus most of the things we choose not to do aren't because of their morality nor legality (since they're both moral and legal), they're just not to our taste.

:ok:

A Catholic Hangover me thinks, for Leontiskos.

If 'society' is the light, then its merely mob rule. Morality isn't owned by anyone. It's a free-floating ideal which alters person-to-person and is used internally to guide one's behaviour. Social 'morality' is just "Oh, most of us agree so here's a policy. Nice". — AmadeusD

Yes, but I'd emphasize that this guide is a delusional one which through religion or philosophy we acknowledge its unreality yet we desire to hold to its dictates. If we had a great enough external, or internal, conflict to change it then we'd create not some truth but another delusion through which to carve the world up once more. Something about it all feels so tantalizing yet elusive and for that reason it seems also so fake.

It seems to me that the virtue ethicist and the consequentialist will agree that if volition is involved, then what is occurring may be immoral — Leontiskos

I don't think the virtue ethicist will agree that it is a vice to do something you did not know had negative consequences, as humans we are always learning after all. In fact, that is another issue with consequentialism. Most people would not say a child touching a stove is immoral, it did not want to harm itself obviously. That a moral theory does not get along with moral human intuition and with human semantic intuition (what linguistic subjects the predicate "is immoral" can apply to) is an indication that such moral theory is flawed or at least redefining what "moral" really means.

but many other consequentialists would disagree — Leontiskos

How so?

I think all moral theories are capable of coming to the conclusion that alcoholism is not necessarily non-moral — Leontiskos

The triple negative took me a while. Yes, I suppose that for every mainstream ethical theory there would be cases where alcoholism is immoral. Some ethical theories would say that alcoholism is necessarily immoral. But others will say that alcoholism is not always immoral, I argue that virtue ethics is one of those. The issue is that the OP is not clear:

You may bring up the example of touching a hot pan, which involves ignorance surrounding a topic, but OP includes the verb "want", which implies that the subject is conscious of the context he is in. — Lionino

If we agree that the OP's premise includes awareness of the consequences of an action, for pretty much any ethical theory — including virtue ethics —, there would be no difference between things that are immoral and things you shouldn't want to be the kind of person that does them. Because the "shouldn't want" basically collapses to "is wrong", which is "is immoral" in others words. The "should" verb brings morality into the second part of the question anyway.

It would be another story if the OP said "between things that aren’t immoral and things you don't want to be the kind of person that does them". Then it would become an aesthetic issue, which is why Amadeus is nagging you here:

Aesthetic disagreement is not moral. — AmadeusD

Something about it all feels so tantalizing yet elusive and for that reason it seems also so fake. — substantivalism

Do you mean moralising in general? If so, I agree.

not some truth but another delusion through which to carve the world up once more. Something about it all feels so tantalizing yet elusive and for that reason it seems also so fake. — substantivalism

I believe this will always be hte case with moralising. It's paradigmatic.

I don't think the virtue ethicist will agree that it is a vice to do something you did not know had negative consequences, as humans we are always learning after all. — Lionino

If one does not know it has negative consequences (and they cannot be expected to know) then they do not have volition vis-a-vis the harm in question. Ignorance excuses because of a lack of volition.

That a moral theory does not get along with moral human intuition and with human semantic intuition (what linguistic subjects the predicate "is immoral" can apply to) is an indication that such moral theory is flawed or at least redefining what "moral" really means. — Lionino

As indicated above, I don't think our colloquial notion of "moral" is entirely coherent, given the way that it relies on arbitrary degrees (). If this is right then "moral" in the colloquial sense falls far short of philosophical rigor. ...But the genealogy of this colloquial term is a much larger topic. See, for example, my post <here>.

How so? — Lionino

For example, by stipulating that morality is a species of decision making, and therefore the child who ignorantly places their hand on a hot stove has not made a decision with respect to moral categories, such as harm. If someone does not know that their act involves moral consequences, then they cannot be said to be making a moral decision.

If we agree that the OP's premise includes awareness of the consequences of an action, for pretty much any ethical theory — including virtue ethics —, there would be no difference between things that aren’t immoral and things you shouldn't want to be the kind of person that does them. Because the "shouldn't want" basically collapses to "is wrong", which is "is immoral" in others words. — Lionino

Yes, I have been agreeing with you on this, although it would seem that you made a rather crucial typo in saying "aren't immoral" instead of "are immoral."

It would be another story if the OP said "between things that aren’t immoral and things you don't want to be the kind of person that does them". Then it would become an aesthetic issue... — Lionino

I don't follow the sentence you here rewrote. The OP is saying, "If I see some X and say, 'One should not want to be the kind of person that does X,' then does it automatically follow that X is immoral?"

I actually have Amadeus on ignore, for after extended exchanges with him I came to the conclusion that he is one of the dumbest posters on the forum. He was recently seen using AI to try to support Corvus' claim that denying the antecedent is not a fallacy. Of course he is a youth, so there is still hope. But let me wade through his trolling and look at what he said...

So I don't think there is any hard line between "aesthetic judgment" and moral judgment (what is being considered is actually aesthetic judgment of behavior). An infraction against norms of decorum is one of those things that our culture does not call "moral" because it does not rise to the arbitrary threshold set for "moral" acts. In the same way, we hold that minor slights are not immoral, such as inconveniencing another by hogging the telephone for longer than we should. One simply won't find this arbitrary use of "moral" prior to the modern period. But again, this is a larger topic.

(To be clear, historically we have always distinguished exceptionally bad acts from acts that are not exceptionally bad. This happens via law, for it is universally recognized that not all undesirable acts should be legislated against. But prior to the modern period we did not speak as if such distinctions were qualitative.)

If one does not know it has negative consequences (and they cannot be expected to know) then they do not have volition vis-a-vis the harm in question. Ignorance excuses because of a lack of volition. — Leontiskos

I don't know where you get this meaning of volition, as it really is just the French word for the noun "will", and for me the word does not imply anything about awareness or ignorance, only about intention; but, in this meaning, yes, it is true that the virtue ethicist and the consequentialist will agree that it is immoral.

although it would seem that you made a rather crucial typo in saying "aren't immoral" instead of "are immoral." — Leontiskos

Not a typo but I copy pasted straight from the OP's title when I shouldn't. You are right. I fixed it.

If this is right then "moral" in the colloquial sense falls far short of philosophical rigor. — Leontiskos

That is true when it comes to degrees. The point you make about telephone hogging for example. A philosophically rigorous theory has to make away with this arbitrary line. My point was more that consequentialism falls out of the common usage of "immoral" because it does not take intention into consideration, only act, making it seem like it is describing harmfulness rather than good and evil. This aspect of the common usage of the word seems, unlike the arbitrary line, acceptable.

If I understood it correctly, some consequentialists would be able to overcome that by putting their ground on decision-making, but it does not seem to be the case of utilitarianism, for example.

For example, by stipulating that morality is a species of decision making, and therefore the child who ignorantly places their hand on a hot stove has not made a decision with respect to moral categories, such as harm. If someone does not know that their act involves moral consequences, then they cannot be said to be making a moral decision. — Leontiskos

:up:

I don't know where you get this meaning of volition — Lionino

Primarily from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Our discussion prompted me to publish my recent thread, "The Breadth of the Moral Sphere." Here is a relevant quote from one of my responses in that thread:

The second objection says that culpable negligence is not deliberate. This is where things get especially complicated in the realm of volition (and Book III of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is a standard text for a study of volition). First we should note that ignorance is capable of excusing, particularly in the case of what we now call "invincible ignorance." If someone neglects to do something with invincible ignorance, then they are not culpable for their "negligence" because their omission is not in any way deliberate. More precisely, they are not culpable because their omission is in no way traceable to their will. For example, suppose I am driving 55 mph on an unmarked road. A police officer pulls me over and tickets me for driving 55 when the speed limit is 45. I tell him that I did not know the speed limit was 45 mph because there are no speed limit signs. Did I neglect to drive the speed limit? — Leontiskos

Not a typo but I copy pasted straight from the OP's title when I shouldn't. You are right. I fixed it. — Lionino

:up:

That is true when it comes to degrees. The point you make about telephone hogging for example. A philosophically rigorous theory has to make away with this arbitrary line. — Lionino

Okay, I'm glad we agree. Persuasion on this website tends to be either effortless or impossible. :smile:

My point was more that consequentialism falls out of the common usage of "immoral" because it does not take intention into consideration, only act, making it seem like it is describing harmfulness rather than good and evil. — Lionino

There is an interesting debate about the topic of whether a consequentialist can ever be subjectively wrong or immoral when they act, and I think it relates to this question of intention. I think the consequentialist would say that morality is like mathematics, and that although mathematics is all about objective computations it is nevertheless true that one can hold to incorrect mathematical opinions, and even do so culpably. I'm not sure if this is the same thing you are speaking to? For more information see the link I gave here:

There is an interesting exchange on this very topic between two groups of philosophers. See my post on a different forum for links to the three papers in question (link). — Leontiskos