Means toward the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony." — Leontiskos
And how do you view this stipulated end as differing from Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra
What is the difference between the end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" and Kant's Kingdom of Ends? — javra
Therefore your question makes no sense to me. — Leontiskos
To minimize harm and maximize harmony is obviously not the same as treating everyone as an end in themselves. — Leontiskos
In his writings on religion, Kant interprets the Kingdom of God as a religious symbol for the moral reality of the Kingdom of Ends. As such, it is the ultimate goal of both religious and political organization of human society.[1] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Ends#Overview
A number of Kant’s readers have come to question this received view, however. Perhaps the first philosopher to suggest a teleological reading of Kant was John Stuart Mill. In the first chapter of his Utilitarianism, Mill implies that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative could only sensibly be interpreted as a test of the consequences of universal adoption of a maxim. [...]
There are also teleological readings of Kant’s ethics that are non-consequentialist. Barbara Herman (1993) has urged philosophers to “leave deontology behind” as an understanding of Kant’s moral theory on the grounds that the conception of practical reason grounding the Categorical Imperative is itself a conception of value. Herman’s idea is that Kant never meant to say that no value grounds moral principles. [...]
It is of considerable interest to those who follow Kant to determine which reading — teleological or deontological — was actually Kant’s, as well as which view ought to have been his. A powerful argument for the teleological reading is the motivation for Herman’s proposal: What rationale can we provide for doing our duty at all if we don’t appeal to it’s being good to do it? [...] — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#TelDeo
While I'm waiting for your reply: This quote addresses means, but not the stipulated end of "minimizing harm and maximizing harmony" which, as end pursued, would be more properly expressed as "a state of being wherein harm is minimal, if at all yet present, and harmony is maximal, if not ubiquitously applicable". An idealized future state of being as that intended which, by my best appraisals of your previous statements, you deem to be different in nature to that state of being Kant terms "the Kingdom of Ends". * — javra
But again, I'm waiting to discern what you interpret Kant to mean by the term "Kingdom of Ends" ... such that it, as realm of being, is not equivalent to a realm wherein minimal harm and maximal harmony is actualized. — javra
My main point to these quickly produced references being, what you have taken to be "my view" is neither idiosyncratic nor original in its analysis of Kantian ethics. — javra
The main problem with your interpretation is that none of the texts that you have provided support it, and this is because Kant is explicit that the "Kingdom of Ends" is only an ideal, or in your quote, "merely possible." If it were more than an ideal and it were—as you seem to conceive it—an actualizable utopia, then all of the problems I have pointed out would come to bear. In that case the utopian end-state would be liable to justify the sort of violence you have in mind, all in order to achieve it. — Leontiskos
A cursory reading of these essays is sufficient to reveal that Kant's interest in political history was an intentional application of his overall Transcendental Perspective[17] to the final (i.e., ultimate) problem of the end or destiny of the human race. The essays rarely give an account or interpretation of any specific historical events. Instead, as their very titles suggest, they pose questions about the necessary form of human history, such as: What was the "Conjectural Beginning of Human History"? (1786), "What is Enlightenment?" (1784), "...Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" (1798), and What is "The End of All Things"? (1794). Kant's goal, in other words, was to discover an "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective" (1784) which could bring "Perpetual Peace" (1795) to humanity through a full realization of the highest good. — Palmquist, Stephen (October 1994) 'The Kingdom of God Is at Hand!' (Did Kant Really Say That?). History of Philosophy Quarterly. 11 (4): 421–437. ISSN 0740-0675. JSTOR 27744641
According to your source such interpretations are certainly atypical, deviating from the received view. Still, none of the sources you cite are promoting your view that it is necessary to resort to violence to bring about a Kingdom of Ends. That strikes me as a grievous departure from Kant. — Leontiskos
Again, given the exact same distal intent of, say, minimizing harm and maximizing harmony, the use of violence as means of obtaining this very same distal intent can be simultaneously right in proximal application (wherein far greater harm/disharmony is thereby avoided) and yet remain wrong in distal terms (for an absolute harmony cannot be of itself produced via violence); — javra
The question at hand is whether your analogy is apt. Perhaps you should attempt to give an example of a non-moral decision. — Leontiskos
If we say that a "moral decision" is one based on what is right and wrong, moral or immoral... — Judaka
By "non-moral decision", I take you to mean the parallel of a "non-financial decision" to buy a phone, so, a "non-moral decision" which leads to a "moral judgement" being made. — Judaka
I find that you, inadvertently or not, have often strawmanned the arguments I've make. Which makes this conversation with you quite unpleasant. For example, I don't recall every saying "it is necessary to resort to violence" but only that the use of violence within certain contexts can be the right/good thing to do as a means of optimally approaching the Good - "necessity" having nothing to do with it. — javra
"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. — javra
I am furthermore not in this thread regurgitating Kant's thoughts. But have instead made reasoned argument for oughts and ought nots given an intended proximity to the Good as ultimate end, for which Kant's notion of the Kingdom of Ends was intended to serve only as one possible example among others. — javra
To address this first point you make that Kant's notion of a Kingdom of Ends is only (an inconsequential?) ideal — javra
Again, I see two ends, and in this case I think both are simultaneously aimed at:
1. Do not commit violence (because violence requires treating the object as a means)
2. Survive as a community
These are both involved in the goal to, "Arrive at a Kingdom of Ends."
But in this case it seems that (2) is given precedence over (1), and I'm not sure if it is possible to arrive at a "Kingdom of Ends" so long as (2) is given precedence over (1). When would you ever "get there"? Obviously the alternative would be strict pacifism: giving (1) precedence over (2).
Secondly, in light of (2) does (1) need to be revised to (1a): "Do not commit violence except in extremis"? It seems like this is the rule that is actually in play, although there is simultaneously a desire or telos towards (1). — Leontiskos
"Do not commit violence" holds no meaning or significance in the complete absence of agents. In order for violence to not be committed, there must be agents present which do not commit violence. So I again find the presented dichotomy of ends to be inappropriate.
Aside from which, as stated (1) gives the impression of an absolute commandment. ... Whose goodness or rightness as such would be itself justified in which manner?
Moreover, the "strict pacifism" mentioned would leave all peace aspiring people to die at the hands of violent people, thereby resulting in nothing but violence-loving people to populate the world in its entirety. How might this bring about or else be in the service of a "Kingdom of Ends"? — javra
On this reading you must think that the pacifist could not agree to the rule, "Do not commit violence," which is of course strange to say the least. "Do not commit violence" simply does not mean, "Do not commit violence unless your survival is threatened." People do not generally say, "In order to not-commit violence we must be alive, so therefore in order to obey the rule 'Do not commit violence' we must use violence against this aggressor who is trying to kill us." I don't think this is plausible at all. It strikes me as common sense that use of violence will be contrary to a rule against violence.
[...]
It was not absolute. The rationale was provided: "because violence requires treating the object as a means." The idea was <We are not to treat others as a means; violence treats others as a means; therefore we are not to use violence>. — Leontiskos
Again, you have said that violence is prohibited because it treats another person as a means. — Leontiskos
I'm curious as to what references or arguments you have that dispel the argument this paper makes. — javra
You so far seem dead-set against the use of any measure of controlled violence in any context whatsoever, thereby, for example, condemning all police officers all all soldiers to immorality ... as though such ought to be viewed as evil rather than, at least on occasion, heroic. If I am, to what extent am I wrong in this appraisal? — javra
Despite spending time on the forum, you’ve chosen to make your reply rather late. The weekend has now passed, and I now have real world duties in need of tending. — javra
You are again freely strawmanning, inventing truths, putting words into my mouth that I've never spoken, spinning realities, whatever terminology best gets the point across. In this case, I only said that violence is a wrong in an ultimate sense from an ultimate vantage-point, but never that it is "prohibited". And I have neither the time nor the inclination to correct every strawman you've so far made.
[...]
… Which I can’t help but find intellectually dishonest. — javra
In your primary counter, you are conflating the end aimed at of “the Good”, however you prefer to imperfectly exemplify it (you’ve so far alluded to it being an unobtainable utopia of no real consequence), with the means toward approaching it (this assuming one deems the Good as their primary purpose to begin with) as though the Good were somehow already obtained. — javra
In your equating of right/good action to necessary action you, for example, remove all choice from the equation — javra
And you have chosen to ignore both of the following — javra
I am not a Kantian — Leontiskos
To say that a moral decision is based on what is moral or immoral is tautological, and does not tell us anything — Leontiskos
No, that is not even necessary, for I take it that the example is so disanalogous that even a decision which is non-moral simpliciter would suffice. — Leontiskos
I would suggest sticking with Thesis 1 and leaving Thesis 2 to the side for the time being. — Leontiskos
The common view is that some acts are moral, such as giving a starving man food or committing murder, and some acts are non-moral, such as taking one’s dog for a walk. — Leontiskos
I have no clue what a "moral decision" is supposed to be, it's a term you brought up but isn't defined in the OP. I explained my assumption so it can be corrected. — Judaka
Suit yourself. — Judaka
We don't consider acts moral/immoral, we consider principles moral/immoral and acts with no relevance to any moral principles are non-moral. Is that not your experience as well? — Judaka
You are the one who introduced that term, hence my point. — Leontiskos
And my point was that you should provide an example, even though that example does not need to adhere to the financial parallel you have tried to set up. — Leontiskos
The OP asks you to spell out the difference between a moral principle and a non-moral principle. The contention is that you will not be able to do this, and because of this your moral theory will fail. — Leontiskos
There's an incentive to come up with a logical, well-reasoned argument even though it's bullshit. Which further complicates explaining what morality is. There are too many social and political influences at play. We can't tell what's real or just convenient - too much "fake data", if you like. — Judaka
You are again freely strawmanning, inventing truths, putting words into my mouth that I've never spoken, spinning realities, whatever terminology best gets the point across. In this case, I only said that violence is a wrong in an ultimate sense from an ultimate vantage-point, but never that it is "prohibited". And I have neither the time nor the inclination to correct every strawman you've so far made.
[...]
… Which I can’t help but find intellectually dishonest. — javra
Ad hominem is what one often resorts to when they find themselves unable to address the arguments at hand. Clearly you've devolved into this state with abandon. You were doing much better towards the beginning of our conversation. Granted, the absurd things you claimed, which I have highlighted and specifically asked you to address, are indefensible, and so it's no coincidence that you refuse to defend them. But the intellectually honest person would simply retract such statements instead of playing the victim. — Leontiskos
Short for argumentum ad hominem: A fallacious objection to an argument or factual claim by appealing to a characteristic or belief of the person making the argument or claim, rather than by addressing the substance of the argument or producing evidence against the claim; an attempt to argue against an opponent's idea by discrediting the opponent themselves. — https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ad_hominem
But no, I only stated the facts of the matter regarding your actions as I honestly saw them and as I've tried to succinctly evidence via quotes, this rather than engaging in personal attacks of your character as person so as to discredit your comments. — javra
As before, go for it in terms of last words. — javra
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