Which brings to mind the Pinter analysis - that form is precisely what is brought to bear by cognition so as to navigate the environment — Wayfarer

It’s not just humans who bring form to bear on an environment. This is precisely what all living systems do. And we don’t have to stop there. The non-living world subsists in itself as configurative phenomena. Matter ‘comes to matter’ within intra-actively changing agential configurations.

Matter ‘comes to matter’ within intra-actively changing agential configurations. — Joshs

What now?

I think both form and content are missing from the blob Bob received. Can we take a closer look at the relationship between these things? — frank

Ironically, I had just read a book review in Philosophy Now magazine, before I noticed this post. The book author discusses the "neoliberal consumerist worldview", and the reviewer noted : "in postmodern culture the value of art is financial rather than aesthetic". The illustration showed a stainless steel sculpture by Jeff Koons, which sold for $91 million dollars in 2019. What did the buyer get for his financial fortune : a> a tchotchke to put on a shelf for the aesthetic amusement of his friends, or b> a steel object emulating a child's plastic balloon? Is "The Rabbit" merely a material thing (Hyle), or an aesthetic idea (Morph) in the form of a visual joke : steel art emulating plastic plaything?

Aristotle's Hylomorphism*2 has been interpreted in various ways. The Hyle (wood) component is obviously a material object, but the Morph (Form) component is defined philosophically as "immaterial". Yet Materialists may not distinguish between the tangible (stuff) of the Thing and the Idea (meaning) of the Thing. Is the aesthetic value of the Rabbit in the stainless steel, or in the irony of a child's toy on a museum pedestal? Did the buyer pay for the physical Matter or the metaphysical Form? Which is the "content", the steel or the joke? :joke:


*1. A financial investment, or a sight gag (wink, wink)?


2. Hylomorphism is a philosophical doctrine developed by the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, which conceives every physical entity or being as a compound of matter and immaterial form, with the generic form as immanently real within the individual. ___Wikipedia

*3. Steel Manufacturer Pays More Than $100 Million to Reduce Emissions from its Dearborn, Michigan Facility
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/steel-manufacturer-pays-more-100-million-reduce-emissions-its-dearborn-michigan


PS___
a> Does the stainless steel Rabbit have more or less Content (material or financial or aesthetic value) than the plastic inflatable Rabbit?
b> The language on such topics gets confusing. Is the steel mill (*3) paying for negative Material (hyle ; pollution) and positive Content (form ; ethics ; purity ; public image ; legal status )?

I love most of Koons' stuff. But yea, investment is like accounting: it's a bizarre other world. S&P500 futures make about as much sense as a giant balloon dog.

If this was an exercise in all of the possible definitions of "house", then yes. But in exploring the agreements between the homeowner and the contrators, no.

Ok, but my point is not that 'house' can have many definitions, but that the form of a house is insignificant for its definition.

A homeowner and a contractor can agree to build a house in the form of a pile of building materials as long as it can be used according to the building regulations (e.g. provide shelter, possibilities for cooking, toilet, shower etc).

There is no form shared by all houses. Instead, there are some functions shared by all houses.

We're able to impose form on it by way of analysis of the chemical composition, spectroscopic analysis, etc. But in another sense, there are vast clouds of interstellar matter that are formless.

Which brings to mind the Pinter analysis - that form is precisely what is brought to bear by cognition so as to navigate the environment.

If the mind is imposing a form on "clouds of interstellar matter," that lack it, why does it impose one form over any other? Why would this imposed form be helpful if it doesn't have to do with something that exists in the "cloud of matter?" And then what causes this imposition of form?

For my part, it seems like the causes must be traced, at least in part, to the things, in which case things can be said to poses form.

But we imagine that if we had eyes small enough, we would see particles down there. It's not really formless, is it?

I suppose it depends on how we use the term "form." In Artistotle, and the classical metaphysical tradition more generally, the form is responsible for all of a thing's "whatness," quiddity. Without eidos, form, there is nothing to say about a thing. And there is a strong phenomenological thread ancient and medieval thought, so this would also amount to saying that formless matter cannot be experienced as anything (cannot be a noema in Husserl's terminology, a target of intentionally.) Prime matter, matter without form is only known as speculative abstraction.

St. Gregory of Nyssa takes this up in "On the Making of Man." Apparently, a common argument at the time was to say that matter must be coeternal with God (a view based on the Timaeus) because God, as pure act, would lack the properties of matter (which must come from somewhere). But as St. Gregory points out, having removed all form, all whatness, from matter, one is left with nothing, no attributes at all—so there is nothing to "lack" in a "lack of potency." (This is also how Aristotle's Prime Mover(s) or Plotinus' One cannot be said to suffer from any privation through being pure act).

So all observed matter would have some form, but not all things would be beings (i.e., having a telos, an internally organizing principle). Clay, rocks, etc. are just bundles of external causes. Statues, being artifacts, have their forms determined by the minds of men.

Now, if form is rather something created by/imposed by the mind, it almost seems to counterintuitively dislodge the phenomenological side of the understanding of eidos, since now the whatness of things is no longer essential to what they are but is rather something produced in one corner of the world, for some perceiving subject.

The non-living world subsists in itself as configurative phenomena.

What does this mean? Are there non-configurative phenomena as a constant?

Matter ‘comes to matter’ within intra-actively changing agential configurations.

"Agent" as the term is used in chemistry, e.g anything affecting change, or "agent" as the term is often used in the social sciences, as an entity that makes intentional decisions/choices?

If the mind is imposing a form on "clouds of interstellar matter," that lack it, why does it impose one form over any other? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Because 'cloud' is a familar cognitive trope. But do clouds possess form at all? I think in the strict sense that it is questionable. They fall under this description:

Clay, rocks, etc. are just bundles of external causes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

(That question is anticipated in the Parmenides, when Socrates asks if there are forms for hair, dirt and mud.)

In any case, the fact that forms are artefacts of the cognitive system, does not undermine their objective (or would that be transjective) reality. It doesn't say that they're solely the product of the mind, but that they arise in the relationship between observer and observed. Biological phenomenology such as enactivism sees such cognitive artifacts as co-arising as a consequence of the interaction between organism and environment. For the pre-moderns, obviously forms could have 'eternal reality in the mind of God' but that is generally not an option for modern philosophy, but we could plausibly say that the idea of forms arose from an intuitive grasp of this co-dependency.

(That question is anticipated in the Parmenides, when Socrates asks if there are forms for hair, dirt and mud.) — Wayfarer

This is an issue where Aristotle's argument about the inseparability of form and matter comes into play. The call for a comprehensive causality means not being able to choose who shows up for the party.

Ah, ok. Makes sense!

St. Gregory of Nyssa takes this up in "On the Making of Man." Apparently, a common argument at the time was to say that matter must be coeternal with God (a view based on the Timaeus) because God, as pure act, would lack the properties of matter (which must come from somewhere). But as St. Gregory points out, having removed all form, all whatness, from matter, one is left with nothing, no attributes at all—so there is nothing to "lack" in a "lack of potency." (This is also how Aristotle's Prime Mover(s) or Plotinus' One cannot be said to suffer from any privation through being pure act). — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's interesting. One of the books I read about Plotinus suggested that he was an eliminative idealist (like a reflection of an eliminative materialist). Though we talk about the privation of the good (or mind), it's not really an independent thing. It's also part of the One, though apparently the part where Plotinus explains this is squirrelly.

Now, if form is rather something created by/imposed by the mind, it almost seems to counterintuitively dislodge the phenomenological side of the understanding of eidos, since now the whatness of things is no longer essential to what they are but is rather something produced in one corner of the world, for some perceiving subject. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I suppose that goes well with panpsychism. I've leaned pretty far into the skepticism about metaphysics these days. Don't have much to say about it, but I could go on and on forever about the dramas that Form and Formlessness play out in the psyche. Cool stuff.

It's also part of the One, though apparently the part where Plotinus explains this is squirrelly. — frank

Does this source quote from a specific text from Plotinus?

↪Joshs

The non-living world subsists in itself as configurative phenomena.

What does this mean? Are there non-configurative phenomena as a constant?

Matter ‘comes to matter’ within intra-actively changing agential configurations.

"Agent" as the term is used in chemistry, e.g anything affecting change, or "agent" as the term is often used in the social sciences, as an entity that makes intentional decisions/choices? — Count Timothy von Icarus

There are no non-configurative phenomena. All events take place within some larger pattern of relations. Agency here does not refer to an entity, but to the organizational capacities of reciprocally affecting relational processes.