Simply, like footprints in sand on a beach, "the statue" (pattern) is a secondary quality and "the clay" (material) is a primary quality; thus, unlike the latter, the former is not physically conserved.How are the clay and the statue related? — frank
Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:
(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics
The authors of the article make some reasonable arguments to resolve the issue. I tend to look at it as an ongoing issue of how to understand the role of all the causes needed for particular creatures to come into being. Since the forms don't have their own real estate outside the convergence of causes, a new concept of the soul is needed. — Paine
There is a parallel consideration taking place in Plato's Sophist, where the sharp division between Being and Becoming is brought into question. It is interesting that Aristotle's Physics (nature) spends so much time and effort into pressing a thumb into the eye of the Eleatics. — Paine
I disagree with your depiction of the Eleatics as sophists. Plato wrote the Sophist having a student of Parmenides overturning a critical tenet of his teacher. Aristotle (almost reluctantly) confirms Plato's descriptions of sophistry as a way to "say what is not." Pretty darn Parmenidean. — Paine
Your version of 'being' and 'becoming' gives a place for "potential" to hang out in between times of actuality. That does not fit well with Aristotle speaking of potential as something we can only apply by analogy. We need experience to use the idea. In a parallel fashion, I read the tension created in Metaphysics Zeta 13 to point to the complexity of causes beyond being able to recognize "kinds" (genos). — Paine
I don't understand what you are saying here. Parmenides is Eleatic. And then you say "Pretty darn Parmenidean", as if you are confirming that Parmenides was sophistic. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is much said about "potential", and "potency" in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially Bk.9, and most is not said by analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover
What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, |1048a35| and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, |1048b1| and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second. |1048b5| But things are said to actively be, not all in the same way, but by analogy—as this is in this or to this, so that is in that or to that. For some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential], and the others as substance to some sort of matter. — Aristotle, Metaphysic, Theta 6, 1048a34, translated by CDC Reeve
Agreed, in principle. With the (entirely personal) caveat that any comprehensible notion of mind, as such, is necessarily conditioned by time, reflected in all the relations a mind constructs, including between matter and form in general, clay and statue as instances thereof. — Mww
I think it is safe to say that Aristotle does not hold Parmenides in the same high esteem expressed by Socrates in Theaetetus. — Paine
There is more in Book Lamda drawing the same distinction, but I remember that you have excluded that from your canon. — Paine
The paragraph states that it is the meaning of "actual", that we learn by analogy, not the meaning of "potential". — Metaphysician Undercover
…..also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency. — creativesoul
also related in minds. One of elemental constituency and perhaps also existential dependency.
— creativesoul
……and I’m good with calling those correlations. — Mww
καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν — Theta 1048a35
But things are not all said to exist actually in the same sense, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B, so is C in or to D; for the relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter. — Translated by Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Edition
Of nothing that exists is there nature, but only mixture and separation of what has been mixed; nature is but a name given to these by men. — ibid. 1015a1
Hence as regards those things which exist or are produced by nature, although that from which they naturally are produced or exist is already present, we say that they have not their nature yet unless they have their form and shape. That which comprises both of these exists by nature; e.g. animals and their parts. And nature is both the primary matter (and this in two senses: either primary in relation to the thing, or primary in general; e.g., in bronze articles the primary matter in relation to those articles is bronze, but in general it is perhaps water—that is if all things which can be melted are water) and the form or essence, i.e. the end of the process of generation. Indeed from this sense of “nature,” by an extension of meaning, every essence in general is called “nature,” because the nature of anything is a kind of essence.
From what has been said, then, the primary and proper sense of “nature” is the essence of those things which contain in themselves as such a source of motion; for the matter is called “nature” because it is capable of receiving the nature, and the processes of generation and growth are called “nature” because they are motions derived from it. And nature in this sense is the source of motion in natural objects, which is somehow inherent in them, either potentially or actually. — ibid 1015a6, emphasis mine
Your reading overlooks the role of analogy as a response to what cannot be defined. The Greek of 1048a35 is: — Paine
Aristotle yokes together these two senses of natural being without reducing them further. Notice that it is the same pair of terms which get used analogically in Theta 6. — Paine
How are the clay and the statue related? — frank
The ἀλλὰ sharply separates the 'seeking the boundaries of all things' from 'being able to see through analogy'. The separation is reiterated at 1048b10: — Paine
“Actuality “means the presence of the thing, not in the sense which we mean by “potentially.” We say that a thing is present potentially as Hermes is present in the wood, or the half-line in the whole, from potentiality. because it can be separated from it: and as we call even a man who is not studying “a scholar” if he is capable of studying. That which is present in the opposite sense to this is present actually. What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular cases by induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but must comprehend the analogy: that as that which is actually building is to that which is capable of building, so is that which is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is seeing to that which has the eyes shut, but has the power of sight; and that which is differentiated out of matter to the matter; and the finished article to the raw material. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. — ibid. 1048a30, emphasis mine
So he says that we understand the difference between these senses of "actual" by the way that they each relate to "potential". — Metaphysician Undercover
1825. Now actuality (769).
Second, he establishes the truth about actuality. First, he shows what actuality is; and second (1828), how it is used in different senses in the case of different things (“However, things”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows what actuality is. He says that a thing is actual when it exists but not in the way in which it exists when it is potential. (a) For we say that the image of Mercury is in the wood potentially and not actually before the wood is carved; but once it has been carved the image of Mercury is then said to be in the wood actually. (b) And in the same way we say that any part of a continuous whole is in that whole, because any part (for example, the middle one) is present potentially inasmuch as it is possible for it to be separated from the whole by dividing the whole; but after the whole has been divided, that part will now be present actually. (c) The same thing is true of one who has a science and is not speculating, for he is capable of speculating even though he is not actually doing so; but to be speculating or contemplating is to be in a state of actuality.
1826. What we mean (770).
Here he answers an implied question; for someone could ask him to explain what actuality is by giving its definition. And he answers by saying that it is possible to show what we mean (i.e., by actuality) in the case of singular things by proceeding inductively from examples, “and we should not look for the boundaries of everything,” i.e., the definition. For simple notions cannot be defined, since an infinite regress in definitions is impossible. But actuality is one of those first simple notions. Hence it cannot be defined.
1827. And he says that we can see what actuality is by means of the proportion existing between two things. For example, we may take the proportion of one who is building to one capable of building; and of one who is awake to one asleep; and of one who sees to one whose eyes are closed although he has the power of sight; and “of that which is separated out of matter,” i.e., what is formed by means of the operation of art or of nature, and thus is separated out of unformed matter, to what is not separated out of unformed matter. And similarly we may take the proportion of what has been prepared to what has not been prepared, or of what has been worked on to what has not been worked on. But in each of these opposed pairs one member will be actual and the other potential.
And thus by proceeding from particular cases we can come to an understanding in a proportional way of what actuality and potency are. — Aquinas, Commentaries on Metaphysics, LESSON 5 Actuality and Its Various Meanings ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1048a 25-1048b 36
In the text preceding Theta 6, different senses of how potentiality was present in a motion or a being was discussed. — Paine
Theta 6 begins by addressing the difference between how actuality and potentiality can be said to be present: — Paine
The passage does relate how specific senses of actuality relate to specific potential activities but it uses the clearly stated antithesis between actuality and potentiality to do so. — Paine
it is logically consistent to designate the actual as eternal, having been separated from the concepts of time and movement. — Metaphysician Undercover
The effort you have put into placing me outside of the conversation does not address the distinctions that Aquinas also understood. — Paine
Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:
(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics
The passage in question is not claiming that result. — Paine
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