I don't so far find justification for this claim. But groovy all the same. Then, please enlighten me as to what we all know "mind" to be in the ordinary sense. — javra
I'll start here: What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds? — javra
Some folk need there to be only two genders — Banno
I thought you decided not to read my posts. Sure, beliefs have an impact on behaviour. And behaviours have an impact on belief. My point is that how to count genders is a decision, not an observation.Let's do philosophy instead of polemics. — Leontiskos
I don't so far find justification for this claim. But groovy all the same. Then, please enlighten me as to what we all know "mind" to be in the ordinary sense. — javra
We know what we mean when we say such things as "I changed my mind", "I made up my mind", "I don't mind", " I did that task mindfully", "mind your step" and so on...there are countless examples. They suggest that what we understand as mind is really minding, a verb not a noun, an activity not an object. Of course this is not to say that reification of that activity does not often set in.
I'll start here: What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds? — javra
Everything in the so-called external world is not an aspect of our own minds. Of course our perception of those things is a form of minding, but it does not follow that the things are forms of minding. It seems impossible to make sense of the idea that they could be. If the tree I see and the tree you see are forms of our respective mindings then how is that we obviously see the same tree? That we see the same tree suggests that the tree is mind-independent. — Janus
If the tree I see and the tree you see are forms of our respective mindings then how is that we obviously see the same tree? That we see the same tree suggests that the tree is mind-independent. — Janus
None of which provides a justifiably true belief of what demarcates mind from non-mind. — javra
Repetition of unjustified affirmations such as that "we all know what 'mind' is in the ordinary sense" does not make the affirmation true — javra
By what means do you conclude that trees and insentient, as in not able to perceive things such as gravity and light in their own non-animal based ways? — javra
But since I, again, don't want to play devil's advocate, I'll do my best to leave you to it in turn. — javra
2. The boundary between mental & extra-mental objects is blurry even if we accept this distinction. Pick any object X you regard as extra mental with following features a,b,c..etc. Its conceivable that I can alter all the features you perceive of X by changing your brain chemistry or neural structuring. In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, If we still establish an identity across change. Apply this argument to all objects in the world and you will end up reducing the entire world to one substance, which is neither mental nor extra-mental, since it cannot be grasped via concepts or experience. We have arrived at a contradiction. The boundary between extra mental and mental objects belongs to neither camps. Kant ran into this problem and there hasn't really been any satisfactory response to it.
What aspect of what we are aware of will not be an aspect of our own minds? — javra
When you take your coffee cup and put it in the dishwasher, does it still exist? — Banno
Speaking very roughly, just to get started, realism holds that ...stuff... is independent of what we say about it; anti-realism, that it isn't. — Banno
Pick any object X (…) with following features a,b,c..etc. It’s conceivable that I can alter all the features you perceive of X by changing your brain chemistry or neural structuring. In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, — Sirius
In which case, the object X would just be some empty "thing in itself" with no inherent features to it, if we establish identity across change. — Sirius
The boundary between extra mental and mental objects belongs to neither camps. Kant ran into this problem and there hasn't really been any satisfactory response to it. — Sirius
Regardless of whether idealism or realism is true, our phenomenological experience of the world would remain unchanged. — Sirius
Moore made the claim that "Here is a hand". On a forum such as this, we might instead point out that you are now reading this post. Now if you find it difficult to doubt that you are now reading this sentence, then you might also grant things such as that there is a language in which it is written, that someone wrote it, that there are screens and devices and networks linking you to that writer, and so on. — Banno
When you take your coffee cup and put it in the dishwasher, does it still exist? A realist might say that it either exists or it doesn't, and since we have no reason to think it has ceased to exist, then we can reasonably maintain that it still exists. On this view, there are at least two things in the world, the cup and the dishwasher.
On the other hand, the anti-realist might suppose that since the cup is in the dishwasher we cannot perceive it, and so cannot say for sure if it exists or not. They might conclude that at best we can say that it is neither true nor false that the cup exists. They would conclude that there is at least only one thing, the dishwasher — Banno
That strikes me as ad hoc - introducing a needless distinction in order to maintain a position that has been shown errant.I think it's important to recognise the distinction between intension and extension. — Michael
"Determined" doesn't sound right. We can name things in different ways, to different ends. But excluding the word "cup" from our vocabulary will not make the cup disappear, except perhaps from our conversation.but haven't you said that what there is is determined by our words for them? — bert1
Quite. The choice between realism and anti-realism is not a choice of realities, but a choice of language games. If asked "where is the cup", which answer is to be preferred - "It is in the dishwasher" or "I don't know"?Someone who rejects both realism and anti-realism, as I believe Wittgenstein did... — Joshs
That strikes me as ad hoc - introducing a needless distinction in order to maintain a position that has been shown errant.
The topic is the truth of "the cup is in the dishwasher", understood extensionally as being about the cup. We might, separately and distinct from this conversation, talk about the suitability of the use of the word "cup" to talk about the cup before us as distinct from and the cup in the dishwasher. Just as we might talk about the suitability of "King Charles" to refer to Camilla's husband if he had been deposed.
The question at hand is not about the suitability of certain descriptions, but the truth of "the cup is in the dishwasher".
Unless you can show that these are somehow the very same question. — Banno
Statements are grammatical combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present king of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.
Revising all one's beliefs is not perfectly easy.
I said changing a societal belief from X to Y would have radical implications. You replied that "one could believe" Y without moving into those implications. This is a modal notion which is quite foreign to reality. Beliefs have implications, just as knowledge does, and changes in belief will involve changes in behavior.
It is important to note that there is a difference in logic sitting behind the distinction between realism and anti-realism. Realists supose that a proposition is either true or it is false, and that there are no alternatives. Their attitude towards truth is binary. On the other hand, anti-realists are happy to admit at least a third possibility, that a proposition might be neither true nor false, but have some third value. Anti-realism became more prominent towards the end of last century with the development of formal paraconsistent and many-valued logics.
I think a large part of the difference between realism and anti-realism can be explained by making use of Anscombe's notion of direction of fit. This is the difference between the list you take with you to remind yourself of what you want to buy and the list the register produces listing the things you actually purchased. The intent of the first list is to collect the things listed; of the second, to list the things collected. The first seeks to make the world fit the list, the second, to make the list to fit the world. So perhaps anti-realism applies to ethics and aesthetics because we seek to make the world as we say, while realism applies to ontology and epistemology because we seek to make what we say fit the world.
Take two questions:
1. Is the king in the palace?
2. Is the cup in the dishwasher?
Do we understand (1) extensionally as being about Charles, such that the answer to the question is "yes" if Charles is in the palace, even if the monarchy has been abolished? Or is the answer "there is no king"?
Anti-realists simply extend this reasoning to a greater class of nouns. Maybe they're wrong to, but at least we're able to address their actual position and not some strawman that treats all anti-realisms as phenomenalism
As for the cup in the dishwasher, only someone commitment to sophism would deny that. But non realism isn't reducible to that. A Berkeleyan idealist for eg would say the cup is in the dishwasher since that's how God perceives it, even if no human being does. Both the realist and anti realist have the same answer here. — Sirius
I don't believe an anti realist goes around saying such and such statement is neither true nor false, anymore than a realist. Every theory of truth is compatible with realism vs anti realism, both classical & non classical logic are likewise compatible with realism & anti realism. In other words, they are of no help here.
Can you cash out non realism in a way that doesn't invoke idealism or phenomenonalism etc ? I don't think so. — Sirius
Just as being a king is not a property/condition that is reducible to mere material composition and location in space and time it can be argued that being a cup is not a property/condition that is reducible to mere material composition and location in space and time.
If we abolish the monarchy then it is not the case that those people who were kings no longer exist but it is the case that they are no longer kings, and so no kings exist.
And so one can argue that if we don't see or use something as a cup then it is not the case that those things which were cups no longer exist but it is the case that they are no longer cups, and so no cups exist.
The term "anti-realism" was coined by Michael Dummett to refer to those positions which reject "semantic realism, i.e. the view that every declarative sentence in one's language is bivalent (determinately true or false) and evidence-transcendent (independent of our means of coming to know which)".
Let's suppose an non realist comes to the conclusion that there are no cups. — Sirius
If asked "where is the cup", which answer is to be preferred - "It is in the dishwasher" or "I don't know"? — Banno
I don't follow this. Non-classical logic is one way to defend anti-realism, but that does not rule out others. So Kripke's theory of truth is arguably classical, in that it only assigns "true" or "false" to any proposition, just not to all of them.Graham Priest has shown non classical logic is compatible with all sorts of theory of truths you find. So we cannot distinguish metaphysical realism or anti realism based on theory of truth via its commitment
to classical or non classical logic. — Sirius
It is rather hard to see how "a cup exists only if there exists some X such that X is being seen or used as a cup" counts as scientific realism. — Banno
Not so much, perhaps, since "This has nothing to do with scientific realism" yet " it's perfectly consistent with physicalism and scientific realism". But thanks for clarifying.I explained it quite clearly in that post: — Michael
I gather this is intensional, as opposed to extensional.P2. For all X, X is a cup only if X is being seen or used as a cup — Michael
Not so much, perhaps, since "This has nothing to do with scientific realism" yet " it's perfectly consistent with physicalism and scientific realism". — Banno
I gather this is intensional, as opposed to extensional. — Banno
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