In one sense it tells us that there is nothing more to say about red; given the domain is only the beads, red just is {1,2,3}.

I agree that there is something annoying here, but I suspect that it cannot be well articulated. — Banno

I wonder if part of the problem lies in the choice of "red". I thought that picking an irreducible quale would help us see what's going on with "meaning," but maybe not. In a certain sense, "red" is like a proper name, in that it's "just there," and can't be defined further, at least not in a way that's relevant to the phenomenology.

So what if we pick "square" instead? This term has a simple definition, and doubts about possible squares are easily and publicly resolvable. Would you want to say that the extension of Square X simply is what we mean by (or define as) a square?

Would you want to say that the extension of Square X simply is what we mean by (or define as) a square? — J

Perhaps bead eight is square. In that case, and given that our domain is just the beads, "...is square" and '...is eight" are extensionally equivalent, and whatever is extensional the case with square things will be extensively the case with bead eight.

So it does not look as if the choice of red is an issue.

Take note that "red" and "square" are not proper names.

Part of what is shown here is the poverty of phenomenological approaches that is simply bypassed by the extensional treatment. We don't need the messy thinking that accompanies trying to explain if and how what you see as red and what I see as red (...or square...) are the same. So ling as we agree that {1,2,3} are red and {8} is square, we can get on.

A whole philosophical quagmire avoided.

Thanks, that makes your point clearer.

So type theory can be used to give a clear account of what is analytic and what is synthetic. This is different to what is necessary and what is possible, the concerns of modal logic. So we now have formal tools at hand with which we can make distinctions that were not available to Quine. Quine rightly dismissed the analytic/synthetic distinction as too vague, and consequently also dismissed modality, which he understood as closely related. Subsequent - or perhaps even consequent - developments have shown us ways to revive these ideas.

Perhaps bead eight is square. In that case, and given that our domain is just the beads, "...is square" and '...is eight" are extensionally equivalent, and whatever is extensional the case with square things will be extensively the case with bead eight.

So it does not look as if the choice of red is an issue. — Banno

Here is the difference I see between "red" and "square". If someone is in doubt about "red", they aren't going to say "But what does 'red' mean?" They're probably not even going to ask, "How do you define 'red'?", though if they did, a definition of sorts is available, involving wavelengths. But people used "red" correctly long before this definition was known, so it's not a helpful response. The point, then, is that "red" does seem to be the sort of thing that has to get pointed to; it can't otherwise be explained or defined (phenomenologically).

"Square" is different. The doubtful geometer can and does ask, "What does 'square' mean?" and receives a definition that is phenomenologically relevant and simple -- check the sides and angles. For me, the conclusion is irresistible that, in addition to various extended things that are square, there is also an intension for "square", a meaning or definition that can be appealed to in doubtful cases, and that we would certainly use in teaching a child about squares.

This doesn't yet constitute a full-fledged defense of "meaning," but are you with me so far?

@Banno, @sime

Quine rightly dismissed the analytic/synthetic distinction as too vague, — Banno

I know I've pointed this out before, but I think it's really important to keep in mind: Quine accepts the analytic/synthetic distinction when it comes to what he called "logical truths":

If we suppose a prior inventory of logical particles . . . then in general a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles. — Two Dogmas, section 1

It is the second kind of alleged analyticity, typified by "No bachelor is married", which requires synonymy, that is the focus of Quine's objections.

Obervation sentences are stimulus-synonymous for a speaker if their stimulus meanings are the same for him. But whereas one’s stimulations and their ranges are a private affair, stimulus synonymy makes sense socially. Sentences are stimulus-synonymous for the community if stimulus-synonymous for each member. This still does not work between languages, unless the community is bilingual. — Quine, Pursuit of Truth

I'm not seeing a difference. Won't you also have to explain what a side and an angle are? How would you do that? Is your point that red is a simple and square, a construction? Is "angle" a simple or a construct? What about "side"?

Yep, tautologies are true because they remain true under substitution - and that is becasue of the very definition of extensionality. So a=a or p v ~p are analytic because no matter what you substitute in to a, it remains true. Same for any tautology.

But a Batchelor of Arts need not be married, and a bachelor might be married to his work.

That is, Quine accepts the analytic/synthetic distinction when it can be given a firmly extensional definition.

So far as I understand the sort of formal systems @sime has in mind, analyticity is defined in terms of construction rather than substitution. The identity a=a is always constructible, without the need for external verification. Not so for "p v ~p". Nor for "Bachelors are unmarried".

So yes, synonymy requires verification - "witness".

I'm not seeing a difference. Won't you also have to explain what a side and an angle are? How would you do that? Is your point that red is a simple and square, a construction? Is "angle" a simple or a construct? What about "side"? — Banno

I think you're pointing to the fact that any definition will ultimately have to consist of simples. But why would that mean it wasn't a definition, or meaning? My suggestion is modest: anything which can be defined in terms of simples is therefore different from a simple itself. Thus, this may lead to an explanation of why we have a pretty good idea what "square" means, much less so for "red."

It's important that we don't get this mixed up with using these terms. Here, of course, we do fine with both "square" and "red," but to say that this settles the issue of meaning is to beg the question, surely; the question at hand is whether meaning is use.

BTW, if either one of us resolves this satisfactorily, I will write it up and send it to a major journal -- Breaking news! 20th century conflict settled! Wittgenstein proved right (or wrong, as the case may be)! :wink:

It's not that meaning is use. Explanations in terms of meaning invariably reach a point were one asks the meaning of "meaning" or some such, running against the limits of that sort of approach. The admonition here is to stop looking at meaning and look instead at what one is doing - to look instead at use. This transcends the discussion of meaning, replacing what is said by what can be shown.

Wittgenstein already won this particular game by pointing out that it is not so much what we say as want we do that is of import.

Wittgenstein already won this particular game by pointing out that it is not so much what we say as what we do that is of import. — Banno

I guess I never understood why this was supposed to be obvious, or even true. Why is doing more important than saying? Certainly we want to know what we're doing with words, but what we're trying to express with them has usually been taken as extending well beyond what we may do. Is there a way of expanding the above maxim with some argument or demonstration, rather than claiming it's something we can simply "point out" as a game-winning move?

Why is doing more important than saying? — J

Saying is a doing.

I win.

:wink: