It's a statue of X, not X. There's a difference, kind of the same difference between the concept of 14 and 14. — noAxioms

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
The concept of 14 is 14.

Adjective yes, and for argument sake, noun, yes. Does that thing playing that role need to 'exist' to have that adjective apply to it? Depends on definition of 'exist' (nobody ever specifies it no matter how many times I ask), and it depends on if EPP applies to the kind of existence being used. — noAxioms

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? Since an adjective is defined as a modifier (of a noun), how can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify? Consider a parallel question, "How can red exist if there's no thing that's red?" Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. Clearly, if redness doesn't exist (the state of being red), then red doesn't exist.

As for the general definition of the infinitive: to exist, I say it's the ability to be measured, and thus the ability to exhibit its presence as a measurable thing. Therefore, all existing things have a measurable presence. Let's consider something believed to exist, but not measurable. The math concept of infinity is an example. An infinite series can be parsed into segments unlimited. Now we see that the abstract concept of infinity can be measured indefinitely, so it's not completely measurable rather than unmeasurable.

The color read exists

Only as a concept/experience, hardly as a 'thing' in itself... — noAxioms

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon.

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton. — noAxioms

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood.

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from.

Does a unicorn being horny make it exist then? If so, what definition of 'exists'? If not, how is that consistent with EPP?
17 is prime, so 17 exists? Same questions. — noAxioms

My answer here is the same as directly above: unicorns and prime numbers exist within language, and language is a real thing, so they are real linguistically. As we say in common speech, a real person differs from a fictional person in that the former exists in both flesh and blood and language whereas the latter exists only in language.

A machine can perceive stuff without what most would call a 'mind', but I suppose it would not qualify as a sentient thing. — noAxioms

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming?

If it's impossible to measure something not present

Dark matter is not perceived, but we measure it nonetheless by its effects on other more directly perceived things. — noAxioms

In your example with dark matter, presence precedes indirect measurement.

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named.

...there's not much utility to a definition that doesn't exclude anything. — noAxioms

This explains our conversation; it's hard to define and rationalize totality.

if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A'). — ucarr

Think of a fraction in math. If the numerator and the denominator are the same, then, as you know, the value of the fraction evaluates to one. In the first statement in parentheses, it's merely saying noAxioms is noAxioms, a circularity we don't waste our time on. The second statement, an equation, translates to A/A. Then we can treat A as a variable that let's us add a coefficient, such as 2. So 2A/2A = 1A = A. The third statement is a logical deduction from knowing that if a fraction has a value other than 1, then the numerator and the denominator are not equal.

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them. — ucarr

Distance is not a journey. That word implies that a separation isn't meaningful unless something travels (which drags in time and all sorts of irrelevancies). — noAxioms

I think the implication you describe is a true implication. If D(istance) = A, and A > 0, then any length beyond a dimensionless point is meaningful in terms of the definition of distance. We know this because the dimensionless point (0 distance) is the negation of length which, in our context here, equals distance. Our conclusion, then, says both thinking about and experiencing distance becomes meaningful as a journey either of the mind or of the body.

Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact. — ucarr

The time for a rock to hit the ground depends on a relation with the immaterial gravitational constant. That seems to be an example of material things interacting with something not material.
Greed (not a material thing) drives much of the actions of people (material things).
A shadow (not a material thing) has a length, and often relates to a material object. — noAxioms

Math → emergent from brain; Greed → emergent from brain; Shadow → emergent from massive object. The bi-conditional IFF connects them necessarily to physics.

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding? — ucarr

Space expands over time... — noAxioms

If your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space?

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? — ucarr

Depends on definitions.

how can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify?

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence.
If we posit EPP, then a contradiction is reached when asserting that Pegasus has wings, as you seem to be doing.

Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red.

OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'.

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us.

As for the general definition of the infinitive: to exist, I say it's the ability to be measured, and thus the ability to exhibit its presence as a measurable thing. Therefore, all existing things have a measurable presence. Let's consider something believed to exist, but not measurable. The math concept of infinity is an example. An infinite series can be parsed into segments unlimited. Now we see that the abstract concept of infinity can be measured indefinitely, so it's not completely measurable rather than unmeasurable.

The color read exists

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.

Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2.

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum

Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers.

b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon.

I will protest this one. A hydrocarbon is simply not sweetness. It is a molecule, and sweetness is only a perception when the molecule is contacted in just the right places by something evolved to be sensitive to it.
Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them.

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different.

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun

No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so.

Whether or not Sherlock Holmes exists or not depends on definitions, and by your definition above, I would say that yes, he exists since you can measure him the same way you claimed to measure the mathematical concept of infinity. To that, instead of giving examples of things that exist, give some examples of something nonexistent. Pretty tough to do since the mere act of thinking about the example is a measurement, and thus it must exist.

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming?

You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.
None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them.

In your example with dark matter, presence precedes indirect measurement.

Under E2, yes. Oddly enough, under E5 it doesn't. Rovelli discussed that interesting bit. Under a relational view like that, measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement.

If your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space?

Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. Space expansion over time means that (given a simplified linear expansion), a meter expands to two meters after twice the time. The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime.

Of course there are other definitions of 'universe', some of which are contained by time. Some use the word to refer to the visible universe, which expands over time since after a longer time, light from more distant things has had enough time to reach us. The visible universe has a time-dependent size, and thus the visible universe expands, currently at a rate of about 6-7c proper distance along lines of constant cosmological time. But that would be true even without expansion of space.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No? — Corvus

No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue.

The concept of 14 is 14.

Per a very explicit statement in the OP, if I wanted to refer to the concept of 14, I would have explicitly said something like 'the concept of 14' or 'the perception of X'. Your inability to distinguish the two prevents any productive participation in a discussion about realism.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
— Corvus
No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue. — noAxioms

X is a free variable. It can take any value in it. X could have been a statue of Pegasus for its original value. Your inability to understand even what a variable has been the cause of muddle and confusion

, if I wanted to refer to the concept of 14, I would have explicitly said something like 'the concept of 14' or 'the perception of X' — noAxioms

It is not matter of if you wanted. We have had this discussion many times before, and it had been concluded that number is concept. Your ignorance on the fact has been contributing to beating around the bush in circles instead of seeing any progress in the discussion.

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? — ucarr

Depends on definitions. — noAxioms

How can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify? — ucarr

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence;
D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}. If E, a modifier, can modify E[B} so that it evaluates to 0{B}, then you show how E changes the initial state of B to a final state of B = to 0{B}. This statement says that B = Object, when modified by E, becomes 0{B}. The translation for this says, "B = Object, when modified by E becomes { }. This means that E modifies B = Object such that it becomes B equals an expression of the null set, the set of nothing. So modifier E changes Object B into non-existence. Only non-existence can practice infinite negation so that there is never any existence that can get started. Non-existence admits no presence of existence. They cannot intersect. This tells us that E{B} ≠ { } because something existing, such as E, cannot modify non-existence because E itself cannot exist within the presence of non-existence. Only zero can evaluate to zero, a non-modification. This tells us that modification only applies to existing things acting upon other existing things, and thus there are no attributes modifying things that don't exist.

If we posit EPP, then a contradiction is reached when asserting that Pegasus has wings, as you seem to be doing. — noAxioms

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction?

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence; D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." — ucarr

Don't follow, but that may be me. You reference only C and D, so let's say B is my mailbox and C is <stuff in my kitchen>. I don't know what " Let C = {D | D ∉ C} " means. It seems to say existence is some object where the object is not in my kitchen which seems to be a self contradictory definition of what existence meant. Existence is anything that doesn't exist. I didn't say that.
Maybe I read it wrong. E would be 'has a flag'. We can go to Pegasus after we work out the mailbox example, and also if we have a far better definition of 'existence'.

In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}.

Don't know what any of that means. Sorry if I'm not up on the notation. I don't know what the zero means. Existence of Pegasus is the zero of Pegasus?

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction?

It is assigning predication to something that doesn't exist, where EPP says existence is necessarily prior to predication.
Actually, it says that existence is conceptually prior to predication, which makes it possibly not about realism at all. Pegasus can be conceived to have wings only if one first conceives of Pegasus. It has nothing to do with if Pegasus actually is real or not. Maybe that is all the principle is about, and not about realism.
But in that case, Meinong is spouting nonsense with his examples. Sherlock Holmes has a pipe, which requires Sherlock to be conceived before we conceive of him with the pipe. Need a better example. A jabberwockey lives on Baker street. That's a predicate even if I have no concept of what a Jabberwockey is.

But if X was originally a statue of X, then a statue of X is X. No?
— Corvus
No. The Trojan Horse was arguably a mythological statue. Pegasus was never a mythological statue. — noAxioms
X is a free variable. It can take any value in it. X could have been a statue of Pegasus for its original value. — Corvus

Fine, then X is a statue of Pegasus, but that doesn't make your statement valid since a statue of X would be a statue of a statue, not a statue of Pegasus. And yes, they do make statues of statues. They sell them in gift shops.

We have had this discussion many times before, and it had been concluded that number is concept.

Only by a non-realist, and this discussion is about realism. Per my OP, if I say '14', I am discussing 14 and not the concept of 14. If you can't do that (if only to demonstrate the inconsistency of it), then as I say, you've nothing to contribute to a discussion about a stance that distinguishes the two.

Your ignorance on the fact

14 being no more than a concept is not a fact, it's an idealistic opinion.

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence; D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." — ucarr

I don't know what " Let C = {D | D ∉ C} " means. — noAxioms

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. This is a sentence logic (SL) statement representing your sentence verbal statement:

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier and it modifies an object that doesn't exist. Since the adjective, defined as a modifier of an object, exists, then its object exists. If the adjective also modifies an object that doesn't exist, you imply that the object simultaneously does and doesn't exist. The contradiction of something simultaneously existing and not existing is expressed in sentence logic as: Let C (existence) = {D | D ∉ C}.

You think a modifier can modify an object that exists, and you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist. I think a modifier can only modify an object that exists. If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state, and thus its state can't be changed, and thus it can't have a modifier that changes its state.

In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}. — ucarr

E{B} says E (Winged) changes B (Horse) into Winged Horse. 0{B} says 0 (non-existence) changes B (Horse) into { }, the null set, which is the empty set, or non-existence. This is the crux of my argument supporting EPP. Non-existence, like zero, negates infinitely all that would seek to be in its presence.

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction? — ucarr

It is assigning predication to something that doesn't exist, where EPP says existence is necessarily prior to predication.
Actually, it says that existence is conceptually prior to predication, which makes it possibly not about realism at all. Pegasus can be conceived to have wings only if one first conceives of Pegasus. It has nothing to do with if Pegasus actually is real or not. Maybe that is all the principle is about, and not about realism.
But in that case, Meinong is spouting nonsense with his examples. Sherlock Holmes has a pipe, which requires Sherlock to be conceived before we conceive of him with the pipe. Need a better example. A jabberwockey lives on Baker street. That's a predicate even if I have no concept of what a Jabberwockey is. — noAxioms

All of this, speaking in terms of logical consistency, revolves around definition, grammar and syntax. Object by definition ≠ non-existence. Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence. If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective.

Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. — ucarr

OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'. — noAxioms

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us. — noAxioms

I think it makes sense to say a thing is red such that there's an intersection between the thing and redness such that the two overlap. Within the region of the overlap, it's as if the two are one, as the language indicates.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.

Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism. — noAxioms

You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon. — ucarr

Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers. — noAxioms

Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them. — noAxioms

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others?

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes? — ucarr

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton. — noAxioms

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood. — ucarr

No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so. — noAxioms

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction.

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming? — ucarr

You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.

None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them. — noAxioms

I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?
Are you saying that when AI performs rational functions, it knows its doing so? Since you think AI has feelings, apparently you do think AI is self-aware. Is that correct? Don't confuse the impressive accomplishments of AI's iterative machine learning with self-awareness.

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.

f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? — ucarr

Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. — noAxioms

If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room? When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. Isn't that how we talk about space? On the other hand, non-existence, infinite negation, can't even do the infinite negation I describe it doing. Non-existence, then, is the limit of negation. The accommodation of the presence of existing things by space is one of the most fundamental actions within physics.

The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime. — noAxioms

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? I wonder if you hold with background independence?

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. — ucarr

That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me.

Is this meant to be your definition of 'exists'? Because from that I have no idea what does and doesn't exist. It seems to presume that we already know, yet no definition is given.
Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them.

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else.

Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier

If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. If not, then you need to define how you're using 'exists' here before I can agree to taking such a position. Remember, no EPP if we're predicating nonexistent things.

you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist.

I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration.

I think a modifier can only modify an object that exists.

Actually, your logic in your earlier post was perhaps predicating nonexistent things when talking about winged horses. But yes, you did say that you hold to EPP.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist.

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't).

Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence.. — ucarr

Two things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.
Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse.
Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic.

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.

You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives. — ucarr

OK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality.

Yes, there is a tiny bit of overlap between perception and quantum entanglement, but they're a world apart in my opinion.

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees

But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition.

If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.

But nobody was questioning the existence of the drawing or of a statue (OK, I am questioning it). We're questioning the existence of Pegasus, and by E2, yes. Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence.

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. I have better proof of mind independence.
So OK, the drawing is perhaps more than an ideal. The ideal corresponds to something mind independent. Next question: Does it exist? Depends on definition. OK, specifically, does it exist under definitions E1,3,4,5,6? Most of those are similar but with different domains. Under which domains does the drawing exist? Under which domains is EPP valid? E4 still seems anthropocentric, a form of mind dependency. Thus E4 makes for a poor definition for mind independent existence.

You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives.

My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. I also did not mention a third part. The example was how you would see it.
What is evidence for the sign's mind independence is that we both see it, as we did with your example of a drawing above.

How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?

By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway.

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post.

I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?

Kind of off topic, no? I have neither claimed this nor denied this.

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it?

The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition.

If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball?

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical

Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.

Yes, it did (E5), because it was measured even before you had a notion to seek after it. Your current state was a function of the ball, as it is a function of a great deal of anything inside your past light cone.

f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? — ucarr

If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room?

Most people use 'material' to mean matter. If space was matter, you could not walk into a room since it was already full. So rather than argue about this, let's clearly define 'material' before we decide if space qualifies as it or not.
Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property.

When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space.

I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'.

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static?

It has a temporal dimension. What you call 'change' is a difference in cross sections at different times, just like an MRI image has different pictures of cross sections of a body at different values of some spatial axis.

I wonder if you hold with background independence?

I suppose I hold to it. I only know the relevance to general relativity.

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. — ucarr

That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me. — noAxioms

Things that either exist or don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." If this is reality, then saying,

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

is an example of winged _______________. You say, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." That means there's something to modify, something that exists. Next you say, The object simply lacks the property of existence." Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them. — noAxioms

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1.

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else. — noAxioms

Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2. — noAxioms

Within the scope of predication, I don't object to what you say here. I think the scope of existence is greater than language since I think earth, for example, existed before there was a language naming it.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier

If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. — noAxioms

I acknowledge this truth within the scope of language. I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. Non-existence precludes relations. Humans can talk meaningfully about relations between existing things and non-existence, as Meinong does.

This type of talk, however, depends upon the indirection of complexity. I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence, and the different parts have relations connecting them. Because the sentence has the indirection of complexity, humans cannot observe the imaginary object directly. They can observe the local part, the language part, directly. They cannot observe the non-local part, the imaginary part, directly. In this example there is the real-imaginary thing, the language establishing the predication of a circular triangle. This we can observe directly as language. The non-local part, the imaginary-imaginary thing, the actual circular triangle that is the referent for the language signing for it, we cannot observe directly.

you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist.

I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration. — noAxioms

I think here you have a good policy.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. — ucarr

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate. — noAxioms

Here you say something interesting because, by my reading of you, you involve modification with state change. Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red. It moves on to a field of visible green light and observers see that now the soccer ball is green. In both instances of the soccer ball being observed first red and then green, we perceive that modification plays the role of a function that creates a bi-furcation of before/after for the soccer ball. In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things that embody their colors as real things, but WRT the soccer ball, they can't act as modifiers until a pre-existing thing enters the field of their presence and undergoes the modification of their functions.

Things that either exist or don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. — ucarr

Two things here.
1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said.
2) You mention 'simultaneiously', which seriously narrows down the sort of existence you're talking about. Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction. So we're once again talking about E2 existence, and we all agreed that Pegasus has exists as a human concept.

The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." — ucarr

Wrong, because I explicitly stated that EPP was not one of my premises, and the implication you mention directly requires EPP, else it is a non-sequitur.
Your job is to demonstrate that "Pegausus has wings" leads to a contradiction, but without begging EPP. Yes, I realize that it is a contradiction if that principle is presumed, but I don't presume principles unless there's a logical reason to do so. Believing an unjustified principle is essentially rationalizing your beliefs, as opposed to holding rational beliefs. People are very good at the former and just terrible at the latter, perhaps for the best. We're evolved to do that, so to do otherwise is against our nature.

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

I never said it exists. Read the quote.

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1. — ucarr

OK, E1. Yet all your descriptions are of E2. Pegasus doesn't exist because you do not see it. A T-Rex doesn't exist because you see it, but it isn't simultaneous with you. That's not objective existence. That's existence relative to you, or E2.
Just saying that your posts in no way reflect using 'exists' in an E1 way, so it was a surprise to see that statement. E1,5 & maybe 6 are mind independent, but your posts imply that they exist due to your perception of them.
There is no empirical test for E1 existence since it isn't defined in an empirical manner, so it is really hard to justify the existence of something if E1 is what you mean by 'existence'. It needs a rational justification, not an empirical one.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence.

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets.


As for my counter to EPP, I point out that 8 is an even number, which is a predicate of 8. The concept of 8 is not even, but the concept of 8 bears the concept of something even. Either way it is not a predicate of the concept. How is EPP consistent with that?

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence

No, presumably only the concepts have existence, especially per Meinong.

Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. — ucarr

You know I don't consider color to be a predicate of a soccer ball, but I will allow it to have physical properties that would result in perception by some as what you call these proto-colors, yet unspecified.

The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red.

More like black and white. All colors look pretty much like grayscale under monochrome light. If the ball had two different materials (as most do), the one would be lighter than the other. Anyway, were it observed by a simple human-made digital camera, yes, you'd get a picture with only reds in it. I'm just being picky here, not disagreeing with anything. More picky: Is there such a thing as invisible red light?

Your soccer ball seems to reflect at least these two wavelengths of light, else your story would not work.

In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things

Not clear under E1. Yes, clear under E2 and E4, the two anthropocentric definitions.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state — ucarr

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field and then argue for such axiomatically determined existence therein. If “existence” and “predicate” are only words, then, of course, you can axiomatically determine their existence.

If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective. — ucarr

Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence.. — ucarr

Two things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.

Regarding your example sentence, in your prepositional phrase, "about the homeless." the modifying adjective "the" attaches to the noun "homeless." If you remove "homeless" from the sentence, the sentence disappears and becomes an incomplete thought with the article dangling.

Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse. Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic. — noAxioms

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence. If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement. — ucarr

OK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality. — noAxioms

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent. — ucarr

But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition. — noAxioms

Knowing what someone else's mind sees by evidence supporting inference to my mind seeing the same thing is how we know what exists beyond mind-dependent perception. If I see a car run a red light and enter an intersection, and then one car in the oncoming traffic swerves one way to avoid the intruding car, and another car in the oncoming traffic swerves another way, then I know both swerving drivers saw the same intruding car. I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind.

If there's no way to transcend one's own mind, and yet all members of society are confined to their own minds likewise, and therefore I can infer what's confined to the mind of another is the same as what's confined to my mind by what my mind sees as the behavior of others, then that's a functional simulation of objective reality, and the conjectured real, unreachable objective reality is trivial. Given this, the epistemological reach for the conjectured real, objective reality is just academic fuss.

Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence. — noAxioms

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality.

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. — noAxioms

I now suspect your apparent quest for epistemic certainty is the idealism lurking within this conversation.

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others? — ucarr

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. — noAxioms

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? Isn't it generally understood what's perceived in our minds is a functional substitute for whatever is out there causing it?

How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway. — noAxioms

So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction. — ucarr

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post. — noAxioms

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication?

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? — noAxioms

The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition. — noAxioms

E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"

Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality.

If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? — ucarr

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical — noAxioms

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.

Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property. — noAxioms

Loop quantum gravity posits space as a construction from elementary units (of space) assembled. By this definition, space is a divisible thing. Space as a four-manifold of Relativity warps around celestial bodies including the earth. Things fall to earth due to its curved space.

When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. — ucarr

I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'. — noAxioms

So-called emptiness ≠ emptiness.

When you throw a football, or anything else with a horizontal trajectory velocity, its trajectory traces a parabola. This is a predication about how space physically accommodates material objects.

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? — ucarr

It has a temporal dimension. — noAxioms

Spacetime means space and time are connected. Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically. The universe has an age. It is changing its age and its degree of expansion.

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field — ucarr

I made no mention of any existence within a language field. Your comment used words that implied usage of 'existing' within the domain of time, as opposed to your usual domain of perception, and I was noting that. I need to do this since you've been very inconsistent and unclear with your usage of the word. There are no axioms being leveraged.

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

Yes, language alters E2 existence, but not the other kinds, and this topic is about the other kinds.

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.

You say that your example is not limited to mind-dependent reality, yet your example is one of perception. Pick an example that is not based on mind or perception.

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)
Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events.

I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind. — ucarr

Yes, that is the primary evidence for E4 sort of existence. Unlike E2, the car would still be there if you were not, but it's existence is still epistemologically based. You posit the mind-independent existence of the car from your mind dependent perception of it. Our tiny corner of the universe exists, but probably not other universes because we don't see those. There's incredible resistance to theories that only explain things by requiring the 'existence' of far more than what was presumed before. It started when Earth was all that existed, coupled with the domes of light show that circled overhead. The discovery of other galaxies was met with significant resistance, and you can see those. Imagine the pushback when the boundary got pushed back to nonexistence. So yes, your car example is evidence for E4, but E4 is still very anthropocentric.

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours.

Not sure. You seem to perceive a drawing instead of a flying horse. I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse, and not the existence or predicates of either a drawing (which has E4 existence) or the concept of Pegasus (E2 existence). Neither of the latter has wings, but the former does. EPP says that last statement is meaningless.

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? — ucarr

I am absolutely separating the two, and no, it does not mean that I cannot infer the predicates of the sign, such as its mass or location. I was just noting that being red wasn't one of those predicates. That is a deception of language. We say that 'the sign is red', and we hear that so many times that you believe it, instead of realizing that it would be far more correct to say 'the sign appears red'. Knowing the difference is a good step towards knowing the mind independent thing itself, but it's got a long way to go from there.

So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?

'Ontic' means existence, so it seems contradictory to refer to ontic status independent of existence. But while 'ontic' refers to what is, it isn't confined to just one definition of what is, E1-E6+.

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication? — ucarr

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived.
How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5.
So E1 is the problem. Sherlock Holmes presumably doesn't objectively exist and yet he wears a trench coat. I cannot say he just exists in some other domain, since that would violate E1. So trick is to drive that premise to contradiction without leveraging EPP.

E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"

Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality. — ucarr

For the most part, I am willing to accept this. The measurement event and the wave function of its entire causal past (a subset of its past light cone given a presumption of locality) can be thought of as expressions of the same thing, neither being prior to the other. But all past events (the causes) are temporally prior. I was caused in part by my parents long ago, thus my parents then exist in relation to me now and not v-v.

The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.

Under E5 it's existence relative to you is by definition caused by you. Without you, there'd be no ball relative to you.
Its existence relative to you just has nothing to do with the event of your learning about it. It has been part of your causal past long before that.

Spacetime means space and time are connected. — ucarr

Yes. Spacetime is part of the universe, not something in which the universe is contained.

Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically.

Both wrong. Time isn't something that elapses under the spacetime model. It is a dimension. Due to deformation of otherwise flat spacetime, timelike worldlines between two events are shorter along paths near mass. Coordinate time dilation (an abstract coordinate effect, not a physical one like gravitational effects) is not a function of acceleration.

The universe has an age.

This statement presumes the universe is is something contained by time. If so, you discard the spacetime model, but adopt an nonstandard model where it is meaningful to say the universe-object-with-age exists (E4, existing in some larger container universe)

Things that exist/don't exist simultaneously are paradoxical. — ucarr

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox. — ucarr

Two things here.
1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said. — noAxioms

No. You did say, "the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist." See your own quote below.

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. You've been talking this way throughout this conversation. My sentential logic translation of your words quoted above makes clear the element of paradox in your explanation of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I suspect you embrace Meinong's rejection of EPP.

2) You mention 'simultaneiously', which seriously narrows down the sort of existence you're talking about. Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction. — noAxioms

You say, "Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction." I'm unsure about the purity of the truth content of your claim. If I'm in Cincinnati, I know I'm simultaneously in Ohio. Although a human-level mind is required to know this, a chimp in Cincinnati is also simultaneously in Ohio, and this is an existential truth independent of whether or not the Chimp knows it.

So we're once again talking about E2 existence, and we all agreed that Pegasus has exists as a human concept. — noAxioms

You and Meinong, when talking about predication sans existence, navigate the mind-scape of abstractions including paradox. At the level of practical English, and everyday conversation, if I say, "Yesterday, I looked at the red..." In response, you would probably say, "You looked at the red what?" My statement is either an incomplete thought with a adjective dangling, or it is a complete thought about a noun expressed by the word "red." An example of the latter is "red" used to designate a radical leftist.

These two predications, assuming existing things, make declarations about them. The scope of predication always includes existing things. Our declarations fall into two categories: a) claims about the behavior of an existing thing; b) claims about the state of being of an existing thing. We can wax fanciful and make claims about non-existing things - such as a winged Pegasus of the mind non-existent - but such talk inhabits the realm of paradox.

The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." — ucarr

Wrong, because I explicitly stated that EPP was not one of my premises, and the implication you mention directly requires EPP, else it is a non-sequitur. — noAxioms

Is EPP your language denoting Sartre’s “Existence Precedes Essence”?

Your job is to demonstrate that "Pegausus has wings" leads to a contradiction, but without begging EPP. — noAxioms

Anyone can show non-existent winged Pegasus is a contradiction by establishing the definition of attribute:

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something: flexibility and mobility are the key attributes of our army. – The Apple Dictionary

I think it likely the cited definition of “attribute” assumes EPP based on its use of the preposition “of.”

preposition | əv | 1 expressing the relationship between a part and a whole: the sleeve of his coat | in the back of the car | the days of the week | a series of programs | a piece of cake | a lot of money. – The Apple Dictionary

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 … a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something…

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter. At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms:

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

Yes, I realize that it is a contradiction if that principle [EPP] is presumed, but I don't presume principles unless there's a logical reason to do so. Believing an unjustified principle is essentially rationalizing your beliefs, as opposed to holding rational beliefs. People are very good at the former and just terrible at the latter, perhaps for the best. We're evolved to do that, so to do otherwise is against our nature. — noAxioms

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy? It's quite distinct from what you argue below:

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said. — noAxioms
No. You did say, "the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist."
...
You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. — ucarr

But I didn't say that it also existed. That's the part that would have made it paradoxical.

You've been talking this way throughout this conversation. My sentential logic translation of your words quoted above makes clear the element of paradox in your explanation of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I suspect you embrace Meinong's rejection of EPP.

I had explicitly not posited EPP in my example. This does not mean I embrace anything, it means I am testing it. I am trying to have it driven to contradiction, but I've not seen that done yet.

You say, "Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction." I'm unsure about the purity of the truth content of your claim.

There are alternate theories where time is absolute, sure. Aether theories come to mind, but then all talk of spacetime is discarded.

If I'm in Cincinnati, I know I'm simultaneously in Ohio.

So you are. It's simultaneity at a distance that is abstract. I stand clarified.

Is EPP your language denoting Sartre’s “Existence Precedes Essence”?

No. I suppose I would abbreviate that as EPE.

Anyone can show non-existent winged Pegasus is a contradiction by establishing the definition of attribute:

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something: flexibility and mobility are the key attributes of our army. – The Apple Dictionary

I think it likely the cited definition of “attribute” assumes EPP based on its use of the preposition “of.” — ucarr

No leverage of EPP is there. 'of' refers to Pegasus in our example. None of your cited definitions make mention of the object of predication necessarily existing.
Besides, it's a definition, and language usage is not proof of anything.

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter.

I don't think Pegasus requires creation from nothing. Also, the reference to the necessity of matter makes this an E4 reference (part of a domain), not E1, and I already gave a solid example of something nonexistent having predicates. So I don't see the relevance of any of your 'conservation laws' at all.

At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms:

I don't even know what 'eternal matter' is. There was no matter shortly after the big bang, so if you think there's relevance to there not being a time when there wasn't matter, you'd be wrong. There will be none left after heat death either.

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy?

Apparently not since Meinong would say that a square with a predicate of being round absists, but does not exist in any way.

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

I never said it exists. Read the quote. — noAxioms

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense. It's like multiplying 'has wings' by zero with a total non-existence result.). Next you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." Your first sentence posits an object. Your second sentence denies its existence. The two sentences describe a paradox.

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1. — ucarr

OK, E1. Yet all your descriptions are of E2. Pegasus doesn't exist because you do not see it. A T-Rex doesn't exist because you see it, but it isn't simultaneous with you. That's not objective existence. That's existence relative to you, or E2.

Just saying that your posts in no way reflect using 'exists' in an E1 way, so it was a surprise to see that statement. E1,5 & maybe 6 are mind independent, but your posts imply that they exist due to your perception of them.

There is no empirical test for E1 existence since it isn't defined in an empirical manner, so it is really hard to justify the existence of something if E1 is what you mean by 'existence'. It needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. — noAxioms

You say E1 needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. I can point to a rational justification of E1 in the form of Noether's Theorem. It makes the prediction that WRT mass, “If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities of mass whose values are conserved in time. – Wikipedia”

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

If numbers exist as a concept, then they exist. Zero does not equal non-existence because it's an unsigned number that's a placeholder and, as such, it can add great positive value to other numbers. For example,

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence

in base 10, the difference between 1 and 10 is a factor of ten, a big difference of value.

In a similar manner, zero as a factor erases value including presence altogether. Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar. It negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible.

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence — ucarr

No, presumably only the concepts have existence, especially per Meinong. — noAxioms

Everything in the sentence has existence as a concept.

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. — ucarr

You are incapable of setting EPP aside then, are you?: You are then incapable of defending it since you cannot drive the lack of it to contradiction without being able to conceive of the lack of it.

Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense.

Depends on your definition of 'exists', something you refuse to specify despite it seemingly changing from one statement to the next.. I've gone through all six, and it indeed makes no sense for some of them, and plenty of sense for others.

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem.

I don't see how mass conservation allows a generalization to E1. If you mean Pegasus cannot just pop into our universe without being built by existing mass, then I agree, but nobody is claiming that. E1 has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws. E4 might apply to that, but Pegasus can easily have wings while not having E4 existence by simply being in another universe.

Zero does not equal non-existence
...
In a similar manner, zero as a factor erases value including presence altogether.

Make up your mind...

in base 10

All bases are base 10, but they're not all base ten. Sorry, I digress, but I totally didn't see any point to the number base comment.

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar.

I don't see the relevance of this. Pegasus has two wings. Not contradictory. There are zero instances of an existing Pegasus, thus there are zero times 2 existing Pegasus-wings. None of this is contradictory until you drag EPP into it.

Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible.

So we're back to total mind-dependent everything again.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state — ucarr

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states. — noAxioms

Regarding,"the lack of a state"qualifying as a predicate, such a predicate applies to a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Only a cognitive entity of the mind-scape can be a whole apple and not just one of its states. Such wholeness beyond the scope of a particular temporal state is an abstraction. You cannot access a mind-independent, physically real thing not within a particular temporal state.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

In this example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field — ucarr

I made no mention of any existence within a language field. Your comment used words that implied usage of 'existing' within the domain of time, as opposed to your usual domain of perception, and I was noting that. I need to do this since you've been very inconsistent and unclear with your usage of the word. There are no axioms being leveraged. — noAxioms

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws. My main premise says, mind-independent things and cognitive things have two parts: a) local part: a mind-independent material thing measurable in its dimensions and also in its location; b) non-local part: the quintet that funds the physics of the temporary forms of emergent physical things and the cognitive things of sentience.

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time. The dimension of time applies to both modes. My saying your "analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field," does not establish an either/or binary governing the two modes.

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

Yes, language alters E2 existence, but not the other kinds, and this topic is about the other kinds. — noAxioms

Observer entanglement raises doubt about cognition having no impact upon E1, E3, E4, E5, E6.

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence. — ucarr

You say that your example is not limited to mind-dependent reality, yet your example is one of perception. Pick an example that is not based on mind or perception. — noAxioms

I don't argue with the claim all of our human perceptions of existence are mind-dependent. My "inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence." stands as my argument inference from observed behaviors of other persons gives us reliable information about their cognitive states as objective reality. No reasonable person disputes one person's ability to predict another person's behavior on the basis of inference from past observed behavior.

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)

Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events. — noAxioms

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above.

I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind. — ucarr

Yes, that is the primary evidence for E4 sort of existence. Unlike E2, the car would still be there if you were not, but it's existence is still epistemologically based. You posit the mind-independent existence of the car from your mind dependent perception of it. Our tiny corner of the universe exists, but probably not other universes because we don't see those. There's incredible resistance to theories that only explain things by requiring the 'existence' of far more than what was presumed before. It started when Earth was all that existed, coupled with the domes of light show that circled overhead. The discovery of other galaxies was met with significant resistance, and you can see those. Imagine the pushback when the boundary got pushed back to nonexistence. So yes, your car example is evidence for E4, but E4 is still very anthropocentric. — noAxioms

Yes, E4 is very anthropocentric, and likewise your conversation here notwithstanding your stipulation for the exclusion of E2. Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge.

Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence. — noAxioms

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality. — ucarr

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. — noAxioms

Not sure. You seem to perceive a drawing instead of a flying horse. I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse, and not the existence or predicates of either a drawing (which has E4 existence) or the concept of Pegasus (E2 existence). Neither of the latter has wings, but the former does. EPP says that last statement is meaningless. — noAxioms

When you say, "I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..."as I understand you, you refer to a flying horse defined by physics. E2 "I know about it," refers to cognitive things of the mind-scape. E4 "Is part of the objective state of this universe," as I understand it, refers to a flying horse defined by physics as rendered through a cognitive thing of the mind-scape.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the [referent of] predicate of the sign? — ucarr

I am absolutely separating the two, and no, it does not mean that I cannot infer the predicates of the sign, such as its mass or location. I was just noting that being red wasn't one of those predicates. That is a deception of language. We say that 'the sign is red', and we hear that so many times that you believe it, instead of realizing that it would be far more correct to say 'the sign appears red'. Knowing the difference is a good step towards knowing the mind independent thing itself, but it's got a long way to go from there. — noAxioms

From our consensus-based social reality, we know the stop sign is red because we infer from the similar behavior of others reacting to it their mental content in reaction to it. This means the mind-independent physics we call "stop sign" lies in the causal history of the socially verified public reaction to it. Why should we, the perceiving society, think the causal history of the referent might be, WRT language, an intentional deception or an unintentional distortion of the mind-independent state of the stop sign? This type of supposition presents itself as likely being a capricious frolic of a wayward mind.

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication? — ucarr

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived.

If philosophy wants to use "predication" in a sense other than "part of a surrounding whole" then it needs to establish a separate philosophical sense of "predication." Let's suppose you're six feet tall. Do you define yourself overall as six feet of length? Do you, instead, think of your height as a part of a larger, more inclusive identity?

How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates san existence.

If A ∈ {A,B,C} and {A,B,C} ≠ {¬A,¬B,¬C}, then A ≠ ¬A.
— noAxioms

So E1 is the problem. Sherlock Holmes presumably doesn't objectively exist and yet he wears a trench coat. I cannot say he just exists in some other domain, since that would violate E1. So trick is to drive that premise to contradiction without leveraging EPP. — noAxioms

By this argument, EPP is allowed as the causal history of Sherlock Holmes as rendered in the socially-verified mind-scape. E1"Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" says there is no objective reality of things not embedded within existence defined by E1. Moreover, as you say, if you try to exclude Sherlock Holmes from E1, you get a contradiction forbidding that exclusion. For Sherlock Holmes, or anything else, to exist, it must be part of E1. This is the argument for EPP protected by contradiction if EPP is denied.

The issue herein concerns the relationship between E1 and E2. Can anyone verify a distortion factor in the translation between the two too large to render a functional translation?

...all past events (the causes) are temporally prior. I was caused in part by my parents long ago, thus my parents then exist in relation to me now and not v-v. — noAxioms

Causal relationships are not temporal. When your parents conceived you, they became cause to your effect, and not a moment before. Speaking reciprocally, when you were conceived, you became effect to their cause, and not a moment before. This relationship will always be true.

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical — noAxioms

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me. — ucarr

Under E5 it's existence relative to you is by definition caused by you. Without you, there'd be no ball relative to you.

Its existence relative to you just has nothing to do with the event of your learning about it. It has been part of your causal past long before that. — noAxioms

The inter-relatedness you describe here is parallel to the inter-relatedness that general existence, as the quintet funding physics, holds in relation to all temporary physical forms emergent from it.

Spacetime means space and time are connected. — ucarr

Yes. Spacetime is part of the universe, not something in which the universe is contained. — noAxioms

The part/whole relationship connecting spacetime_universe might be emergence of universe from spacetime. If so, then the two are fundamentally connected. The inconceivability of universe without spacetime supports emergence.

Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically. — ucarr

Both wrong. Time isn't something that elapses under the spacetime model. It is a dimension. Due to deformation of otherwise flat spacetime, timelike worldlines between two events are shorter along paths near mass. Coordinate time dilation (an abstract coordinate effect, not a physical one like gravitational effects) is not a function of acceleration. — noAxioms

Deformation of flat spacetime resulting in shorter time-like worldlines between two events isn't warping of spacetime around a massive celestial body?

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously? — ucarr

No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location. — noAxioms

From your quotes here it sounds like you're describing a worldline dimension warping around a massive celestial body.

Gravity and acceleration causing the passing of time to slow are well known, long established predictions of Relativity. Do you deny the validity of the experimental verification of these predictions and do you deny their truth content?

The universe has an age. It is changing its age and its degree of expansion. — ucarr

This statement presumes the universe is is something contained by time. If so, you discard the spacetime model, but adopt an nonstandard model where it is meaningful to say the universe-object-with-age exists (E4, existing in some larger container universe) — noAxioms

Are you saying passing time is contained within the universe and applies to its parts but doesn't apply to the universe as a whole?

In this example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape. — ucarr

Fine. Then we're talking past each other because I'm not exploring nonexistence of concepts.

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws.

None of those exist under E2. Concepts of them do, but a concept of say mass does not have mass.
None of those have objective meaning since they are all but properties of objects in our universe,. So I don't see how you're going to build an argument for EPP under E1 using these empirical notions.

My main premise says, mind-independent things and cognitive things have two parts: a) local part: a mind-independent material thing measurable in its dimensions and also in its location; b) non-local part: the quintet that funds the physics of the temporary forms of emergent physical things and the cognitive things of sentience.

Your premise seems to presume that only 'material' things have objective existence, which confines them to our universe or one very much like it, pretty much an E4 definition. What if your premise is wrong? I mean, 14 is even (a predicate) and yet 14 is not material, so it doesn't exist by your premise. That seems to be a counterexample to your premise. And remember, I'm talking about 14 and not the concept of 14, the latter of which does not have the listed predicate.
14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time.

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates.

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above.

event A is measured by event B if the state of event B is in any way a function of the state at event A. This is a definition of 'measure' as used by E5. My paragraphs were meant as examples illustrating how it worked.

Yes, E4 is very anthropocentric, and likewise your conversation here notwithstanding your stipulation for the exclusion of E2.

The stipulation is logical. The topic is about mind independent existence, and E2 is by definition mind dependent existence. I'm not saying it's wrong, it's just not mind independent.

Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge.

I am discussing ontology, not epistemology.

When you say, "I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..."as I understand you, you refer to a flying horse defined by physics.

Not sure if physics defines Pegasus. That specific creature is, after all, in violation of our physics. Physics does allow a winged thing that in a reasonable way otherwise resembles a horse, so I'll accept the comment.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

I don't understand almost any of that, but in the end you draw a distinction between something observable or not. Not sure how Pegasus can not be observable since it, being a life form, is an observer, whether it exists or not.

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else. — ucarr

False, since Baker St is present in London, no mere abstraction. The example shows its nonexistence in a chosen domain, and yet still having predication. This is a counterexample to EPP for existence in a domain.

E1"Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" says there is no objective reality of things not embedded within existence defined by E1.

This seems to say that there cannot be more than one objective reality, or one OR embedded within another. With that I can agree, but tell me if I parsed it wrong, because it's obfuscated wording.

Moreover, as you say, if you try to exclude Sherlock Holmes from E1, you get a contradiction forbidding that exclusion. For Sherlock Holmes, or anything else, to exist, it must be part of E1.

Nothing is 'part of E1'. E1 is a definition. So anything that exists is part of objective reality (OR), by definition. If Sherlock Holmes is not part of OR (and I had presumed this), then I see no contradiction still. X exists. Y does not. I see no contradiction in some things being part of OR and other things not.
The only rule seems to be that if X and Y interact, they must have similar ontology. I can interact with ghosts only if ghosts are real or if I'm not real.
Anyway, you said 'get a contradiction from excluding Holmes from OR. Please spell out that contradiction since I do not see one. It is asserted, but in no way demonstrated.

Causal relationships are not temporal.

By definition they very much are.

When your parents conceived you, they became cause to your effect, and not a moment before.

I was talking about the E5 definition, and this isn't true under E5. They are not the cause to my effect until my effect measures them, and that doesn't happen for over half a century after said conception event. E5 is not a standard ontology definition. Rovelli is the only one that got close to its wording.

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me. — ucarr

I didn't say it was. I said that under E5 definition, its existence relative to you is due to your measurement of it. That measurement has zero to do with epistemology. Rocks measure things in this sense just as much as a biological system. E5 is a completely mind independent definition.

The inconceivability of universe without spacetime supports emergence.

Wow, I have no trouble conceiving of a universe without spacetime.

There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fat. — noAxioms

Disclaimer: I am not talking about ideals or the mental abstraction of Santa or anything else. If I want to reference a mental abstraction, I will do so explicitly. Thus I will not accept arguments about the distinction between a human abstraction of something lacking noumena (Santa, other gods, unicorns, whatever) from abstractions of things not thus lacking (apples and such). Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition. — noAxioms

The statement "An apple is red only if the apple exists," describes the scope of objective reality IFF the apple examples complex objectivity in the form of: a) non-locality by means of symmetry and conservation and b) temporary formal change emergent from the quintet of mass_energy_force-motion_space_time.

preposition - of | əv | 1 expressing the relationship between a part and a whole: the sleeve of his coat | in the back of the car | the days of the week | a series of programs | a piece of cake | a lot of money. – The Apple Dictionary

noun - attribute | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature… a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something…

The part/whole relationship connecting functions to the dynamic system (material thing) they describe examples an indivisible unity. The emergent system, a temporal form, encloses the defining characteristics within its perimeter. You can't separate a sphere from the curvature of its surface area.

A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container.

This overview of the insuperable container by the thing it contains insuperably equals the thing contained being simultaneously itself and that which is greater than itself.

In the specifics of an example, it's the curvature of the surface area of a sphere standing outside of the sphere and observing the whole sphere with itself as a part. This is an example of the curvature of the surface area of the sphere being simultaneously itself and that which is greater than itself, a contradiction.

This contradiction is inevitable whenever a subordinate attribute attempts to describe the insuperable whole encompassing it.

You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. — ucarr

But I didn't say that it also existed. That's the part that would have made it paradoxical. — noAxioms

...the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

My interpretation of your statement quoted above understands that when you say, "'has wings has an object to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence," you're saying that something that is an object that can be modified is also something that lacks the property of existence. These two states combined into one thing: a) an object that can be modified; b) an object that lacks the property of existence examples a paradox.

My argument supporting my defense of EPP draws a parallel: a) 'has wings' modifies an object that lacks existence; b) the factor 2 multiplied by the null set. This expresses as 2 { } = 0. When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist.

When you claim something that is an object that can be modified is also something that lacks the property of existence, you argue for predication outside of EPP, but you do so by resorting to paradox. If you don't resort to paradox, you evaluate to 2 { } = 0.

There are alternate theories where time is absolute, sure — noAxioms

You embrace the relativity of simultaneity?

..it's a definition, and language usage is not proof of anything. — noAxioms

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof.

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter. — ucarr

I don't think Pegasus requires creation from nothing. — noAxioms

Eternal universe precludes "nothing."

Also, the reference to the necessity of matter makes this an E4 reference (part of a domain), not E1, and I already gave a solid example of something nonexistent having predicates. So I don't see the relevance of any of your 'conservation laws' at all. — noAxioms

Don't confuse necessity of matter with necessity of existence.

If there are meaningful distinctions between E1-E6, then existence supervenes on all of their applications.

"Something non-existent" is a contradiction.

The conservation laws establish and maintain the noumenal substantiation of the ontically-supported abstractions - as opposed to the ideals - you stipulated in your quest for a metaphysical definition of existence.

At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms: — ucarr

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

I don't even know what 'eternal matter' is. There was no matter shortly after the big bang, so if you think there's relevance to there not being a time when there wasn't matter, you'd be wrong. There will be none left after heat death either. — noAxioms

The wave function in quantum fluctuations at the singularity stands as a good candidate for eternal matter.

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy? — ucarr

Apparently not since Meinong would say that a square with a predicate of being round absists, but does not exist in any way. — noAxioms

Even to desist implies the existence of a subject carrying out the action described.

The statement "An apple is red only if the apple exists," describes the scope of objective reality IFF the apple examples complex objectivity in the form of: a) non-locality by means of symmetry and conservation and b) temporary formal change emergent from the quintet of mass_energy_force-motion_space_time. — ucarr

None of those criteria have objective meaning, so you're saying nothing exists (E1)?
The bold part directly begs EPP. As I said, you just cannot set it aside long enough to drive its absence to contradiction.

You can't separate a sphere from the curvature of its surface area.

Not trying to. I'm trying to separate the curvature of the sphere from the existence of the sphere, to see if that breaks something.

A predication without a mind-independent dynamic system examples an attribute perceiving from the outside the encompassing perimeter that is its insuperable container.

In the specifics of an example, it's the curvature of the surface area of a sphere standing outside of the sphere

This wording seems to presume that predication has a location, which seems to make no sense. The thing predicated might not have a location to be outside of.
Maybe I'm just not getting the poetic way you word things.

My argument supporting my defense of EPP draws a parallel: a) 'has wings' modifies an object that lacks existence; b) the factor 2 multiplied by the null set. This expresses as 2 { } = 0. When there's nothing to modify, there are no modifiers because modification is attached to things that exist. — ucarr

The last bold bit begs EPP, invalidating the reasoning since the opening premise is that EPP is explicitly being denied.
As for the funny multiplication bit, 2 wings multiplied by the number of existing entities with them results in zero existing wings. I don't dispute that. The nonexistent object still has wings without contradiction. I never claimed the wings (or the object, or the predicates) have the property of existence. I only claim that the predication modifies the object.

You embrace the relativity of simultaneity?

It comes with embrace of spacetime, big bang, black holes, all of which are described only by relativity theory and denied by absolutist theories. Relativity of simultaneity directly follows from the premises of special relativity. The absolutist alternatives deny both of those premises. You are of course free to join that group.

If language cannot prove anything, then language cannot demand proof.

Language is very much used to prove or give evidence for things, but the rules of language do not in any way dictate how 'reality' (whatever that entails) works. You're crossing that line.

"Something non-existent" is a contradiction.

Still not demonstrated, only asserted.
Sherlock is one example of something (supposedly) nonexistent. No contradiction is entailed if I assert that.

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. — ucarr

You are incapable of setting EPP aside then, are you?: You are then incapable of defending it since you cannot drive the lack of it to contradiction without being able to conceive of the lack of it. — noAxioms

I understand you to be saying I can't show EPP is necessary because the lack of it evaluates to a contradiction. I have a route to this contradiction that extends from my definition of "existence" already presented but forgotten by you.

Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense. — ucarr

Depends on your definition of 'exists', something you refuse to specify despite it seemingly changing from one statement to the next.. I've gone through all six, and it indeed makes no sense for some of them, and plenty of sense for others. — noAxioms

Non-existence, an infinite series of negations... negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible. — ucarr

If you want to see the original post of this definition with full context, use the link below.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/976808

This definition is more that axiomatic language because you cannot experience a time when you were not alive and therefore non-existent. By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. Per my definition of non-existence as an infinite series of negations, to attempt an approach to it, you must negate everything you can think of as part of an unending series that gains no purchase upon non-existence. This is proof that for humans existence is insuperable. Therefore, all thought and talk of non-existence is just more naming of existence. This leads us to understand that talking about non-existence as humans confined to existence is a contradiction. This is my short route to the lack of EPP necessarily leading to a contradiction.

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem. — ucarr

I don't see how mass conservation allows a generalization to E1. If you mean Pegasus cannot just pop into our universe without being built by existing mass, then I agree, but nobody is claiming that. E1 has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws. E4 might apply to that, but Pegasus can easily have wings while not having E4 existence by simply being in another universe. — noAxioms

You say, "'E1- Existence is a member of all that is part of objective reality' has nothing to do with our universe or its conservation laws." Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist. We agree on this point. However, because you are cementing the fact numbers exist with the example of the eight planets, your example is of the type predication about two existing things. Haven't you been rebutting me by arguing predications about non-existence are possible?

As a factor, zero negates the presence of all other things, and yet that's still not non-existence because the evaluation to zero has a number as its conclusion.

All bases are base 10, but they're not all base ten. — noAxioms

All numbers can use base 10, but not all number bases are 10. Some other number bases include base 2, base 8 and base 16.

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar. — ucarr

I don't see the relevance of this. Pegasus has two wings. Not contradictory. There are zero instances of an existing Pegasus, thus there are zero times 2 existing Pegasus-wings. None of this is contradictory until you drag EPP into it. — noAxioms

If two wings are a part of Pegasus, given that Pegasus doesn't exist, then also given that two wings a part of Pegasus don't exist. If we stipulate two wings exist with no existing Pegasus, we can't prove they're a predication about Pegasus. If we stipulate Pegasus existed in the past with two wings, inferring two wings are a predication about Pegasus is an historical claim about a prior state; it is not a predication about a non-existent Pegasus.

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings, unless we posit the contradiction of Pegasus simultaneously existing and not existing.

Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible — ucarr

So we're back to total mind-dependent everything again. — noAxioms

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. — noAxioms

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate. — noAxioms

modify | ˈmädəˌfī |verb (modifies, modifying, modified) [with object]
make partial or minor changes to (something), typically so as to improve it or to make it less extreme: she may be prepared to modify her views | the theory has been modified to fit subsequent experimental evidence | (as adjective modified) : a modified version of the aircraft.

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

Regarding,"the lack of a state"qualifying as a predicate, such a predicate applies to a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Only a cognitive entity of the mind-scape can be all of the states of the apple within its entire history and not just one of its states. Such wholeness beyond the scope of a particular temporal state is an abstraction. You cannot access a mind-independent, physically real thing not within a particular temporal state.

In your example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Fine. Then we're talking past each other because I'm not exploring nonexistence of concepts. — noAxioms

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction and thus it's irrelevant to non-existence of material things.

Regarding change of states of material things, explain how a infinite series of negations (non-existence) of the existence of things with states of being allows such states to be changed.

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws.

None of those exist under E2. Concepts of them do, but a concept of say mass does not have mass. None of those have objective meaning since they are all but properties of objects in our universe,. So I don't see how you're going to build an argument for EPP under E1 using these empirical notions. — noAxioms

There's no simple division of mind-independent reality and mind-dependent reality. EPP, whether accepted or discarded, articulates an inter-weave of the two realities. Were that not the case, there would be no controversy about it. This inter-weave is the foundation of your conversation and our debate. E1-E6 are distillations from a fluid inter-weave of noumena meets phenomena. There will be no perfectly discrete separation one from the other. E1 is mind-independent reality. E2 is mind-dependent reality. Without their inter-weave, no philosophy possible.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. Do you suppose you'd be making statements without them? Can you show something non-physical not tied to the them?

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time — ucarr

The universe doesn't exist within time. Neither does 14. Both these have predicates. — noAxioms

Are their predicates outside time?

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)

Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events. — noAxioms

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above. — ucarr

event A is measured by event B if the state of event B is in any way a function of the state at event A. This is a definition of 'measure' as used by E5. My paragraphs were meant as examples illustrating how it worked. — noAxioms

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles.

Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge. — ucarr

I am discussing ontology, not epistemology. — noAxioms

The distinction is partial. What we know must have an referent external to itself. The Incompleteness Theorem of logic demonstrates math axiomatic systems' inability to justify all their true statements. This is proof of the entanglement of E1 with E2.

Without this entanglement of ontology and epistemology, knowledge, if it could exist, would be nothing more than a vacuous circularity. Speaking reciprocally, material things without the awareness of sentient beings knowing them would be a thicket of unparsed redundancies, which is pretty close to the vacuous circularity of knowledge. The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

...you draw a distinction between something observable or not. Not sure how Pegasus can not be observable since it, being a life form, is an observer, whether it exists or not. — noAxioms

Here's the distinction between something directly observable and something not directly observable.

With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them. In fact, WRT Pegasus with wings, your eyes aren't detecting anything at all. Your brain is "seeing" Pegasus with wings by means of its ability to evaluate to an "image" of Pegasus with wings by means of your mind's manipulation of its memory circuits (of horses and wings respectively) toward the desired composite.

How about existence relative to a domain? Baker St does not exist in Moscow, yet it has predicates. There's an example of a perfectly consistent predication sans existence. This covers E4 and E6 and probably E5. — noAxioms

I am trying to avoid personal opinions. If EPP is not embraced, then yes, Sherlock Holmes being non-existent but receptive to predication seems not to be contradictory. I have invited you to demonstrate otherwise, but without begging EPP. Much probably depends on which definition of existence is chosen. I've already admitted that denial of EPP is inconsistent with E2,E3 existence since it seems impossible to conceive of something not conceived. — noAxioms

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow, nor are they present anywhere else apart from the location of Baker St within the mind-scape of abstract-only things. Conclusion: Baker St exists only in the mind-scape, but exist there it does indeed, and thus its positive existence cannot be an example of its predicates san existence. — ucarr

False, since Baker St is present in London, no mere abstraction. The example shows its nonexistence in a chosen domain, and yet still having predication. This is a counterexample to EPP for existence in a domain. — noAxioms

If it's Sherlock Holmes' Baker St. in London, and not some ontic Baker St. in physical London, then there is no example of non-existent Baker St. with predicates. Sherlock Holmes' Baker St. has predicates in the world of fiction; ontic Baker St. in physical London has predicates in the real world of objective reality.

I have a route to this contradiction that extends from my definition of "existence" already presented but forgotten by you.

Non-existence, an infinite series of negations... negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible. — ucarr — ucarr

I already commented on that definition. What is a negation in this context? Usually it is a transform of a logical statement, like A -> ~B negates to B -> ~A. Why does a finite series of negations not equate to nonexistence? What does it mean to negate a nonexistent thing? Sounds like predication to me.

Your definition also is based on perception. I didn't forget it, I ignored it as irrelevant to mind independent existence.

you cannot experience a time when you were not alive and therefore non-existent.

Not being alive is not necessarily equated with nonexistence. A rock isn't alive and you probably consider it to exist (I don't think it follows with the rock either, at least not without presuming EPP).

By your own understanding of mind independent reality, you cannot know it directly, but only by inference. — ucarr

You are very bad at knowing anything by inference due to your contradictory insistence of mental perception in any consideration of mind independence. As I said, you apparently can't do it. I have no trouble defining existence sans perception, but it's still not an objective reality, only a relational one. So I am similarly encumbered by my inability to find objective existence meaningful in any logical way.

Per my definition of non-existence as an infinite series of negations, to attempt an approach to it, you must negate everything you can think of as part of an unending series that gains no purchase upon non-existence.

I don't know what it means to negate a 'thing'. I don't know what 'purchase upon nonexistence' means at all. I don't see any proof here, just words that I cannot make out. Maybe if you formalized it and defined the terms, I could critique it. It all sounds very mind dependent. If I think of a thing, no amount of negating will make it not exist in an E2 sort of way.
Without knowing what these words mean, why cannot I negate human existence as part of an unending series? There is no mention of humans in there, and yet you claim this somehow proves human existence by this baffling definition of nonexistence.

Present your argument proving our universe and its conservation laws have nothing to do with objective reality. — ucarr

That burden is yours, to prove that the conservation laws of just this one particular universe have any objective relevance at all. It's your assertion, not mine. All I see it an attempt to slap an E1 label on an E4 definition, with some E2 thrown in since perception always seems to creep in there as well.

a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms
Although we're debating whether you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence, you seem to be arguing numbers exist.

Read the bold part. I said the opposite. You asked for an example of a relation between an existent thing and a nonexistent thing. That was one example.

Unicorns (and dragons) valuing human female virgins is another example.
If you feel that numbers exist (or you think that I assert that), then we can relative Pegasus to its count of wings, making that an example of such a relation.

Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. — ucarr

OK, how is the count of Pegasuses (Pegasi?) determined? Maybe there are 5. Subjectively Pegasus counts himself as 1, as does anybody that sees him. Not zero. It seems that you already must presume the nonexistence of Pegasus to conclude a count of zero of them, rather than determining in some way a count of zero and from that concluding nonexistence.
This is pretty easy if existence means 'in some domain'. Pegasus does not exist in Moscow, so Pegasus can count himself or his wings all he wants, but that doesn't put him in the specified domain. Predication works fine despite the nonexistence. But if you mean E1 existence, then there's no domain. The thing either exists or not, and Pegasus counting himself isn't empirical evidence one way or the other.

If we stipulate Pegasus existed in the past — ucarr

I didn't even put temporal restrictions in my list of 6. Exists in the (abstract) domain of 'now', which has a general form of existence within a restricted domain.

Reversing our direction and beginning by saying two wings are a predication about a non-existent Pegasus, we cannot prove this connection between Pegasus and two wings

Proof is not the point. We presume Pegasus has two wings. Proving a premise negates the point of it being a premise.

unless we posit the contradiction of Pegasus simultaneously existing and not existing.

No such premise is required for nonexistent Pegasus to have two wings since existence of anything was not mentioned, let alone posited, in the above description. You've not justified why anything needs to exist in this scenario that explicitly references only nonexistent things.

We never leave mind-dependent perception. No brain, no mind, no perception. — ucarr

I don't dispute that perception is mind dependent, but the topic is about predication of mind-independent things, not perception or mind dependent concepts of predication. How many times do I have to remind you of that? This is about mind-independence. Perception plays zero role in that by definition.

We see in the definition that "modify" is an action that changes of the state of being of the object of its action. — ucarr

Different definition. I reject this usage as how predication applies to the predicate. Predication does not imply an action of change of state over time, as does the definition quoted. Surely your dictionary had more appropriate definitions than that one.

Since you're not exploring nonexistence of concepts, I pointed out your example deals with an abstraction

None of my examples are about abstractions. If I meant the abstraction of X, I would have said something like 'the concept of X'. I didn't use those words, so I'm not talking about the existence of concepts, but rather the mind-independent X. The OP is very clear about this distinction.

I am sorry that you cannot distinguish the two. I'm trying to help out out of that hole but I don't think I can, in which case you have no hope of justifying EPP except perhaps under E2, the only definition that you seem to be able to grasp.

14 does not have mass energy force, motion, nor location in space or time. — noAxioms

The neuronal circuits that support your articulation of your above quote do possess: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time plus position and momentum. — ucarr

That they do, but if I was talking about those, I would have said 'concept of 14'. I was not talking about the conception of it.

Are their predicates outside time?

Predicates don't have coordinates. They're not objects. One can apply predicates to objects within time, such as a person having a tatoo only after a certain age, but only because a person very much does have temporal coordinates.

Similarly I can talk about 14 being even, despite 14 not having a time coordinate (nor a spatial coordinate).

If Baker St doesn't exist in Moscow, then no predicates of Baker St are present in Moscow

Again, predicates don't have coordinates. They not predicates located at/near Baker St, but instead are predicates of Baker St itself, independent of the street's nonexistence in Moscow.



Concerning E5 definition:

There is no future-to-past relationship at the time of measurement. Neither role of "cause" or "effect" exists before the connection linking the two roles. — ucarr

There is such a relationship at the time of measurement since the measurement defines the existence of the cause event relative to the measurement event. The two events are ordered, cause first, measurement later. That part of the definition holding to the principle of locality. There is no coming into existence of anything. An event is an event and as such, has a time coordinate. E5 is not relevant to non-events, so asking of 14 exists under D5 is a category error. Oddly enough, the definition is relevant to something like the set of all possible chess states.

Speaking reciprocally, material things without the awareness of sentient beings knowing them would be a thicket of unparsed redundancies, which is pretty close to the vacuous circularity of knowledge. — ucarr

No, it would be a vacuous absence of knowledge, but this topic is not concerned with knowledge of mind-independent things, but rather the existence of them.

The entanglement of ontology and epistemology is a big message to us from QM.

QM does not posit or conclude any role to knowledge or perception. If you think otherwise, you read too many pop articles.

With your empirical eyes, you look at a white horse racing around the paddock of a horse ranch. This is direct observation because your eyes are detecting something external to your mind. — ucarr

Oh you do have a concept of something external to your own mind.

In your mind's eye, you imagine Pegasus with wings. This is indirect observation because your eyes are not detecting something external to them.

OK. But neither mental activity creates the object in question. Empirical perception does not create a white horse where there wasn't one without it. Hence it being mind independent. Similarly, Pegasus does pop into existence because of your imagination. It is also independent of your mind, but lacks the causal relationship that you have with the white horse. Per D5, the white horse exists relative to say your belt buckle and Pegasus does not.