I don't even think that solves anything personally. Like, so what, grant them spirits and souls - it's still either the case that a particular decision is a deterministic output of the full state of everything (everything including this soul realm), OR it's in some part random.

People think souls get past the determinist/random dichotomy, I definitely don't see it.

Yes, the argument still holds given the dualistic model. It just extends what currently is known as 'naturalism. Either way, Bob1 & Bob2 are only going to 'do otherwise' due to differences not in the Bobs. Under 'hard' determinism (I counted 5 other kinds), it is not possible for the Bobs to choose differently. Funny that they can under the other five.

Free will, as typically defined, sounds dreadful, like responsibility for choices only exists if there's randomness or demonic possession at work instead choices being rational. That's a crock.

The compatibilists have a better definition of free will, that the thing being held responsible actually had critical agency (and knowledge of the morality of the situation) in the making of the choice.

So an epiphenomenal mind cannot be held responsible since it lacks agency. It would be like me being held responsible for a murder because I watched a murder movie.
Similarly, a seagull is not much responsible for snatching my chips since it holds to a different moral code, one which allows me to wring its neck if I catch it in the act.

A soldier is not responsible for murder if the choice is mandated by his commander. The ultimate commander's responsibility lies with the morality of his participation in the conflict.

Bob contracts rabies and starts biting babies. Is he responsible for that or is the disease that has taken over his will? It's not like the disease is a conscious agent, and yet it takes over your mechanism for agency.

But "I'm not responsible, physics made me do it" is not an excuse. You had the agency, knew the consequences of an immoral choice, and chose anyway. Free will (by most definitions), physics, and determinism all have nothing to do with that.

yeah I think for the most part I align with most of what you said

I don't even think that solves anything personally. Like, so what, grant them spirits and souls - it's still either the case that a particular decision is a deterministic output of the full state of everything (everything including this soul realm), OR it's in some part random.

People think souls get past the determinist/random dichotomy, I definitely don't see it. — flannel jesus

I agree. But I don't understand where freedom is introduced. Or perhaps I don't understand, as it says in the quote of the OP, "in what sense are they free." I am reading the SEP entry on Compatibilism. The first thing I see:

...an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way. — SEP

Is that what you mean? I am, say, free to pick up my coffee mug, assuming nothing prevents me from doing so? Is that free will?

is that what I mean by what?

The focus of the argument here isn't about compatibilism. Compatibilism is a related interesting side topic. I'm not even completely sure that, when I'm talking about compatibilism, what I mean when I say "free will" is the right thing to call "free will", but that's all a complete aside to the argument here, which is all about incompatibilist free will (or at least that's how I define libertarian free will).

The title of the thread says you have a problem with libertarian free will. And, in this thread, you said you believe in free will, you directed me to the Compatibility entry of SEP, and compatibility is being discussed everywhere in the thread. Is it really inappropriate to ask what kind of free will you believe in? Afaict, there are many different views on it, and I'm trying to see if I can wrap my head around them.

it's not inappropriate, I just don't want this thread to center on what I think about free will.

It'd be like a thread in a basketball forum about how bad the Timberwolves are doing this season, but instead of everyone talking about the Timberwolves, the focus on the OPs favourite team. "Oh you think the Timberwolves are doing bad? But aren't you a fan of the jazz?" Or something like that.

I actually think this is the far simpler conversation to have, because compatibilism is... weird. I think it's weird. I accept it but I understand why it's unintuitive to people, but you could never convince someone of it as long as they're convinced that libertarianism makes sense. So this has to be step 1. Talk about libertarian free will in isolation, and then separately (and preferrably with a mutual understanding that libertarian free will is out of the picture) talk about compatibilism.

Compatibilism is a related interesting side topic. I'm not even completely sure that, when I'm talking about compatibilism, what I mean when I say "free will" is the right thing to call "free will", but that's all a complete aside to the argument here, which is all about incompatibilist free will (or at least that's how I define libertarian free will). — flannel jesus

Thing is, the argument linked in the OP also works against compatibilism, but only if free will is defined the same way. A compatibilist cannot claim 'could have done otherwise', so his (your) definition of free will is one that necessarily is immune to the sort of argument put forth in that paper.

I'm all about that as well. I don't get all enamored over the free will concept, so I have no drive to define it in a way that pleases me. The typical definition sounds horrible and would not be something I'd want.
But if I did need to assert I had it, I'd define it in a sort of compatibilist way even if I don't think the kinds of determinism that are relevant are the case.

My definition then? How about "the think doing the choosing is getting what it wants". That works, and means I lack the free will to fly like superman. Physics really does constrain my choices, more evidence against idealism where physics does not so constrain you.

Thing is, the argument linked in the OP also works against compatibilism, but only if free will is defined the same way. A compatibilist cannot claim 'could have done otherwise', — noAxioms

I think there's an interesting way to frame "could have done otherwise". The usual way libertarians frame it - in my experience - is in the way framed in the OP, where you really ontologically could have done otherwise, even if nothing in the preceding conditions were different. You can have other ways of framing that phrase, including compatibilist ways. Maybe I should start a thread on that, where people can pick apart my compatibilism without it becoming the central focus of this thread.

I think this is a conflation between physical and motive causality: I would recommend looking into Schopenhauer's "On the Fourfold Foundation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason". In short, a libertarian is not going to grant you that free will requires that one could have done otherwise if their will is the same when time is rewound but, rather, that one could have willed differently if the physical causality were rewound.

yes, I've noticed this huge language disconnect. Some libertarians would actually argue that they could have done otherwise even if everything about their mind and agency was rewound too, but some do as you said and just make it about physicality. They present their idea as anti deterministic because they're convinced "determinism" means physical determinism.

But I'm not convinced of that, quite the contrary.

:up:

just to be clear, you're imagining a scenario where someone does some action, the physical world is rewound but their mental state, which is supposed to be different from physical, is not rewound so they're like... imagining themselves remembering what they did the first time, and then imagining themselves able to choose something different the second time, right?

Not quite. I was saying that willing, under some forms of libertarianism, generates new causality that originates from the will and the willing may differ even if the physical causality differs (according to this view)(such as if there is a soul or something like that). So if some person performs action, A, with intent, M, and you rewind the physical causality; then:

1. A, which is comprised of intent with physical causality originating therefrom, is only rewound in terms of having the intent and the physical causality it introduced into reality; and

2. If M is from leeway freedom, then it does not originate from the physical causality you rewound; and

3. If #2, then that person could will A for another intent, N, or intent some other action, B, with some other intent.

2. If #2, then that person could will A for another intent, N, or intent some other action, B, with some other intent. — Bob Ross

Right. Only that what is quoted here is not mandatory for libertarian free will.

The physical causality could be the exact same and the intent pursued could be the exact same. Each option toward the given intent pursued is of itself, however, a more proximal possible intent toward the here distant intent one aims to actualize.

So A within the exact same physical context, with the exact same cognitive options available to A, can intend the exact same distant intent by choosing a different alternative. So construed, there will necessarily be ontically occurring reasons for any choice (between alternatives) taken, but reality, and so one's choice, is not "causally inevitable", and neither is the choice made of itself random (hence, devoid of any actual ontically occurring reason for its occurrence).

For example, a person wants to travel form A to B; the options cognitively available to the person for so doing are X, Y, and Z; if the person chooses option X as a means of getting to B, they at this moment of choice were metaphysically unconstrained in, and only in, their in fact choosing X rather than Y or Z. Hence, they could have chosen otherwise than they did. This very much assuming that the exact same physical context, the exact same intent to travel from A to B, and the exact same options of X, Y, and Z would occur.

so are you or are you not also rewinding the will when your rewind the physical?

so are you or are you not also rewinding the will when your rewind the physical? — flannel jesus

No, the description seems to rewind only the physical part of the state, not all of it, thus sidestepping the argument in the OP paper. It's two different initial conditions, so of course they're likely to evolve differently.

I was saying that willing, under some forms of libertarianism,generates new causality that originates from the will and the willing may differ even if the physical causality differs — Bob Ross

How does the bold part even work. Why would new causality being generated be any advantage at all? Suppose one uses this kind of free will to cross a busy street. Generating new causality seems to be pure randomness, as opposed to actually looking and using the state of the cars as the primary cause of your decision as to when to cross.

No, the description seems to rewind only the physical part of the state, not all of it, thus sidestepping the argument in the OP paper. It's two different initial conditions, so of course they're likely to evolve differently. — noAxioms

exactly. no one diagrees with that. if the starting conditions are different, of course something different will happen.

I think some people think that libertarian free will is just another way to say they believe they have a nonphysical mind.

CC @flannel jesus

The physical causality could be the exact same and the intent pursued could be the exact same. Each option toward the given intent pursued is of itself, however, a more proximal possible intent toward the here distant intent one aims to actualize.

If the intent is the exact same, then only the means towards that end could be subject to change (in principle); so it would be impossible that one has the leeway freedom to intend differently in your example here (to Flannel’s point). Javra, what you are saying here is that one can intend something differently when they intend the same thing: it’s internally incoherent.

In your example we don't, or if we do it is presupposed we will will the same anyways, whereas in mine we do but we could will differently.

My point is not that libertarianism is correct but, rather, that your OP is a straw man of their position: no libertarian worth any salt is going to disagree with the idea that if you will the same then you will will the same. They are going to note that if you rewound their motives and reasons and the physical aspects of their action, then they may have had different motives or reasons and thusly willed differently. For libertarians, willing is a source of causality and not merely a biproduct of physical causality.

They are going to note that if you rewound their motives and reasons and the physical aspects of their action, then they may have had different motives or reasons and thusly willed differently — Bob Ross

I'm not sure what that means.

We take note of all causally relevant facts at T1, including all facts about the physical world as well as their motives and mind etc. then we watch what decision they make at T2. Then at T3, we rewind back to T1.

Now when we rewind, we're of course rewinding such that all those facts we took note of are all the same. Everything physical, and also every non physical fact, including motives mind etc. what do you mean, then, when you say "they may have had different motives"? May have how? Their motives are part of the thing we're accounting for in rewinding

How does the bold part even work. Why would new causality being generated be any advantage at all? Suppose one uses this kind of free will to cross a busy street. Generating new causality seems to be pure randomness, as opposed to actually looking and using the state of the cars as the primary cause of your decision as to when to cross.

That is beyond the scope of my critique: I am merely pointing out to @flannel jesus that it is not a valid rejoinder to libertarianism to stipulate one will will the same (and thusly the change in causality is from some other source if the causality is different at all the second or third time we rewind the clock).

They tend to believe in a soul or immaterial mind and that reality has top-down causality to some extent; which would not be random: e.g., things ordering themselves in correspondence with an idea is not random at all. The idea is that the higher-ontological things have some sway over what exists at the lower-ontological things.

I am not a libertarian, but the way I would think about it is that our brains facilitate our ability to reason and reason governs our actions; so the "top" does have influence over the "bottom" causally to some extent. The memory your brain formulates influences your decisions, which can impact how the brain organizes itself in the future. Our brains are not like mechanical domino-style robots.

This is the crux presupposition in your thought:

Now when we rewind, we're of course rewinding such that all those facts we took note of are all the same

I reject this. When you rewind the clock, you are rewinding the facts which does not itself necessitate that when you start the clock again those facts will re-emerge. You haven't provided any justification for why one should believe that and it just begs the question by presupposing that causal determinism is true.

E.g., if it is a fact that I went for a run today and you rewind the clock to right before I began my run; then ceteris paribus we don't know that I am going to go for a run today. If we believe causal determinism, the loosest sense of the term, is true, then we have reasons to believe I will necessarily go for that run.

The problem is that you are claiming to refute libertarianism by presupposing causal determinism in the first place; and you are doing this by implicitly stipulating that when the facts are rewound those facts are inevitably going to happen again: that's just saying "causal determinism is true" with convoluted steps.

EDIT:

So, you end up needing to prove causal determinism to prove that your OP's argument is true; which defeats the purpose of your argument in the OP in the first place.

So, why should one expect the same outcome if we rewind all the facts?

Moreover, with respect to my original critique, what if we only rewound the physical facts?

E.g., if it is a fact that I went for a run today and you rewind the clock to right before I began my run; then ceteris paribus we don't know that I am going to go for a run today. If we believe causal determinism, the loosest sense of the term, is true, then we have reasons to believe I will necessarily go for that run.

The problem is that you are claiming to refute libertarianism by presupposing causal determinism in the first place; — Bob Ross

I think you're confused about what rewinding the clock is about. Nobody is saying "you will necessarily go for that run". In fact we're explictly allowing for the exact opposite. Nowhere in the anlysis does it say "the future will necessarily play out the same way, and determinism is the case."

You aren't the first person to get the impression that this is somehow an argument for determinism. It isn't. The conclusion of the article isn't "determinism is the case". It's apparently very difficult to explain to people why that's *not* the point of the article.

That is beyond the scope of my critique: I am merely pointing out to flannel jesus that it is not a valid rejoinder to libertarianism to stipulate one will will the same (and thusly the change in causality is from some other source if the causality is different at all the second or third time we rewind the clock). — Bob Ross

It is valid. The phrase 'rewind time' should never have been used. Free will is often described as 'could have done otherwise' and not 'would do otherwise if given the chance again'. To assert that one's will is not the same after the rewind is to assert that one has two different states of mind at that one time, not that the same physical scenario is presented to you in succession, just as going back to a saved state in a video game.

They tend to believe in a soul or immaterial mind and that reality has top-down causality to some extent; which would not be random: e.g., things ordering themselves in correspondence with an idea is not random at all. The idea is that the higher-ontological things have some sway over what exists at the lower-ontological things. — Bob Ross

Why have I never seen such a libertarian describe how/where in any way these 'higher-ontological things' exert any sway at all over something 'lower'? Where is the primitive in the lower part (the part accessible to empirical analysis) that is in any way sensitive to something other than physical cause?

I don't think the article begs the question: I was noting your response did.

Here’s what the article says:

However, since Bob1 and Bob2 have all of the same goals, beliefs, etc., there is nothing different between them to which we can appeal to explain why Bob1 chose to go the bookshelf at time T2 and Bob2 chose to go the kitchen at time T2.  Their individual actions are explainable, but libertarianism cannot explain why one choice is made instead of another.

This has the same problem I already exposed: a libertarian is not per se committed to the idea that if Bob1 and Bob2 have the same exact beliefs, desires, etc. that they each could decide to will something different than each other—this is a straw man.

The libertarian could hold equally that two Bobs in identical universes would reason the same and decide the same while also holding that if merely the physical causality were the same in each world then the Bobs could reason differently.

It’s also worth mentioning that the article sets up a shaky distinction between beliefs and reasons that I don’t think a libertarian has to accept.

The core tenant of libertarianism is that leeway free will exists, which implies that there is free will in the sense that one could have done otherwise: they are not committed per se to the view that one can reason contrary to their beliefs nor that they cannot reason contrary to their beliefs.

This has the same problem I already exposed: a libertarian is not per se committed to the idea that if Bob1 and Bob2 have the same exact beliefs, desires, etc. that they each could decide to will something different than each other—this is a straw man. — Bob Ross

ok well it's the type of libertarianism in question here, since that's what it means for something to be "indeterministic". It means given the same exact conditions, something different might happen.

Javra, what you are saying here is that one can intend something differently when they intend the same thing: it’s internally incoherent. — Bob Ross

That’s not what I said in my post. What I expressed is that one can intend the same distant intent B by choosing a different option toward it, with each option toward the distal intent - say options X, Y, an Z - being its own possible, proximate intention toward the exact same distant intent B which one wants to actualize.

I gave a relatively easy to understand example of this here:

For example, a person wants to travel form A to B; the options cognitively available to the person for so doing are X, Y, and Z; if the person chooses option X as a means of getting to B, they at this moment of choice were metaphysically unconstrained in, and only in, their in fact choosing X rather than Y or Z. Hence, they could have chosen otherwise than they did. This very much assuming that the exact same physical context, the exact same intent to travel from A to B, and the exact same options of X, Y, and Z would occur. — javra

If you want to disagree, please disagree using this example just quoted.

To bring this back to the thread’s subject, when construed as expressed in my previous post, libertarian free will can then be neither a) random - for, if for no other reason, it will in all cases be intentional - nor can it be b) “causally inevitable” - for the lack of metaphysical constraints (aka, the metaphysical freedom) which strictly applies in regard to what option to choose entails that the option chosen cannot so be causally inevitable.

Libertarian free will, at least when so understood, will thereby necessitate a metaphysics regarding the possibility of determinants which is different from that in which the only two ontically occurring options are either that of a) randomness or b) causal inevitability. Such that the OP’s article, which only allows for these two possibilities, thereby misses the point.

That said, whether libertarian free will ontically occurs and, if so, what the details of such alternative metaphysics which it requires might possibly be, however, are separate issues from that of what the term “libertarian free will” intends to signify.