Yeah, exactly, so in a choice there's no randomess, the choice follows naturally from the preceding state of everything (which of course includes the state of you), which is what you experience. — flannel jesus

Hang on, do you perceive a total state of everything, including the state of you, whenever you act or make a choice?

you experience your choice following from the state of you, including your desires and wants, which is part of the state of everything.

You don't experience your choice coming out of nowhere at all, random and unrelated to any pre existing facts about the world and facts about yourself

It's a stretch to say that's what people experience. I certainly don't.

You're essentially saying people experience determinism.

I'm saying people experience their choices as being related to the state of themselves, as opposed to unrelated. The ice cream they choose isn't random, people generally don't choose flavours they know they hate (because "i know i hate that flavour" is part of the state of themselves), and they slightly more frequently choose flavours they like a little (because "i know i like this a little" is part of the state of themselves) and the way more frequently choose flavours they like a lot (because "i know i like this a lot" is part of the state of themselves), and some people are more daring than others so more willing to take a risk on a flavor they're unfamiliar with (because "i value trying new things" is part of the state of themselves)

In other words, it seems as though what *determines* why someone makes one choice instead of another is pre-existing states. And that's what determinism is about - determining the future based on facts that currently exist.

So far, so good. But what you've said earlier suggests that you're intent on taking this argument to an extreme where people have no meaningful choice at all.

I have literally never said anything like that at all.

(probably shouldn't say "literally never", i did used to be a hard determinist. i haven't said anything like that in this thread.)

You can still have choices, it's just that your choices follow from... well, follow from YOU, follow from the state of you. — flannel jesus

:up:

Where were you taking that paragraph then? Because so far it's a somewhat convoluted way of describing how people make everyday choices.

eh? can you please be specific?

People make choices based on such things as what type of ice cream they like.

But then you insert the unquantifiable idea of a 'state of you', which includes much more than just conscious deliberation. This is where it starts to get vague.

I sort of get where you're going with this, but it'd be a stretch to say people experience their every day decisions in that way.

When you do that in the context of a 'libertarian free will vs. determinism'-type debate, I'm obviously going to be quite critical of the leaps you're taking.

interesting comic.

ok

Choosing the ice cream you like is an unfree decision since you have a reason for your choice. The question is whether you can choose the ice cream that you don't like for no specific reason. If yes, then you are a free agent. Moreover, our lives are not that easy since we occasionally face options that we don't know their future outcomes yet we have to make a decision. In such a situation, we don't have any reason to choose one option over another so we have to make a free decision.

Are you sure you provided the correct link? — javra

Apparently not. Here is the correct one, and I fixed the prior post link. Hopefully I did it right this time.
The SEP article is here and is not linked by that post, but you seem to have found it below.
It matches the idea conveyed by just a google search of the word 'determinism', which seems to be an alternate term for naturalism, even thought there are natural interpretations that are not deterministic in the sense of subsequent specific states being inevitable.

The list of six is just something I came up with. You are free to disagree with any of them (especially #6).
Turns out that most people arguing for free will define determinism with #1 whereas I defined it by default to #2, causing us to talk past each other.

I searched SEP again, and the only entry that stands out is this one, which defines causal determinism in the same old way: in short as entailing causal inevitability. — javra

That's the one. It isn't crystal clear on its definition:
"roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature."
The google search yielded a similar statement:
"all events in the universe are caused by prior events or natural laws "
It says that all states evolve only from prior states per the laws of nature (naturalism), but is vague about things like quantum mechanics which seems probabilistic according to said laws of nature.
Hence it seems to be a statement more about naturalism and not explicitly 'hard' determinism.

This from Oxford dictionary entry for determinism:
"the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions."
That definition is exactly #1, just saying that the will is determined (a function entirely of) causes external to the will. No mention is made of there being one inevitable outcome from a given state.

Biological determinism, also known as genetic determinism,[1] is the belief that human behaviour is directly controlled by an individual's genes or some component of their physiology, generally at the expense of the role of the environment, whether in embryonic development or in learning — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_determinism — javra

I suppose I could just have looked that up. Not sure if it belongs on my list, but while my genetics may very well determine my general nature and thus choices in the long run, it is not directly consulted when making a decision. For instance, somebody was shown to have a genetic preference for cinnamon. That general nature definitely influences choices of which foods to pick, but the gene involved here is not part of that decision. If the genes of that person was suddenly to change (all cells at once), the preference would still be there. Changing the blueprint after the building is finished doesn't change the building, but it might change the way it is subsequently maintained.

Again, I read nothing in the linked post to that effect.

Again, apologies. Better proof reading next time, eh?

But then, if we agree on this, then #6 as specified in the parentheses does not apply to the issue at hand. Period.

I'm fine with that. The correct linked post also says that only the first four are important.

#3 MWI

No. You don't do otherwise. You by entailment do both in causally inevitable manners, each being done in a different world, with no ability to do otherwise to speak of. — javra

OK. Yes, each done in a different world. Is it you doing both then? Identity is not really preserved over time with MWI, so the question is ill framed. Not only can you not have chosen chocolate, but it wasn't even you that had chosen vanilla. It was somebody else. Identity becomes an abstract concept under MWI, without physical meaning, and abstractly, yes, you chose vanilla.

#1 is a synonym for naturalism, meaning that will is a function of natural physics. — noAxioms

Again, provide a link to reference this. — javra

#1 is 'causal determinism' as opposed to 'determinism', distinguished in the SEP article. It later gives a less rough definition of the former that attempts to cover as many bases as possible.
"Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. "
This makes a declaration and an assumption. First, it asserts the subsequent state is fixed, which is the inevitable part, even though 'inevitable' is not used this way in the article. But it also says "given a specified way things are" at some time, and that wording is a counterfactual, something not physically verifiable. Some quantum interpretations (#2 in particular) posit the principle of counterfactual definiteness. Almost all the other ones do not, rendering statements like the one above meaningless.
SEP begins to address this when it questions the phrase "way things are". It talks about speed of light and locality (not by name), but no mention is made of counterfactuals. Locality is more important to the authors, as it is with me, but omitting something relevant is a mistake.

Almost all philosophy sites ignore (assume?) that principle, but almost no philosophers know their physics enough to realize that it's important to be explicit about it, and what the implications of positing it are (such as retro-causality). Almost all the philosophers presume a classical universe despite the fact that it has been proven to be otherwise.

Hence the lack of links in my posts. Such issues are rarely discussed, and the physics people often don't know or don't care about the philosophical implications of the prevailing views. I do care, so I had to learn the physics myself, enough that I'm a moderator on a science forum (medium fish in very small pond), but I know the science only enough to do the philosophy that wasn't being done by anybody else.

I did a internet search on "philosophical determinism" and nothing came up to this effect — javra

I called it that because it's what most forum users are referencing with the word 'determinism', but 'causal determinism' seems to be the more correct term.
Most proponents of free will seem to argue not against determinism, but rather against fatalism, which is a different thing and has no place on my list any more than does superdeterminism. Their strawman notion of determinism is actually a description of fatalism, where subsequent events are inevitable even if different choices were made.


SEP mentions a Popper definition where determinism is equated to subjective predictability. That is trivially proven false and doesn't belong on my list.


Thank you for engaging with my posts. Much of it is mine, leaving you quite free to tell me I'm full of it.


Cool comic, and leaving unclear which side to identify with since both of them seem to fail to make a distinction between choice and free choice.

By this definition, any free choice is irrational. — noAxioms

Call it whatever you like! — MoK

It's what you're saying, not me.
You assert you have free will, and then assert that will isn't free if it is based on a reason. Hence your asserted free choices are not based on any reason, which is by definition irrational.

Choosing the ice cream you like is an unfree decision since you have a reason for your choice — MoK

So freedom is only when you choose things that you don't have reasons to choose? Wowza, what a wild conception of free will.

So freedom is only when you choose things that you don't have reasons to choose? Wowza, what a wild conception of free will. — flannel jesus

Well, how your decision could be free if it is based on a reason? So we have a dichotomy: either you have a reason for your decision or not, in the first case your decision is unfree and in the second case it is free.

:grin: No worries about the link. And many thanks for the thoughtful clarifications. I get that there can be found ambiguities in many definitions if one so intends.

As to determinism vs. fatalism, do you not find that determinism as concept entails necessitarianism. If you're not familiar with the concept, here is a synopsis:

Necessitarianism is a metaphysical principle that denies all mere possibility; there is exactly one way for the world to be. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necessitarianism

I could argue this well enough via the SEP article specified: Such as via this affirmation:

#1 is 'causal determinism' as opposed to 'determinism', distinguished in the SEP article. It later gives a less rough definition of the former that attempts to cover as many bases as possible.
"Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law. " — noAxioms

If things are "fixed" (irrespective of why), then there will only be "exactly one way for the world to be".

I ask because, as far as I can see, if necessitarianism is entailed by determinism (or vice versa), then determinism is necessarily fatalistic when contemplated in terms of events occurring over time.

... but this might spin into how to then interpret "fate" or "destiny". To be clear, I don't here intend any omni-anything to have so determined. I only intend that if necessitarianism, we are then fated or else destined to do what we will do by reality at large, irrespective of how its workings get to be construed, such that the future can only be fixed and, hence, can only take one particular course of events.

Well, how your decision could be free if it is based on a reason? — MoK

You've presented such a bonkers idea that I don't even know where to start. I'm going to pass.

It is not a crazy idea at all if you think about it. How are you going to deal with the dichotomy that I presented?

Haven't you ever had options in your life?

Sure. I'll take the option of not engaging in what I expect would be a tedious discussion. (I.e. there is a reason I choose this option.)

if there isn't a reason for something that happens, it's random.

So if I ask "why did this happen?" and there's an explanation for why it happened, "it happened because of this and this and this", that's not random - or at least not entirely random.

But if I ask "why did this happen?" and there's no reason at all - not just no known reason, ontologically no actual reason - it's random.

So it's odd that people have been trying to dispel me of the notion that libertarian free will isn't about randomness, and here you are affirming the notion.

But also it means we don't have free will when it comes to very important ethical decisions. If I choose to save a baby's life, and I have reasons to do that, then you say I'm not free. And if I decide to murder a bunch of babies, and I have reasons to do that, then you say I'm not free. So I don't have free will in those moments and am not responsible for them? Weird.

Ok, as you please. I am glad to see that you agree that options are real and life is not a domino though.

As an afterthought to my previous post, to bring this purely philosophical issue of determinism more into the purview of physics, to me determinism - when so understood as necessitarian - equates to eternalism, aka "the block universe" understanding of time and, hence, of the cosmos at large. Here, everything is fixed bar none.

A guy chooses to eat vanilla ice cream instead of chocolate.

Instead of asking the question “was that choice free” which looks at the situation before any ice cream was eaten, I see it all from a different angle. I ask “why is the vanilla ice cream now gone”. If the guy answers “I did it - I’m the cause of the missing ice cream” then I have the starting point for digging deeper into whether there was a free choice involved - I have to ask him more questions to see if he really was the cause or if some subconscious forces or some tyrant, or other cause determined him to eat the ice cream.

In the end, it is solely up to the guy whether we find free choice was involved. At any point in the investigation into underlying causes of the missing ice cream, he can either cut it off and say “that’s enough - it’s all my fault, I are the ice cream, I am responsible.” Or we need to keep digging into the behaviorists/material causes.

That moment is the moment freedom is inserted into any otherwise completely deterministic system.

We don’t choose to want what we want. We want it, and are determined to want it by whatever we are. We choose to call what we want “my choice” - we create the character of “me” as what is known by the rest of the world by consent and by staking a claim - “that’s me - the ice cream eater.”

So my choice and my will and me in the first place are all made one and the same by simple assertion - “that’s my will”. The forces that carry us to the ice cream and force us to see vanilla as best and allow us to eat it - will isn’t found there. Will is found when one steps outside at any of these moments and says “that’s my will - I am walking myself to the refrigerator”. Or “Vanilla is better than chocolate”.

We are our wills.

This is only true when we are willing.

It’s not a complete picture.

And the only way we preserve the feeling of freedom as normally seen as free from or free to, is to see the process described above as happening instantaneously on everything we do. If I am free in each moment, I am consenting to each moment.

if there isn't a reason for something that happens, it's random. — flannel jesus

We have been through this in another thread. The decision seems random from the third perspective but not the first perspective since it is up to the person want to choose one option or another.

So if I ask "why did this happen?" and there's an explanation for why it happened, "it happened because of this and this and this", that's not random - or at least not entirely random. — flannel jesus

It does not happen to you, it is you who makes the decision. Of course, you fall into a troublesome situation looking for where this decision comes from if you believe in a monistic view, physicalism for example, so you have to assign a sort of randomness to the physical while accepting that they are deterministic. Of course, this coincidence, making a free decision, and randomness in the physical cannot be explained in a monistic view either. All the troubles are gone if you believe in a dualistic view where the mind is the observer and decision-making entity.

But if I ask "why did this happen?" and there's no reason at all - not just no known reason, ontologically no actual reason - it's random. — flannel jesus

That is the mind that makes the decision always so it doesn't happen to you.

So it's odd that people have been trying to dispel me of the notion that libertarian free will isn't about randomness, and here you are affirming the notion. — flannel jesus

Of course, the physical is deterministic. How could we possibly depend on reality if it was random?

But also it means we don't have free will when it comes to very important ethical decisions. If I choose to save a baby's life, and I have reasons to do that, then you say I'm not free. — flannel jesus

No, you can always make decisions based on reason, saving a baby's life for example. But you can do otherwise. It is exactly because of this ability that we are responsible for our choices.

And if I decide to murder a bunch of babies, and I have reasons to do that, then you say I'm not free. — flannel jesus

I say that you are free but your decision was unfree. You could do otherwise despite having a reason to murder them and that is why you are responsible for your actions.

So I don't have free will in those moments and am not responsible for them? Weird. — flannel jesus

Of course, you are responsible for your actions since you are a free agent.

As to determinism vs. fatalism, do you not find that determinism as concept entails necessitarianism. — javra

That sounds like 'hard determinism' or D2, but I notice that they use the word 'world' like there are other worlds and therefore this particular world is no more necessitated than the others.

If things are "fixed" (irrespective of why), then there will only be "exactly one way for the world to be"

Agree..#1 was causal determinism, which didn't use that word.

I ask because, as far as I can see, if necessitarianism is entailed by determinism

OK, let's compare it to my list of 6. 1 is out since it allows randomness. 3 allows (demands?) all outcomes, necessitating no particular world. 4 (eternalism) seems to fit the bill. 5 is falsifiable since the universe is not classical. 6?? Depends on how you spin it.

So sure, necessitarianism is entailed by determinism under definitions 2 and 4.

then determinism is necessarily fatalistic when contemplated in terms of events occurring over time.

No, fatalism is completely different, saying that there's one end outcome even if initial conditions are different. None of the other isms say anything like that. Fatalism says I will die eventually. This is consistent with non-determinism that allows all sorts of crazy paths to that end.

I only intend that if necessitarianism, we are then fated or else destined to do what we will do by reality at large, irrespective of how its workings get to be construed, such that the future can only be in fixed and, hence, can only take one particular course of events.

Fine. Sounds valid. I have no problem with it, and find no particular impact to the way I live if it turns out to be true or not.

How are you going to deal with the dichotomy that I presented? — MoK

Easy. By not asserting that I have the kind of free will that you define. I make decisions for reasons. You apparently assert that you don't, which I suppose explains some things, but doesn't explain how you are alive enough to post to a forum.

The decision seems random from the third perspective but not the first perspective since it is up to the person want to choose one option or another. — MoK

Making a choice based on what you want is doing it for a reason.

I ask because, as far as I can see, if necessitarianism is entailed by determinism

OK, let's compare it to my list of 6. 1 is out since it allows randomness — noAxioms

This is the principle area where I'm losing what you're trying to say (all other differences of opinion to me follow suit): If determinism, of any variety, can be said to allow for randomness, doesn't this then imply that, since its determinism, the randomness addressed must have been itself determined by antecedent givens (things, events, etc.)?

If so, then one gets randomness only in the sense of notions such as chaos theory, of the butterfly effect repute, which is itself deterministic ontologically... and so here the resulting randomness is only so epistemologically (to any non-omniscient being) but not so ontologically. Ontologically, there is no randomness. And so everything ontologically remains causally inevitable. Edit: And so completely necessary in every respect; thereby completely fixed; and thus fully equivalent to eternalism in its ontic being.

------

Maybe we should better define what "randomness" is intended to here specify. I'll start by defining it as an event within the cosmos (with the cosmos here understood to be the totality of all that is, to include multiple worlds or universes where such to occur) that as event has no reason whatsoever for its so occurring. This then to me generally conforms to this definition of randomness:

3. A measure of the lack of purpose, logic or objectivity of an event

Only that instead of being "a measure of" which holds degrees, it's taken to be a complete lack of that specified.

Do you mean something different by the word such that randomness would be something not deterministic in terms of ontology (rather than in terms of mere epistemology as just previously addressed)?

1 is out since it allows randomness — noAxioms


This is the principle area where I'm losing what you're trying to say (all other differences of opinion to me follow suit): If determinism, of any variety, can be said to allow for randomness, doesn't this then imply that, since its determinism, the randomness addressed must have been itself determined by antecedent givens (things, events, etc.)? — javra

I've encountered plenty of people that use definition 1, the one in the dictionary, which yes, doesn't seem like determinism at all to me. That D1 allows it does not in any way imply that the others do. D1 just says naturalism: no magic going on. No interfering miracles or anything like that.

If so, then one gets randomness only in the sense of notions such as chaos theory

No. Chaos theory is entirely consistent with any kind of determinism, and says only that small differences in initial conditions result in large difference later on. Determinism (D2,3,4) says that a given initial condition can evolve only one way. D5 asserts this, but D5 is demonstrably wrong. D6 paradoxically says that it will evolve but the one <predicted> way, but it 'could have' evolved a different way. We could do a whole topic trying to justify that one, or have its proponents attempt the feat.

As for epistemic randomness, it is pretty trivially proven that a system cannot be predicted from inside the system, no matter the processing power of the predictor, and no matter the impossible knowledge of the initial state. As for Chaos theory, you put 3 equal Newtonian point masses stationary in a 3-4-5 triangle arrangement and let them go. We can predict that one of them will fly off at escape velocity leaving the other two in a stable orbit, but we cannot predict which mass or which speed/direction the exit takes place. Doing so requires more precision that can reasonably be achieved, but it's possible in principle since the calculation is outside the simple closed system.

Question: Can it be shown that one mass will escape under relativity theory? I think it depends on the masses, whereas the Newtonian case did not. So certainly different evolution.

Ontologically, there is no randomness. And so everything ontologically remains causally inevitable.

Correct, for D2,3,4

Edit: And so completely necessary in every respect; thereby completely fixed; and thus fully equivalent to eternalism in its ontic being.

D4 is less specific and can be single (D2) or multi-world (D3).
Is calling it 'similar in Ontic being' correct? Eternalism says that all moments in time have equal ontic status, while E2 under say presentism says that future events are inevitable, but still nonexistent, which seems to be an ontic difference.

Maybe we should better define what "randomness" is intended to here specify. I'll start by defining it as an event within the cosmos (with the cosmos here understood to be the totality of all that is, to include multiple worlds or universes where such to occur) that as event has no reason whatsoever for its so occurring.

Not 'no reason'. I mean, a neutron decay happens because there's a free neutron with a half life of say a second, but the exact moment it decays is what's random. Ditto with the photon/slits. The thing has to end up somewhere, but there's randomness to exactly where. Both are caused, but not precisely caused.

This then to me generally conforms to this definition of randomness:

I'm fine with your definition, despite my instinct to pick at it.

Do you mean something different by the word such that randomness would be something not deterministic in terms of ontology (rather than in terms of mere epistemology as just previously addressed)?

Definitely ontic since epistemic randomness is not in question.


Edit: D5 has been shown nondeterministic, hence should not be on my list at all.
Norton's dome is a demonstration of the indeterminacy of Newtonian physics.