Aren't you a compatibilist? — MoK

In trying to stave off potential headaches, he's a compatibilist in the sense of free will being defined as "anything one wills to do that is not obstructed is thereby one's free will" ... which would then be a free will notion that is perfectly compatible with realty being "causally inevitable".

@flannel jesus is of course free to correct or else modify this if wrong. But I've had my headaches in the past in trying to discuss with him the difference between libertarian compatibilism and deterministic compatibilism - which he seems to conflate into the same thing. He sticks to everything necessarily being either "causally inevitable" or else random. And hence to compatibilism only making sense within this framework.

Anyway, if this helps ...

I don't think we have the same understanding of what compatibilism means. A being compatible with B isn't necessarily a claim that B is true. I could say "This TV remote is compatible with double a batteries". That doesn't mean it's only compatible with double a batteries. That doesn't mean it currently has double a batteries in it.

Compatibilism isn't a hard commitment to determinism.

Compatibilism isn't a hard commitment to determinism. — flannel jesus

How can the stance of "compatibilism" be compatible with randomness? In other words, if one's actions of will are random, how then can one be stated to have free will?

If it can't, and if there is no other option than that of reality being "causally inevitable" or else random, doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable?

No.

Incompatibilists say "determinism destroys free will". Compatibilists simply say "determinism doesn't destroy free will". They're not (all) saying "and that means determinism is necessarily the case" or "indeterminism destroys free will".

Just one simple thing: determinism doesn't destroy free will.

Basically, imagine I have a snow globe in my left hand and a snow globe in my right hand - in each snow globe a little handheld universe. Suppose I know the one in my left hand is indeterministic, and the one in my right hand, while looking at a surface level pretty much just like the left one, is deterministic. An incompatibilist would say "free will may exist in the left globe but not the right", a compatibilist would say "free will may exist in both".

Some compatibilists are definitely unambiguously determinists, and some believe free will is incompatible with indeterminism, but that's not a necessary feature of compatibilis.m

In trying to stave off potential headaches, he's a compatibilist in the sense of free will being defined as "anything one wills to do that is not obstructed is thereby one's free will" — javra

Cool.

which would then be a free will notion that is perfectly compatible with realty being "causally inevitable". — javra

I think we first have to agree on how options could be real in a determinist world. Once that is established then we could understand that decision is not possible in a deterministic system.

flannel jesus is of course free to correct or else modify this if wrong. But I've had my headaches in the past in trying to discuss with him the difference between c compatibilism and deterministic compatibilism - which he seems to conflate into the same thing. He sticks to everything necessarily being either "causally inevitable" or else random. And hence to compatibilism only making sense within this framework. — javra

Are you saying that in his opinion the decision is the result of randomness or else is determined? I think we can simply exclude the latter because both options are real. The former also can be excluded as well because of the correlation between the time of decision and action.

Compatibilism isn't a hard commitment to determinism. — flannel jesus

It is. If you have some other view in your mind please be more specific and use other terminology.

None of which is a reply to what I asked.

Just one simple thing: determinism doesn't destroy free will. — flannel jesus

It does not destroy free will when free will is defined as:

"anything one wills to do that is not obstructed is thereby one's free will" — javra

If however does necessarily deny the very possibility of free will when free will is defined as:

"One could have chosen an option other than the one option one ends up choosing". Or, more simply, the ability to choose otherwise.

Common sense holds free will to be the latter. As it for example gets applied, however implicitly, in judicial systems.

None of which is a reply to what I asked. — javra

It's all explicitly a reply to what you asked.

if you know what the word 'compatible' means, you would understand.

I think we first have to agree on how options could be real in a determinist world. Once that is established then we could understand that decision is not possible in a deterministic system. — MoK

Agreed.

Are you saying that in his opinion the decision is the result of randomness or else is determined? — MoK

Yes. With the caveat that "determined' here entails "causally inevitable".

I think we can simply exclude the latter because both options are real. The former also can be excluded as well because of the correlation between the time of decision and action. — MoK

I'd again agree.

None of which is a reply to what I asked. — javra


It's all explicitly a reply to what you said. — flannel jesus

OK. But neither question asked was in any way answered.

you asked "doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable?" I explained why it doesn't.

you asked "doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable?" I explained why it doesn't. — flannel jesus

Okey dokey, then. (In the world I live in, however, context is quite important to individual words, such as the ones you've quoted. Apparently not so much in yours. Sounds more like an ego battle than an honest search for truths, in this case truths of a rational kind. But as you say, you've replied.)

I know what compatibilism means. Compatibilism is however nonsensical.

i don't understand what you're perceiving as an ego battle. I genuinely tried to explain why compatibilists don't have to hard-commit to determinism. Can you explain what part of my answer feels like an ego-battle to you?

Can you explain what part of my answer feels like an ego-battle to you? — flannel jesus

Sure. Here were my two questions:

How can the stance of "compatibilism" be compatible with randomness? In other words, if one's actions of will are random, how then can one be stated to have free will?

If it can't, and if there is no other option than that of reality being "causally inevitable" or else random, doesn't that then mandate compatibilism's "hard commitment to determinism" in the sense that everything is causally inevitable? — javra

Here was your reply which you insist answered the questions:

No.

Incompatibilists say "determinism destroys free will". Compatibilists simply say "determinism doesn't destroy free will". They're not (all) saying "and that means determinism is necessarily the case" or "indeterminism destroys free will".

Just one simple thing: determinism doesn't destroy free will.

Basically, imagine I have a snow globe in my left hand and a snow globe in my right hand - in each snow globe a little handheld universe. Suppose I know the one in my left hand is indeterministic, and the one in my right hand, while looking at a surface level pretty much just like the left one, is deterministic. An incompatibilist would say "free will may exist in the left globe but not the right", a compatibilist would say "free will may exist in both". — flannel jesus

For starters, my two questions are such that the second hinges on the answer to the first. You did not answer the first. You therefore neither answered the second.

is hard to answer a post with many questions while staying focused, I do prefer answering one question at a time. A failing of mine perhaps, I focused on the last one.

If the world has a little bit of randomness, that doesn't necessarily destroy the causality one needs to enact one's will. So that should be the answer to your first two questions, right?

If the world has a little bit of randomness, that doesn't necessarily destroy the causality one needs to enact one's will. So that should be the answer to your first two questions, right? — flannel jesus

No. It's not an answer to the first question. The first question regarded what a "random free will" can possibly signify, and if the idea of such a random free will is at all viable. It did not address the workings of the world, but instead addressed what free will can and cannot possibly be.

Please re-read the first question again.

your first question was how can the stance of compatibilism be compatible with randomness?

Why wouldn't it be? I don't know what's so unsatisfying about my answer to you, I feel like I'm answering pretty straight forward, but since that's not satisfying to you, let me know why you think a world with a little bit of randomness is necessarily contrary to a compatibilist idea of free will

Just to check: We do agree that compatibilism entails the reality of free will, right?

I could probably be persuaded otherwise on some weird technicality but yeah, i think someone who calls themselves a compatibilist is almost certainly someone who believes humans have free will in this universe

Adding a little randomness to the world means that it is not deterministic anymore.

that's correct

I could probably be persuaded otherwise on some weird technicality — flannel jesus

What technicality could that possibly be?

Perhaps that just because I think free will is compatible with determinism doesn't mean I actually believe we do have free will.

As in, "there's a possible world where determinism is true and beings in that world have free will, this just doesn't happen to be one of them".

I'm certain the vast majority of compatibilists don't take a position like that though.

that's correct — flannel jesus

But compatibilism is about the existence of free will in a deterministic world rather than a random world.

1) How could randomness (“chance” so understood) allow for one’s responsibility (in the sense of culpability or praiseworthiness) for the options one decides upon? — javra

Absolute Determinism would be one-damn-thing-after-another. Randomness is non-linear, so there are forks in the path. Those forks are opportunities for Choice. If there is an option, you may be forced to choose by pressure from the past, but left vs right would be a "free" choice. :joke:

How is this not playing footloose with definitions derived from a word's common use? One can entertain compatibilism but cannot oneself be a compatibilist if one denies compatibilism's validity, as in the validity that free will occurs and is compatible with the likewise occurring reality that everything is in one way or another determined.

Can we at least agree that there can be no compatibilism if free will is denied regardless of how free will is defined?

Absolute Determinism would be one-damn-thing-after-another. Randomness is non-linear, so there are forks in the path. Those forks are opportunities for Choice. If there is an option, you may be forced to choose by pressure from the past, but left vs right would be a "free" choice. :joke: — Gnomon

You've explained options via randomness, but not the choice between options which is taken. How can randomness account for the very act of deciding while yet accounting for one's responsibility in light of the decision made?

I don't know, we don't have to focus on that, I said pretty much every compatibilist believes in free will, so it doesn't really matter that I can conceive of some weird edge case. We can just ignore that edge case. I'm happy to