you said physical means stuff that exists.

But then you said you differentiate physical from the mind.

So the mind doesn't exist? — flannel jesus

I gave you the example of physical, such as my body, your body, etc. And of course, the mind exists and it is a separate thing from my body, your body, etc.

So you said physical means stuff that exists, but now you're saying that's not correct, and physical means something else?

Deterministic and random
Is different from
Deterministic or random

"And" and "or" are two very extremely different words — flannel jesus

Are you saying that in your view things are sometimes deterministic and sometimes random? If not what are you trying to say?

So you said physical means stuff that exists, but now you're saying that's not correct, and physical means something else? — flannel jesus

I gave the example of the physical stuff, like my body. I also think that there is mental stuff, like my mind.

I have no idea whether or not anything, in reality, is determined or random.

I do have an idea, however, that the processes by which things happen are either deterministic or in some part random. That if a process isn't deterministic, that can only mean that the part of that process that isn't deterministic is random.

The a priori modes by which one cognizes depends on, as the name suggests, how their cognition is pre-structured and not the natural laws which govern those pre-structures: they relate to each other, but aren’t the same. — Bob Ross

I don't know if I'm understanding you, because I see something very different.

As you say, the natural laws govern the pre-structures. If the natural laws are different, the pre-structures are different, so the modes of cognition are different. If the natural laws are not such that 1 + 1 = 2, then they will not lead to pre-structures, then rational principles of logic and cognition, that reflect/suggest/embody/whatever 1 + 1 = 2, and 1 + 1 = 2 will never be determined.


It all depends on the underlying natural laws. A healthy brain will not facilitate thinking powers that contradict the natural laws from which the brain grew, and of which the brain is composed.

Ok, so you are talking about processes that happen in things. When I say that a thing is deterministic or random, I mean that the processes within the thing are deterministic or random. I however think that something cannot be deterministic sometimes and random at other times.

ok well I can write a program of Conway's game of life that's mostly deterministic and a little bit random so I guess I'll just go with that and stick with what I'm saying.

ok well I can write a program of Conway's game of life that's mostly deterministic and a little bit random so I guess I'll just go with that and stick with what I'm saying. — flannel jesus

But the reality is different from your program.

of course it is. But you said "something cannot be...". Something can be

of course it is. But you said "something cannot be...". Something can be — flannel jesus

I talk about things in reality.

I don't pretend to perfectly know how reality works, which is why I'm agnostic about if pieces of reality may be a bit random. Quantum mechanics could easily be a bit random.

I don't pretend to perfectly know how reality works, which is why I'm agnostic about if pieces of reality may be a bit random. — flannel jesus

But you cannot be agnostic about reality if you are a compatibilist!

well too bad

well too bad — flannel jesus

So the end of the discussion?

Do you have something to say other than just bare contrarianism? If not then yeah, probably.

Do you have something to say other than just bare contrarianism? If not then yeah, probably. — flannel jesus

I already discussed substance dualism to a good extent. If you have any questions then I would be happy to answer. Otherwise, I don't see anything to add.

I already discussed substance dualism to a good extent — MoK

nothing i've said is pro- or contra- substance dualism. I don't care about it either way. It just seems completely orthogonal to any point I've made.

nothing i've said is pro- or contra- substance dualism. I don't care about it either way. It just seems completely orthogonal to any point I've made. — flannel jesus

Ok, it was very nice to chat with you.

Your thinking presupposes that the a priori modes of cognition have to mirror the natural laws; and this is simply not true.

Who said that, e.g., mathematics is more than (transcendental) a priori?

One analogy is, if you are in a lumberyard, and you build a house, your house is not going to be made out of stone.

Another analogy is, if you use the sword-making methods of Masamune, you won't end up with Excaliber.

The general idea being, a product cannot reflect materials and methods that were not used during its production.

Nothing produced in this universe can reflect natural laws other than the natural laws of this universe. How could it be otherwise? How could an intelligence, produced in and by a reality where 1 + 1 = 2, seeing that principle reflected everywhere, think that 1 + 1 = 3? Not, as you said, in a healthy brain.

Or, from the other direction, does 1 + 1 = 3, and the universe produced intelligences that built mathematical systems around the wrong answer?

Right or wrong, this is my reasoning:

1. A causally closed system either evolves towards the future deterministically, or it is in some part random. So that's the difference between determinism and indeterminism - indeterminism has some randomness.

2. Thus any time someone expresses an idea that's supposedly "incompatible with determinism", that's the same thing as saying "this idea requires randomness"

3. When libertarians say free will is incompatible with determinism, I hear "free will requires randomness"

4. I do not believe any coherent concept of free will requires randomness (and that's independent of whether or not I think randomness actually exists), and that's for one simple reason: if something is random, it's uncontrolled. If random stuff is happening in your brain or in your mind or in your agency, you don't control that any more than you control a fully determined brain / mind / agency (and it could be argued that the randomness gives you explicitly less control)

5. Therefore I believe that the libertarian concept of free will is incorrect (and again, that's independent of whether or not I think randomness actually exists). At this point I can either reframe free will to be more coherent according to my understand, or reject it altogether

6. I DID reject it altogether for many years. Perhaps you think that's a more coherent position, and perhaps it is.

7. Some years ago, something flipped, I don't recall what or why, but I came to accept the idea of a compatibilist emergent decision making process. Such a process doesn't rely on randomness (again, regardless of whether randomness actually exists). Through much abstract contemplation, most of which I can't put into words, that ended up with me thinking that some flavour of compatibilism is the right way to think about free will. — flannel jesus

Good explanation of things. I don't disagree with anything significant. But I still don't understand why you say you are a compatibilist if you are agnostic regarding determinism. I also don't see the freedom in your free will, although there doesn't seem to be any commonly accepted definition of free will, so that doesn't really matter.

But I still don't understand why you say you are a compatibilist if you are agnostic regarding determinism. — Patterner

Imagine the universe in a snow globe. Imagine 2 snow globes, one in each hand. In your left hand, it's a lot like this universe, but where a random-collapse quantum interpretation is true. In your right hand, it's a lot like this universe, but one where a deterministic quantum interpretation is true. My understanding of free will is such that, as long as humans and human decision making is an emergent feature, both of those universes have human beings with tthe only sort of "free will" I think means anything.

My understanding of free will is *compatible with* determinism, but that doesn't mean it's incompatible with indeterminism. Being compatible with one thing doesn't mean incompatible with another. We have free will, regardless of determinism.