No problem, mate. :wink:

it works like this:

The Schrödinger equation evolves the wave function deterministically, and then at some moment it collapses the wave function randomly, with the probabilities of that random collapse determined by the shape of the wave function

The Schrödinger equation evolves the wave function deterministically, and then at some moment it collapses the wave function randomly. — flannel jesus

But here your saying that the first is 100% determined and the second is 100% random. Neither then are hybrid events. Where is the hybrid event at?

The Schrödinger equation evolves the wave function deterministically, and then at some moment it collapses the wave function randomly. — flannel jesus

The wave function does not collapse randomly. It just collapses when a measurement is done on the system.

Ah sorry I didn't realize that's what you were asking for. A single event that's a hybrid.

Well, I'm a programmer, and as a programmer I can tell you, fundamentally if I wanted to develop a hybrid process, there's always a function call to the *random number generator* as one command, and the function that uses that random result as another one. So I don't necessarily think any *single event* is hybrid at that detailed level of description, no. Maybe it is, idk, I'm agnostic. I'm not sure it matters either way.

The wave function does not collapse randomly. It just collapses when a measurement is done on the system. — MoK

If you're not yet familiar with this, the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment gets extremely interesting.

Nothing conclusive about it in this regard, but - from my last readings regarding it - it to me so far illustrates that the measurement by which collapse occurs might well be pivoted upon observers as conscious beings. But I grant that's debatable.

At any rate, its an interesting QM experiment that's been replicated many times.

So I don't necessarily think any *single event* is hybrid at that detailed level of description, no. Maybe it is, idk, I'm agnostic. — flannel jesus

Got it. I'm still curious though: What then would be your gut feeling regarding this in terms of free will?

that it's mostly irrelevant. It's an implementation detail that doesn't give us or deny us free will.

Thanks, I was familiar with the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment. De Broglie–Bohm interpretation can simply address this paradox as you can find it here.

It's an implementation detail that doesn't give us or deny us free will. — flannel jesus

As a reminder, do you believe that you could have chosen otherwise at an past juncture of choice-making (i.e., at any juncture in which you decided upon an option)?

De Broglie–Bohm interpretation can simply address this paradox as you can find it here. — MoK

Granted. Bohm does have a lot of interesting things to say.

IF there's quantum randomness, genuine randomness, then probably. If Many Worlds is the case, then at any point where quantum randomness might have produced different results for a particular choice, in Many Worlds there's some version of me that made each possible choice.

But I don't think that either of those things are required for free will.

IF there's quantum randomness, genuine randomness, then probably. — flannel jesus

Unless one introduces some form of a hybrid event in one's metaphysics, I still don't get how randomness can account for any notion of free will. But thanks for the answer. :up:

It doesn't Account for it. It's just there. It exists. Not everything that exists has to account for everything else that exists. I don't believe the chemical behaviour of Uranium accounts for the behaviour of birds in flight. They're just two things that happen to happen in the same universe.

It doesn't Account for it. It's just there. It exists. — flannel jesus

Than why did you just specify the possibility of free will thus defined as being contingent on "genuine randomness"?

I don't think so. Do you think so?

I think explicitly saying "it doesn't account for it" is exactly the opposite of me saying it's contingent on it. How could I say randomness doesn't account for it, but also think that it's contingent on randomness? I think you're interpreting these words in the exact wrong direction.

I don't think so. Do you think so? — flannel jesus

Can you clarify what you're here addressing. As a reminder, what I was addressing is in relation to what you expressed here:

IF there's quantum randomness, genuine randomness, then probably. — flannel jesus

Can you clarify what your here addressing — javra

The question you asked.

I do not believe I expressed anything about free will being contingent upon randomness.

I'm getting headaches again. So I'll stop.

do you believe that you could have chosen otherwise at an past juncture of choice-making — javra

If we do some rewind experiment, and it does end up with me making a different choice despite being under exactly the same conditions, that difference in choice isn't due to my will, it's due to randomness. I'm not saying, and haven't said, that free will is contingent on the possibility that i could rewind time and make a different choice.

It may be ontologically true that if time was rewound, quantum randomness allows for a different choice to be made. But I didn't call that "free will" at any point. That's just random. Random is random, random isn't human freedom.

If we do some rewind experiment, — flannel jesus

For the record, it has nothing to do with rewinding time. (It has to do which what is and is not possible at any juncture of choice-making. which as event always occurs in the present, and not in the past. If one can chose differently than what one ends up doing at any present juncture of choice making, then one could have chosen differently at any past juncture of choice-making.)

But I didn't call that "free will" at any point. — flannel jesus

I thought you implicitly did. But ok, you didn't. What then does this "free will" term signify to you?

I think the biggest part of it is that my conscious experience doesn't seem to be epiphenomenal. I can make a concsious choice and my body can enact it. A lot of detreminists (maybe not most, idk) can be elimitavists about the mind and about choice and reasoning and decision making. I'm not an eliminativist. I'm a non-eliminativist reductionist - I think minds are real, I think consciousness really happens, I think conscious choice really happens, I think we really deliberate and consider "alterantive possibilities" (regardless of if those possibilities are ontologically real possibilities), and I guess in some sense I call all that crap free will.

I call all that crap free will. — flannel jesus

Can you be explicit on whether or not "all that crap" allows for you having chosen differently than what you do or else did?

You mean under the exact same conditions, right? You said it has nothing to do with the rewind test, but... that's it for me. That's what I imagine as the "rewind test". A god pressing rewind on the VCR that is our universe, then pressing play and seeing what happens.

So this god sees me do one thing, presses rewind, so all relevant causal facts are the same, presses play and then he sees me do something different, right? That's what you mean by "allows me to have chosen differently", right? It means there's a non-zero probability that I actually do something different, despite being perfectly the same, the second time around. Yeah?

That's what you mean by "allows me to have chosen differently", right? — flannel jesus

Nor really. It has nothing to do with rewinding time, and certainly has nothing to do with any god. Assume your right now have two options of either replying or of not replying. In this very act of choice-making, can you of your own volition (which would preclude the outcome being random) choose either of the two options? Or are you causally determined to choose one option such that you in reality have no true choice between the two?

What does it mean to "in reality have a choice between the two" though? If you're the god of some universe, and you want to check if someone "in reality has a choice between the two", how would you check that if not doing the rewind test?

I say god because we can't check that sort of thing from inside the universe. It's gotta be tested from outside.

If you're the god of some universe, and you want to check if someone "in reality has a choice between the two", how would you check that if not doing the rewind test? — flannel jesus

Why "god" and not a "brain-in-vat dragon"? It has nothing to do with god, nor with the omniscience omnipotence I take it you're here addressing.

What does it mean to "in reality have a choice between the two" though? — flannel jesus

It means that you could in fact choose either of the two options of your own volition. This in contrast to such presumption being in reality only an illusory emotion / sentiment regarding your ability to do so.

I'm not talking about omniscience at all, just a being with a rewind button for our universe. If a brain in a vat dragon has the rewind button, then he's the god in question.

The difference between indeterminism and determinism is, given the exact same conditions, with determinism you get the exact same result every time. With indeterminism you don't. That's what this rewind test is all about. It's an easy to visualise way of setting up the same exact conditions.

So when you say "could in fact choose", I'm trying to figure out if you mean like in an indeterministic way, or if you mean some other way.

Because some people think you "could in fact choose" even if you get the same result every time from the same condition.

The difference between indeterminism and determinism is, given the exact same conditions, with determinism you get the exact same result every time. With indeterminism you don't. That's what this rewind test is all about.

So when you say "could in fact choose", I'm trying to figure out if you mean like in an indeterministic way, or if you mean some other way. — flannel jesus

You're in many a way placing the cart before the horse. If one can choose any of the two options via one's own volition, that is termed liberatrian free will. If this belief that one can is only illusory, that is then determinism in the sense of "everything is causally inevitable" - be it compatibilist or nor. Each will in turn require its own metaphysical account for how it operates. With these being all over the place.

There are other ways of defining determinism and indeterminism. But using the definitions you've just given, quite plainly, libertairan free will shall need to adopt some variant of indeterminism, i.e., some variant which specifies that not everything is causally inevitable - such that given the same physical context, the same intent, and the same options (these being the conditions) different options can be chosen (the option chosen then being the result, such that different results are then possible - but certainly not necessary).

so you know I'm a compatibilist. I haven't changed my mind on that. So, knowing I'm a compatibilist, and knowing thus that my idea of free will does not require indeterminism, and does not require that it be ontologically true that, given the exact same conditions, something different could happen, does that answer your question?

My concern in just answering directly is that I'm not confident I understand what you mean. If you played ball with the rewind test, I would perhaps have been able to figure out what you mean, but without that I feel like I'm just guessing at what you mean.