And yet we can build a whole body of knowledge, neurology, from the conscious study of what we call the brain. This implies, by right, an epistemological primacy of consciousness over neurology. From neurology we cannot know the consciousness, but from the consciousness we can know the brain.

Thus it is difficult to think of consciousness as simply something enclosed in an interiority (the brain). Consciousness seems to be thrown into the world and in a more direct connection with the world than the physical sciences themselves. For me this is the reason why the question of the external world seems implicated in consciousness, and even a dualism between consciousness and the world is problematic.

It seems you're claiming that particles must be conscious because some aggregates of particles are conscious. That seems like saying that particles must be wet because some aggregates of particles are wet. What's the actual argument?

i'm saying there must be an explanation for our consciousness in the properties of the particles that we are made out of. Just as there is an explanation for wet in the properties of the particles that whatever the liquid in question is made out of.

i'm saying there must be an explanation for our consciousness in the properties of the particles that we are made out of. — Patterner

You also deny this, by asserting that the environment of those particles is just as important, being "the conditions". The environment of the particles (the conditions), is not a property of the particles, but of a larger context, within which the particles exist.

Really loving Lights On. Thank you for the recommendation. Just spoke with Daniel Chamovitz in Ch 4.

cool, glad you're enjoying it. What's the cliff notes for that convo with chamovitz?

i'm saying there must be an explanation for our consciousness in the properties of the particles that we are made out of. Just as there is an explanation for wet in the properties of the particles that whatever the liquid in question is made out of. — Patterner

What is the explanation of wetness in the properties of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms?

My cliff notes for it? Well, he doesn't seem to differentiate much between human and plant consciousness. Like they're talking about plants having a form of memory. He says, "i'll be giving a talk, and someone will say, 'Oh, no, that's not memory. They're just responding to a past event.' I just give them a look and say, 'Yeah? And what do you call responding to a past event?'."

Plants have far more photoreceptors than we do. which I've never thought about, but it makes sense. As he says, they are entirely dependent upon life for their survival. They have a "vast array" of photo receptors. They're in every cell, in different parts of the cells, and move around in the cell when they need to. They are able to "see" shapes, colored and intensity to high degrees.

Plants only have one kind of touch receptor, whereas we have many. And there's very little subjectivity in plants, so they don't feel pain. They just sense touch. Pain relievers should be called ion channel inhibitors. They work on plants by stopping the flow of electricity, just as they do humans, because it's the same molecular mechanism. So a Venus flytrap doesn't send the signal that a fly has touched one of its hairs, and doesn't close in on it.

He says the same about plants "smelling" as he did about memory. Like when one plant releases pheromones, and nearby fruity ripen. People two him, "No, they're not smelling it, they're just experiencing it." Then they say, "Ok, they're not aware of it." He compares it to involuntarily salivating when you smell the barbecue.

What is the explanation of wetness in the properties of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms? — Janus

The Hawaiians do a good, quick rundown of Cohesion, the attraction of liquid molecules to each other, and Adhesion, the attraction of liquid molecules to other substances. If adhesion is stronger than cohesion, the substance gets wet.

And cohesion and adhesion are the result of hydrogen bonds. Which gets into electron shells, and how many electrons are best for each shell's stability. And down to the negatively charged electrons circling three positively charged protons in the nucleus.

No substance just happens to have the characteristics it has. There are reasons. The properties of particles, forces, and laws of physics dictate how things are.

You haven't answered the question. I'm asking about atoms not molecules. I could be asking about what properties of electrons, protons and neutrons or even quarks give rise to wetness.
All you're telling us is that wetness emerges at the molecular level. What you've given is just description of what happens not explanation.

ah the plant chapter, that was honestly fascinating.

You haven't answered the question. I'm asking about atoms not molecules. I could be asking about what properties of electrons, protons and neutrons or even quarks give rise to wetness.
All you're telling us is that wetness emerges at the molecular level. What you've given is just description of what happens not explanation. — Janus

I did answer about atoms. I even went down a level below that. I started at the top, with cohesion and adhesion. Then went down to the molecules and their hydrogen bonds. Then down to the atoms and their electron shells. Then down to the electrons and protons and their opposing charges, which attract each other.

If not for the bottom, there wouldn't be the top. There wouldn't be atoms if not for the properties of the electrons are protons. There wouldn't be molecules if not for the properties of the atom. There wouldn't be wetness if not for the properties of the molecules.

Or is it your position that wetness comes about for no reason at all? In which case, I wonder why it always exists in certain conditions. Water always makes a carpet wet within a certain temperature range. If there was no reason for that, wouldn't it happen inconsistently?

It doesn't happen inconsistently. It happens every single time. If something happens every single time, we assume there's an underlying reason.

ah the plant chapter, that was honestly fascinating. — flannel jesus

Yes, that was also the parasites. Less fun, but no less fascinating.

You're still missing the point. You argue that microphysical particles must be conscious because consciousness is always found in certain configurations of particles. I pointed out that is like saying that microphysical particles must be wet because wetness is reliably found in certain configurations of microphysical particles.

I haven't denied that the potential for wetness and consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, but that is a different claim altogether. And I haven't said that anything just happens randomly or by chance either, so that is a red herring..

You're still missing the point. You argue that microphysical particles must be conscious because consciousness is always found in certain configurations of particles. I pointed out that is like saying that microphysical particles must be wet because wetness is reliably found in certain configurations of microphysical particles. — Janus

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.

I know many people disagree with my second sentence, but that's what I think.

I do, however, consider the possibility that consciousness is a ubiquitous field that accomplishes the same thing proto-consciousness does. Whether subjective experience is due to the particles being animated by such a field, or a property of the particles, might amount to the same thing.

And I haven't said that anything just happens randomly or by chance either, so that is a red herring.. — Janus

It wasn't a red herring. I didn't know if that's what you were thinking.

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness. — Patterner

It is often said that consciousness is analogous to liquidity or transparency: it appears only at a certain level of complexity in physical systems, though it is wholly constituted by simpler elements that lack it. This is a bad analogy. ...

Liquidity is just the behavior of molecules en masse, and transparency is a matter of molecular structure in relation to light. But what it is like to be a conscious organism is not reducible in this way to the behavior or structure of its parts, because it has a subjective character that is not captured by physical description. ...

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide. — Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness. — Patterner

I agree with this, except I would just say "consciousness" and drop the "human".

I do, however, consider the possibility that consciousness is a ubiquitous field that accomplishes the same thing proto-consciousness does. — Patterner

So what is the difference between consciousness and "proto-consciousness? Does the latter just mean "potential for consciousness" in which case we could talk about fundamental particles, even quarks, having "proto-wetness"?

Whether subjective experience is due to the particles being animated by such a field, or a property of the particles, might amount to the same thing. — Patterner

It might, but it only requires that the field have the potential to cause consciousness or wetness, not that the field itself be conscious or wet.

I quite agree. The kinds of properties of microphysical particles that cause the emergence of wetness cannot cause the emergence of human consciousness.

And vice versa, and so on with all other emergent properties. I wonder, though, why you keep speaking about human consciousness, as though humans were the only conscious entities.

So what is the difference between consciousness and "proto-consciousness? — Janus

It's the difference between the subjective experience of an information processing system and the subjective experience of a particle.

Does the latter just mean "potential for consciousness" — Janus

No. Proto-consciousness is subjective experience, not the potential for it. I use proto-consciousness to refer to the subjective experience of particles, and consciousness to refer to the collective subjective experience of groups of particles that process information. But whether it's a particle's consciousness or a human's, the consciousness is the same. The difference is what is being subjectively experienced. A particle is not experiencing thoughts, hormones, vision, hearing, being alive, or anything other than being a particle.

It's the difference between the subjective experience of an information processing system and the subjective experience of a particle. — Patterner

The notion of a subjective experience of a particle makes no sense.

No. Proto-consciousness is subjective experience, not the potential for it. I use proto-consciousness to refer to the subjective experience of particles, and consciousness to refer to the collective subjective experience of groups of particles that process information. But whether it's a particle's consciousness or a human's, the consciousness is the same. The difference is what is being subjectively experienced. A particle is not experiencing thoughts, hormones, vision, hearing, being alive, or anything other than being a particle. — Patterner

Why not just use 'consciousness' to denote subjective experience? There is no "collective subjective experience of groups of particles" there is just subjective experience. You are multiplying entities unnecessarily. You list all the things a particle is not experiencing; and "being a particle" is not an experience unless it involves experiencing something, and being is not something, so can you say what it is experiencing or in other words aware of?

I use proto-consciousness to refer to the subjective experience of particles, — Patterner

‘Organisms’ might be preferable. At least organisms are feasibly subjects whereas there’s no grounds to believe that is true of particles.

There's nothing it's like to be a particle, because it's not experiencing anything other than existence. Even it a particle is moved from the most remote point in intergalactic space to the core of the hottest star, there's nothing about the particle that produces, or allows, the experience to be anything it's like to be the particle. It doesn't have anything that makes there something its like to be the particle to the particle. No thought or sensation of any kind.

But there must be a property there that can give rise to the "what it's like" of consciousness, because, if there isn't, then our subjective experience emerges for no reason. Emergent properties don't come about for no reason. The explanation for them is down there somewhere, starting with the particles that everything is made of. And if the properties we know of cannot explain subjective experiences, then there must be one or more properties that we don't know of.

And if the properties we know of cannot explain subjective experiences — Patterner

But what if it's not the properties alone that explain it, but instead the processes that the properties enable?

Properties alone should, I think, not be seen as the place for all explanations.

But there must be a property there that can give rise to the "what it's like" of consciousness, because, if there isn't, then our subjective experience emerges for no reason. — Patterner

That's not a valid conclusion, because you allow that the particle's environment (the condition which it is in), such as hot or cold, also has causal influence over the properties which the object demonstrates. This means that some of the properties which an object displays must be caused by something other than the particles which constitute the object. Therefore "subjective experience" could come from something other than the properties of the particles which make up the object.

But there must be a property there that can give rise to the "what it's like" of consciousness, because, if there isn't, then our subjective experience emerges for no reason. Emergent properties don't come about for no reason. The explanation for them is down there somewhere, starting with the particles that everything is made of — Patterner

Can’t you see that this still holds to the basic premises of materialism - that what is real must be understood in terms of ‘the particles that everything is made of’? As I said in my first response in this thread:

…the background assumption behind all of it is still reductionist, in the sense that it is assumed that the fundamental constituents of beings exist on the micro level, and gradually combine to form greater levels of complexity. — Wayfarer

The only option you’ll consider is that particles, as the ‘constituents of everything that is’, must have some undiscovered property which can account for consciousness. When you say there ‘must be’ an explanation in terms of how constituent particles can be combined to ‘produce’ subjective experience, you’re still operating within a basically materialist paradigm.

Without wanting to sound facetious, it is like an example of the old saying about the drunk looking for his keys under a lamp post. He’s joined by an onlooker, and they both search for the keys but to no avail. ‘Are you sure you lost your keys here?’, says the onlooker. ‘No’, says the drunk, ‘but the light is better here.’

I suggest that likewise, you’ve painted yourself into a corner, because of the inability to conceive of the nature of mind in any sense other than that of a combination of particulate matter. And I understand that, because it is pretty well the mainstream view. But I think it’s a dead end: that the nature of mind can’t be understood in terms of the laws that govern inanimate matter, because it operates according to different principles altogether. What they might be - well, that’s the question!

If you look further into the David Chalmers famous essay Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness you will see he makes a start at addressing the question in terms of non-reductive physicalism. He says that the starting point is to realise that experience (I would say: the capacity for experience) is itself fundamental, in the same way that the so-called ‘fundamental particles’ are. But it can’t be explained purely in terms of the laws that govern physical matter.

Of course, by taking experience as fundamental, there is a sense in which this approach does not tell us why there is experience in the first place. But this is the same for any fundamental theory. Nothing in physics tells us why there is matter in the first place, but we do not count this against theories of matter. Certain features of the world need to be taken as fundamental by any scientific theory. A theory of matter can still explain all sorts of facts about matter, by showing how they are consequences of the basic laws. The same goes for a theory of experience.

This position qualifies as a variety of dualism, as it postulates basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics. But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes. There is nothing particularly spiritual or mystical about this theory - its overall shape is like that of a physical theory, with a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws. It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing. Indeed, the overall structure of this position is entirely naturalistic, allowing that ultimately the universe comes down to a network of basic entities obeying simple laws, and allowing that there may ultimately be a theory of consciousness cast in terms of such laws. If the position is to have a name, a good choice might be naturalistic dualism.

Myself, I don’t favour that kind of approach, but the point is, he’s not relying on an account based on the aggregation of material particles.

But what if it's not the properties alone that explain it, but instead the processes that the properties enable?

Properties alone should, I think, not be seen as the place for all explanations. — flannel jesus

It is seldom, if ever, the micro properties alone that account for macro characteristics.

But there is a connection between the micro and macro. If the micro properties play no roll in the macro characteristics, then the appearance of the macro characteristics would be unpredictable, and would emerge from any micro properties. If macro properties emerge consistently, there are reasons, which include three properties.

And if the properties we know of cannot explain subjective experiences, then there must be one or more properties that we don't know of. — Patterner

It’s more that: we have a ‘theory of everything’ that presumes that ‘everything’ consists of matter or matter-energy. But that theory excludes or brackets out the subject who is doing the analysing. You can see this right at the outset of modern science, with Galileo’s division of primary and secondary attributes. And that is the source of the ‘hard problem’:

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them.

Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp 35-36

And I suggest you’re still trying to resolve this problem within that framework. So it’s not a matter of ‘missing properties’, so much as a category error. You’re describing the problem OK but you’re still trying to solve it within the framework which caused it to be a problem in the first place.

Why not just use 'consciousness' to denote subjective experience? There is no "collective subjective experience of groups of particles" there is just subjective experience. — Janus

There is consciousness of a single particle, and, under various circumstances, consciousness of group of particles. I differentiate the two to make it clear that I am saying the particles subjectively experience.

Then, of course, I explain what I mean by that. That I'm not saying particles are intelligent; sentient; that there is not something that it is like to be that particle – not something it is like for the particle.

Sorry, can't read your post ATM. But in response to your first sentence:

Can’t you see that this still holds to the basic premises of materialism - that what is real must be understood in terms of ‘the particles that everything is made of’? — Wayfarer

Yes, I can see that. I do believe it's understood in terms of the particles. (In conjunction with the forces, laws of physics, and anything else anyone would care to mention.) But it involves non-physicsl properties of the particles. So it's not materialism or physicalism. It's panpsychism.