The corpse's particles all still have the same properties they had when the organism wads alive. — Patterner

But apparently not the same relations with one another.

Loving Ch 5 with David Eagleman. Discussing the illusions of what we perceive vs what is actually happening. Hit a button that causes a flash of light. They insert a tiny delay between the button and the flash, and gradually increase it, up to 200 milliseconds. The brain adapts to the delay, synchronizing the touch and the flash. "I know that those should all be synchronized, because I'm the one who caused it. So, in other words, the best way to predict the future is to cause it yourself."

Then they remove the delay all at once. Having adjusted to the delay, the subject now thinks there's something wrong with the machine, because they think the flash came before they pressed the button.

As Annaka says, "We wouldn't consider them illusions normally, because they work in everyday life. ... They're useful for being a human being in our day to day lives. But they're obstacles for actually understanding the true nature of reality."

When Eagleman later talks about the wristband his company makes that vibrates to give the deaf wearer audio information, he talks about sensory input meaning anything. We learn what it means, or it's all just gibberish. The signals have to make sense. "And making sense means it has correlations with other things. And, by the way, the most important correlation is with our motor actions. Is what I do in the world, and that is what causes anything to have meaning." I suspect AI needs to do things in order to be like us. Maybe it can't understand like we do if it it only has theoretical understanding.

*

they think the flash came before they pressed the button. — Patterner

Absolutely bonkers

I suspect AI needs to do things in order to be like us. Maybe it can't understand like we do if it it only has theoretical understanding. — Patterner

Well yes, and it does. I'm pretty sure the process of training is involves a whole lot of asking the ai for an output given some input, and giving rewards as they give more of the right kinds of outputs.

I'm not completely sure I agree that a person born locked in wouldn't ever be able to make sense of their sensory inputs, but his reasoning makes complete sense and I wouldn't be massively surprised if he were right.

Well yes, and it does. I'm pretty sure the process of training is involves a whole lot of asking the ai for an output given some input, and giving rewards as they give more of the right kinds of outputs. — flannel jesus

I wonder if direct manipulation of the environment would change things.

I also wonder if it would be able to distinguish between directly manipulatiing its and what it currently experiences.

I'm not completely sure I agree that a person born locked in wouldn't ever be able to make sense of their sensory inputs, but his reasoning makes complete sense and I wouldn't be massively surprised if he were right. — flannel jesus

Harris' scenario has only sight. No other senses. Difficult to see the road to understanding. But even if not senses were added, I wonder if being able to act on the input, and see what succeeds and what doesn't, would need required.

I've quoted this before from, Journey of the Mind: How Thinking Emerged from Chaos, by Ogi Ogas and Sai Gaddam:

A mind is a physical system that converts sensations into action. A mind takes in a set of inputs from its environment and transforms them into a set of environment-impacting outputs that, crucially, influence the welfare of its body. This process of changing inputs into outputs—of changing sensation into useful behavior—is thinking, the defining activity of a mind. — Ogas and Gaddam

They seem to agree with Eagleman that acting on input is key. Although they are talking about the evolution of the mind, the first step of which is a simple flicker of movement in response to photons hitting rhodopsin, while Harris' scenario is a human infant whose brain is normal, but gets only visual input.

What I do say, is that what is real is not exhausted by, or limited to, the physical. To clarify — I’m not suggesting we invent a false reality, nor that the physical is an illusion. What I’m questioning is the assumption that the appearance of a world with particle-like structure entails that the physical structure is primary, or exists independently of the mind that apprehends it.
— Wayfarer
I agree with all of this, but I think it has a different explanation. I do not think the physical and conscious properties of what exists can be separated. No more than the mass and charge of a particle can be separated. And, just as it doesn't make sense to say either mass or charge are more important than the other, it doesn't make sense to say either or both are more important than consciousness. So no, what is real is not exhausted by, or limited to, the physical. No, the appearance of a world with particle-like structure does not entail that the physical structure is primary. And it is impossible for the physical structure to exist independently of the mind that apprehends it. — Patterner

You are both forgetting about a very important thing - QM.

What is a physical structure and how exactly does that differ from a non-physical structure? How are mass and charge physical and not informational? What does QM say the mass and charge, and the particle they are associated with, are when not observing them? Is a wave function physical? Is the observer and the collapse of the wave function a physical interaction?

Is it that the observer actually causes the collapse of the wave function, or are we confusing the map with the territory here, where we are confusing what we experience (particles) with what it actually there.

If mass and charge are properties, then how many properties of physical structures are there? It seems to me that there would be far more than just two to claim property dualism, or you are focusing only two types of "properties" - physical and non-physical while ignoring the rest to be able to claim property dualism. It seems more like substance dualism but then you'd have to explain how two different substances can interact.

If mass and charge are properties, then how many properties of physical structures are there? It seems to me that there would be far more than just two to claim property dualism, or you are focusing only two types of "properties" - physical and non-physical while ignoring the rest to be able to claim property dualism. — Harry Hindu

I'm only mentioning the two a) to try to give an idea of what I'm getting at, and b) because I don't know house many we know about. Spin and charm are two more I've heard of.

I call these "physical" properties because they are studied and quantified by our sciences, and we call everything that we can study and quantify "physical". Hence physicalism. Things that cannot be studied and quantified, or even detected, are not physical. Terrence Deacon's absential features.

I really can't comment on your QM thinking. I don't know enough about that.

How are mass and charge physical and not informational? — Harry Hindu

Can you explain? I've been involved with someone on another site who says things like that. For example, "At the most micro-level you can imagine, matter does not seem to be anything other than information." I haven't gotten a real handle on the idea.

The strange thing is that you both seem to be ignoring the access to your own minds that you have and not accounting for its properties/structure and how its property/structure is used to model something else (physical) that does not share its property/structure (non-physical), but then go on to assert that the model is a more accurate representation of reality than the structure you have direct access to (your minds).

It seems only logical that the world share more properties/structure of the mind than the way the mind models the world (which is really just part of the mind in the first place). This is not to say that idealism or panpsychism is the case. It is merely saying that the mind and world are informational, not physical or non-physical.

I'm only mentioning the two a) to try to give an idea of what I'm getting at, and b) because I don't know house many we know about. Spin and charm are two more I've heard of. — Patterner

Then we are not discussing property dualism, are we? We are discussing substance dualism.

I call these "physical" properties because they are studied and quantified by our sciences, and we call everything that we can study and quantify "physical". Hence physicalism. Things that cannot be studied and quantified, or even detected, are not physical. Terrence Deacon's absential features. — Patterner

This is circular. Does this mean that once we are able to properly study consciousness and quantify it, it becomes physical? It seems to me that what you are describing as physical and non-physical is not ontological, but epistemological, in that what is physical is dependent upon us following Galileo's recommendation that we measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so, not some inherent nature of matter.

Can you explain? I've been involved with someone on another site who says things like that. For example, "At the most micro-level you can imagine, matter does not seem to be anything other than information." I haven't gotten a real handle on the idea. — Patterner

Maybe you should try to explain to yourself what you mean by "matter". Is not matter really the interaction of smaller particles, which are themselves the interaction of ever smaller particles, all the way down? If all we ever get at is interactions when observing reality at deeper levels, then where exactly is the matter?

Then we are not discussing property dualism, are we? We are discussing substance dualism. — Harry Hindu

I don't think so. One substance (that which makes up the universe) has two kinds of properties (physical and experiential). If that's not property dualism, then what is?

Does this mean that once we are able to properly study consciousness and quantify it, it becomes physical? — Harry Hindu

If we ever come to study and quantify consciousness, then it will be revealed that it is a physical property, and I'm wrong.

Maybe you should try to explain to yourself what you mean by "matter". Is not matter really the interaction of smaller particles, which are themselves the interaction of ever smaller particles, all the way down? If all we ever get at is interactions when observing reality at deeper levels, then where exactly is the matter? — Harry Hindu

I define it as that which makes up the universe. I don't know if there is a bottom. Perhaps the vibrating strings of energy that some physicists speak of. In which case, it would seem the bottom of matter is energy. Are you saying this energy is more properly called information? I suspect that's not what you mean, but don't know what you do.

I don't think so. One substance (that which makes up the universe) has two kinds of properties (physical and experiential). If that's not property dualism, then what is? — Patterner

Because you're also talking about a multitude of properties (mass, charge, etc.), not just those two. You are positing property dualism by asserting that there is something special about two properties and all the rest are not special (You're essentially invoking a third property - "special", which is a mental projection). Why are just those two properties so special? If there are more than two properties then property dualism is inherently false.

If we ever come to study and quantify consciousness, then it will be revealed that it is a physical property, and I'm wrong. — Patterner

That's strange that you are asserting that you can study and quantify the world via your consciousness that cannot be studied and quantified. If you can't study or quantify the means by which the world is studied and quantified then what does that say about your actual understanding of the world? It's like you're saying you can measure the length of a stick without understanding how a ruler works.

I define it as that which makes up the universe. I don't know if there is a bottom. Perhaps the vibrating strings of energy that some physicists speak of. In which case, it would seem the bottom of matter is energy. Are you saying this energy is more properly called information? I suspect that's not what you mean, but don't know what you do. — Patterner

It does seem that energy is more fundamental than matter as energy seems more prevalent than matter as most of the universe is a vacuum (the absence of matter) yet EM energy permeates the vacuum. Matter appears to be something like energy feedback loops.

Because you're also talking about a multitude of properties (mass, charge, etc.), not just those two. You are positing property dualism by asserting that there is something special about two properties and all the rest are not special (You're essentially invoking a third property - "special", which is a mental projection). Why are just those two properties so special? If there are more than two properties then property dualism is inherently false. — Harry Hindu

I'm not talking about the number of properties. I'm talking about the number of kinds of properties. The ones we can detect, manipulate, and measure on the one hand, and the one we cannot on the other.

That's strange that you are asserting that you can study and quantify the world via your consciousness that cannot be studied and quantified. If you can't study or quantify the means by with the world is studied and quantified then what does that say about your actual understanding of the world? It's like you're saying you can measure the length of a stick without understanding how a ruler works. — Harry Hindu

I'm not saying we can study and quantify the world via our consciousness. Consciousness is our subjective experience of our studies and quantifications. (And our subjective experience of everything else we subjectively experience.)

It does seem that energy is more fundamental than matter as energy seems more prevalent than matter as most of the universe is a vacuum (the absence of matter) yet EM energy permeates the vacuum. Matter appears to be something like energy feedback loops. — Harry Hindu

Where are you saying information is?

I'm not talking about the number of properties. I'm talking about the number of kinds of properties. The ones we can detect, manipulate, and measure on the one hand, and the one we cannot on the other. — Patterner

In other words, substance dualism.
Googling "substance vs property dualism", the AI response is:
"Property dualism and substance dualism are two different views within the broader philosophical concept of dualism, which addresses the relationship between the mind and body. Property dualism suggests that while there is only one fundamental substance (typically physical), there are two kinds of properties: physical and mental. Substance dualism, on the other hand, argues that there are two distinct substances: a physical substance (like the body) and a non-physical substance (like the mind or soul). "
Since "physical" is used to describe both a kind of property and a kind of substance, I would need you to define what you mean by "physical" to understand what you are actually talking about. You mentioned that it comes down to being able to measure something or not, and I pointed out the problems with that in that it may turn out that the mind is measurable and you would be wrong as you admitted. There are also the plethora of issues QM brings along, like the measurement problem, Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, and observer effect.

You cannot simultaneously determine both the exact position and exact momentum of a particle with complete precision due to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Does this mean that one property becomes more non-physical while the other becomes more physical, and vice versa, depending on which one is being measured? This would mean that "physical" and "non-physical" are properties of the measurements themselves and not the actual things being measured or that there are multiple properties, like position and momentum, that can be either physical or non-physical depending upon its interaction with a measuring device.

The idea of property dualism labels both the substance and the property as "physical", which I find odd and would need further explanation from you and others more knowledgeable what that really means by defining "physical" in both terms of property and substance.

I'm not saying we can study and quantify the world via our consciousness. Consciousness is our subjective experience of our studies and quantifications. (And our subjective experience of everything else we subjectively experience.) — Patterner

We are only aware of the studies and quantifications by being conscious of them, which you are saying is subjective. It seems to me that consciousness can be both objective and subjective depending what parts of consciousness are involved in interpreting sensory data (if our emotions and value systems are involved that would make our interpretations more subjective and less objective.

Where are you saying information is? — Patterner

Everywhere causes leave effects.

The idea of property dualism labels both the substance and the property as "physical", which I find odd and would need further explanation from you and others more knowledgeable what that really means by defining "physical" in both terms of property and substance. — Harry Hindu

I know. It's ridiculous. I mean, even Google's AI couldn't find a word, as you quoted:

Property dualism suggests that while there is only one fundamental substance (typically physical), there are two kinds of properties: physical and mental.

That's obviously a problem. On the previous page, I wrote this:

"Matter" means "physical". And that's the only way people conceive of it. Largely because of Galileo's Error, and the spectacular success of our sciences. I think we should think of matter - of everything, everywhere - as both physical and conscious. From the ground up. Another word entirely would be good, since "matter" is so entrenched in our language. — Patterner

I guess the vast majority of people in the cultures from which English developed have always been either materialists or believers in a soul. If anyone ever coined a word that means That which the universe is made of, which has both experiential and physical properties, I guess they're weren't enough people using it for it to become widely known, asked a party of the language. But I would like to have such a word, so that, when I use iy, there would be no implication that I'm talking exclusively, or primarily, about the physical.

Maybe can get to sign on and coin the needed word. :grin:

We are only aware of the studies and quantifications by being conscious of them, which you are saying is subjective. — Harry Hindu

Yes, we are only aware of them (or anything) by being conscious of them. But can studies and quantifications take place without any awareness of them? We could program a robot to measure things, and store or write down the results. William Hertling wrote a series of sci-fi books about an AI. It was acting intelligently, including protecting itself from a guy who was emailing people about the danger it would come to present, before it became what is typically thought of as conscious.

It seems only logical that the world share more properties/structure of the mind than the way the mind models the world (which is really just part of the mind in the first place). This is not to say that idealism or panpsychism is the case. It is merely saying that the mind and world are informational, not physical or non-physical. — Harry Hindu

Are there any books that discuss this specific idea?

What is a physical structure and how exactly does that differ from a non-physical structure? How are mass and charge physical and not informational? What does QM say the mass and charge, and the particle they are associated with, are when not observing them? Is a wave function physical? Is the observer and the collapse of the wave function a physical interaction? — Harry Hindu

Those questions are not answerable - at least, there is no consensus view as to an answer. That is where you enter the field of interpretations of quantum physics, which baffles experts. I could state my view - I do have a view - but you will then easily find any number of examples which dispute it.

Suffice to say that I don’t believe the wavefunction is physical. It is a distribution of possibilities. The observation actualises a specific possibility. Prior to that actualisation, there is no definitely-existing ‘particle’. Atomic entities are nowadays thought of in terms of excitations in fields although what exactly fields are is an open question. In any case, I think the idea of particular atoms as being what the world is ‘made of’ is no longer tenable.

The idea of ‘mental substance’ is also problematical. (See this OP). I don’t believe that the mind or consciousness can be thought of as something objectively existent, or as any kind of ‘substance’ in the sense we usually use the word.

Are there any books that discuss this specific idea? — Patterner

A book I’ve found very useful is one I’ve already quoted, Mind and the Cosmic Order. The problem I’m finding with your posts, is that you agree with a whole bunch of contradictory propositions. Philosophy and clear thinking generally depends on the ability to make distinctions. Upthread, your model had difficulty even distinguishing the living from the dead. So until you get that sorted, I don’t know whether more reading is going to help.

Suffice to say that I don’t believe the wavefunction is physical. It is a distribution of possibilities. The observation actualises a specific possibility. Prior to that actualisation, there is no definitely-existing ‘particle’. Atomic entities are nowadays thought of in terms of excitations in fields although what exactly fields are is an open question. In any case, I think the idea of particular atoms as the being what the world is ‘made of’ is no longer tenable. — Wayfarer

How does the observer get actualized?

Is there one wavefunction for every particle? When observing multiple particles what determines which wavefunction actualizes which particle? When observing a macro-scaled object are we actualizing trillions of wavefunctions (one for every sub-atomic particle), or just one big one?

The idea of ‘mental substance’ is also problematical. (See this OP). I don’t believe that the mind or consciousness can be thought of as something objectively existent, or as any kind of ‘substance’ in the sense we usually use the word. — Wayfarer

I wouldn't call 'mental' a substance rather an arrangement of information, or an information process and is "objectively existent" (seems redundant) as anything else we talk about as the scribbles on this page would not objectively exist if not for the "objectively existent" ideas in our heads. For me, anything objective/existent is something that participates in causal relations.

Upthread, your model had difficulty even distinguishing the living from the dead. — Wayfarer

I said the particles in a dead body have the same properties as they had when the body was alive. That may be incorrect. But if so, I don't see how it's a contradiction. Can you explain?

Can you explain? — Patterner

Bodies and organisms comprise the same materials as inorganic matter, but there's obviously a profound difference in kind between them. As far as their chemical composition is concerned, they're the same, but the processes which characterise organic life have ceased to operate. And there are many specific types of molecules that are only found in the presence of organic life.

What I meant by contradictions - you said

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness. — Patterner

I then presented a passage from Thomas Nagel, which says:

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.

To which you responded, 'I agree' even though it clearly contradicts what you were arguing.

For me, anything objective/existent is something that participates in causal relations. — Harry Hindu

The point which that completely misses is the subjective nature of consciousness, which is not at all required or implied by calling it 'information'.

They seem to agree with Eagleman that acting on input is key. — Patterner

"Acting on input" is the wrong attitude, because we need to understand actions as prior to input. Notice the example, hitting the button is prior to the flash.

The problem I’m finding with your posts, is that you agree with a whole bunch of contradictory propositions. — Wayfarer

That's what I was pointing out, but Patterner quit talking to me.

Bodies and organisms comprise the same materials as inorganic matter, but there's obviously a profound difference in kind between them. As far as their chemical composition is concerned, they're the same, but the processes which characterise organic life have ceased to operate. And there are many specific types of molecules that are only found in the presence of organic life. — Wayfarer

Are those molecules instantly gone when the organism dies?

What I meant by contradictions - you said

Although wetness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of wetness.

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness.
— Patterner

I then presented a passage from Thomas Nagel, which says: — Wayfarer

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.

To which you responded, 'I agree' even though it clearly contradicts what you were arguing. — Wayfarer

The physical properties of particles cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances. Once they have combined in certain ways, into certain arrangements, the experiential property of particles - which was there from the beginning - causes the emergence of human consciousness.

Should I unpack that at all?

Should I unpack that at all? — Patterner

If you can't see the contradictions in what you're writing, there's no point in continuing.

I said the particles in a dead body have the same properties as they had when the body was alive. That may be incorrect. But if so, I don't see how it's a contradiction. Can you explain? — Patterner

The physical properties of particles cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances. Once they have combined in certain ways, into certain arrangements, the experiential property of particles - which was there from the beginning - causes the emergence of human consciousness. — Patterner

You've ignored this:

.

The corpse's particles all still have the same properties they had when the organism wads alive.
— Patterner

But apparently not the same relations with one another. — Janus

It seems reasonable to think that when an organism dies the ways in which the particles that constitute the body are combined change such that the capacity for experience departs. I think it's reasonable to say the capacity for those experience-enabling combinations exists in the natures of those particles. What reason would we have for claiming that experience or consciousness itself exists in the particles any more than we would say that of other emergent properties? You also ignored an earlier response:

What is the reason for thinking matter cannot subjectively experience at one level when we know it subjectively experiences at another level? Why is it deemed impossible at the micro when it is a fact (possibly the only undeniable fact) at the macro?
— Patterner

OK, so we know matter can experience, as we and the other animals are material beings and we know they and we experience things. Other emergent properties such as wetness, hardness and so on don't obtain at the level of fundamental particles because they are the result of interactions between particles, so why should we think the case is any different with experience or consciousness?

It's not a matter of saying that it is impossible that particles experience, but that we have no idea how it could be that they experience anything. In other words, we don't know what it could even mean to say that particles are conscious. We are satisfied with saying that particles have the potential, in their interactions with each other, for other emergent properties, so why not think the same for consciousness? — Janus

Why don't you try to address those objections?

For me, anything objective/existent is something that participates in causal relations.
— Harry Hindu

The point which that completely misses is the subjective nature of consciousness, which is not at all required or implied by calling it 'information'. — Wayfarer

You said something like this before in the thread which I called you out on and you failed to follow up. You seem to be saying that only others' consciousness have subjective natures as the nature of your consciousness does not miss the point. To even claim that others miss the point is to say that the point is objective which we are all missing but you are not. How is it that you are not missing some point if the nature of your consciousness is as subjective as everyone else?

Is the fact that you are conscious subjective, or the causal processes that make you conscious subjective? What exactly is the subjective nature of consciousness and how anyone of us can ever hope to get the point (objectivity) if the nature of consciousness is only subjective?

Isn't the "point of the article" the same as being "objective"? If there is a point to the article that one is not seeing, isn't that the same as saying the article can be assessed (seen) objectively which you have "seen" and the other has not "seen"? How can we hope to see the point of anything if all we have to go by is "subjective" experiences? It would seem that we have both subjective and objective experiences and the issue is trying to discern which is which. — Harry Hindu

What exactly is the subjective nature of consciousness and how anyone of us can ever hope to get the point (objectivity) if the nature of consciousness is only subjective? — Harry Hindu

This is central to 'facing up to the problem of consciousness' which has been discussed many times on this forum. The key paragraphs are:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of "consciousness", an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state. Sometimes terms such as "phenomenal consciousness" and "qualia" are also used here, but I find it more natural to speak of "conscious experience" or simply "experience".

So Chalmer's doesn't deny the efficacy of objective measurement with respect to ascertaining facts about cognitive systems. But, he's saying, the nature of experience is fundamentally first-person or subjective, and hence never captured by those objective descriptions.

On which basis, I would argue that primitive organisms are feasibly subjects of experience in a way that atomic particle cannot be.

This all seems interesting but you continually pull the rug out from under yourself every time you claim that consciousness is subjective while at the same time describing the ontological and objective nature of consciousnesses everywhere in the universe (not just yours). Is what you said subjective or objective? If it is subjective then I only missed YOUR point not THE point, and we can never hope to apprehend THE point because we are stuck in the subjective nature of our consciousness.

All these dualist terms - physical vs non-physical, direct vs indirect, objective vs subjective, etc, are the cause of the problem here in this type of discussion.

You don't explain how it is we get at the objective nature of things (scientific method) from our subjective standpoint. I don't expect you to as it would be as impossible as trying to describe how something comes from nothing or how the mental can influence the material and vice versa. That is what dualism does. It separates things into two opposing ideas that dualists then have the problem of trying to explain how they interact.

The idea that there is something it is like to be me seems to be an objective property, not a subjective one. It seems only logical that by body's senses would provide information about the world relative to my position in space-time, and not someone, or somewhere else's position in space-time. My experience is an objective representation of the world from my own position in space-time. It would only be subjective if I confused the experience as the world as a whole, or the world is located relative to my eyes. But this is not what I think. I know that there are parts of the world that I cannot experience but only because my senses have not accessed them.

All you can ever be sure of is the existence of your own mind. Your mind is part of the world, unless you are a solipsist which you would believe your mind and the world are the same. So it only seems logical that the world would be like the mind. When asking what it is like to be you, can you not also say that what it is like to be you is to be part of the world, and not the entire world?

The hard problem is the result of thinking the world is at it appears in your mind, rather than thinking that the way the world appears is actually a mental model of the world. Thinking that the world is full of solid static objects and then trying to reconcile that with the nature of the mind itself - the medium in which these models appear - it is no wonder philosophers of mind have a hard problem.

When observing someone's brain you are actually experiencing your minds mental model of their mind. There is no physical brain there. The world is not physical. While the model is not what is actually there, it is representative of what is actually there. By invoking our memories of prior experiences of prior models we can interact with the world in meaningful ways.

This also brings to mind the question of how brains are actualized to become observers themselves, but I digress. QM seems to imply that your brain is in a state if superposition and you only have a brain or don't have a brain only when someone opens your skull and looks inside.

We can access each others thoughts by reading the scribbles on this page. I doubt that you think that the scribbles on this page are the actual thoughts in all of our heads, rather they are representative of the thoughts in our heads, and allows you to apprehend what we are thinking. If we think that each of us are not just scribbles on this screen, but actual human beings that the scribbles partially represent, then why is it so hard to understand that the mind works a similar way?

Subjectivity is essentially making a category mistake in thinking that you experience the world and not a model, or representation of it, but as it really is, no different than thinking that the scribbles on this screen exhausts everything it means to be the person that wrote them.

If you can't see the contradictions in what you're writing, there's no point in continuing. — Wayfarer

I don't see how it is more of a contradiction than thinking that the properties of the molecules of paint that make it able to be spread on a fence, where it dries and hardens, protecting the wood, are not the same properties that make it white. Any manipulation or activity of one property does not necessarily have anything to do with another property in every instance.

There are two issues here.

First, the contradiction. You said:

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness — Patterner

I then presented a passage from Thomas Nagel, which says the opposite:

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.

To which you responded, 'I agree' - even though it contradicts what you had said. So you are agreeing with both 'X' and 'not X' which is a contradiction, and not the only one in this thread.

Second, the issue of the sameness or difference of dead and living organisms. That organisms and other objects comprise the same basic elements from the periodic table is not at issue. But there clearly is a difference between a live and a dead animal, and that difference is the point at issue. That difference cannot be described in terms of the characteristics of the individual molecules that comprise the corpse, but in terms of the absence of the activities which characterise living organisms. Those activities are cellular, bio-molecular, metabolic, endocrinal, and so forth - the intricacies of living organisms are quite unlike anything in inorganic nature. It is simply mistaken to say 'well it's all the same stuff.' It glosses over many fundamental and important distinctions that are crucial to both philosophy and science. There are volumes of literature debating all these issues but you have to be able to grasp basic distinctions before tackling them.

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The hard problem is the result of thinking the world is at it appears in your mind, rather than thinking that the way the world appears is actually a mental model of the world. — Harry Hindu

That is not a description of the hard problem of consciousness, as described by David Chalmer's Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. It is a description of your own idiosyncratic philosophy which contains too many sweeping statements and foundational claims to respond to.

First, the contradiction. You said:

Although human consciousness does not exist in microphysical particles, their properties cause them to combine in certain ways under certain circumstances, which cause the emergence of human consciousness
— Patterner

I then presented a passage from Thomas Nagel, which says the opposite:

It is not possible to derive the existence of consciousness from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.

To which you responded, 'I agree' - even though it contradicts what you had said. So you are agreeing with both 'X' and 'not X' which is a contradiction — Wayfarer

The idea that the physical properties of particles are why particles combine, but are not why certain groups of particles are conscious, is not a contradiction.

The idea that the subjective experience of particles is not why particles combine, but is why certain groups of particles have a group consciousness, is not a contradiction.

Now combining the two:

The physical properties of particles are why particles combine, and the subjective experience of particles is why certain groups of particles have a group consciousness.

There is no contradiction between the two parts of that sentence. And saying them is not saying, or even implying, the existence of consciousness is derived from the physical structure of the brain in the way in which it is possible to derive the transparency of glass from the molecular structure of silicon dioxide.


Regarding living and dead bodies, I'm aware of all that. I never said anything to the contrary. I didn't bring corpses into the conversation. When you did, I simply said the particles have the same properties. And they do. Same mass, same charm, same spin, etc. That doesn't mean I don't grasp basic distinctions. If you want to start a thread describing and defining life and all its activities, I bet it would be great.

The idea that the physical properties of particles are why particles combine, but are not why certain groups of particles are conscious, is not a contradiction. — Patterner

The contradiction was your agreement with two contradictory statements about the same matter. You agree with both X and Not-X. That's the contradiction.

The physical properties of particles are why particles combine, and the subjective experience of particles is why certain groups of particles have a group consciousness.

There is no contradiction between the two parts of that sentence. — Patterner

It doesn't need to be contradictory to be fallacious, and you've presented no argument, or any references, for why it should be considered true, beyond your belief that it must be the case. There is no evidence from you as to whether 'certain groups of particles' are conscious, or whether conscious organisms can be considered 'groups of particles'. And that really is the last thing I'm going to say in this thread.