What "makes us conscious" is the (rare) arrangements of our constituent "particles" into generative cognitive systems — 180 Proof
Those processes aren't in any individual particle at all. — flannel jesus
What property of matter is such that it spontaneously assembles itself into sentient life-forms. — Wayfarer
Red herring.spontaneously assembles itself — Wayfarer
What "makes us conscious" is the (rare) arrangements of our constituent "particles" into generative cognitive systems. — “180 Proof"
I don't think that's the right question. — flannel jesus
Why not? What’s the matter with the question? Surely it’s germane to the subject. — Wayfarer
I'm not sure it's established that there's anything "spontaneous" about it. And once you realize that, the rest of your question is just... chemistry. Literal chemistry. Like, if you want to understand how life forms came about from non life, that's a question for science, and you can take classes on chemistry, bio chemistry, maybe even early life chemistry. — flannel jesus
I’m asking, what causes that ‘rare arrangement’ — Wayfarer
At the micro level, matter has various physical properties. Mass, charge, spin, color, whatever else we're aware of. These properties determine how particles combine and interact, which determine the physical objects, energy fields, and everything else we see all around us, and their macro characteristics. — Patterner
The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.
We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.
However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. — Thomas Nagel, Core of Mind and Cosmos
You're not intelligent because of the properties alone of the chemicals in your body. You can't skip the middle step. You're intelligent because of the processes that that specific arrangement of chemicals allows to happen. And those processes AREN'T in all the particles. Those processes aren't in any individual particle at all. — flannel jesus
Right - so what is it a matter of? — Wayfarer
Well you skip the question about spontaneous generation of sentience, and just ask, why is it that this hunk of smushy pink wet matter has an experience? — flannel jesus
flannel jesus seems to want to say Patterner is claiming the opposite of what he has clearly said more than once, in order to weaken his position.Patterner seems to want to leap from low level properties to high level properties, that there's some direct correspondence there. The problem with that is, there's intermediate steps that are super important that get missed by that approach. — flannel jesus
But the properties of particles are, in conjunction with other factors, the reason groups off particles have the states they do under various conditions.
Where am I leaping? — Patterner
But the properties of particles are, in conjunction with other factors, the reason groups off particles have the states they do under various conditions.
Where am I leaping — Patterner
well if physicalism is true, then at what point does matter go from just matter to matter with experience?" — flannel jesus
Clearly, the objects of our fears and desires do not cause behavior in the same way that forces and energy cause behavior in the physical realm. When my desire for the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow causes me to go on a search, the (nonexistent) pot of gold is not a causal property of the sort that is involved in natural laws. (Pylyshyn 1984, p. xii) — Excerpt
You can have a whole neural complex and establish relationships between each neuron up to a very complex level, and yet you do not know whether you have constructed the experience. You can't even decompose an experience into neural processes. — JuanZu
Second, big things are made of little things. And the big things have the characteristics they have because of the properties of the little things. — Patterner
I agree. I used iron and water to show that, although macro physical characteristics are not identical to the properties of the particles that the macro object is composed of (which is a ridiculous notion), those macro characteristics are exactly as they are because of the micro properties. If the micro was different, the macro would be, also. It's impossible for things to be otherwise.In your example of iron, a path of decomposition, reduction and reconstruction is still possible. In these paths you find the parts that constitute the whole and with which you can reconstruct it. That does not happen with experience. You can have a whole neural complex and establish relationships between each neuron up to a very complex level, and yet you do not know whether you have constructed the experience. You can't even decompose an experience into neural processes. So the idea of composition and decomposition is not useful for understanding this matter of experience and physical matter. — JuanZu
Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this. It's solid form floats in its liquid form. Very unusual. And it's because of the ways the molecules are arranged in the two different forms. In this case, temperature is key.Participants in this thread have demonstrated two problems with this statement. First, a lot of the characteristics of the "big things" are due to the variety of different ways that the "little things" can be arranged, therefore many of the characteristics of the big things are not "because of the properties of the little things", they are bcause of the way that the little things are arranged. The next problem is the reason why the little things get arranged in the way that they do. This is the issue of causation, the arrangements are not random chance. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure. But do you think the emergent property of life would be the same as it is if carbon's properties were other than they are?Also you have to take into account emergent properties. That is the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Though a cat is made up of carbon it is not identical to it as it now has a function such as life. — kindred
Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this. — Patterner
H2O's macro physical characteristics, under any conditions, are explained by how's it's micro physical properties behave under those conditions. Every physicist, website, and book that explains its characteristics, under any conditions, including why ice floats on water, will say the same. It's because of the properties of its molecules, like its weak hydrogen bonds, and the angle of the arrangement of its atoms in the molecules. These things, in turn, due to the nature of electron shells.Of course. I used H2O to illustrate this.
— Patterner
So, you're disproving what you are asserting? — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm thinking otherwise. Let's take the world's best AI. We have conversations with AI. It gives us very good information. In speed and multitasking, it surpasses us. But, despite it's capabilities, it is not conscious. So there can be intelligence on par with ours, in at least some ways, without consciousness.An intrinsic aspect of consciousness – at the very least as we humans experience it – is that faculty of understanding via which information becomes comprehensible. It is not that which is understood, like a concept, but instead that which understands. And can be deemed a synonym for the intellect, that to which things are intelligible. This faculty of consciousness, the intellect, — javra
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