But it's also predictive. — Wayfarer

Yes, we can assume that the mathematical and logical laws will be valid forever, so we can use them in our prediction models. But that's just the skeleton. The flesh comes from the values that you feed into the formula, and these values may be wrong or variable or not relevant at all. We can't know for sure if the values are accurate.

We can't know for sure if the values are accurate. — Quk

We can for practical purposes. Agree that numerical values don’t describe or capture everything but that they’re obviously effective within specific ranges of application.

If every possibility is compatible with PSR, then PSR is methodologically useless. — Banno

Being that the PSR is categorized as a first principle of metaphysics, it's expected that it should cover everything in reality, actual and possible. But I don't see why that would make it useless. Let's compare it with the laws of logic. Being that logic is also a first principle of metaphysics, it also covers everything in reality, i.e., nothing can break logic. Yet, applying the laws of logic is not useless.

WHat you are saying is that whatever occurs, there must be a reason, even if we don't know what that reason is and don't have any evidence or justification to claim there is such a reason. — Banno

Correct. Reality exists even if we don't know the specific about it. But we can often find the specific reasons or explanations. That's the job of abductive reasoning: inference to the best explanation. We would not start looking for explanations if we did not believe that explanations existed.

Further, as pointed out above, physicist do not look for, nor expect to find, any cause for such results. They are not needed; and physics does not fail as a result of this failure of PSR. — Banno

That's fine; that doesn't make the principle false.

PSR is not needed, and indeed not useful. — Banno

The PSR can be useful. Among other things, it can be used to draw conclusions about intelligent design as per the OP.

For practical purposes, yes. As long as the prediction algorithm works within a tolerance useable for our purposes, I call it a robust thesis. I just speak of "robustness" instead of "truth".

The PSR can be useful. Among other things, it can be used to draw conclusions about intelligent design as per the OP. — A Christian Philosophy

Who designed the intelligent designer?

Who designed the designer of the intelligent designer?

Here's a simple example. Data: A thing looks like a duck and sounds like a duck. We posit two explanations. Explanation 1: It's a duck. Explanation 2: It's the DH disguised as a duck. Both explanations account for all the data, but Explanation 1 is more reasonable because all the data supports the claim that it's a duck and none of the data supports the claim that it's a hippopotamus or divine. The DH explanation is therefore superfluous. — A Christian Philosophy

According to whom and by what standard? — tim wood

According to Occam's Razor, or the principle of parsimony, or abductive reasoning, or even the duck test. I can understand that you do not accept the PSR, but do you honestly deny all of these other standards?

Infinite regress is avoided if the first cause has inherent existence. In this case, its existence is explained internally (reason type 3). — A Christian Philosophy

This is called Deux ex machina. As argument it won't do, as being essentially a kind of begging the question. — tim wood

Why do you say that positing a first cause with inherent existence begs the question? It is not arbitrary if it is derived from the PSR and avoids infinite regress.

Let's take a step back. Purely physical things have only 3 components: matter, energy, and the arrangement of matter. When we speak on man-made things, we really refer only to the arrangement of matter since man did not create the raw matter or energy.

With that, when we say that man creates scissors, we mean that man creates the specific shape of scissors which is designed to cut paper. Even when scissors are used for another purpose, say as a door holder, it retains its shape which is designed to cut paper.

I claim that it is an argument against intelligent design. — JuanZu

Even if I were to agree that the scissors lose their identity of scissors as soon as they are used for another purpose, it does not change the fact that were created from intelligent design in the first place.

Who designed the intelligent designer?
Who designed the designer of the intelligent designer? — Quk

You are asking how to solve the problem of infinite regress. Infinite regress is avoided if we posit that the first cause has inherent existence. In which case, the reason or explanation for the existence of the first cause is an internal one (type 3): The statement "the first cause which has inherent existence exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true. And no prior cause is needed to fulfill the PSR.

I don't think "intelligent" design is even a correct saying to even get at a notion of God creating something (at least in so far as the etymology of intelligent). Intelligent design really just means something that understands it's own (idiocy) to the point it follows its own instructions.

Which doesn't exactly get at the notion of God.

The statement "the first cause which has inherent existence exists" is a tautology and is therefore necessarily true. And no prior cause is needed to fulfill the PSR. — A Christian Philosophy

Good. So incausality is possible. Next question: Why should the first cause, of all possibilities, be a god and not the universe itself or chaos itself or any other fluctuation itself? There's no reason to assign this very first function to a god, in my opinion, unless it makes the believer happier.

I'm an agnostic atheist. I'm not an atheistic missionary; everyone should be happy with their personal religion. I just see a problem when someone confuses belief with science. The attempt to prove the existence of god is not a belief and not a religion. The attempt is literally hopeless: It's no hope per se, nor will the attempt be successful. See Münchhausen trilemma. If you need a proof, you don't believe in god.

If we accept the scissors argument, we accept the idea of a universe that is out of the hands of a supposed creator and designer. In other words, God has not foreseen the evolution of the universe. And if this is so then why maintain the idea of a Great Designer? It is like saying that the designer is not such a designer and God who foresees everything does not foresee too much. Do you understand my point?

Why do you say that positing a first cause with inherent existence begs the question? It is not arbitrary if it is derived from the PSR and avoids infinite regress. — A Christian Philosophy

On the assumption you buy your own argument as valid - not a good look for you - what, exactly, do you think you've proved?

Again, your claim is that whatever occurs, there must be a reason, even if we don't know what that reason is, and don't have any evidence or justification to claim there is such a reason.

That is a bland, unjustified assertion.

Further, it is not a law of logic nor of rationality, and so we are not under any obligation to accept it. There are incidents for which it is reasonably and rationally supposed that there is not reason. Sometimes things just happen.

You have not given sufficient reason for us to accept he principle of sufficient reason.

The supposed principle is let down by three ambiguities. "What is it that it seeks to explain?" "What counts as sufficient?" And "What counts as a reason?".

, the supposed principle of sufficient reason is not a principle of logic.

The supposed principle is let down by three ambiguities. "What is it that it seeks to explain?" "What counts as sufficient?" And "What counts as a reason?". — Banno

A reason is an “aitia”: an account of why, irrespective of the type of account it would be: e.g., causal, teleological, constitutional, or else formal. More technically, one could also address a reason as an account of what determinants (again, irrespective of type, as per the aforementioned examples) in part or in whole determined that addressed – thereby being the reason for the presence or occurrence or being of that addressed.

What is sought to be explained is whatever exists, in particular or in general, in the abstract or in the concrete – this in the present, in the past, in the future, or else atemporally (with natural laws being a possible example of the latter type of existence, this if they indeed never change throughout all of time (not my own point of view but all the same)).

“Sufficient” specifies the following when it comes to causes:

Sufficient causes
If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the prior occurrence of x.[20] — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Necessary_and_sufficient_causes

... here, replace "cause" with "reason" and remove the implied necessity that the determinant precedes that which it determines (this not being the case for final causes, material causes, or formal causes). The meaning of "sufficient" will then remain the same for the context of "sufficient reason".

If the PSR does not apply, then at least some occurrences can occur and cease occurring in manners utterly devoid of any conceivable determinants – this irrespective of appearances and beliefs to the contrary, for the latter too could of themselves then be events that hold no conceivable determinants for being or ceasing to be. If this were to in fact be the case, then, quite rationally, the only cogent conclusion is that all epistemology would eventually implode when analyzed: There would then be no means of establishing what, if anything, occurs via some determinants rather than occurring in manners that are utterly “magical” - to use the pejorative meaning of the word. No justification would then rationally hold any water or carry any weight – for that which constitutes the justification could itself in fact be devoid of any substance and, hence, not capable of justifying anything. There could then be no declarative truth, which relies upon justifiability. And there could then be no grounded knowledge or understanding of any sort regarding reality or any aspect of it.

If the PSR does apply, then epistemologies can hold, and thereby knowledge and understanding of what is in fact real and what is not. As too can tychism then cogently hold: the randomness of some events too here will have their reasons, i.e. explanations: for one relatively easy to express example of this, the degree of randomness, if any, in a soccer game’s outcome will be determined by the skill of the respective team members of each team, with each team’s actions being of itself in large part teleologically determined by the final cause – here, more specifically, aim – of winning the addressed game.

To chose against the PSR is to shoot oneself in the foot in terms of reasoning, philosophy, knowledge, and the like. Or, at best, is to revert to a literal interpretation of "it is so because I so state it is" - which is not any better.

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That offered, the PSR says nothing about there needing to be a first cause to all that is – existence could just as conceivably be devoid of any ascertainable beginning, with our current physical universe being only the latest iteration an any number of prior Big Bounces or the like – to not even start on the PSR saying nothing about the notion of a grand omni-this-and-that “designer” deity.

If this were to in fact be the case, then, quite rationally, the only cogent conclusion is that all epistemology would eventually implode when analyzed: — javra

Why?

The movement of an electron to the right instead of to the left is inexplicable, and yet the world has not ended, explanations have not collapsed.

You seem to think that one absent reason implies that there can be no reasons at all. Why? Prima facie that just does not follow.

Why? — Banno

This very question - the act of asking and expecting a cogent answer or else refusing the offered premise - entails and screams out the underlying presumption of the PSR. Else, there'd be no reason to ask.

The movement of an electron to the right instead of to the left is inexplicable, and yet the world has not ended, explanations have not collapsed.

You seem to think that one absent reason implies that there can be no reasons at all. Why? Prima facie that just does not follow. — Banno

What I've done is provide a reason for the Principle at hand, and not purport to thereby know the reasons for each and every last occurrence that is, has been, or will be. An extremely major difference in scope.

In sum of what ought to not be so readily overlooked, in theoretical principle only, if so much as one occurrence can occur and/or cease occurring in manners devoid of any determinants and hence reasons, then:

• By what means can you conclude that the occurrence or disappearance of anything whatsoever is not in fact the same feat of pure nonsense (here, "pure nonsense" being shorthand for an event that holds no determinants, and hence reasons for occurring, whatsoever)?

We might quite happily ask for and even look for a reason, all the while there not being any. There is simply no guarantee that there must be a reason.

Indeed, that seems to be what is the case.

↪javra
rubbish. — Banno

Is what your reply is. You all of a sudden conflate ontology and epistemology as thought there would be no difference whatsoever between them. And then, instead of giving a reasoned answer to the question placed, reply with what essentially equates to an emotivist "boo".

Yea, rubbish. (I can be emotive too, don't you know.)

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Saying this at large and not to Banno:

If not yet amply clear, the Principle of Sufficient Reason no more entails the necessitarianism of causal determinism than it does there being a "first cause" - which is nil. This as per the previously mentioned example of how tychism (i.e., ontic randomness) in a game of soccer can well occur within a cosmos wherein the PSR applies - as it only can for those who maintain any coherent form of rationality.

no one has provided a reason to think that everything has a reason….


Show me to be mistaken. Set out why every whatever must have a reason.

After all, there must be a reason…

no one has provided a reason to think that everything has a reason….


Show me to be mistaken. Set out why every whatever must have a reason.

After all, there must be a reason… — Banno

This, its now worse than rubbish, its bullshit.

Reason provided here.

Unanswered question to justify the point is as follows:

In sum of what ought to not be so readily overlooked, in theoretical principle only, if so much as one occurrence can occur and/or cease occurring in manners devoid of any determinants and hence reasons, then:

By what means can you conclude that the occurrence or disappearance of anything whatsoever is not in fact the same feat of pure nonsense (here, "pure nonsense" being shorthand for an event that holds no determinants, and hence reasons for occurring, whatsoever)? — javra

I can't, and won't, spoon feed you any more than this. Thinking is sometimes far easier said than done.

you’ve simply restated that everything must have a reason.

So your entire argument is that everything has a reason because everything has a reason.

Meh. Silly stuff.

Meh. Silly stuff. — Banno

I'll ... um ... endeavor to more strictly communicate which those who are reason-able and thereby give importance to rational thought, this from here on out. Good day, Banno.

To be sure, you are quite welcome to look for or make up a reason for any particular you like. Go for it.

It’s just hot air.

So in a trivial sense, for any whatever, you can make up some story and call that the sufficient reason for that whatever.


But that’s pretty uninteresting.


And I suspect it will not be enough for our Christian friend.

you do not have to answer me.


And when you do not have an answer, that is probably a good idea.

the supposed principle of sufficient reason is not a principle of logic. — Banno

I quite agree, but surely it is relevant. It provides, if you like, the nexus between logic and observation. It provides a way to integrate the principles of logic with empirical observation. Aside from that, I agree with @javra.

I think there are two kinds of why-questions:

Why does ...?
Why should ...?

"Why-does" implies a reason or cause.
"Why-should" doesn't imply a reason or cause.

Therefore, it's not paradox if a PSR-denier asks a "why should" question.

were you to say that things might have a reason, I would agree.

But that is not what is being claimed.

Here’s a simple question: why must everything have an explanation? Why can’t some things simply be the case?

Here's another suggestion regarding two categories: This time with two kinds of mindsets.

Hypothesis: "All random events so far were not really random but triggered by a hidden, deterministic program."

Mindset 1 says: This hypothesis must be true.
Mindset 2 says: This hypothesis may be true.

The difference between the two mindsets is this:
Mindset 1 needs the PSR and is thusly caught in the infinite regress which contradicts with the idea of a "first cause".
Mindset 2 needs no PSR; hence it's nonparadoxical and open in all directions.

Therefore:
Mindset 1 is erroneous due to its self-contradiction ("infinite regress" versus "first cause").
Mindset 2 is error-free because it doesn't claim a "first cause" nor an infinite regress; mindset 2 allows the possibility of either or neither, but not necessarily both at the same time.