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I admit I have a bit of trouble understanding your comment. Perhaps the following example will help, and hopefully, you can build on it if it does not address your objection.

Consider a paper cutter. It's a man-made device designed for the purpose of cutting paper (its final cause). That is the reason why we brought it into existence. Suppose that, over the years, through wear and tear, the device is no longer able to cut paper. At that point, it is no longer correct to identify it as a paper cutter. It is now junk or recycling material. Thus, the existence of a thing as a paper cut is determined by its function which is the ability to cut paper.

Assume and presuppose, and neglect the fact that the thing thereby created is your own invention — tim wood

If you invented the law of the excluded middle, then all I can say is you haven't received the recognition you so plainly deserve.

things happen for a reason’ might be comforting, but need not be accurate. — Banno

For what reason would you say that?

When a technological apparatus works, it does so to the extent that we have expectations, but the technological apparatus can always fail. The question is: Where is the intention and the final cause in the technological apparatus that works differently from our expectations? If everything has a reason it should also have a reason for failure too, and we would have to say that we also intended it to fail. — JuanZu

Not at all. We regularly distinguish between success and failure precisely because we know what the intention was. If a machine fails to perform its intended function, we don’t say “there was no reason”; we say it didn't work as intended.

In fact, your very example relies on final causality: you speak of expectations, failures, and introducing intentions—all of which presuppose directedness or purpose. If final causes were truly arbitrary or non-existent, those distinctions wouldn’t make any sense. They only make sense against a posited outcome which they have (or haven't) achieved.

For what reason would you say that? — Wayfarer

Is it realy necessary to point out the difference between "There might be a reason" and "There must be a reason"?

PSR says the latter. That's another step too far...

Just a point about where I'm coming from. The law of gravity, sure, a mighty fine and useful law, and one of some we even depend on. But a reason? And to be sure, nothing falls, ever. Things follow geodesics in a curved space-time. The reason, then, or law if you will, is nothing but an idea - some ideas better than others, but just ideas. And ideas come into fashion and go out of fashion, usually slowly. And this all goes back to hinge propositions aka absolute presuppositions. — tim wood

Yep.

Ok lets talk about scissors.

What I'm saying is actually quite simple. Think of other uses we can put those scissors to - which indeed it has. Those different uses are part of its existence and being. So linking a specific intention to its being is arbitrary. In this case, existence surpasses intention. It does not matter if when you created the scissors you were thinking of a purpose, what matters is also the becoming of the scissors that you were not thinking of, that is, not a purpose. In this sense the existence and being of the scissors surpasses the final cause that supposedly gave rise to it.

If you give an alien a pair of scissors, he might not know what to do with them. Or it could be that it would give them an extraordinary and different use than the great creator of the scissors. That is something that cannot be denied. The being and existence of the scissors surpasses purposes and final causes. So, literally, when we create scissors, we do not know what we create and the supposed main reason for the great creation of the scissors does not saturate the becoming of the scissors.

Is it realy necessary to point out the difference between "There might be a reason" and "There must be a reason"? — Banno

Something only reason could differentiate.

But scissors only have extrinsic causes whereas life is self-organizing, it has intrinsic reason

intrinsic reason — Wayfarer

Well, that's a concept. But I'm afraid experience contradicts it. We can give many uses to a scissors, why discriminate between one and another more than by an anthropomorphism?

Anyway I claim that scissors are more than scissors. And this "more" has to be explained, but it cannot be explained by the purpose.

We can give many uses to a scissors, why discriminate between one and another more than by an anthropomorphism? — JuanZu

There’s an objective distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic causation. Organisms are self-organizing and perpetuating in a way that artifacts are not. It’s an Aristotelian principle.

So you are not talking about scissors determined by the external agent, the great creator of scissors. You are talking about self-organizing systems. Is the universe a self-organizing system? But that excludes God, as the external cause of the organized being of the universe. So what is your point?

I can see your point about the definition of scissors in terms of their use - it is true that artifacts can be defined in those terms. But as far as that being an analogy or argument for a 'divine creator', that was not the point. (Besides, there are naturalistic philosophies of biology like Terrence Deacon's which extend naturalism to include 'ententionality' which takes a broader view of intentionality beyond what is simply consciously intended.)

But in any case the distinction between the intrinsic principles of living organisms and the extrinsic principles of designed artifacts nevertheless points to a real ontological distinction.

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You appear to want or need something both separate and that is absolute, and universally and necessarily so. — tim wood

It's not a matter of what I want. There is such a thing as logical necessity, and not as a matter of belief. If you don't accept the facts of logic, then you have no basis on which to argue.

It's not a matter of what I want. — Wayfarer

Seems to be just that. The belief that there must be a reason for each thing is wishful thinking on your part.

At least part of 's point is the opacity of intent. The intent with which the scissors are made is not a part of

There’s an objective distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic causation. Organisms are self-organizing and perpetuating in a way that artifacts are not. It’s an Aristotelian principle. — Wayfarer

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The belief that there must be a reason for each thing is wishful thinking on your part. — Banno

You’ll need to justify that. The Principle of Sufficient Reason doesn’t mandate complete determinism: there’s room within it for hazard and chance. PSR is a principle of intelligibility, not of mechanical causation. That things are explainable doesn’t mean they’re determined by prior causes in a strict mechanistic sense. For instance, in quantum mechanics, the outcome of a specific measurement may not be predetermined, but the probability distribution within which it falls is governed by well-defined laws—such as the Born Rule.

But if the idea that things—circumstances, happenings, events—occur for a reason is denied altogether, doesn’t that open the door to relativism, which our friend @tim wood seems to be gesturing toward? That facts are merely a matter of personal predilection?

You’ll need to justify that. — Wayfarer

No, I don't. That's the point. Justification ends wherever we want. If you need a stronger account of that, see the various discussions concerning hinge propositions, status functions, haunted universe doctrines and so on. These are very far from relativise ideas.

But as far as that being an analogy or argument for a 'divine creator', that was not the point. — Wayfarer

I claim that it is an argument against intelligent design. We can talk about the creator of the scissors or the creator of the universe. In both cases the becoming outweighs the intention or purpose. And the example of the scissors is important because it refers to the only case where purpose and intention seem to be present and can function as evidence for understanding intelligent design. That is, human action. And I say "seems" because in reality intention and purpose are not really able to saturate the being and existence of things created by man. Or created by God, as its first analogy. We can speak of scissors as of laws of nature, there is no distinction.

No, I don't. That's the point. Justification ends wherever we want. If you need a stronger account of that, see the various discussions concerning hinge propositions, status functions, haunted universe doctrines and so on. These are very far from relativise ideas. — Banno

But by saying 'justification ends wherever we want', you're explicitly relativising it. And hand-waving to boot. You’re making a claim about justification, while denying the need to justify it.

again, it’s not that there are no justifications, but that they are not necessary. It’s perfectly Acceptable that somethings are just the case.

A very large part of this disagreement is that the idea of justification is so ambiguous

A very large part of this disagreement is that the idea of justification is so ambiguous — Banno

Or being obfuscated by you, more likely.

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It's time to lay out and lay bare what a reason is. Written down, it's an archive of an utterance, the utterance being an acceptable and presumably accepted account of some occurrence. As such, as accepted, there is nothing about it that says it's true. "True" not even well-defined in this context. What matters is only that it is accepted. — tim wood

Isn’t that just simple relativism? If reasons are nothing more than accepted utterances, and truth has no role except as a vague "sense," then there’s no fact of the matter—only what people happen to accept. But if that’s the case, what’s the point of argument at all? On that view, argument becomes persuasion, not inquiry—and justification collapses into convention. That’s not just deflationary; it prescinds all rational argument.

It's time to lay out and lay bare what a reason is. — tim wood

Isn't a reason the connection between cause and effect? ('Ah, I can see why that is so!') Isn't the role of reason to discern such connections, and the progress of reason the continual enlargement of the scope of those connections? If it is not, do you have an alternative definition?

If there is an almighty god, what is the reason, explanation, ground for his existence or occurrence?

Who designed god?

Who designed the designer of god?

Isn't a reason the connection between cause and effect? — Wayfarer

I'd say reason is a logical, timeless context; for example: The sum of all angles within a triangle is always 180 degrees. There is a reason that the value is always 180. But the triangle doesn't "cause" this value; the value is not an "effect". The time dimension has nothing to do with that logical context.

Cause and effect, on the other hand, require a time axis. A cause is an event in time, and the effect is an event as well. A cause always happens before the event.

The triangle is not an event. And the value 180 is not an event either. Geometry contains reasons. Causality contains events.

You probably knew this already and I was just misunderstanding your questions. I'm posting my reply anyway, just to be on the safe side, hehe ...

A good point—you’re drawing attention to the distinction between logical necessity and physical causation. Many will say these are separate domains. But the modern scientific method, since Galileo, presumes—and indeed demonstrates—that physical phenomena behave in mathematically describable ways. This operationally bridges logical structure and physical observation. But it doesn’t explain why the fundamental laws of nature themselves are orderly, rational, or intelligible. And that, in turn, is precisely why arguments like the one given in the OP remain live philosophical options.

that physical phenomena behave in mathematically describable ways — Wayfarer

I agree with that statement, but I disagree with your conclusion. I think a mathematical description is just that: a description; the description itself is not the described physical phenomenon itself. The symbolic description "3 apples" are not the three physical apples themselves. When a fourth physical apple occurs, the description "3 apples" won't be updated automatically. Vice versa, when I write "4 apples", those three physical apples remain just three. I can't see any bridge here. Besides, being a fallibilist, I doubt that inductive descriptions (theses) about empirical observations are necessarily true. They may be wrong. I can't be sure if all swans are white. I haven't seen other places yet, and I can't predict the future. Einsteins's descriptions showed that Newton's description was inaccurate.

It's time to lay out and lay bare what a reason is. — tim wood

I'm hungry. This box contains an apple, that second box is empty. As I'm hungry, I have a good reason to take the first box. That's a reason.

(This example doesn't show any "cause and effect"; it's not a "when"-event. It's an "if"-reason.)

. I think a mathematical description is just that: a description; — Quk

But it's also predictive. Mathematical modelling has enabled the discovery of many phenomena which otherwise could have been known at all. The history of modern science is evidence of that.

being a fallibilist, I doubt that inductive descriptions (theses) about empirical observations are necessarily true. — Quk

That was the subject of 'Kant's answer to Hume'. Too big a digression to pursue here.